John KMore sites relating to the offer of Ark to the RAN
Aircraft Carrier NameWhile it too mentions that Ark was “Reportedly offered”, I can honestly remember that she was, I remember the news papers at the time and how PM Frazer was delighted to have accepted the offer. The deal stagnated over price and time of delivery- HMAS Melbourne couldn’t undergo any further refits or modernisations due to the extreme age of not only the vessel but of it’s componants, besides the Skyhawks were seen as Lacking in terms of fleet defence compared to it’s contemporaries.
But bottom line- I remember Ark being offered to us
Again, as you say, that site only says “reportedly”, so it may or may not have been. Talks may well have taken place, but the fact is that Invincible was formally offered for sale, and Britain broke the deal after the Falklands. Invincible was going to be renamed HMAS Australia I believe.
John KArk was offered first because she was still being built and as such was deemed to offer easier modifications to our needs at the construction level, also having been deemed unwarrented for the RN as the Two other vessels were seen by the bean counters to be sufficient for the needs of the time. Vince was offered later because of problems with construction and time frame for hand over- the RAN wanted it there and then!
Wiki’s speal on Ark which gives mention to her sale to the RAN
Didn’t you ever wonder why Ark differed in key areas from her two sister ships?
Wikipedia says the Ark was “reportedly” offered to Australia, so it’s hardly proof. It is a fact though that the cretin Nott offered Invincible, for £175 million if I recall. I assumed the Ark differed from Invincible and Illustrious because she able to take advantage of their operating experience in the Falklands and elsewhere.
I must say that if Australia had been serious about keeping naval aviation, it was open to them to order their own Invincible class ship, or even a Principe de Asturias, there was no need to bin off naval aviation just because the sale of Invincible was cancelled. But I suppose it was too much of a chance for the politiscum to resist.
John KIt was Invincible which was offered to the RAN at a knock down price by that egregious cretin John Nott. But as it stands, I can’t see any other country wanting to buy Ark Royal, not without buying Harriers as well. It’s too much trouble for such an old weapon system.
John KWell I think we can agree on that.
John KNo, it’s not particularly realistic – but that’s because of will. It’s unlikely that a British government would have the will to do it, & political pressure from other countries is one of the reasons. But we had the capability to do it. Intentions trump capability.
You see? You’ve just demonstrated that you understand the principle, & can apply it.
Now we’ve got that out of the way, we might be able to find some common ground.
I tend to agree with Nocuts. I think intentions and capability are two sides of the same coin, and influence each other. It is certainly very dangerous to have the intentions without the capability: look at what happened to the British Army in Basra.
John KYou see? It didn’t really matter if we couldn’t counter-attack immediately, as long as they believed that we would when we could. Even if we’d retired our carriers or amphibious ships, we could have (given the will) had SSNs prowling off their coast keeping their navy in port & necessitating the islands to be supplied by air for a year or two while we frantically refurbished reserve ships, modified merchant vessels, & bought ex-USN amphibious ships. That was not a result they thought worth fighting for, & nor was a bloody, hard-fought conquest thought acceptable.
I can’t see that as a realistic scenario at all. The idea that we would have gone in for a two year naval blockade whilst trying to rebuild a naval air and amphibious capability is unrealistic. Can you imagine how that would have played at the UN?
John KHistory is full of examples of bad decisions. If the ARA VdM had been equipped with SHARS and not Skyhawks then we would have seen the first carrier vs carrier battle on 1st May 1982. As it was the weather did not allow VdM to launch her skyhawks – which is a very relevant and salient point when talking about how useful Ark Royal would have been in 1982, there would have been many non-flying days, which would not have been the case for land based types. You can’t talk up large carriers as infallible and all powerful, they really aren’t.
Of course large carriers are not infallible and all powerful. But if you have to deliver air power and have no land bases, they are all you have.
As it was, Ark Royal could have launched aircraft even if 25 May could not. I believe 25 May was pretty slow by this stage, and needed a fair bit of wind over the deck. But that’s one area where the SHAR has the advantage over both types.
John KSo the private message I sent you this morning offering a truce was to no avail? Time to wrap this up soon I think….
Your logic, as I have said before in a point you have never answered, leads to the unavoidable conclusion that a fleet carrier is the only true form of deterrent and therefore all other warships in ours and all other navies are pointless and provide little, which comes back to the original point over whether the RN still provides a useful deterrent or not, which given that carriers are just one type of ship in a whole plethora of available ships and boats and given the evidence of 1977 is patently not true.
Didn’t see the message, hence no reply. Didn’t realise we were at war!
