…there is also at least one account of where a Sea Vixen FAW2 armed with Red Top missiles beat a Phantom FG1 (F-4K) during a simulated intercept. A full account of this is due to be included in a forthcoming book on the Sea Vixen by author Tony Buttler due for publication by Air-Britain later this year. Can’t wait!
I understand that there were plans for a supersonic version of the Sea Vixen but the twin boom configuration would have led to a big design issue as the heat generated by the afterburners would have caused potential problems around the tailplanerudders.
The Sea Vixen was an excellent fighter for its time and had good all round multi-role capability.
Just saw this thread. Freely admit that I know little about either of these aircraft – except to observe that (a) am I not right in thinking neither of them ever saw active service? So comments about their alleged performance are somewhat ethereal. And (b) like most British designs of the period, they were pretty much obsolescent even before they entered squadron service, owing to the desperately straightened postwar British economy coupled with unimaginative, constipated thinking both by government and service chiefs.
Both are lovely, characterful aircraft in their way, and I see their appeal – a Gloster Javelin plastic kit (would it have been Airfix, Frog..?) was given to me sometime in the 1950s and it seemed pretty exciting then. But the Javelin was really a no-hoper, probably in combat would have been like a latterday Albacore or Skua, effective in very competent hands but outclassed by the opposition; and while the Sea Vixen was a better aircraft, it too would have struggled. Match it against F-86 or MiG-15 from an earlier generation? Dubious outcome.
Sorry, but I think sentiment shouldn’t overcome a hard-headed recognition that in military hardware terms both planes were bummers. Brit designers have had some outstanding successes over the years, often against all odds, but I suggest these aircraft were not among them.
Neither ‘plane ever WAS in combat, was it?
hps
The attacks were made at about 14000 feet. The time of bomb fall, allowing for bomb drag, would be about 31 seconds and the impact velocity just 880 feet per second.
At 420 kts (I am guessing) the bombs would have been released at just under 4 miles from the target with plenty of turn room so that the aircraft could be well on its way out having turned about 90 degrees and be about 3 miles away before the noise started.
They would have come over the sea and be well away over the sea and out of missile range even before the crews could wake up.
Given your background I imagine you’re right. But just for the record, I’ve seen elsewhere a suggestion (perhaps in Woodward’s “100 Days”) that the bombs were released two miles short of target; and in Middlebrook’s account of the Argentine view of the war, he says they bombed from 10000 feet for optimum accuracy. The latter certainly supports what you say about the Vulcan’s getting away: he suggests that though it ventured (just) within the engagement envelope of the 35mm Oerlikons and the Roland launcher, Vulcan 607 jammed their radars with ECM, and furthermore that only after the bombs hit did the Chinese fire-drill start, with missiles and AAA blazing away blindly, while our chaps were already heading north…
hps
…pinch a Victor, scrounge a camera or two,borrow a PR expert and then keep ya fingers crossed. From what I can gather it worked but I dont know how well. Bex
Where and when was a Victor used for PR? Hadn’t heard this before. Is this referenced in “Vulcan 607”? AFAIK the only PR over the Islands was performed by SHARs, and some maritime surveillance plus ELINT was done by Nimrod off the Argentine coast at least once.
Pontius Nav, if the “gems” to which you refer aren’t brought up anyway, please don’t hold us in suspense… And you might consider writing your own book! With a background on Vulcans + Shackletons et al it sounds as though you have the material… Want a co-writer? Message me..
Regards, hps
HP, forgive me for being lazy and not rereading all the posts, but, have u read 100 days by Sandy Woodward yet? That is a rather good book I must admit. And, Vulcan 607 is a rather rivetting read too
(a) Yes, nearly finished it.
(b) Yes, have it on order, looking forward to reading that too.
hps
IIn the late 1960s there were 3 marks of 1000lb bomb. The Royal Navy had the Mark 10 and the RAF had the Mark 11 and 12. One of these was of forged steel and intended for penetration and use with delayed action fuses. The other was made of cast iron and intended for airburst and fragmentation. I can’t recall which was which………….On soft ground it would have been most unlikely that they would have functioned, especially with the more modern and safer 952 fuse.
