Standard to what? I should hope a family of aircraft have a great deal of commonality and standardisation.

Standard as in common. We are saying the same thing.

The L1011 was an extraordinary aircraft.

It was a smooth flying, stable airplane that pilots and passengers loved. One of the reasons it flew so well was because the tail was so large, particularly the horizontal stabilizer. The all flying horizontal stabilizer on the L1011 was only 2 feet smaller in span than that of the 747! It also had an extremely elegant flight control system which included systems not installed on any other major airplanes of that era (DLC and ACS to name a few).

However, because it was so advanced at the time it was introduced, and because so few were built, it was never truly a finished design. In a word, it was very unreliable. Had Lockheed been able to continue to sell them, they would have no doubt improved the problem systems which contributed to the unreliability: Flight Controls/Flaps, Autopilot, Cargo doors, Pack Valves, APU, Thrust Reversers. It should be stated that the APU and T/R’s were responsibility of the supplier.

The L1011 was heavy. It never made weight specification and therefore never made the fuel/range specifications. It flew at 6-7 degrees nose up, and I have been told that the early ones flew at 7-8 degrees nose up.

The L1011 was only offered with one engine choice. This hurt the program because some airlines will only purchase from one engine provider, or at least did so only at that time. NWA jumps to mind, they were a loyal PW customer and required Douglas to put the PW engine on the previously GE powered DC-10. Furthermore, its sole engine provider was in receivership during a critical early portion of the L1011 program.

The L1011 was safe. It put the DC-10 to shame with regard to crash statistics. The major L1011 accidents were largely the result of operator error and were entirely preventable.

In retrospect, one could argue that the 747 was too big for the time that it was built. Airlines have been purchasing smaller and smaller airplanes for the last 30 years or so. Thus, the DC-10 and L1011 would have been perfectly positioned to sell many hundreds of airliners had the too-big 747 not been built.

Finally, the twins have out performed the tri-jets in this seat range. The fuel efficiency of the 767-300ER, and later the A330 and the 777, have pushed the tri-jets out of the market.

Too summarize: too few built, too inefficient versus twins, and too unreliable.

Another reason that the A340 has 4 engines is because Airbus and some of it’s key customers (notably Lufthansa) didn’t/don’t believe in ETOPS. I think that LH was very late to the ETOPS game and still does not flies only a few ETOPS operations (although Condor does it more routinely). At one air show, Airbus went so far as to advertise, albeit for only a short time, that the A340 was safer than the 777.

Two engines provide the most efficient operation. You obtain marginally less performance increase for each additional engine you add. If a large enough engine is not available (as in the case of the DC-10 and the L1011) for the size airplane you want to build then you add a third. The problem then become where to mount it.

Airbus wanted to make the A330/340 airplanes very similar. Since they were not an enthusiastic ETOPS supporter, the airplane intended for the long haul overwater flying had to have more than 2 engines. If the 340 had been built with 3 engines it would have necessitated engineering changes to the fuselage that would have negated the program efficiency of building a very common fuselage. Thus, by having a 2/4 setup, they could use a very common fuselage and only make different wings.

Fast forward 15-20 years later, and the 340 is languishing and the 330 is flourishing as airlines like the efficiency of the twin over the quad. The 330 is also perfectly sized between teh 767 and 777.

Based upon the very slim information you have provided, I would guess that you are confusing several issues.

I believe the terms “legacy” and “pegasus” WRT to navigational databases refer to the Flight Management Computer (FMC), 2 of which, with other components, normally comprise the Flight Management System (FMS) on modern airliners. The Flight Management System is a computerized system which contains, among other things, navigational databases and aircraft performance data. Prior to flight, the crew loads the route into the system and after takeoff they connect the FMS to the automatic pilot. On Boeing aircraft, the autopilot is engaged in LNAV (lateral navigation) and VNAV (vertical navigation). Airbus calls the vertical navigation function “profile.” The system also has a time component, as in being programmed to be over a fix at a specific time. The system can be re-programmed or amended in flight.

This is a very, very rudimentary description. More basics: The “legacy” systems were the original systems installed in the early 80’s that basically have a processor with similar capacity to an IBM 8086 with very limited memory. The “pegasus” system is a progressive upgrade of the FMS, with much improved processor speed, memory, and integration of GPS. Older aircraft are being upgraded in steps in order to comply with future ATC requirements of very precise navigation, commonly referred to as “nextgen” (for next generation) in the U.S.

The nav database is simply the list of pre-stored fixes in the box that are available for use. More memory (ie., Pegasus) = More fixes = more system capability.

Furthermore, focusing on Airbus or Boeing, is, I believe, a non sequiter. The subcontractor to both that is the leader in the field is Honeywell. Also, the topic of engines, per se, is related only tangentially to the topic of FMC’s/FMS’s. The system just needs to know what engines are installed and what performance they provide.

As stated, this is very rudimentary. My suggestion to use a search engine and look for “pegasus fmc” “honeywell fmc.” Also, go to the Honeywell website and search “pegasus fms.” Other useful searches: “RNAV” “RNP” “RNAV RNP.”

I hope this has been helpful. I almost answered your tankering post, but didn’t because it seems you want everyone here to do your research for you. Most people, including me, like to help, but you need to do your part. My suggestion is to take a little more upon yourself and google aggressively.

Why did NASA choose the TU144 instead of Concorde for SST research?

Because it didn’t cost much to do the program, and the US wanted to prop up the post cold war Russia with something productive, and the US had the money at the time, and the TU144 had very different qualities than the Concorde, which was a very well understood airplane in the west. They thought they might learn some things on the cheap, and it was the kind of high profile stunt that NASA loves. My guess is the taxpayer got little to nothing from it, though some test pilots got TU144 time in their logbooks, and some engineering technocrats maybe laid some groundwork for further cooperation in space.

I agree with Bemused. A poorly designed, very complex, dangerous airplane best left on the ground.

And you have documentary evidence for this?

Please type “A380 breakeven” into any large search engine and you will find many news reports of Airubs publicly stating that the breakeven had been raised to 420 planes in 2006. Here is one I pulled at random:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6067540.stm

There are still, nine years into the program, only about 200ish orders.

Now, I’m not a highly respected financial analyst, but it seems rather obvious that a project 9 years on that only has half of it’s breakeven, and no new orders on the horizon, and estabished customers seeking to delay deliveries CAN’T be on the firmest of financial footing. How much additional evidence does a reasonable person need? I doubt that Airbus is going to publicly come out and state that the program is in financial crisis, if that is what you need to be convinced, I guess we’ll have to agree to disagree.

Someone stated in the other thread that ALL airplane makes are under the same pressure. True, but none of those are such a huge capital risk and none are at this critical stage of gestation.

It’s beginning to look like the A380 program is in real trouble…..No Japanese orders…..some existing customers trying to delay deliveries……the cargo version delayed basically indefinitely……..world economy doing very poorly…….Middle East economic bubble bursting……existing customers whining about reliability…….no significant new orders……no A389 orders yet. I’ll bet the original plan for the program, before all the delays and the economic woes was to have the 389 flying by now.

The “breakeven” that was estimated to be 420 frames in 2006 has got to be getting pushed further and further back as the program continues to flounder. Interest on the original investment continues to compound and compound and compound.