Not with the airshow.

Sorry, couldn’t resist :p

May I be the first to start the rumours that the Spruce Goose, ‘Just Jane’ and the Roswell UFO will all be on the display schedule?

Yes the project is a bit off in places but anyone who is prepared for a bit more cosmetic surgery should put it right.I,m waiting for someone game enough to try a Spiteful.:D Who Dares ,Wins…

And a Firebrand TFII perhaps?

However all the above was realy the problem, frankly most of these requirements were rather extravagant, and the P.1121 could have filled most of the RAF’s combat aircraft needs. Sandys review may have been excessive but it was certainly partially neccesary, the level of spending the British government was doing on defence was simply unsustainable.

I agree. Some weeding was definitely needed, the problem was that Sandys review went way too far and destroyed a lot of capability in the UK aviation industry that could never be regained. Part of the problem was the government not being able to decide what it wanted. There was limited scope so that produced pressure for ‘all singing-all dancing’ solutions which became way too complicated and expensive and consequently were cancelled. I agree about the P.1121 but the extent to which the powers-that-be ignored this potentially very capable aircraft bordered on the perverse. Equally, a mildly developed Fairey Delta 2 could have made an excellent lightweight interceptor and export fighter. Not taking this design forward was a huge missed opportunity.

The RAF didn’t know what it wanted either and hedged its bets at every available opportunity. It pushed the Javelin when the Sea Vixen was more capable and less troubled, turned its nose up at the Buccaneer then ended up using them from the late 60s to the mid 90s, and wasted time with the Swift when the superlative interceptor of the age (Hunter) was just round the corner. No wonder everything imploded.

There are pictures of all the entrants in Bill Gunston’s ‘Secret Projects: Fighters’ book. In addition to the aircraft mentioned are the second Fairey offering (a smaller and more practical design drawing heavily on the Fairey Delta 2 research aircraft and would have been like a big Mirage III) and the de Havilland DH117 (imagine a stretched F-4 with F-104 style wings).

The EE design was visually similar to the smaller Lightning, but with a side-by-side two seat cockpit, mainwheels retracting into the fuselage and an area-rule bulge aft of the wings.

In hindsight, the requirement was asking too much. Even if Sandys hadn’t decided that manned aircraft were soooo 1956, I find it hard to believe any of these aircraft would have made it to production – the sensible ones (smaller Fairey, English Electric, de Havilland) were ruled out at an early stage in favour of the enormous Fairey and AW offerings. The Fairey wouldn’t have been all that much smaller than a Vulcan.

Addition: the picture shown in the link is actually the smaller Fairey design with a single Gyron or RB122 turbojet and rocket supplement, not the Fairey Delta 3. This would have looked similar but been rather bigger, and was projected to have two de Havilland Gyron engines. It would have been huge – the designer remarked once that the fuselage cross section would have been about the same as a double decker bus!

The reason for Fairey offering two alternatives, and the general difference in capabilities, was that F155T specified somewhat unrealistic delivery dates considering what was being asked (Mach 3, collision course intercept of a supersonic target at very high altitude etc.) so some companies (DH, EE, Hawker) chose to offer designs that could meet the delivery date with possible upgrades afterwards. The Air Ministry gave this rather short shrift and quickly weeded out the less… well, ‘Dan Dare’ options. Hawker’s offering suffered from being designed as an aircraft, not a ‘weapons system’, i.e. integrated airframe/avionics/weapon guidance etc etc.

The main weapon considered for the spec was the Red Hebe, a missile under development by Vickers, which was cancelled by dint of being too big and complex.

History tends to show that the potential success of ship-based anti-aircraft systems is generally overrated, and the best thing for shooting down an aircraft (or keeping it away from your ships) is another aircraft. The reported attitude of ship captains and their perceptions of the level of success they could expect from their AA systems at the Falklands was comparable to the beginning of the Second World War (High angle MkXII 5″ and 12pdr pom-poms? Nothing could live through a barrage of that, surely?). It’s easy to suggest that if this or that had been available losses would have been mitigated, but in my opinion, what the task force needed was AEW as opposed to ‘picket ships’ and more aircraft on CAP.

Yep – that about sums it up – they were crap!

The NF3 was in service for less than a year – which is interesting, as the FAA operated the Sea Venom for much longer, and it was fundamentally the same aeroplane.

The Swedish operated a number of updated NF2’s (built for them), which were later converted to target tugs. Two survive – SE-DCA, and SE-DCD

Bruce

There are also many more Sea Venoms still in existence according to Barry Jones’ DH Twin Boom Fighters book. Having said that, according to said book there are more Night Fighter Venoms in the UK (three) than FB models (two) although there are a number of export and licence built models overseas.

I suspect the reason Sea Venoms were in service for longer had to do with lack of available replacements – Javelins were available to RAF squadrons from 1957 I believe, whereas the RN had to wait until 1959-1960 for Sea Vixens. (The RN fiddled about with the DH116 Avon engined swept wing ‘Super Venom’ before deciding the Sea Vixen was the better option).

I suppose what I’m reacting to in what might seem a nigglingly pedantic way is a degree of hyperbole, of OTT praise, for the White book, that suggests it offers a “corrective” to e.g. Sharkey Ward. But I’ll read it, together with the Martin Middlebrook book about which I was reminded by Creaking Door.

Not a corrective, merely an alternative – I suspect both are polarised views. But anecdotally, everyone I know who has read the White book raves about it. Not necessarily a reflection on its accuracy or worthiness, just that it’s a darn good read.

I hope that doesn’t apply to me: as a long-time devotee of the RAF I’m ready to be persuaded that Black Buck was an enormous success; but rather than preconceptions (which I disdain) or high quality arguments (which in a court of law can be used to ill effect as readily as the other way) I’m just curious about the evidence available. In reading White’s book, I hope I’ll find the sort of objective presentation of evidence that one can respect. Perhaps even some facts new to me. Call me cynical, but I’m just not holding my breath.
Regards, hps

No, not really, only in so much as it applies to anyone, we can never be entirely free of preconceptions and my hat is off to anyone who even tries to stand outside them. I’m a long-time FAA buff and I’m deeply proud of the achievements of the SHAR squadrons in the Falklands (and extremely critical of the RAF lobbying to stunt the FAA in the 1960s and 70s) but Black Buck has always inspired me as well. I’m inclined to think that one very large crater in an important runway should not be underestimated as an outcome of a very expensive, complex and risky mission. The Dams raid has been criticised for ‘only’ knocking out the Ruhr facilities for six weeks. I say six weeks of inactivity at the height of a war in a country’s industrial heartland is a hell of a thing to achieve… but I digress. Some perspective, please. White’s book is not scholarly, but it records the views of a large number of people involved in and affected by Black Buck (including people who were on the Falklands at the time).