Scientists hurl mud bombs
– Debate over Pokhran nuclear tests descends into slanging match
G.S. MUDUR

New Delhi, Sept. 21: The debate over India’s hydrogen bomb capability, rekindled by a former defence research official, has degenerated into a murky slanging match loaded with claims and allegations, but bereft of hard scientific evidence.

K. Santhanam, who was involved in the nuclear weapons tests in Pokhran on May 11 and May 13, 1998, has said the thermonuclear device — a hydrogen bomb — tested on May 11 had failed to deliver its intended yield of 45 kilotons.

Within weeks after the tests, a team of US researchers had expressed their doubts about the yield. But Indian nuclear scientists had argued in a research paper in a peer-reviewed journal that the tests had been successful and India did not have to conduct any more nuclear weapons tests. This had prompted the government to announce a unilateral moratorium on testing.

But Santhanam, who had once worked in the atomic energy establishment, has amplified concerns — first expressed by him at a meeting of strategic experts four weeks ago — listing specific observations from the site to back his claims.

An intact test shaft after the explosion, the absence of a crater, and instrument readings, he said, suggest that the main hydrogen bomb “failed to ignite at least anything like fully and even let alone explode with its designed power”.

Santhanam, who had once stood alongside top atomic energy and defence research officials to declare the May 1998 tests a success, said he wasn’t a “Rip Van Winkle” who had woken up after 11 years.

He has accused the nuclear establishment and the government of ignoring a 50-page document the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) had submitted at the end of 1998 outlining its concerns about the hydrogen bomb test.

“The attitude is — my mind is made up, don’t confuse me with facts,” Santhanam said. “This is like religious dogma. Science doesn’t progress through such a process.”

Santhanam and other strategic experts have said India should resume tests of thermonuclear weapons to perfect the technology of hydrogen bombs and resist pressures to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Amid the debate, some analysts are speculating whether Santhanam might only be articulating the views of sections of the government and perhaps even the nuclear weapons establishment who do not want India to accept the CTBT.

But a former head of the nuclear weapons programme at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (Barc) said instrument readings, radioactivity levels and other evidence from the site “clearly demonstrate” the success of the tests.

“There was damage to the shaft,” Satinder Sikka, the scientist said. “Researchers in Trombay have simulated the explosions and reproduced the exact surface features that were observed,” Sikka told The Telegraph.

But Santhanam has alleged that Barc has selectively used data to declare the thermonuclear weapon test a success. “The trouble lies in what data was included in the Barc analysis and what was not,” Santhanam said.

He claimed that Sikka himself accepted the failure to his former bosses and to himself (Santhanam) as well in detailed bilateral scientific discussions, but the former chief of the atomic energy commission, R. Chidambaram, had muzzled him.

Sikka has denied this. “This is an utter lie,” Sikka said. “I didn’t know he (Santhanam) would stoop to such depths.”

Sikka said Santhanam was not in any way involved in the physics or the instrumentation associated with the Pokhran tests.

Santhanam has also challenged assertions made by the national security adviser, M.K. Narayanan, to a television channel. Narayanan had said that Santhanam “has absolutely no idea what he is talking about”.

“Indeed I do. The boot is on the other foot,” Santhanam retorted today. He also said Narayanan’s assertion that India has “thermonuclear capability should be taken with a kiloton of salt”.

Sikka said Barc had produced a 100-page rebuttal to the document from the DRDO. Both documents were discussed at a special meeting called by the national security establishment in 1998-99.

Santhanam has suggested that all the data from the tests should be made available to an independent panel of scientists — including retired former nuclear scientists who would be familiar with the science of weapons — for scrutiny and recommendations.

The government could decide the course of action, Santhanam said. Such a report could well be labelled a classified document, he said, with selected portions released for the public.

ISRO to launch 7 satellites in 1,200 seconds

BANGALORE/MUMBAI: Seven satellites in 1,200 seconds. A launch similar to the one in April 2008 when ISRO launched 10 satellites.

