Rubbish! I remember seeing photos of Jags with over wing R-550 in 1976.

Then go complain to BAe for being taken for a ride, since they got the overwing capability via HAL.

Its already pretty well known that numbers and dates are not your forte, so go recheck.

My sources are given below and the ASTE – Overwing Magic2 thing is old hand. Perhaps its a surprise to you?

Weapons carriage was also generally similar to that of British Jaguars, with several customers buying the BL755 cluster bomb as a prominent store. The Jaguar International could be fitted with the overwing pylons, mentioned in the previous section, for carriage of heat-seeking AAMs, allowing all underwing pylons to be used for heavy stores. The usual overwing munition was a Matra Magic AAM, though the Sidewinder was also qualified eventually. Although it might seem that overwing launch would have led to problems with stores separation, it apparently was no big deal.

And the above mentions the Jaguar International which is what the IAF operates and in no way disproves what ASTE did.

Think they maybe used on the choppers on the frigates, which makes sense, why waste a harpoon or exocet on a small patrol boat when a much cheaper and smaller ATGM will do. I think US P-3s can carry maverick

PT, which helo commander would like to use a slow, SACLOS ATGM requiring a human operator, against a fast moving target, which can be very carrying MANPADS?

Mavericks come in fire and forget flavours. The ATGMs in the PA inventory dont.

WTF are you babbling about? What danger?

Aw dont do the martyr act and leave in a huff because of one discussion wherein you did all the initial punching.

Boss, you are welcome to break open a case of champagne when the Gorshy sinks. Your life, your choice.

Great to see you acknowledging that you dont need a case. Boss, as of now, you dont have one. So its a moot point.

GRRR, you really don’t get it do you???
I’m not saying those IN experts are bad, they certainly know more about it than I do, since I’m still learning from them (not IN ones, but other ones, from a less monkey-country), what I’m saying is that their results might have been “changed” by higher instances.

Sev, I really dont quite get you. Less-monkey country? What is that supposed to mean.

That apart, the basic flaw in your theory is this:
1. Multiple delegations went to see the Gorshkov
2.They comprised not merely of the IN, but the DRDO and the MOD as well
3. The negotiations were multiyear and pursued by different teams

In such a clime its well nigh impossible for a few motivated parties to swing the deal and convince all concerned.

About those fights, the most obvious ones I’ve seen: Belgian admiral was accused of being drunk most of the time on official diners, also accused of sexual intimidation, in a “anonimous letter” to a paper and armed forces commander. And then came the defense of the MoD.

The IN is NOT the Belgian Navy.

Russian Admiral Suchkov was replaced as commander of the Northern Fleet, within a month after he declared only a Single Typhoon SSBN carried only 10 missiles. He was replaced by a admiral that had never even been in the Northern Fleet, he was trained in and made his entire carreer in the Pacific fleet, Admiral Abramov (if you wanted to check that).
And then there of course was the case of Pyotr Velikiy that was likely to blow up any time because the commander happened to be the nephew of one of Kuroyedov’s accusors in the Kurk “scandal”.
Admirals often know their case, but there is mostly more than one person waiting for his position, as you said it doesn’t really matter in here.
If I’m talking about Russian Navy, I very well know what I’m talking about. I sent a picture to Blackcat with some “evidence” of what Russians do with ships. I’ll try to reduce the pic in size, but can’t promise to get it online.

Nor is it the Russian Navy.

I seriously see a communication problem here. You are taking some serious politicking across certain other organizations which you know of and ascribing the same to the IN.
Is that objective or what?

Please realize that vested interests are not “swinging the Gorshkov”, the interests are merely the IN’s acquisition bean counters doing their job, to ensure that the IN retains its carrier ability and enhances it over its present position as laid out in RAdmiral Chopre’s article.

Furthermore, I have no claims to prescience regarding either the Belgians or the Russians- heck, they may be your forte not mine. However I do know that the IN *is* (thankfully) professional.

I also know that the IN’s current system is robust enough to ensure that a few bad apples- as will exist in any organization- cannot swing a deal the size of the Gorshkov. Esp without the media or the PAC/ CAG / Assorted beancounters getting a whiff of it.

All service chiefs have supported the Gorshkov. It has been backed by numerous technical surveys. The vested interest angle simply does not hold!