I must express my appreciation for your recent contributions – I’m actually cutting & pasting this stuff, as notes against which to compare & contrast “Vulcan 607” which I shall be reading soon! Talk about straight from the horse’s mouth…
Might one ask whether you nav’d on Vulcans themselves? I suspect you’re older than me, but possibly not by much – I’m the same age as the guys who were flying SHARs in 1982, and if I hadn’t failed the eyesight tests at HMS Sultan in 1966 (or whenever) I might just possibly have been one of their number…
Thanks – hps
how can one truly understand the significance of the raids and the bravery of the military, without understanding also the political landscape against which they were played out?
True to an extent, but I thought some of the comments I scanned quickly the other night were crass and ill informed. And they didn’t really gell with the substance of the thread. So I was irritated. That stuff about Thatcher was particularly crass – to appreciate the 1982 situation properly one has to understand the genuinely scary, chaotic (inflation pushing 20% etc) economic & political legacy they’d inherited from Labour in 1979.
Also one thing intrigues me, you say ‘when did legality – even supposing our invasion to have been “illegal” – ever rate as importantly as our national self interest? Why should it?.’ Do you apply the same principle to your personnal interests when compared with the national law of the UK?
Steve
What mildly intrigues me – though not to the extent that I wish this digression to be prolonged here – is why you should think notions of private and public legality are remotely comparable. And answering a question with another question smacks of evasion. But as I say, this stuff is a distraction from the main issue, and getting into it further would be boring and unproductive.
hps
Are you claiming ‘sovereignty’ of this thread? 😀
Listen, gringo, at 04.30 tomorrow, Buenos Aires time, you find out, OK? Hope the APC tracks donta mess-uppa your lawn too much…
Proper answer – though I realise your tongue is in your cheek – is no, of course not! I was delighted to discover this site, but was disappointed when it became clear the fascinating level of aeronautical (etc) expertise is interwoven with rather too much political axe-grinding – not for the most part very well informed, just rather daft cliche-slinging. It seems to afflict the Modern Aviation thread more than this one, but… I’ve been working away from base for a few days, grabbed a quick “fix” of this thread, and reacted perhaps impatiently when I found that the uniquely well-informed contributions of Griffiths911, joined now by Pontius Nav, were IMO being adulterated. No, no “sovereignty”, I’m just an interested (and grateful) part-time participant.
hps
Just finished watching “THe Hunters” on TV (UK Ch4) and was hoping someone could tell me what they used as “Migs” in the film?
Damn, was away, missed that – hardly watch any TV so I tend to miss the occasional goody. Coincidentally, on Wednesday morning on R4 (?) I listened to a short interview with the US author of the original novel on which this film is based, James Salter. His original name was James Horowitz, West Point class of 1945, a genuine F-86 pilot who shot down at least one MiG himself, in 1952. He is very little known in this country, but possibly worth looking into.
hps
Goodness, I turn my back for a few days and find people with political axes to grind hijacking this interesting thread…
Were we the British justified in using military force to build our empire? including our original aquisition of the Falklands.
Short answer is Yes if it meant denying the Falklands either to Argentina, even then a disreputable regime, or to more serious opponents such as the French… But this is the sort of rhetorical (I assume you’re not wholly serious) question that leads inevitably to asking whether the Roman Empire was justified in invading Britannia…
Was our use of military force during the Suez crisis justified?
It’s arguable: there were good grounds for believing it to be in our national interest at the time to protect the Canal and take Nasser down a peg or two. It would have worked had we not been sabotaged by the USA.
Or how about our ‘illegal’ invasion of Iraq?
Since when did legality – even supposing our invasion to have been “illegal” – ever rate as importantly as our national self interest? Why should it?
The problem is that the justification for the use of force depends upon one’s viewpoint. To your average Argentinian the invasion (to regain something that they saw as rightfully thiers) was as well justified, as our liberation of the Falklands was to you or me.
Relativism! To your average German the invasion of Poland (+ most of Europe…) was justified. So what. Galtieri’s Junta was a brutal military dictatorship that murdered an estimated (according to Argentine sources) 30,000 of its citizens – abducted, murdered, tortured, disappeared… The invasion was a transparent attempt to bolster the Junta’s survival through a military PR coup.
Certainly to say it was purely the fault of the Argentine Junto sic, is at best not taking in the whole of the political picture.