ISRO is all set to put six nano satellites and one major ocean satellite into orbit on Wednesday from Sriharikota. The final 51-hour countdown began on Monday at 9am. Of the six nano satellites, four are from Germany, one is from Switzerland and one from Turkey. The seventh is a big one, India’s Oceansat-2 weighing 960 kg.

From the time of launch to ejection of satellites, time taken will be around 1,200 seconds. While Oceansat-2 is set to be ejected after 1,055 seconds, four nano satellites will be ejected in the next 45 seconds. Two others are meant to stay with the fourth stage of the rocket which will be on its own once the different stages of the rocket get separated.

The sequence of ejection is very similar to the April 2008 launch featuring one big satellite – Cartosat-2A and nine other nano satellites – 10 in all: once the PSLV takes off and reaches a certain height and velocity, it will first launch the Oceansat-2 and a few seconds later, the first of four nano satellites. Every 10-12 seconds, the PSLV will launch four satellites one after the other. (Two will remain with the fourth stage).

“The rocket re-orients itself everytime a satellite is to be placed in orbit. The re-orientation ensures one satellite doesn’t collide with another. The rocket effectively re-orients itself four to five times in the space of one flight,” a scientist explained.

The brain of the rocket would have made all calculations in advance – from ejection of first satellite to the fifth. The exact moment of ejection and then re-orientation for the next ejection is worked out in advance. All mathematical calculations on the ground, launch sequence and flight path have to work to zero error.

“There is no room for error. The rocket has to be in flight till the last minute which means all systems on board have to function to perfection. Once the first and second stages separate, and the fourth stage (the engines) stop, the ejection process begins until every satellite circulates in orbit,” an official said.

Oceansat-2, India’s second satellite to study oceans as well as interaction of oceans and atmosphere, is the 16th remote sensing satellite of India. It is in the shape of a cuboid with two solar panels projecting from its sides. The satellite will map fishing zones around India, measure ocean surface windspeeds as well as atmospheric temperature and humidity.

This will be PSLV’s 16th mission. From September 1993 to April 2009, PSLV has been launched 15 times. Fourteen launches have been successful continuously while only one has failed so far.

ISRO spokesperson S Satish told TOI: “It is known that PSLV has been a very successful launch vehicle. Countries realise it is a vehicle or rocket very well suited for launch of nano satellites. We were on to our 16th mission with PSLV and Germany and Swtizerland were looking for a mission. Our needs coincided and that’s how we have the six nano satellites.”

In the April 2008 launch, eight nano satellites were built by universities and research institutions in Canada and Germany.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news/india/ISRO-to-launch-7-satellites-in-1200-seconds/articleshow/5039961.cms

Also again with regards to minimum deterence if these fools were correct and India did have minimum deterence China would have stopped playing the game some time back! The fact is India does not have minimum deterence and china is very aware of this!

India does the same Indian troops has crossed into the other side also. The journos are stirring up ****. And even during cold war era there were events like that.

India has thermonuclear capabilities: NSA

New Delhi, Sep 20: India has thermonuclear capabilities, National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan has emphasised, saying the scientists who raised doubts about the 1998 nuclear tests in Pokhran had personal motives to do so.

Narayanan spoke to CNBC-TV18’S Karan Thapar in an interview to be broadcast Monday night. He insisted that India had the thermonuclear device – the first time a government official has made this statement publicly after the recent controversy.

“We have thermonuclear capabilities. I am absolutely sure. Even if we are hit, we will have enough to be able to deliver something,” said Narayanan.

Former senior DRDO official K. Santhanam had raised doubts that India’s thermonuclear test in 1998 had not worked.

“I have chosen my words very carefully – (the yield was) 45 kilotons… And nobody… including Santhanam, who has absolutely no idea what he is talking about… knows, for that matter any one else can contest what is a proven fact by the data which is there,” said the NSA.

He said the Atomic Energy Commission had last week given the “most authoritative” statement on the efficacy of the 1998 nuclear tests and no more clarification was required from the government.

