Check out more closely, this guy is actually quoting a quite serious load of literature, most of that in Spanish. I’d dare to say that Argentinian sources could be a bit better informed on matters regarding FAA than British ones. My 0.02.

Fair point, though I emphasise that Huertas (whom I quoted) is a Spaniard and his book on the Mirage III/V just happened to be published by Osprey in London. And Calcaterra , in that modelling site link, does not provide a source that can be verified or at least investigated, for his assertions about tactical matters in air combat over the Falklands.
Your information about Jesus Romero Briasco is useful – his name is known to me, probably in connection with Huertas (a collaborator on books i think) but again, I’ve never come across this suggestion before about an April 1982 visit to Argentina.
I’ll look into this interesting possibility.
hps

“Mir Gonzales was about to warn his wing man that another Harrier could now slip behind his tail when CICLON 2 started to climb again, his pilot realizing that this could be a trap (as it had been described by the Spanish pilots to the Argentine ones during some letters of advice that sent before May 1st).”
http://hsfeatures.com/features04/daggerpb_1.htm

Interesting. Another variation on the theme. I looked at the link – it’s a model aircraft site. This does not necessarily invalidate it, since I know many of those enthusiasts are very keen on research. But again, from my point of view it would be essential to see first an original source for this, then have it verified or supported in some way, before accepting its validity. And the experience of “Ciclon” flight is described in different terms in the two best sources I have to hand, which adds to my reservations about Señor Calcaterra’s account. In Burden (et al) Falklands – The Air War (London, 1986, p130) it is confirmed that Gonzalez & Bernhardt encountered four SHARs, but of the manoeuvering it says, “..Bernhardt briefly gave chase to an aircraft that he glimpsed below him but there was no true contact and, with low fuel states, the Dagger crews soon abandoned the search.”While in Salvador Mafé Huertas’s Mirage III/V (London, 1990, pp144-145) he says Ciclon made two successive sorties at 09.00 and noon, on the first of which they “were forced by lack of fuel to break contact” and of the noon sortie merely that “..after reaching the Falklands, the pair failed to make contact with any Sea Harriers” – !
And Huertas met and interviewed a variety of Argentine Air Force personnel, with no possibility of misunderstandings caused by language differences. I wonder why an experienced, respected aviation author like Huertas might not have dug up any of these suggestions about covert assistance from Spain, letters, even this alleged visit by a Matador pilot..? He doesn’t allude to anything like Argentine pilots being made aware of the possibility of VIFF-ing etc. He was after all writing some years after the events, when all should have become clear; there’s no significant doubt about any of the aircraft casualties of the conflict by now – it’s a very well documented war – so where have these mysterious, apocryphal or at least unsubstantiated ideas about undercover Harrier intelligence come from? I’d love to know more – if there’s any “more” to uncover.
hps

But conventional aircraft cannot operate from an HMS Invincible.

A key point is that if the Royal Navy had still possessed a conventional carrier with Phantoms in 1982, which would indeed have posed a much greater threat to incoming Argentine attack aircraft (assuming a degree of AEW…), the very adverse weather would in all likelihood have hindered the ability to launch the conventional F4s, compared with the ski-jump takeoff of the Harrier which enabled takeoff even in rough seas.

Just to drop in a few more “Falkland examples”:
The Vulcan successfully dropped bombs over a long distance. Does anybody take this as prove that it is a highly useful conventional bomber? I hardly think so.
The Westland Scout served as light attack and transport helicopter. Did it prove to be superior to other contemporary designs in this job? Hell no, it was a stop gap after the Brits lost so many helicopters and it was better than nothing, but still a crappy little thing.

We’re in danger of being too philosophical, or something. It is a commonplace observation that in war, all plans go out the window and people end up improvising. I’m not quite sure what point you’re making, but ISTM that the Vulcan demonstrated that it was a fundamentally good aircraft, when expertly flown; and the Scout wasn’t a “stop gap” because the significant helicopter loss was of Chinooks destroyed when Atlantic Conveyor was hit by an Exocet, and they were for an entirely different purpose. The Scout actually proved reliable (a lot of casualties were rescued under enemy fire) and a useful weapons platform for the AS-11 missile too. In other words, both Vulcan and Scout “worked” when put to the test. Doesn’t matter what theoretical role they might or might not have been designed for.
hps

I read it in an airpower mag I believe. But it was only the first of a few times I heard about the french giving them the iff codes. Consistency to the stories has only reinforced my opinion that it was true.

Thanks. Since, as I repeat, this is the first time I’ve ever heard these suggestions (which are pretty extraordinary as I’m sure you’ll agree) about collusion by the French to incapacitate Argentine weapons systems, it would be very useful to have an actual reference, if you could dig it out sometime.
hps

The range of the aircraft did not allow them to do any air combat according to their tactics. If they would do engagements 300km from the Argi’s base, the SHARs wouldn’t have seen such a one-sided success.
The aircraft that flew to the Falklands from Argi homeland knew that they went in without air cover and could only rely on luck.

What evidence have you for such a bold statement? The SHARS were frequently operating at that distance from their own carriers. And a series of air-cover missions were flown by Grupo 8 Mirages.

I don’t want to say the Sea Harrier is a bad aircraft, but it couldn’t stand any 1970ies aircraft by its performance (considering limited range, speed and weapons load, not to mention the mediocre avionics).

I don’t fully understand what you mean. Its performance in the Falklands, and subsequently, demonstrated extreme versatility, robustness, serviceability, and an ability to out-fight nominally superior aircraft when flown well. What more do you want?
Gute Nacht!

You must be a Brit

Right

because I sense that you were a bit offended by my comments.

Wrong

First of all you took what I wrote out of context.

No, the thread is about the SuE in air combat, and you used the words “actual combat against other planes,” implying clearly that you were thinking of the SuE & SHAR in air-to-air combat. Which never came about. But I’m glad to hear you didn’t mean that – maybe you could have expressed yourself less ambiguously! Perhaps “avoid” rather than “evade”…

I’m not knocking the Sea Harrier as it obviously proved itself when dealing with other Argentine aircraft. Those aircraft had to get in close though, and thus within range of the Sea Harrier’s weapons. The SuE didn’t have to get as close and was able to stay away (and thus EVADE) from the FAA’s Sea Harriers. The altitudes at which the SuE’s operated at during their runs, and the range at which the Exocet could be fired meant that detection and interception was very difficult to do.

Yes, that’s what I said. The absence of any AEW planes from the FAA inventory was arguably the greatest gap in our defences.