Simply not the case. The Falkland Islanders were quietly living their lives until one day they were invaded by an Argentine army. It wasn’t Mrs Thatcher or anyone else who mucked up their lives. Oh, and I enjoyed the creative attempt by someone else to link our entirely justifiable re-taking of the Islands with Mrs T’s “destroying the Trade Union movement” or some such. As for the UN, one of the most corrupt and incompetent bodies on the planet, last time I checked its Human Rights Committee was chaired by Libya, which is all one needs to know…
Now can we get back to Vulcans and SHARs? I’m reading the Sandy Woodward book, as recommended, and jolly interesting it is too. Certainly offers the promised alternate perspective. Answers my queries about the failure of our SSNs to sink the 25th May, too.
hps
I’ve always thought that the performance of Sea Dart was tarnished by the loss of HMS Sheffield and, to a lesser extent, by the loss of HMS Coventry (and near loss of HMS Glasgow).
Perhaps my imminent reading of naval material neglected to date will explain your comment, but I assume you’re suggesting that these vessels’ associated Sea Dart radar first failed to give early warning, and then failed to lock-up targets? In the case of Sheffield it was widely suggested at the time and subsquently that power diverted to sat-comms caused her radars to perform ineffectively… Though maybe this is just ill-informed speculation.
There are many reasons for the poor performance of Rapier but a major flaw in the system seems to be that is was deemed so accurate that no ‘proximity’ fuse was fitted!
Really… I know too little about missile systems but can appreciate that this would be a significant lapse. Only recently I was re-reading some Vietnam material, and one of the Hughes Falcon AAM’s serious deficiencies (causing it to be generally despised by the USAF F4 pilots who had to use it) was exactly the same lack of proximity fusing, in addition to too small a warhead.
Regards, hps
“Sea Dart destroyed eight Argentinian aircraft” – presumably 8 out of the 10 listed my earlier posts;- anyone know which ones
Congratulations on this handy summary – without taking the trouble to check my own reference sources (sorry, looking forward to some late bacon & eggs) these include an early helicopter ((Puma I think), Learjet T-24, and Canberra B-108. Not counting the very regrettable friendly-fire incident against our own Gazelle.
“basic optical system Rapier destroyed 14 Argentinian aircraft plus a further 6 probables” I reckon just one confirmed A4 on the 25 May and one possible A4 also on the 25 May. – I do remember see some pictures of damaged A/C (Daggers?) which may have been hit by Rapiers but which got home. – Anyone?
I can recall the Rapier system being credited with multiple kills at the time, including one or two left-and-rights, but I think you’re right: and IIRC wasn’t the single success achieved by RAF Regiment?
Short Blowpipe “accounted for nine Argentinian aircraft plus two probables” I reckon one A4 on May 21, and two Pucaras on May 28
I can find references only to one Pucara damaged by a Blowpipe near Darwin on the 28th, but managing a return to Stanley, and another brought down by smallarms fire near Goose Green. Then of course there was Jeff Glover’s GR3 hit by an Argentine Blowpipe! Burden et al in FTAW write, “..believed fired by a soldier from the Argentine Special Forces unit, CC601”
BAe Systems really pushed Rapier after the conflict and a lot bad press seemed to be generated at Sea Dart, shame really as it was probably the highest scoring SAM system in the conflict (not to mention it was also a system which was very well understood by the Argentinian’s).
Odd that – I wonder if BAe knew the actual score but for reasons of their own inverted the comparative success rates of these systems. I was surprised by Rapier’s very poor showing since I always thought it was pretty hot. Sea Dart did really well, demonstrating great versatility against targets at low and high altitudes, and its true strength has been confirmed by Griffiths911’s contributions here. I second your praise for his first hand account.
hps
From memory it is mentioned in ‘Falklands the Air War’ and ‘The Royal Navy and the Falklands War’ but, thanks to Griffiths911, the most detailed (and convincing) explanation of this engagement is contained within this thread!
Yes, absolutely – until this thread appeared I was left to speculate upon the strange business of the Sea Dart/707 without any substantive info. It is mentioned in a cursory way in Burden et al, FTAW, the authors of which are comprehensively informative on matters they have been able to research, but evidently they uncovered nothing authoritative on that incident. I haven’t yet read the Brown book, looking for a copy – just ordered Sandy Woodward’s memoir, and Vulcan 607…
I wonder if the makers of Sea Dart (BAe Systems?) used its Falklands performance in subsequent marketing efforts, as happened I believe in the case of Roland and Exocet.
