Why did Agni-III lose its fire?

Agni-III took off majestically as the solid propellants fired well. Yet, the missile could not go its full course. What really went wrong with it, though the Agni team seemed so sure as the simulation trials were successful? There is definitely a case for conducting more test flights of the missiles to master the technologies and prove the ruggedness of the components.

India’s quest for acquiring a minimum credible deterrent and arming itself with long-range, nuclear capable, air strike power, received a setback, with the `failure’ of the first trial flight of its most ambitious Agni-III missile.

It could be at least six-eight months before the Defence scientists ready the next test flight of Agni-III, consequent to the mishap that struck the maiden launch on July 9 from Wheeler Island off the coast of Orissa.

According to initial data, the reasons for the `failure’ of the missile to go its full course, after a smooth take-off, were a combination of control and component features not measuring up to the task. The long-range missile had, after a perfect lift-off and flight for nearly 70 seconds, suddenly developed `snags’ and, unable to smoothly transit into Stage-II, tumbled off, severing links with the mission control.

Indigenous Agni-III

The fully indigenous Agni-III weighed 48 tonnes, was 16 metres tall with a payload of 1.5 tonnes. After hours of checking and cross-checking nearly 200 parameters, the missile command had pressed the okay for Agni-III to take-off at exactly 11-03 on that Sunday morning.

The confidence among the DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) missile family was high. The missile was carrying a range of systems, products and components that had been developed indigenously. They were all tested and re-tested. The team had been waiting for months, after having test-run and simulated various systems and sub-systems, for the final launch.

Short-lived euphoria

It went as programmed: The missile took off majestically as the solid propellants fired well. But the euphoria among DRDO team was short-lived. After 70 seconds, the missile, just into the second stage, broke-up, lost contact with the control room and plunged into the Bay of Bengal, scientists said.

What really went wrong, even as the Agni team seemed so sure after the successful simulation trials? According to Defence scientists, there is always a gap between the actual testing and simulation. While the latter can tell you that you have a design in place, the former will indicate if that design is foolproof or error-prone. The core team of the Agni-III programme, piloted by the Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL), Hyderabad, will now have to scrutinise all the data collected by the six radars, the different telemetry and tracking stations, and learn the lessons fast. On the face of it, the propulsion system did well, the Rocket Motor Casings performed good, the inertial navigation and guidance was fine and the on-board computer took over. “It can be easily a 50-70 per cent success of the systems as of now. The final analysis will give us the complete picture,” explained scientists involved in the programme.

The two-stage, solid propellant-powered, surface-to-surface, ballistic missile, Agni, has been the `pride’ and most strategic project in the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP), launched in 1982-83, to give the country the necessary strike power and defence capability. In addition to ASL, the Research Centre Imarat (RCI), the Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL), the Defence Electronics Research Laboratory (DLRL), the Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratory (DMRL), amd the High Energy Materials Laboratory (HEMRL) are actively involved in the project.

It is interesting to note that the July 9 partial failure of Agni-III is just the second mishap in 10 flights of Agni, in its different avatars — Agni-I (700 km range) and Agni-II (2,000 km) — since 1989, when the first technology development flight was successfully accomplished by the DRDO.

Impact of failure

In the field of missile technology, India finds itself on tough terrain. It can, for neither money nor love, get technology, components or buy missiles from the advanced nations because of the control regimes enforced on it.

Hence, development has to be from the scratch, in which case, failure cannot be a big surprise. But, then, the failures tend to have a larger impact for countries like India, compared to the developed nations, both in terms of time lost and cost.

While guesstimates put the cost of assembling a single long-range Agni missile at Rs 10-15 crore, the equivalent system for a long-range missile in the Agni class would cost five-six times more abroad.

The real challenges thrown up by the failure are in bridging the technology gaps, and developing indigenously the components and systems. This implies delays in taking the project from trial to user to manufacture and final induction.

