Fortunately (or unfortunately depending on your perspective) enough, it took a free society to recognize the potential brilliance and importance of his original theoretical work. In fact, I think it speaks volumes in an anecdotal sense as to why the USSR was ultimately doomed to absolute failure.

This must be why Germany led the world in R&D for the first half of the 20th century. :rolleyes:

American mythology is always amusing.

In the end, they might have been right, we just have to look at the A/F-X and the massive beast that it was to imagine what it would cost to have the Navy, the USAF and the Marines to design three diferent programs with their own specifications. They would all be axed along the way…

Nope; you have one combined USAF/USN program, and tell USMC (and the Brits) to go jump in a lake. That’s what responsible leadership is all about — making the tough calls in service of the broader national interest.

Instead we get this lame attempt to save money without making any sacrifices whatsoever or hurting anyone’s feelings and the result is a veritable disaster. Massively late, massively over-budget, and compromised to ******y.

I think this hypothetical F-22E would end up with same relation to F-22A as F/A-18E/F has to F/A-18C/D. :p

By “USAF is likely to want…” I meant “and for good reasons.” A lot of what individual services want should be ejected out the nearest airlock and nation would be much better off, but what I was attempting to identify here was real divergent requirements of USN and USAF for future aircraft, which is a Problem with capital P because of the enormous costs involved in fielding even a single platform.

That number represented a 1-for-1 replacement of both the USMC’s “fighter-attack” aircraft.

Which in turn reflects a complete disconnect from reality in believing that —

— next-gen aircraft would be as affordable as current-gen aircraft despite all historical trends to the contrary
— that VLO in particular could be integrated without major cost penalties despite evidence of all prior experience
— that Reagan-era funding which generated those numbers was sustainable and should be assumed as future norm
— that there was even a need to retain anything like those numbers given the end of the Cold War

Like I said: a fairytale from the very beginning.

The ADVENT, etc should result in propulsion technology for the 6th generation fighter applications should be mature enough to launch formally into a program (Either a new project or future engiens for the existing fighters) around 2020 so technically they could begin serious design efforts for a 6th generation fighter provided political/financial support is there which is a BIG deal breaker for any such ambitions..

I think the political support for American nation-building efforts will be there, but constrained by fiscal realities.

That is to say, a decade from now the temperature of the US vs. China issue will be much hotter throughout the public sphere. The prospect of being overshadowed by another power for the first time in living memory will generate increased nationalism and support for projects that are seen to strengthen America, demonstrate American exceptionalism, etc. ‘China bashing’ made its first significant debut in 2012 election campaign but this is only the beginning. At the same time, an ageing population will require increased domestic spending which will offset economic gains elsewhere and ensure military budgets remain under pressure.

personally I would think it would make most sense to stick with a single big deck and surrounding it with better umbrella of protection.

I like George and Meredith Friedman’s conception of weapons systems as organisms. At birth they embody the relentless offensive, and as they age they are increasingly burdened by defensive measures until the cost and/or compromises imposed by those measures outweigh the offensive utility of the system, a condition they characterise as senility. Using this framework, the Friedmans argue that the tank, aircraft carrier, and manned aircraft are all well advanced along the path to senility.

The problem does not have to do (Only) with the number, its the design element, and the concept/strategy element. 4-6 per carrier is what the USN is “Comfortable” operating to begin with as UCAV’s onboard carriers is even more radical then “stealth” onboard a carrier as the article suggests….Then the question arises the high intensity strike ops, is not the role the UCLASS is really designed for, if it was a true F-35C alternative, the navy would have liked it bigger, and possibly supersonic…The USN wants its 24×7 ISR capability and even the ability to offload fuel, in addition to the Strike capability…Then there is the entire question of Semi-autonomous modes and comfortable USN is sending this in heavily defended EW area …

Why need supersonic for VLO strike? F-117/B-2/NGB are not supersonic.

As for operating in EW environments, sounds like even more incentive to invest further in Super Hornet for coordinated SH/UCLASS ops. :p

As per current acquisition and plans the USN wishes to have around 4-6 UCLASS type birds per carrier, so no meaningful ops could be generated (strike role) beyond

Not like it would be difficult to double that number with savings from F-35 program. Given the high proportion of development and fixed costs at such unit numbers it would probably only cost 50% more to do so.

the navy would probably want to operate one or 2 generations of UCAV’s in light-moderate strike roles before it decides to OUTSOURCE all if not most of the HIGH THREAT (IADS) strike missions to unmanned assets

I’m not saying it’s ideal, merely that alternatives that preserve some degree of VLO capability exist. Under constraints hard decisions must be made. Perhaps — as with Australia and SH — better options could’ve been available if sense had reigned 15 or 10 years earlier, but it didn’t. C’est la vie.

In addition to the F-35B and UCLASS, the Super Hornet roadmap (stealth pods) also provides alternative to F-35C.