I don’t say the fleet carrier is the only deterrent, though it is a good one. In the case of Argentine in 1977 and 1982, they would have to look at what Britain could do about an invasion of the Falklands. The only way air power could be brought to bear would be by aircraft carriers. We still had a fleet carrier in 1977, which would have been a major factor in their calculations. In 1982 we only had two light carriers with Sea Harriers, and we know the Argentines did not rate the SHAR, they evaluated it, and bought the Super Etendard instead. Clearly, not much in the way of deterrent.
John KHis point is that as a matter of hard historical fact, Ark Royal did not have any effect on Argentinean actions when she was in the North Atlantic or Mediterranean.
We don’t need to speculate about the effect British possession of a CTOL carrier with Phantoms & Buccaneers might have had on Argentinean actions, because we know what actually happened in 1977. It did not deter them.
Intentions trump capabilities. What we had didn’t count, until we showed willingness to use it. Not theory, but demonstrated fact.
I agree with your last paragraph in part. You have to show a willingness to fight to deter, but to suggest that intentions trump capabilities is surely wrong. Capabilities matter for deterrence to be effective.
What Journeyman demonstrated was that Britain took the defence of the Falklands seriously. But you cannot say that Ark Royal did not have any effect on Argentine actions. That just makes no sense to me. If the Argentines were persuaded that Britain would fight, the next question they had to ask themselves was, what with? In 1977 Britain had a fleet carrier, plus two commando carriers, and a surface fleet of, what, sixty or so frigates and destroyers? Clearly, that was the deterrent, not two frigates and an SSN which may, or may not, have been in the area. Nineteen surface escorts and no fixed wing naval aviation does not provide the same sort of deterrent does it?
John KWind my neck in? About being correct with terminology? It isn’t ‘obvious’ what you meant, your use of an official doctrinal term was wrong, plain and simple – “Fleet in Being” has one meaning and it hasn’t changed for 320 years. Sorry if that makes me a smart ****, but i’m afraid it does make me right.
For the record, I appreciate what the historical term “fleet in being” means. My point was that you seem to be of the opinion that Ark Royal would have no bearing on Argentine planners unless or until she actually turned up in the South Atlantic. I would argue that, although in the Med at the time, Ark Royal (and indeed Hermes, Bulwark, Intrepid, Fearless et al) was functioning as a “fleet in being”, not held in port in the classical use of the term, but equally not in the actual area of operations. Nonetheless, a fleet in the Med could be in the South Atlantic in two weeks, and that is what the Argentines had to take into consideration: if they attacked the Falklands, they would not have to contend just with British forces in the South Atlantic, but also with the naval forces which Britain would be able to bring into the theatre of operations without undue delay.
John KYes. A factor they would have considered in any reprisal but you argue her existence was enough to deter yet they were attempting to invade in 1977 so her mere existence was obviously not enough, she needed to be demonstrably deployed, but she wasn’t, Dreadnought was.
Can’t make sense of the fact that- a 53,950 ton warship (in Ark Royals case) that is electronically active, very detectable on radar and very visible when it passes through a choke point like Gibraltar, surrounded by escorts and oilers, and putting aircraft in the air that are also pretty easy to spot, is difficult to hide?
If in 1977 Ark had been ordered south she would have been spotted passing through Gibraltar. You draw a line to her destination on a map and you can calculate where she will roughly be on each day for any given speed.
You search and of course you might not find her easily, granted, the sea is still a big place, but then your Maritime Patrol Aircraft gets close enough and is intercepted by an RN fighter. Your navigator plots the maximum radius of that fighter on a map from your position and now you know the area of sea the carrier is in. Or Your MPA doesn’t return having been downed, well that tells you just as much.
Point being surface vessels, especially large ones are difficult to hide. SSNs on the other hand are the perverbial needle in the haystack. If one that is already at sea is ordered some where then your opponent has no reference point to start a possible plot, no good idea exactly which direction its coming from and from and how far away. Means they are great for bluffing, you can tell an opponent that there is one nearby and then invite them to prove you wrong. You can’t do that with a carrier battle group.
It’s not hard, really.
Gibraltar is a long way from the South Atlantic, and there is no requirement for the carrier to use her radar is there? That is what rader pickets and AEW are for. A downed MPA doesn’t tell you very much, you don’t know where it has been shot down, or even if it has been shot down, and anyway your target can move over thirty nautical miles in an hour. With Phantoms and Buccaneers, Ark Royal could have operated well out of the range of any Argentine aircraft, and still maintained air superiority over the Falklands, a capability which was in a different league from the plucky Sea Harriers in 1982. Nothing much for the Argentines to have to consider?
Operation Journeyman does seem to have convinced the Argentines that an invasion would be opposed. But that is only one part of deterring aggression. The other part is, opposed by what? In 1977, he Argentines were successfully made aware that Britain would oppose an invasion, and had the assets to make it so. In 1982, neither of these conditions were met.