Narayanan indicated that the sudden statements by Santhanam and other senior nuclear scientists could be a result of personal rivalries within the scientific community.

He rejected the suggestion that a panel of scientists could review the Pokhran test results, asserting that it would be difficult to get neutral, independent scientists who could investigate the matter.

“Which peer scientists are we going to bring in (for a panel)? All those peer scientists are part of the establishment or are sceptics,” he said.

Narayanan said he was aware of reports that Pakistan had increased its nuclear arsenal. He stated that India will suitably respond to do whatever is required in national interest to increase nuclear deterrence.

“The fact that a country not friendly is building up its arsenal is a concern… We will do what we have to do.”

He added: “We have absolutely no intention of changing no-first use doctrine. We are committed to (it).”

On Pakistan reportedly diverting US technology and weapons for use against India, Narayanan said India had taken up the matter a number of times with the US but the latter had only responded by offering the same equipment to India.

But he admitted that India was worried about the modification of Harpoon missiles by Pakistan.

http://week.manoramaonline.com/cgi-bin/MMOnline.dll/portal/ep/contentView.do?contentId=5995908

Deterrence and explosive yield
K. SubrahmanyamV. S. Arunachalam

Following the controversy on the success or otherwise of the thermonuclear test of India on 11th May, 1998, questions have been raised by some senior ex-service officers and civilian strategists on the credibility of the Indian deterrent posture and the perceived mismatch between a 3,500-km missile and a warhead of two digit explosive yield. It is not the intention here to go into the question of success or otherwise of the thermonuclear test. Heaven knows so much has been said about that already. Instead, there is a need to understand what we mean by deterrence and we shall also discuss whether Indian nuclear strategic posture is credible in the absence of thermonuclear warheads.

Nuclear deterrence is essentially a mind game. A potential aggressor will be deterred if he is persuaded that the nuclear retaliation that will be delivered by the survivable nuclear force of the victim will cause unacceptable damage, totally incommensurate with any strategic, political, economic or any other objective that drives him to go for the first strike. During the Cold War, the Western assumption was that Communist ideological expansionism constituted a threat to the very survival of democratic system. But as George Kennan pointed out, the Communists while espousing an offensive ideology were also convinced that history was on their side and were not ready to push it at the risk of a nuclear conflict. Both sides thus opted for a status-quo and the world was spared a nuclear war.

In the sixties the U.S. gave serious thought to the possibility of carrying out a total disarming strike on the Soviet Union when it had more than ten times the superiority in warheads. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff could not, however, assure the President that a few Soviet warheads would not get through to the U.S. and that was enough to deter Washington from pursuing that idea of a disarming strike.

No doubt Robert McNamara as Defence Secretary came up with very fanciful calculations of what percentages of Soviet population and industry should be threatened by assured destruction to become the deterrent. These calculations were based on the Soviet Union suffering 20 million casualties in the Second World War and enormous damage to its industry in the European part of Russia. But that happened incrementally over four years of the war and the Soviet leadership could not have known there would be such losses when the Nazi aggression took place. In real world, the Soviets could not accept the loss of fifteen thousand lives in Afghanistan and pulled out of that country. In a sense, the U.S. calculations were a misplaced justification to build an arsenal of several thousand warheads and engage the Soviet Union in an arms race. Having built 30,000 warheads at great costs, both sides are now cutting back on their arsenals and dismantling those weapons, again at great cost.

Robert McNamara in later years of his life changed his views. Writing in Foreign Policy of May/June 2005 he said that he had never seen any U.S. or NATO war plan which concluded that initiating the use of nuclear weapons would yield U.S. or the Alliance any benefit. He added that his statements to this effect had never been refuted by any NATO Defence Minister or senior military leaders. Yet it was impossible for any of them, including the U.S. Presidents, to make such statements publicly because they were totally contrary to established NATO policy

War is politics by other means and the aim of a war is to compel the adversary to accept one’s terms. President Reagan and the Soviet Union’s General Secretary Gorbachev are on record that a nuclear war cannot be won. In a nuclear war, once the missiles are launched, entire countries on both sides become battlefields. It is difficult to control or regulate the firing of the missiles since both sides are under compulsion to use the missiles before they are eliminated by the enemy strike. As soon as the first city is hit, populations of all cities would attempt to empty out into the countryside since there will be panic that their own city will be the next target in the next few minutes. Think of the entire urban population of a country becoming internally displaced persons in a matter of hours. Can there be effective governance in the country?