Well, I haven’t been on Gorshkov, but I’ve been on other Russian ships and have many high-res pictures of them. Then you see the general Russian thought about their Navy. In a certain way I indeed admit I ‘m whistling in the dark, but I do have my lighter with me…

Dude, get a life. If you havent been on the Gorshkov, then you certainly know less than IN delegations who have worked on Russian ships all their life and examined the ship. Being a merchant navy sailor doesnt make you a know it all when it comes to Russian expertise and certainly doesnt make you more of an expert than those whose job it is to do evaluate weapons platforms and who have served on them all their life.
Given the chutzpah of your statements below, I’d say you had them coming.

And you guys really have to stop dreaming. I’ve heard about a dozen Indians yelling: “everything is controlled in our country” and “No one would lie” and all that kind of bull****, but I can tell you in every country the ones that aren’t scared of their position still have their price.

Utter and total nonsense. Name those Indians. You fail to understand the rationale behind a public, multilayered audit but you can continue to wank about some kind of conspiracy and how powerful people are pushing the Gorshkov, but hey, I have a bridge here to sell you.

The only one BSing is you with your idiotic accusations about Indians claiming
“everything being controlled”. If you cant grasp the concept of a multilayered audit mechanism and a paper trail which has worked for countless projects but hey, which disappears for the Gorshkov, pardon my total and complete disbelief at your lack of reading comprehension and your ability to twist others words.

In some countries fights are more open and ruthless (Russia for example) than others, but be assured these fights and so called “control comitties” are and happen EVERYWHERE. A Navy consists of people that love their job, people that want the best for themselves and their country, if that requires a lie to achieve, then so be it.

At least be consistent. So purchasing a decrepit ship is IN the Navy’s interests and they’d lie to Parliament about it. ROTFLMAO.
Heres a CLUE for you. The delegations to the Gorshkov included MOD, DRDO and IN experts. How easy for the Navy to buy all of them off.
Wow.

But that is something that goes against most governments (and their funding programme). The admirals really aren’t Saints, you don’t reach such a position by being a good man.

Great. Now the Admirals are the target, hey? Jeezuz, dude you have issues.
Have you even met any freakin IN admiral before making such wild allegations based upon some generic stuff you believe in?
For all my contempt for Nadkarnis pie in the sky views and his naivete regarding certain issues, I also know he is regarded as a good man by his peers and his subordinates.
I would still accord him respect if I met him. But hey, you know ALL about the IN and now say Admirals arent Saints.
WTF relevance does that have to the topic anyhow?
As was proven, Nadkarnis claims were rubbished by his peers, another admiral and now since that happened, Admirals are no longer saints!
Jeez!

But I won’t say anything more about this.

Hallelujah!

My last posts were more to be educative to Blackcat and answer his questions. Here are some pictures to show what I mean. (NOTE: these ships have hard lives, that is why they mostly are only good for 10 years of service, much harder than a carrier, so it’s unlikely that the snapping will occur to a carrier)

Oh I appreciate your knowledge of what you do know but kindly do realise the limitations of what you do know when you go about psychoanalyzing the IN or Indians in general without even attempting to understand whats being said in the first place.

PLus all the other obnoxious BS about Indians this, Indians that.

Oh wait, since we are talking of Admirals here- why not try this as well…what his peers think of Nadkarni’s views:

The Black Gorshkov
Vice-Admiral Subhash Chopra (Retd.)

Last fortnight we reproduced an article from The Asian Age by former Indian Navy Chief Admiral J.G. Nadkarni, on the move to acquire the Russian carrier Admiral Gorshkov. Admiral Nadkarni had argued against it. In a riposte which appeared also in The Asian Age, Vice-Admiral Subhash Chopre (Retd.) argues strongly in favour of the Gorshkov.

THERE IS is a good old saying that “old generals don’t die they simply fade away”. Surely this applies equally to old admirals. But what shall we do when some refuse to do so?

There was the case of an ex-chief of naval staff who having presided over many nuclear-related projects, suddenly turned a peacenik after retirement and now heads the anti-nuclear lobby in India for whatever it is worth. Now comes another ex-chief of naval staff who laboured hard to get a 30,000 tons plus aircraft carrier built at Cochin Shipyard in the early ’90s but failed to do so because of financial and bureaucratic hurdles, turning against an alternative which his successors deem not only desirable but vital for the operational efficiency of the Navy.

