Maybe what is meant is the differing philosophies to FBW Boeing and Airbus have?
That is, in fact, the crux of the matter imho. A and B have different WRT the “man/machine interface.” Hard limits versus soft limits. Tactile feedback versus a stick that doesn’t move when the other one does. Visual feedback in the case of the throttles moving versus not moving when the autothrottles adjust engine power.
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[B]I’m not sure its fair to lump the Chicago and Souix City crashes together.
Niether one was the fault of the airframe….bad maintenence procedures on an engine change….
I would like to emphasize the PROCEDURES part of your statment. The mechanics performed the engine change per the procedure designed by AA engineers. The Douglas engineers never created or approved that procedure IIRC. These are the details, among others, that the AA management team attempted to hide when they shredded the internal report they created. In the aftermath of the accident, the pressure was so great that the lead mechanic that was in charge of the engine change crew committed suicide.
Sadly, the engineer who created the procedure was not only not disciplined, but was allowed to progress in his career and eventually became the CEO or President of Valujet/Air Tran. A sad ending to a sorry episode, IMHO.
I figured someone would point out the Concorde numbers…..
The chart clearly says it is per million departures, thus a small fleet with one or two crashes will have a disproportionally larger crash rate (due to the low number of departures.) Please note that only 250 L1011’s were built, (vice 386 DC-10 IIRC) yet the DC-10 accident rate is much higher, in fact roughly 3 times as high. For the record, the two L1011 accidents that I clearly recall when large numbers of the airplane were in service was the thunderstorm/microbust encounter in Dallas and the one in Saudi Arabia where some guy was cooking in the cabin with some strange device and the S/O did not get the cabin depressurized upon landing.
It is not my chart, I believe it is a Boeing product, and I want to say that terrorism/hijack was excluded, but I can’t prove it now.
Graphic evidence of the poor safety record of the DC-10/MD-11 versus it’s competitors.
Also, I believe the requirement for a stickshaker was only on the Captain’s yoke at that time….the stickshaker wasn’t even installed on the FO’s yoke, and he was flying the airplane.
Indeed. What a horrible record the DC-10/MD-11 has. There are always those who defend the design, but the record is pretty compelling. Compellingly bad, that is.
Didn’t AA Flight Operations policy also play are role?
At that time, I believe they were taught in an engine failure scenario to fly the airplane in a way that favored climbing over maintaining airspeed, for terrain avoidance. Thus, the FO continued to hold the pitch high, right to the limit of the stalling speed. Unfortunately, the stall speed was below that required for the wing that had the slats retracted. Had he lowered the nose and flown faster, even the wing with the slats retracted would have continued flying.
Also, the design of the airplane played a role. The slats should have been “locked out” in the deployed position and designed to stay that way even in loss of hydraulics or flight control cables. Had that been the case, they wouldn’t have retracted.
As always, many factors combine in an accident scenario. Breaking the chain in any one of them might have saved the flight.
The part I have always found bone chilling, and rarely reported, is the part about the internal investigation done by AA. It was apparently so damning that the few copies produced were shredded in an attempt to hide the failings. It’s a shame that people could be so wanting in basic ethics that they could do such a thing.
A couple thoughts:
1. The references to disappearing off the radar. They would be drifting out of radar range in that area anyway…may already have been out of radar area.
2. Terrorism. In today’s world, I always think of a bomb in a situation like this. When an airplane crashes so suddenly, with little or no communication, my first thought is either a massive structural failure or a bomb.
The leading evidence is that the pilot reported an electrical issue coupled with heavy or severe (depending on what source you read) turbulence. The aicraft also apparently sent an automated maintenance message describing an electrical malfunction.
What ever has happened it happened so quick, the crew had no chance of calling a mayday or any sort of call out.
Weren’t there two in-flight upsets last year due to transient ADIRU failures?
Who in their right mind would place orders for Super-Jumbos during a recession, when consolidation and financial security are the highest priorities of all but the wackiest of airlines.
Well, proponents of the A380 always refer to it’s low seat costs, and capacity constrained airports in 6-10 major capitals. If those arguments are true, aren’t they true even during recession?
WRT to the SH…..no one has yet mentioned in this thread that the long promised engine upgrade program to increase thrust/decrease fuel consumption is now ready. GE delivers again.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/systems/f110.htm
😉
Thanks, the evidence is out there, and not too hard to find for anyone who wants to look…..GE reigns supreme.
I stand by my claim: GE is the pre-eminent aircraft engine provdier. PW has floundered for the last 20 years or more, while GE continues to develop, re-develop, and flourish with regard to both military and commercial products. Yet, for some unknown reason, it appears that PW is the “fair haired boy” of the USAF. (F-22, F-35, etc.)
Sometimes, when the USAF does finally buy GE, they do something stupid like buying 20 year old CF-6-80C’s for the C-5M’s, when GEnx’s are available. The GEnx is ready now, and could provide a 15% fuel savings over the CF-6. As impressive an improvement as the C-5M is over the A’s and B’s, imagine what it could be with the GEnx.
Meanwhile, all PW can do is keep promising the GTF, which apparently will have a gestation period rivaling the PAK-FA.
A bit premature, surely?
Just trying to deflect focus from the fact its still not making Airbus money.
And won’t be making money for many more years. Not that it matters in today’s world. Look at the billions the U.S. is throwing around to the banks and the automakers.
Apparently, in today’s virtual world all you have to do is declare a product or a program to be a success for it to be so.
GE fought an uphill battle on the F-16, and arguably had the better engine. Eventually they got a portion of the program.
The PW engines on the F-14 sucked, the GE powered D model blew them out of the water.
In the commercial world, the CF-6-80C series has about half the IFSD rate of the PW4000, and has won more orders. The CFM56, of which GE owns 50%, is the industry leading engine in it’s class, and has been for years. The crappy V2500 can’t even compete. The GEnx is coming soon, and will have industry best fuel consumption, PW doesn’t even have a competitor on the drawing boards.
Is it any wonder why PW doesn’t want to compete with GE?
I’ll save a few individuals the trouble of posting (you know who you are): Ship 741, you are wrong. You are ill-informed and poorly educated on the topic. I don’t really have anthing to add other than to attack your post.
GE fought an uphill battle on the F-16, and arguably had the better engine. Eventually they got a portion of the program.
The PW engines on the F-14 sucked, the GE powered D model blew them out of the water.
In the commercial world, the CF-6-80C series has about half the IFSD rate of the PW4000, and has won more orders. The CFM56, of which GE owns 50%, is the industry leading engine in it’s class, and has been for years. The crappy V2500 can’t even compete. The GEnx is coming soon, and will have industry best fuel consumption, PW doesn’t even have a competitor on the drawing boards.
Is it any wonder why PW doesn’t want to compete with GE?