Griffiths911, glad to hear you’re still there and ready to contribute further personal-witness info!
Regards, hps
http://www.exequielmartinez.com.ar/malvinas_a.htm
Basically what they seem to be saying is that ‘each Sea Dart missile costs as much as a modern military aircraft’ and that effectively they could claim to have destroyed two of them in this engagement!
Sea Dart missiles were (and are) very expensive but this must be stretching ‘claims’ to the absolute limit![/QUOTE]
Fascinating! I would not attempt to translate this site, which I just glanced at following your link, so I’m glad you appear to be able to do so. As claims go I think it belongs in the “Comical Ali” class, and would appear also to share the latter’s Middle Eastern taste in propagandist illustration: not so much Social Realism, as Fantasist Wishful Thinking…
Which of the books you mention in your helpful list, if any, contains some sort of convincing explanation/reference to that failed engagement of the 707?
hps
Not a corrective, merely an alternative – I suspect both are polarised views. But anecdotally, everyone I know who has read the White book raves about it. Not necessarily a reflection on its accuracy or worthiness, just that it’s a darn good read.
……………White’s book is not scholarly, but it records the views of a large number of people involved in and affected by Black Buck (including people who were on the Falklands at the time).
Better and better – a “darn good read” will do nicely. Thanks for one of the more useful recommendations of this book.
Regards, hps
DAKK:
..David Morgan’s book ‘Dangerous Skies’…The damage to the runway was not just a big hole. A delayed fuse, thousand pound, medium capacity bomb dropped from high altitude will cause more damage from shock wave effects than from pure blast. In this case the runway surface across a large area had been lifted and compromised. This made repairs very difficult with no dedicated equipment at hand.
Thanks for the reminder about Morgan’s book – I’ve read it only once so far, not especially informative and too much stuff about his lovelife, broccoli, etc… Your comments about the efficacy of iron bombs are useful – what’s the source for this info about the exact nature of the damage, and the Argentines’ lack of repair equpment?
Dave’s book will also explain why Sharkey Ward’s contention, that a card formation of four Shars could have achieved the same goal, is wrong. ………..the Roland missile envelope – a system that demonstrated it’s effectiveness a few days later on a GR3 – not to mention the radar layed AAA. To drop from low level, or in a toss attack, would have caused very little damage, hence the 800 sqn attacks on Stanley airfield used mainly CBUs to damage structures and grounded aircraft.
You make some good points, and I dare say you know more about such things than I do. As Creaking Door says, though, what’s this about a Roland missile? TTBOMK too, its only success was indeed on Ian Mortimer’s SHAR.
I recommend this book. Dave Morgan was a light blue flying with 800 sqn on Hermes. He has no axe to grind and therefore his story of the conflict is refreshing. There is no hint of any friction between 800 and 801 indeed non between the hierarchies of Hermes and Invincible evident in this account. No mention of dissatisfaction with the Blue Fox either!
Yes, must re-read it. Actually, a quick revision (2006 Weidenfeld & Nicholson edition) provides these perhaps revealing quotes:
(p77) “(recce pics after the initial SHAR raid on Stanley) also showed the limited extent of the damage caused by the Vulcan raid….It seemed a lot of effort for one hit on the runway but at least it made it unlikely that the Argentines would be able to use the strip to operate fighter aircraft.”
As we know, they weren’t able to do so anyway.(edit: except for those little MB339s…)
(p244) “We were beginning to seriously doubt whether the Vulcans were contributing much to our efforts other than being a strategic threat (sic) to mainland Argentina…we all thought it would be better to give us the bombs and the fuel and let us do the job.”
Clearly, Sharkey Ward was not the only SHAR pilot to think this way.
The other book to read, if you want a fuller picture, is Sandy Woodward’s account of the conflict. This may explain some of the ‘incredulous’ decisions made by the task force commander, which Sharkey Ward could not understand.
Ah, the memoir co-written with thriller writer Patrick Robinson – ought to read that, too, I suppose.
One book does not a history make.
Entirely agree – though even memoirs have their place, as you’ve shown.
Regards, hps