I expect 5th gen birds to be able to carry heavy load outside when stealth is not a priority. also, may not be brahmos but I fully expect the PAKFA to be able to carry at least one type of long range munition internally.

navy has 8 Tu-142M maritime patrol aircraft.

it’s a hi mid mix rather than a hi-lo mix, not that different from IAF. with increasing sophistication and need for internal carriage, the days of light single engined fighters are over.

^^ thanks for making my points before me. 🙂

the US single engined fighter, the JSF matches weight and fuel consumption of most twin engined fighters. by itself, the difference between a twin engined and single engined fighter wrt economics is a pedantic one, unless you consider particular models. the question that should be asked is can the fighter in question match the requirements. clearly, the IAF felt the gripen did not. the rest of the argument is moot.

sopwith camels would be even cheaper to operate than gripens, I doubt any air force is going to opt for it. the question of economics comes only after the minimum requirements are fulfilled, not before.

because from very beginning J-10’s were designated to use as much domestic technology as possible. to both incubate the technology and the design team. which is wonderful if you want to get your technology in shape, nightmare in terms of schedule risk. PAF don’t want schedule risk.
PLAAF can afford to gamble, (worst comes worst they go to Shenyang and build more 27SKs), PAF can’t.

the simple reason is J-10 is far too expensive for PAF to buy and operate with its own money. JF-17 is all they can afford at the moment unless china takes it upon itself to become another sugar daddy.
and there’s always the question of engines.

that they can build in Karma. J-10 does not fit the bill.

kamra not karma.

the real reason is IAF pilots were under strict orders not to cross the LOC. however the LOC runs zigzag at most places making this difficult, the pilots would have moved back into Indian airspace with alacrity once they discovered this or, as is more likely were notified by their GCI controller of the violation. they went back because their ROE didn’t permit them to stay in pak airspace, not because of F-7’s with its non-existent BVR missiles. :rolleyes:
had they not done so they would have faced disciplinary hearings at the least, that’s a much more serious threat than mythical F-7’s.

the rest is usual PAF bluster (we defeated India, we defeated soviet union AND USA and on and on), which F-7MP’s had BVR missiles in 1999 ? which air bases were these supposed F-7’s flying from that they were close enough to target IAF aircraft with WVR missiles ? there’s none that I know of.
and we are supposed to believe the mirages flying top cover with much superior long range capability were sitting on their a$$es ? :p
but not surprising, we have all heard some fancy stories from PAF.

let’s see what PAF’s Director of Operations during kargil Air Cmde kaiser Tufail (then Gp Capt) has to say about PAF’s preparedness during kargil.
http://kaiser-aeronaut.blogspot.com/2009/01/kargil-conflict-and-pakistan-air-force.html

On IAF airspace violations

While the [IAF] photo-recce missions typically did not involve deliberate border violations, there were a total of 37 ‘technical violations’ (which emanate as a consequence of kinks and bends in the geographical boundaries). Typically, these averaged to a depth of five nautical miles, except on one occasion when the IAF fighters apparently cocked-a-snoot at the PAF and came in 13 miles deep.

On IAF impact on kargil

While the Indians had been surprised by the infiltration in Kargil, the IAF mobilised and reacted rapidly as the Indian Army took time to position itself. Later, when the Indian Army had entrenched itself, the IAF supplemented and filled in where the artillery could not be positioned in force. Clearly, Army-Air joint operations had a synergistic effect in evicting the intruders.

on PAF’s gameplan

There was no doubt in the minds of PAF Air Staff that the first cross-border attack (whether across LOC or the international border) would invite an immediate response from the IAF, possibly in the shape of a retaliatory strike against the home base of the intruding fighters, thus starting the first round. PAF’s intervention meant all-out war: this unmistakable conclusion was conveyed to the Prime Minister, Mr Nawaz Sharif, by the Air Chief in no equivocal terms.
……………
…….With good low level radar cover now available up to the LOC, Air Marshal Najib along with the Air Staff focused on fighter sweep (a mission flown to destroy patrolling enemy fighters) as a possible option.
…………….
To prevent the mission from being seen as an escalatory step in the already charged atmosphere, PAF had to lure Indian fighters into its own territory, ie Azad Kashmir or the Northern Areas.
………..
The over-arching consideration was the BVR missile capability of IAF fighters which impinged unfavourably on the mission success probability. ……….
The idea of a fighter sweep thus fizzled out as quickly as it came up for discussion.

How PAF decided to tackle IAF incursions.

While the PAF looked at some offensive options, it had a more pressing defensive issue at hand. The IAF’s minor border violations during recce missions were not of grave consequence in so far as no bombing had taken place in our territory; however, the fact that these missions helped the enemy refine its air and artillery targeting, was, to say the least, disconcerting. There were constant reports of our troops on the LOC disturbed to see, or hear, IAF fighters operating with apparent impunity.

The GHQ took the matter up with the AHQ and it was resolved that Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) would be flown by the F-16s operating out of Minhas (Kamra) and Sargodha. This arrangement resulted in less on-station time but was safer than operating out of vulnerable Skardu, which had inadequate early warning in the mountainous terrain; its status as a turn-around facility was, however, considered acceptable for its location. A flight of F-7s was, nonetheless, deployed primarily for point defence of the important garrison town of Skardu as well as the air base.

clearly, the F-7’s were tasked with point defence of skardu, not going after IAF incursions, which job was given to F-16’s from minhas and sargodha. since skardu is about 90km from the LOC and IAF clearly had no intention of flying towards skardu it is highly unlikely any F-7 with its 15 km range radar ever came even close to “locking” on any IAF fighter, let alone a package of 4 (how many targets can the venerable skyranger simultaneously target ? 😉 ) led by 2 mirage-2000’s.

also,

It also must be noted too that other than F-16s, the PAF did not have a capable enough fighter for patrolling, as the minimum requirement in this scenario was an on-board airborne intercept radar, exceptional agility and sufficient staying power. F-7s had reasonably good manoeuvrability but lacked an intercept radar as well as endurance, while the ground attack Mirage-III/5s and A-5s were sitting ducks for the air combat mission.

In sum, the PAF found it expedient not to worry too much about minor border violations and instead, conserve resources for the larger conflagration that was looming. All the same, it gave the enemy no pretext for retaliation in the face of any provocation, though this latter stance irked some quarters in the Army that were desperate to ‘equal the match’. Might it strike to some that PAF’s restraint in warding off a major conflagration may have been its paramount contribution to the Kargil conflict?

IOW, PAF decided to (wisely) keep its head down for the most part, realising its vulnerability vis-a-vis the IAF.
there was no place for chest beating incidents like the one posted by buran. 😎