The “Stalin’s oceangoing fleet” as its often called dates back to the pre-WWII era first annouced in the 1937-42 five year plan. Several monsterous plans were drafted total of increase 630 000 t of the fleet. One of such called 24 battleships, 20 cruisers and 350 submarines and destroyers.
The plans rationalized over the years and the number of ships decreased. Interestingly enough aicraft carriers did emerge to the plans as early as 1936.
Final version before the war asked 6 Battleships, 2 carriers, 4 Heavy (battle) cruisers and 17 light cruisers, 12 flottilla leaders and 191 submarines.
The industrial base was set up for the huge build-up but it was obvious that it wouldn’t have been possiple to complete it even if the war wouldn’t had broken. Yet it laid basis for the overall growth of VMF and some of the ships in that plan actually maided. The Battleships were of the project 23 which four were laid down. Two pr. 69 Battlecruisers were laid down also. The carriers were presumably the pr. 71 (based on pr. 68 hull) and the light cruisers itself the pr. 68 Chapaev, the only ones of the larger ships that were actually completed tough only after the war.
The war naturally ruined most of the plans and for example none of the capital ship designs were ever completed. Altough the war had mixed effects on the overall soviet naval capacity, it was toughted that in that current position a large naval build-up wouldn’t have been fruitfull. Yet the plans continued and several studies were made to learn the lessons of the war. In 1945 a plan called for 4 battleships, 10 battlecruisers, 30 cruisers, 54 light cruisers, 6 heavy carriers, 6 light carriers, 132 large destroyers and 226 destroyers.
In those plans, there were few very interesting designs. The battleships would have presumably been pr. 24 and the heavy cruisers divided between the famous pr. 82 and more rare pr. 66. The latter was interesting ship, 252 meter long, 30 000t full load and armed with 220 mm guns (like pre-war pr. 25). The 30 cruisers were intended to be the pr. 65, with either 152mm or 180mm guns.
Neither the pr. 66 nor 65 never materialized. To speed up the building, Stalin ordered improved version of the Chapaev design called pr. 68bis (Sverldovs) and the pr. 66 hanged around untill the “revolution in military affairs” put end to it as with all other large surface combatant plans in 1956.
Of the 54 light cruiser or about the carriers, I know very little, my toughts about the carriers can be seen in SDFs proffesional forum. The destroyers were merged to single 250 batch and like with the cruisers, a modified war-era design, pr. 30bis was chosen instead of any new ones (pr. 41 most likely)
The naval build-up was in constant motion and envolved alot during the post war years right untill the death of Stalin himself. Between the years, another strong mastermind behind the soviet fleet, Admiral Kuznetsov spended time in exile as Pacific Fleets commander. Kuznetsov was a strong advocate for carriers and tought their importance decreased during his exile, he retrived the plans as soon as he returned to his post. He was also one of the very few who dared openly to speak against Stalins plans and often tried to convince the stubborn premier from his queer devotion to battlecruisers.
In the last years of Stalin’s era the battleships were cut down in favour of the pr. 82, Stalin’s favorite child and the carrier plans were returned in the shape of pr. 72 and 85. Kuznetsov made few historical desicions to replace the pr. 41 Neustrashimyy class destroyer (the plans were later sold to china and formed the base for 051 Luda class) with pr. 56 Kotlin and pr. 42 Kola class SRK with pr. 50 Riga class. In both cases the reason was rude, simple and yet weird; they were considered too large and therefore smaller designs substituted them.
After Khrutsev took over the controls, all the “conventional” naval build-up plans were cancelled and it ment the death for bot Battlecruisers and Carriers. Altough Stalin often walk over the carrier plans in favour of more “interesting projects”, he never completely denyed them nor purposefully tried to cut them down for the sake of them being carriers. It was his follower who really was to blame for the lack of true carrier force never emerged in Soviet Union.
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