MiG-31s would fire their R-33s from outside the F-15s envelope, the missiles would most likely miss, and the MiG-31s would turn around and go home. F-15 would have little chance to catch up. Thats probably what would happen.

very likely but we cannot assume that all R-33s will miss just because they are not tried in combat.Foxhound has the range advantage and a pretty decent radar, dont you think that ( under most circumstances) the launch of large salvo of missiles ( by a quartet of foxhounds for example) will increase the pK ?

but dogfighting is the last thing a MiG-31 will do unless is at supersonic speeds where the eagle won`t have any advantage at all

can you please explain that ? I thought F-15 has the advantage at all speed and altitude in WVR combat

but of course the R-33 is not a super weapon with 100% sucess kill rate, it might have less limitations than a F-14 has with a MiG-25 because the F-15 was not designed to fly as fast in cruise motion as the MiG-25, the R-33 might fail

apparently the R-33 outranges the AIM-7, the Mig-31 can fire all 4 R-33s in a salvo against a F-15 increasing the chances of a hit.And then run for home.
Will the F-15 be able to get a lock on the MiG if the Mig-31 launches this salvo outside the range of the AIM-7 ?

^ thanks for contributing , but the cold war was over by the time AIM-120 got operational.
What would you do if you are in a AIM-7 equipped F-15 ?

Thank you gentleman for replying, so far from What I understand it seems like that the R-33 would be able to engage fighter sized targets at a longer range than AIM-7s at all altitudes ?

The Slugging-Match over Lebanon
After the last chapter of the Yom Kippour/Ramadan War was definitely closed by the cease-fire on the Golan front, in April 1974, there followed a longer lull in the constant war between Israel and Syria until 1979 and 1980, when a new series of skirmishes developed, as the SyAAF tried to interfere with frequent Israeli recce and bombing missions against PLO-positions in Lebanon. The SyAAF was relatively slow to introduce the MiG-23MS during the fighting over Lebanon, instead dispatching MiG-21s. When the losses of these started to mount, however, the situation changed, and soon enough the Syrian GCI was on a search for a suitable target with which it could re-introduce the MiG-23MS to combat.

The first such event occurred on the afternoon of 26th April 1981, when an Israeli formation bombed the PLO-positions in the southern Lebanese city of Sidon. Two MiG-23MS, which were on low orbit over northern Lebanon, were vectored to intercept, and they were successful in shooting two A-4 Skyhawks down. Following this and several more clashes the situation over Lebanon became particularly tense, but for the time being, the Israelis were busy with preparing their operation against the Iraqi reactor in Tuweitha, flown in June 1981, and the next opportunity for the Syrian MiG-23MS’ to engage Israeli fighters appeared only after the start of the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon, the operation „Peace for Galilea“, initiated on 6 June 1982.

Initially, the Israelis tried to evade any engagements with Syrians, and the IDF/AF concentrated on supporting the ground troops on their drive towards Beirut. However, the SyAAF was clearly not to sit still and monitor as the Israeli armored formations were clearly threatening to bypass flanks of Syrian positions in the Bekaa Valley, or the IDF/AF reconnaissance operations get a clear picture of the Syrian SAM-positions. Therefore, very soon after the start of the Israeli operations, first Syrian interceptors appeared in the Lebanese skies. Nevertheless, while MiG-23MFs have successfully shot down an Israeli BQM-34 recce drone and evaded a section of four Israeli F-15s which fired numerous Sparrows against them on 6 June, and also claimed to have shot down one F-16 on the following day, the MiG-23MS were kept back and did not take part in any fighting initially.

Three days into the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the situation changed completely, as a frontal clash with Syrian troops deployed in the Bekaa Valley and around Beirut became unavoidable. In order to establish air superiority over the battlefield, on the afternoon of 9 June 1982, starting at 14:14hrs, the IDF/AF executed the well known operation against the SAM-sites in the eastern Lebanon, deploying 26 F-4Es to attack Syrian radars with AGM-78 Standard ARM/Purple Fist and AGM-45 Shrike anti-radar missiles. A total of 19 radars was claimed as destroyed or neutralized in the first wave and one of the obvious consequences was, that in the following battles, caused by the appearance of the second Israeli wave, including a total of 92 A-4 Skyhawks, F-4E Phantoms, and Kfirs, escorted by F-15s and F-16s, both the Syrian SAM-stations and no less but 54 Syrian MiG-21 and MiG-23 interceptors sent to stop them were left „blind“. With their radars positioned inside Lebanon out, the Syrians were compelled to guide their fighters using long-range systems positioned inside Syria, and disturbed by the mountain ridges in between. These, however, were jammed by the Israelis, just like the communications between Syrian pilots and their GCI-stations, while – guided by Grumman E-2C Hawkeyes – Israeli interceptors waited in ambush at low level between Lebanese hills. In the ensuing battle, several Syrian MiG-21-squadrons were mauled. Syrian MiG-23MS-pilots played only a secondary role, and have claimed only one Israeli F-4E Phantom as shot down by R-3S’ missiles fired by two Floggers, while two of them were also shot down, with the loss of one pilot, Lt. Sofi. To contrary, Syrian MiG-23MF-pilots claimed a total of three kills, in exchange for three losses, with all pilots ejecting safely.