A thermonuclear weapon of 150 kiloton explosive power or three 25 kiloton warheads delivered in a distributed way on a city will perhaps produce equal magnitudes of casualties and property damage. Can it be argued that only a 150 kiloton weapon will deter another warhead of a similar yield? Deterrence is not about the damage one causes to the adversary. It is about what the aggressive side will consider as unacceptable. It is irrelevant whether the destruction is caused by 150 kt weapons or 25 kt weapons. Obviously, it is not infra-dig for a 3,500-km range missile to carry a 25 kt warhead. Cost-effectiveness calculations have no meaning since the nuclear war itself has no meaning. In a mega-city struck by a couple of 25 kt warheads, apart from the hundreds of thousands of dead, there will be an equal number of people wounded and more people affected by radiation; all of whom will be envying the dead. One of us is revisiting the calculations involved in predicting the extent of destruction inflicted by nuclear weapons. Our preliminary results suggest that that even with 25kt fission bombs, the damages are going to be far more and extensive than what Hiroshima and Nagasaki suffered given the higher population densities in the cities of China and South Asia and the urban development of recent years. Therefore, the Indian deterrent posture will not lose its credibility if India is compelled to rely on fission weapons only.

Important determinants

The role of the Indian nuclear weapons is to deter others using nuclear weapons against us. It can perform that role so long as the retaliatory force is perceived as survivable and able to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor. That does not depend on the explosive yield of the individual warheads. Theoretically speaking, the same unacceptable damage can be inflicted by increasing the number of delivery vehicles and warheads of lower yield and increasing their survivability. Reliability, robustness and survivability of weapon platforms are important determinants in validating the deterrence a country practices.

In this article we do not propose to sermonise on the need to eliminate nuclear weapons globally. This was articulated by Rajiv Gandhi in the United Nations many years ago, but has not been pursued since then. Along with our deterrence policy, we should once again pursue the mission for the global elimination of nuclear weapons. Our world will be better for that and fission or fusion will then lose their relevance.

( K. Subrahmanyam is a well known strategic analyst and V.S. Arunachalam, a former Scientific Advisor to Defence Minister, is now Chairman of CSTEP, a Bangalore-based think-tank.)

http://beta.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article22870.ece

Same view as mine, from more qualified people.

It will be unnecessary when 1)There will be no nuclear willy table(read : P5)
2)Our neighbours stop waving their willies at us.

It is scietnfically proven that you only need to have a certian sized willy to get the job done.

WTF is a “minimum” deterrent?Either there is one or there isnt.And currently its not sufficient to deter our larger neighbour.

It is because with what we have we can kill millions of people and thats unacceptable damage worthy of detterence.

Yeah..your avatar says it all though..

Only on a fair basis. And only if its good for us.

Letme guess when that is going to happen….uhhh..NEVER!

It will it will take a bit of time.

You tend to drift your argument as its suits your need , from not liking close Western relation , to not needing TN , to hitting population centers………..

Are you aware all P-5 have TN device of various yeald from MT to 100’s of kT ? And there exist TransAnlantic NATO alliance ?

Just because you feel US is paramount for India , it does not matter to you if Indian security and her interest are important , let India suffer at the cost of close US relations is what you want and believe.

We are not on the same page.

Not true but all this Nuclear Willy Waving is un-necessary we have our minimum deterrent against both our neighbors. And thats all we need.

I am not concerned about the U.S relations. Testing now will be a blunder thats all. I told you we can and should test. Just bid for our time.