Surely there must be a more graceful method of voicing one’s opinion, rather than asserting the Napoleonic epithet “after me the deluge”. Since we all respect the institution of the chief of naval staff, past and present, it is not the intention to belittle their expertise nor their abiding interest in the future growth of our service. But it is general knowledge in the naval community that more than four fully qualified and professionally competent delegations from Naval Headquarters and Ministry of Defence have visited Gorshkov over the last four years to decide its suitability for our Navy and have given a green chit for her acquisition.

It was not the label “free” that attracted them but the need to replace the Vikrant, at least before Viraat also becomes ready for replacement. This in no way deters the government from ordering the building of an indigenous carrier which will take more than ten years to build even if ordered tomorrow. By then, it will be time to retire the Viraat which would have seen service lasting over a quarter of century in our Navy.

The strange suggestion that Koreans can build us a cheaper carrier at one fifth the cost is simply laughable because they have neither built a warship of this size before, nor will they have the expertise to do so in the future. Trivialising the induction of a major naval weapon by the current management in naval headquarters does no credit to the retired community, who ought to and indeed always has acted in a supportive role to naval planners.

Irrespective of whether the Gorshkov is required or not, let there be no doubt that non-acquisition of a replacement carrier will have serious repercussions on the war fighting capability of the Navy. All those who have been covering the Afghan war would know that America despite being the only super-power, was not allowed to use any airfield in countries surrounding Afghanistan for its fighter bomber operations. Only her aircraft carriers, operating some 400 miles away in the Arabian Sea, could provide this facility from their sovereign flight decks. They not only managed to turn the table against the Taliban, but established total control of airspace in Afghanistan, within the first few days of the war.

There are many factors besides the operational capability of the fleet, which can dictate the need to acquire the Gorshkov. Not only will it bring state-of-the-art air capability, but also add a new dimension to naval operations at sea. Though the Russian Navy is not well known for integral air operations at sea — she is the first to introduce the operation of the modern high performance aircraft from the flight deck, one-tenth the length of a runway ashore, without the use of the steam catapult, which is the standard equipment on board US carriers.

Admiral Kuznetsov is the first carrier in the world to operate SU-33 and MIG-29K high performance aircraft, weighing 18 tons and 5 tons respectively, without a steam catapult. These aircraft belong to the same family as SU-30M and MiG-29, in service with our Air Force.

Displacement: 67,000 tons full load
Dimensions: 984 x 124.5 x 36 feet/300 x 38 x 11 meters
Extreme Dimensions: 990 x 239 x 36 feet/301.8 x 72.8 x 11 meters
Propulsion: Steam turbines, 8 boilers, 4 shafts, 200,000 hp, 30 knots
Crew: 1,500 plus air wing
Armor: Uncertain; probably little or none
Armament: 16 SS-N-19 Shipwreck SSM, 18 8-cell SA-N-9 Gauntlet SAM VLS, 8 CADS-1 CIWS (each 2 30mm gatling AA plus 16 SA-N-11 SAM), 6 AK-630 30 mm gatling AA, 2 RBU-12000 ASW rocket launchers
Aircraft: Approx. 30

Herein lies the story and the arguments why we must acquire the Admiral Gorshkov as a matter of urgency to upgrade our air capability at sea.
We started carrier flying with Sea Hawks in Conventional Take Off and Landing (CTOL) mode on board Vikrant, later graduating to Vertical or Short Take Off and Landing (VSTOL) system with Sea Harriers and now we have the opportunity to move forward to free take off and arrested landing concept.

Conversion plans offered on the Gorshkov include removal of all heavy armament on the upper deck, thus giving it a take-off run of 900 metres with a 14 degree ski-jump at the forward end to enable MiG-29 type of aircraft to climb away safely with full load. A specially designed hold-back device will enable the MiG-29K to build up full power before rolling. Recovery of the aircraft would be by the tailhook picking up one of the arrestor wires along the angled portion of the deck. The STOBAR concept i.e. Short Take Off and Arrested Recovery, is already in full use on board the Kuznestov and isn’t much different from how aircraft operated from carriers during World War II, except that the current generation fighters are much heavier and tend to eat up a lot of runway before getting airborne.