More trials, a must

To get an idea, the first Agni technology demonstrator was successfully carried out in May 1989, after the initial drawings were frozen in 1987. The user trials of the Agni-I and Agni-II were completed in 2002 and 2004. The number of trials was comparatively few by international standards.

This raises the issue as to why more trials cannot be undertaken. There is definitely a case for conducting more test flights of the missiles to master the technologies and prove the rugged nature of the indigenously-developed components, especially the carbon composites.

Not just in Agni, but also in Tejas — the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) — the percentage of carbon composites has been gradually increasing. The light-weight, tough composites have successfully reduced the weight of these weapon systems.

The strategic significance of Agni-III could make it difficult for India to do a large number of tests, as the delays in the first test flight itself have shown.

It is obvious that with its capability to reach 3,500 km, the country will be able to target Beijing or Shanghai; Agni-I and Agni-II can reach every corner of the sub-continent.

In 18 years, from the initial design of Agni which was able to carry a payload of 100-250 kg at a speed of 7-8 km/sec, Mission Agni has brought the country to the verge of catapulting it into the exclusive group that can develop missiles of over 3,500 km range.

But the proverbial slip between the cup and the lip has temporarily delayed this journey. :rolleyes:

Armed forces favour Agni

Prithvi missile project may be terminated

# Plans to raise more missile groups equipped with Prithvi missiles could be put on hold
# IAF has turned down plans to acquire Prithvi II

NEW DELHI: Despite the lack of success in the first test firing of the long range Agni-III missile, its shorter range versions would continue to be favoured for other tactical and strategic deployments and could even replace the Prithvi series of missiles which have not found favour with the armed forces, said Defence Ministry sources here.

Sources said the continued experimentation with the Agni family of missiles would soon signal the termination of the Prithvi ballistic missile project, the first real success story in the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme.

Although there were reservations about the accuracy of Prithvi missiles, the armed forces were aware that the navigation systems could be improved over time. But they were more concerned about the cumbersome procedure for filling the missiles before the launch as that could leave tell tale signs for the enemy to strike at its location.

As a result, work began on an Agni-I missile variation, which completed its last successful test over two years ago. The importance of the test was underlined by congratulatory messages by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, United Progressive Alliance chairperson Sonia Gandhi and Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee.

Since then, the sources said, the equipping of the specially-raised “334 Missile Group” of the Indian Army with these missiles is “almost complete” while the raising of the “335 Missile Group” has been delayed because of rolling stock unavailability.

The Army also has Prithvi missiles in the “333 Missile Group” and the raising of “444 Missile Group” (sometimes referred to as 222 Missile Group) is also nearly complete. But plans to raise more missile groups equipped with Prithvi missiles could be put on hold despite the Bharat Dynamic Limited having put the production on stream.

In contrast to Prithvi, Agni missiles are filled with solid fuel that does not require a large number of vehicles for fuelling the liquid fuel-based Prithvi I and II. The Indian Air Force too has turned down plans to acquire Prithvi II and, for the present, is focussing more on fitting Brahmos missiles, a product of an Indo-Russian joint venture company. Work is on in Russia to strengthen the wings of the Sukhoi-30 MKI fighter to accommodate a Brahmos missile under either wing. :dev2:

Russia hardsells MiGs to India

Young IAF pilots prefer Mirages over F-16s. But the Mirage assembly lines are now being shut down.

Though French defence minister Michele Alliot-Marie told her Indian counterpart Pranab Mukherjee last month that the lines could be kept open if India gave “firm indications”, France itself is pushing the Rafale now.

“If not the much-cheaper Mirage, go for Rafale. At more than $70 million per jet, Rafale is no doubt very expensive but it’s of the latest generation and packs a mean punch. If not 126, we can go in for a lesser number of Rafales,” says a Wing Commander.

But what about the American jets? The US is even promising spin-offs from its F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and FA-22 Raptor programmes, as also the AESA radars, in the deal. Pilots do not seem too keen on F-16s, which they say haven’t fared too well either “across the border” or in joint exercises with India.