The following air-to-air battles fought over Lebanon between 9 and 11 June 1982 were some of the largest ever involving jet fighters, as subsequently the SyAAF started to fly air-to-ground missions as well. Initially a squadron-sized attack force, escorted by at least a squadron of interceptors, was dispatched, with the interceptor pilots being ordered to do their utmost to keep Israeli interceptors at bay. Col. K. H.*, a decorated MiG-23 pilot which flew 13 combat missions over Lebanon in June 1982, explained the situation:

“We were continuously pushed into pursuing the enemy by the ground control, although we were not in the best situations. The enemy used this to advantage and set up numerous ambushes were some fighters would drag us into the shooting zone of the others. When closed to 10-15 kilometers to the enemy, our radars would get black and we would lose all means of detecting them. Heavy jamming wasn’t concentrated on our radars alone, but also on our communications with ground control. Still, there were ways to trick that situation. One was for many formations to ingress simultaneously, or in waves one closely behind the other. This way the later waves would still have the ability to use their radar and fire at the enemy while they were busy engaging the first wave. This tactics, however, proved very expensive, and always lead to losses on our side.

“Many of our pilots were not experienced; they always obeyed to any order by the GCI, and this lead many of them into the death. I followed the advice from an older pilot not to always do what I’m told to do, and this saved me. I used a tactics which depended on making the enemy angry. I would close at high speed, but before entering the range of their Sparrows, I’d turn away and then do that again and again, until they would start to fire their missiles even outside the maximum range. I once evaded four Sparrows this way. Only then would I try to close into the range of my missiles, usually causing them to turn away and try to avoid. That way my mission was done and my bombers were safe to attack.

On 10th of June, SyAAF MiG-23MS’ are not known to have flown any combat sorties over Lebanon. Apparently, this was also the case with MiG-23MFs as well. After the first two days of massive air-to-air battles, it became clear to Syrians, that well placed Israeli fighters have managed several times to torn the escort of Syrians bomber-formations apart. In some cases, the situation was so bad, that the best some of Syrian pilots could do was to drag Israelis into SAM-traps, as Col. H., explained:
“During my last missions, I developed my tactics a little more. I managed twice to lure enemy F-15s into SAM-ambushes. First time they were not hit, but the second time an Eagle got hit and I was told it was shot down. I got many praises for that.”

On 11th June, the SyAAF changed its tactics one more time, starting to dispatch two huge formations – each consisting of a squadron-worth of fighter-bombers with escort of another squadron of interceptors. Several times, also MiG-25s were deployed at high speeds and levels, decoying the Israelis away from the strikers following at low levels. This changed the situation at least in so far, that now the Syrian interceptors would make the Israeli fighters busy, and, even if the first attack wave would have to abort the mission, or suffer losses to Israelis, the second wave following closely behind would usually be able to take advantage of the complete chaos over them.

Apparently, this tactics enabled at least two larger Su-22-formations to break through and hit an Israeli MIM-23 Hawk SAM-site, as well as to cause extensive damage to one of armored brigades battling the Syrian 3rd Armored Division near the Beirut-Damascus road. Furthermore, during the melée in which F-15s and F-16s of the IDF/AF and Israeli SAMs claimed between five and seven Su-22s shot down, two MiG-23MS-pilots apparently used the chaos to break away and surprise an ingressing Israeli formation. Capt. Abdul Wahhab al-Kherat and one of the pilots from the al-Zoa’by family, claimed one F-4E each as shot down using R-3S missiles. According to Syrian sources, both pilots were subsequently shot down by Israeli F-15s, but they ejected safely and walked back to Syrian positions.

Another former SyAAF pilot, Capt. D., later explained:
“Without dispute, we did many mistakes in 1982, and many of our younger and less experienced pilots paid for these with their lives. But the Israelis were never in full control of the skies over Lebanon, and many Syrian pilots managed to dictate the rules of the battle. Heavy jamming and good planning applied by the other side caused us many problems, but the SyAAF was neither completely destroyed, nor neutralized, and it remained active right until the cease-fire at noon of 11th June.”

In total, during the fighting over Lebanon, between April 1981 and June 1982, the SyAAF MiG-23MS claimed two kills and suffered a loss of four planes and one pilot (according to Syrian sources, the SyAAF lost a total of 85 planes between 6th and 11th June, 1982, together with 27 pilots killed and eight injured, and in exchange for 21 Israeli aircraft and helicopters; Israeli sources, to contrary, deny any losses in air combats, while their published air-to-air claims vary between 82:0 and 85:0).

http://s188567700.online.de/CMS/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=183&Itemid=47

Some observers were drawing the conclusion that the warsaw pact airforces can be dealt with in a similar way by NATO as israelis defeated the syrians.
But from what I am hearing it does not seem that these 2 situations were alike.Rather it seems like the syrians had every possible disadvantage.