The Admiral Gorshkov will also be fitted out with all the latest flight deck support equipment required for safe operations of 24 high performance fighters like MiG-29 and SU-33s. In addition, she will be able to carry six ASW helicopters, the actual mix of aircraft depending on the Navy’s choice.

It will thus be seen that induction of the Admiral Gorshkov in the next few years will be a great relief for naval aviation. The cost of the ship and its air wing is a matter of negotiations which no one outside Naval Headquarters is privy to. So there is no point guess-estimating the cost merely to strengthen one’s argument. Surely our government won’t go in for a weapon system which is not effective.

Last, but no less important is the long awaited induction of the HAL-built LCA into the Navy. The Gorshkov will not only enable test flying of this aircraft in STOBAR concept from its flight deck, but also facilitate its full-scale induction after the VSTOL Sea Harriers are retired from service. Finally, those of us who have been watching ongoing research in carrier-borne aviation know that the British are also planning bigger carriers than those in their current inventory. These will be built without catapults and will operate aircraft in the STOBAR concept. By acquiring the Gorshkov, we are seemingly a step ahead of them.

Copyright: The Asian Age, Nov. 27, 2001

http://www.stratmag.com/issue2Dec-1/page02.htm#a02

BTW, this article was a riposte to Nadkarni’s “views” which appeared in 2001 itself.

Sameer,

Pak Thunder is exactly right. The issue here is not one of Indian niaivete its one of the IN having to accept what theyre given by their poltical leadership.

I am sorry Steve, but you are seriously living in cloud cuckoo land if you believe that the IN of all three services would accept something foisted upon it by the political leadership. The IN has traditionally been a very conservative service in terms of fund expenditure, it abhors waste and has always used its funds best of all three services. They have an amazing relationship with local industry primarily because they realised the cost effectiveness of local involvement. The approach the Navy pioneered is yet to be replicated in depth by the other services. In effect the Indian Navy is the most sensible of the three services when it comes to purchasing and outfitting equipment.
If they are buying the Gorshkov, the ship would have been thoroughly checked out to the last bolt and nut.

As regards accepting what is given- do look upon the Shtil issues and the Talwars. The IN chose to withdraw its entire team from Russia rather than accept a ship with a malfunctioning system which the Russians assured they would fix. All three Indian services are intractable when it comes to equipment induction- ask the local R&D fok who interact with them.

The only “political inductions” India has ever made are the Vijayanta MBT and the Su-22. The latter proved its weight in gold in battle though and was used to the hilt. And these inductions were made when India had limited forex and restrictive political climes.

Do tell us of any more “political inductions” made by the Indian services which were not part of the staff requirements! Even the Bofors which came under so much political heat was the #3 of the top ranked 5 and is widely accepted to be one of the lynhcpins of the Indian success at Kargil.

Given the time wasted on acquiring a replacement for Vikrant, all the early 90’s negotiations with Bazan and DCN etc, Gorshkov politically became an important project for the continued regional superpower status of the IN and for the prestige of India in general.

Errant nonsense I am afraid. Have you even talked to any IN staff before making such statements? They sound extremely pompous and are false to boot.
Gorshkov has never been a political project- the delay suffered is primarliy because of India’s civilian top heavy MOD structure as well as the need to dot all the i’s and cross all the t’s when it comes to a multibillion $ project.
Furthermore, the prime delay in the Gorshkov came becuase India simply did not have the money. Kindly look upon when India’s purse became full post 91 slump, and the competing demands on a limited exchequer. All the services were hit.
All this superpower status necessitates an aircraft carrier is left to the Tom Clancy types.
If India was really concerned about the prestige factor it would have sealed the deal asap, not signed it at a time and place of its choice.

A great deal of time and effort was expended on the contract definition and negotiation.

They always are. India hammers out its deals ruthlessly primarily because we are a developing country with limited resources. Spending billions of public money on arms acquisitions thanks to our security perception necessitates that India have ironclad deals which can stand upto intense public scrutiny. They can make and break governments. After the Bofors imbroglio, every document is pored over with a microscope and then some.