John KDo you actually know what a “fleet in being” is? Because you obviously don’t. If you did you would realise what a silly sounding comment that is.
A fleet in being is one that stays in port and does not venture out to give battle. The Doctrine was first dreamt up as a way the RN could survive and still provide some sort of war effort during the early part of the 9 years war (1688-97) They were outnumbered and outgunned and to venture out would invite annhilation. So they stayed in port and provided a phantom threat that could not be entirely ignored, tying up French resources. Germany in world war 1 would be another example, the German Grand Fleet only venturing out on one major sortie. The RN could not ignore them however, the Germans provided a fleet in being – its not however a winning strategy. A very good example would be Argentina post Belgrano – it sat in port, took no further part in the war but the RN could never ignore the potential that it might venture out on a sortie so had to have a strategy and resources to deal with the potential, the Argentinean Navy became a “fleet in being”. The Strategy in the modern era though is pretty obsolete mainly due to air power. A fleet in being concept was supposed to keep your fleet safe and still make it a potential threat that has to be considered. Taranto and Pearl Harbour demonstrate the potential air power gave in that you could now reach into these safe ports and neutralise such a fleet in being. Of course the UK was constrained in the Falklands as it was only a limited war fought for limited aims so Argentinean ports were out of bounds.
So saying you believe in a “fleet in being” suggests you believe in keeping the RN safe in harbour, out of trouble as some sort of imaginary sword of damocles, in what history has proved is rarely a winning strategy,
Yes but thats not deterrence you are talking about is it? I agree with you, if deterrence has failed and you need to fight then carriers yes please. My point is that a single SSN neutralised the whole enemy fleet in one move – it demonstrates the potential of SSNs in reference to your point about 1 sub not being enough.
You are obviously a dye in the wool carrier nut. When it comes to strategic projection sometimes a carrier is best, sometimes it isn’t. I would argue that SSNs have a greater strategic reach given they are self sustaining and self protecting and have a potential effect out of all proportion to their size and manpower. A single SSN often (not always) has a neutralising effect over a greater area of sea than a whole carrier battle group, mainly because a carrier is difficult to hide and therefore predictable. If you have an air base available then deploying land based air is often better, its cheaper in manpower, you get greater sortie rates, deployment is quicker. Obviously if you need air power and have no base then a carrier is best, but conversely there are places in the world you wouldn’t use a carrier or an SSN as it would be far to vulnerable. It is horses for courses, but the carrier is not a magic cure all.
Oh do wind your neck in, it’s obvious what I meant by “fleet in being” in this context, namely that the Argentines would not just look at the SSN and two frigates, but what else the Royal Navy had, not in the South Atlantic. It was you who were rather keen to point out that as Ark Royal was in the Med at the time, she could not provide a deterrent to Argentine aggression, a position I cannot accept.
As to being a “carrier nut”, this is the naval aviation forum isn’t it? We are discussing the uses of naval aviation aren’t we? My position is that whether Ark Royal was in the South Atlantic or not in 1977, the mere fact of her “being” was a major factor the Argentine staff would have to take into account. And as for your comment that a carrier is “difficult to hide and therefore predictable”, I’m afraid I just can’t make sense of it at all. Care to expand?
John KAin’t that the truth, I reckon Dr Fox just loved Top Gun when he was younger.
Ridiculous. The whole point of this change to the F35C is to enable cross decking with France. Green Dave announced that the F35B could not cross deck with the French as if it was some scandal he had just uncovered. Are you surprised that literally days after this announcement, Dave and Sarkozy were signing a treaty to enable the “sharing” of carriers? Clearly this would be impossible if our carrier operated only STOVL aircraft. Do you think the treaty text was written in the days after the SDSR? Whatever the pros and cons of going to CATOBAR for the CVF, the underlying reason was politics, and the desire of “Eurosceptic” Dave to tie Britain’s armed forces into a European defence structure. Do you remember any of this being discussed at the General Election, the one time we serfs get to actually have our say? Me neither. Dave is a typical Tory grandee I’m afraid, and has no interest in consulting the little people.
John KWell, you can hardly deter very much without a fleet in being can you? I am sure the Argentines would have had a copy of Janes to consult, to see what Britain could bring to the party.
Yes, an SSN sank the Belgrano, but no submarine could ever retake the Falklands could it? For that you needed amphibious assault, and for that you needed control of the air, which could only be done with a carrier.
For you to say a carrier has no more deterrent or strategic reach than other platforms really takes the biscuit. It is more of a deterrent and has greater strategic reach than just about any weapon system. One might say that’s the whole point.
John KWhat CVF would that be? There is going to be a ten year gap in naval aviation, but apparently that is all right, because HMG have got a crystal ball.
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