But they feel the much-more expensive F/A-18s, if equipped with AESA radars which make fighters much more lethal, could provide India with a decisive technological edge.

Russia, in turn, is also hardselling its MiG-29M2s. Russian PM Mikhail Fradkov’s visit last week saw Moscow telling New Delhi that MiG-29M2s were “1.5 times cheaper” than new entrants in the race like Rafale.

“Russians have their problems of delayed projects and unreliable spare supply but they give access to everything, unlike the Americans,” says an officer. 😎

IAF doubles overhauling of copters

The number of helicopters to be overhauled annually by the Air Force has been doubled. This sharp increase in the overhauling task has raised several questions, among them being the reason as to why does the Air Force suddenly require such a large number of helicopters to be overhauled.

The step has also brought into focus other issues like availability of trained technical manpower, adequate infrastructure and the inflow of spares. The increase in task is expected to continue for a few years.

Sources revealed that from the forthcoming financial year, No.3 Base Repair Depot (BRD) here has tasked to step up its “production” to about 35 helicopters annually. Production entails stripping open the machine, removing and overhauling the engine and other subsystems, repairing the airframe and finally reassembling and flight-testing the machine.

Over the past few years, the annual “production” at 3 BRD varied from 16-20 helicopters annually. The depot is responsible for the repair and maintenance of Soviet-origin helicopters in the IAF inventory. This includes the Mi-8 and Mi-17 medium utility helicopters and the Mi-25/35 helicopter gunships.

For the purpose of working out the modalities of the revised task, the depot has been on the itinerary of IAF top brass concerned with maintenance. the Air Officer-in-Charge, Maintenance at Air Headquarters, Air Marshal D.U. Chengappa, was here a few days ago. The Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Nagpur-based Maintenance Command, Air Marshal K.S. Chaturvedi, is also scheduled to arrive here, while a visit by the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal S P Tyagi, is on the cards though it is yet to be finalised.

One reason for the increase in task, sources said, could be that the IAF was unable to stick to its stipulated overhaul plan due to heavy commitments, particularly relief operations. A senior officer said the IAF may have decided to continue operating aircraft as long as it safely could without allowing them to be on ground for routine time-bound overhaul.

“It may have overcome immediate requirements at that time, but it has serious long term implications which were not addressed at that time,” he said.

Of prime concern to IAF authorities is the availability of adequate technical manpower to meet the enhanced task, for which the IAF policy on postings is to blame. Unlike many major air forces, IAF engineers and technicians do not stick to working on one particular aircraft type. During the course of their career, they end up working on almost all types of aircraft in the IAF’s inventory. 🙂

Naval chief calls net-centric warfare adoption a costly affair

New Delhi, Dec 21 (PTI) India will have to be “selective” in inducting futuristic network-centric warfare capabilities as transition to this cutting-edge techonology is proving to be a “forbiddingly high-cost affair”, according to Naval chief Admiral Arun Prakash.
Asserting that the country had no other option but to induct this frontline technology, Prakash said: “We will have to pick and choose on what technology we need at what time.”

Delivering the valedictory address at the first-ever tri-Service joint seminar on the ways for the Indian Armed Forces to turn network-centric, the Naval chief said though earlier estimates had put the cost at around Rs 300-400 crore, the Navy had already spent Rs 1,000 crore.

“Now, the new estimates put the figure at Rs 6,000-7,000 crore to make the Armed Forces network centric, which is steep. So we will have to be very selective in inducting network-centric system,” he said.

“There can be no transplantation. We must take as much or as little of networking as we can absord, suited to our own peculiar conditions and to our genius,” he said.

Describing future wars as short, intense and technology-driven conflicts, the Naval chief said network-centric technology would give the country’s armed forces a decisive edge in such confrontations.

He said network-centric operations would impact all levels of war — strategic, operational and tactical. “So network-centric operations will necessitate changes in not only the weaponary but also in the way we train our personnel.” :rolleyes: :rolleyes: 😎