Political expediency would not have been served by the GoI pulling out of the deal at any late stage as it would have left the IN back at square one nearly a decade and a half after the first studies were undertaken for the replacement of Vikrant.

Here you approach the basic rationale yet cloud it up with a tale of political expediency! The GOI has pushed for the Gorshkov because the Navy WANTS it. The GOI would gladly not sign the deal and the Fin Min would gladly allocate it elsewhere. However, the Navy has consistently stuck to its guns on the Gorshkov issue and has detailed reports backing its case. In such a scenario, the Navy’s needs have to be met.

In that context the fact that Gorshkov would give the IN some form of aviation capability, by this time to replace Viraat AS WELL as Vikrant, could easily have been viewed as more significant than specific capabilities and operational efficiencies of the vessel itself.Viewed in that light how disruptive would it have been to publically release the fact that the carrier was in a poor materiel condition?. The very fact that so much of the carrier needs replacement 70-80% is indicative of the real state of it anyway.

Utter tosh. You are speaking of a nation here which has detailed stats on all its acquisition programs.
The Govt is bound by law to release all details of prime acquisition programs and is (over) enthusiastically vetted by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India who reviews defence expenditure and programs, plus a nonpartisan Parliamentary Accounts Committee.
The stuff which you speak of, disruptive this that, is purely fictitious. In the past, the Def Min has been taken to task by the CAG for merely overstocking basic ammunition.
The Su30MKI program saw the CAG criticising the initial imported Su30K’s logistic units for poor build quality and the additional effort required to repair them. The Tunguskas purchased were also vetted, old units were noted as such and the Govt criticised.

Given that each of the above were political hot potato’s- I do wonder how the GOI managed to fail in hushing up the mistakes it initially made and then rectified, and yet managed an utter success in the case of the Gorshkov.

Do go ahead- Indian weapons acquisitions are my forte, as are Indian R&D programs, and in well nigh over a decade of research, I am yet to come across any indications of “image” driving acquisitions or any deals that escaped the CAG’s or PAC’s scanner.

Heck, even the Integrated Guided Missile Program is publically vetted.

In fact, by taking a political tack to addressing the Gorshkov issue and resorting to the hackneyed arguements of “regional superpower”/”image” etc, you only indicate that your arguements are apparently failing on technical grounds and you have to resort to emotive mud slinging to substantiate your claims.

Given the standards you are aspiring to, I may well point out that the RN maintianed its Upholders for purely political reasons and the Canadians purchased an utter lemon – as demonstrated by its recent “excursion”, testifying to the RN’s impeccable maintenance. Hardly accurate, but hey, anything goes, eh?

4. Indian LCA will see further delays

Hardly. This year saw the LCA program sticking to schedule with the anticipated number of flights being met. The following years will see more airframes entering the program and if anything that will accelerate the program.
Plus the GOI has agreed to release more money for the Kaveri development. And per the IAF’s requirement, testing is being speeded up there as well.
The AL31FP production in India also provides a critical fallback, though with reengineering required, if the Kaveri does not deliver by the end of this decade. Ample time.

4) LCA carries on trundling along while the IAF look towards Gripen with tech transfer and fabrication licenses (i wish!! )

The LCA carried out 180 flights this year, with merely 3 airframes- of which one entered relatively late.
The coming year calls for more airframes to enter the program. The program is being accelerated and is hardly “trundling along”. Over the next five years, there will be a total of 17 aircraft in the program, with 8 LSP entering post 2007! Then consider the hours racked up, especially given that the IAF will be be using the LSP as part of the Interim Op Cert program.

The LCA’s key avionics items have already been certified and are being inducted into the IAF’s frontline fleet via Mid Life Upgrades.
The latest news being that the IN MiG29K’s will also see the LCA derived Project Vetrivale equipment.

Rgarding the Gripen, I hope not! The Gripen, is the LCA’s peer not its superior regarding technology and performance and comes with many political strings attached thanks to its considerable US content. Something which the IAF will wish to avoid at all cost.

For the same reason, the F16 sale is a no-show. If anything its the Mirage which will win. Talking to IAF officers, they are still p1ssed over RAC MiG’s inability to deliver on its prior promises and hence the MiG29 MRCA is also hamstrung.

Dassault must be already preparing to have the biggest post sale bash ever.
:rolleyes: