RiiNumbers matter from the standpoint of capability generation only. This is one of those issues where ‘just send out anything’ wont really do the job. Astute, anecdotally, can hold a US Virginia class from hitherto unseen ranges. A 671 or early 971 would not be anticipated, today, to offer the same discretion rate as a Virginia. So the question is ‘does a greater number of ageing and variably updated hulls equal a smaller number of contemporary hulls’. If they dont then the additional hulls dont contribute to an effective mission capability…..they are targets being set up on the range.
Your conflict model seems to envision UK and Russian submarines arrayed against each other like armies of toy soldiers. Let us grant, for the sake of argument, that the Astutes are qualitatively better than anything Russia has put in the water, and that it will be 20 years before Russia is able to field SSNs that are on par with or superior to the Astutes in numbers comparable to them. I don’t see how this leads to your conclusion that, in the event of conflict in the interim, Russian submarines would be akin to “targets being set up on the range”. A common theme amongst your contributions here is that the ocean is a very big place and hence able to hide aircraft carriers and other ships that don’t want to be found, so it seems strange to have to point out that the ocean is a very big place, able to conceal many submarines simultaneously.
Of course the relevant space is greatly constrained by the fact that submarines, like any other platform, would be assigned tasks other than their own survival, and that those tasks are broadly predictable in themselves, and often associated either with known geography or one’s own assets which are presumably of known location. Nonetheless, in the real world we know that submarines are so good at avoiding detection that they risk running into each other. Even if the UK and Russian SSN fleets were assigned as their primary task the destruction of the other — a rather baffling notion in itself given the unique capabilities a submarine offers, while anything and everything can conduct ASW — it does not follow that either side would be very good at it.
With a significantly larger number of submarines to play with, the Russians can simply do more stuff and be in more places at once. You say that “this is one of those issues where ‘just send out anything’ won’t really do the job” — on the contrary, it seems to me that submarines, as largely offensive tools that we have never been very good at finding, provide one of the stronger cases for the utility of having something. Of course there are limits to the principle, but there is no indication that the qualitative gap between Russian and British forces is sufficiently large to breach it.
RiiSo the Chinese don’t copy? I SEE…
Of course China has a very robust industrial espionage program — they would be foolish not to, and as we have seen China is anything but foolish. But no, they don’t “copy” nearly to the degree or in the manner that a large cohort of the English-speaking internet alleges. The internet is full of people (mostly Americans) eager to seize on any commonality between western and Chinese platforms as an indication that copying has occurred. Look at the furor over the cockpit and nose geometry of J-20 being similar to F-22, when of course the real story is how radically different the rest of the aircraft is from its American counterparts.
If this thing is even remotely as capable as
The Americans promise 100 of them will give China hell.
How do you stop 100 of whats is essentially the B-2 2.0?
Given that for the greater part of the B-21s’ service life Chinese capabilities will be at least on par with those of the United States (modified by strategic requirements and the degree of overmatch that China feels is necessary to ensure its security) you could well reverse the question — how will the United States defend Hawaii and the west coast against hordes of Chinese stealth bombers? When you have the answer, then you know what China will do as well.
RiiForm follows function — unless we’re talking about a Chinese or Russian aircraft, then it’s just copying.
I like the “B-21” designation. I’d probably call it the Phantom and to hell with the history, but who knows what today’s HyperPatriot club will come up with.
Rii^ Thanks for the update. There are certainly more boats on that list than I anticipated, but the question remains as to how many (even amongst those not undergoing or scheduled for repair or otherwise laid up) are truly operational.
And why on Earth are they repairing one of the old 667BDRs? I thought the three 955s were supposed to be their replacements in the Pacific Fleet? How many SSBNs does Russia want? =/
That would be my position broadly also. I thought the admirals statement was very carefully worded. In terms of simple capabilities the coastal/patrol submarine element of the Russian navy is something we have no answer for…and, as grounded Astutes demonstrate, it does represent a distinct skillset.
It may have been carefully worded, or it may have been a more casual statement that, when examined from just the right angle, makes some kind of sense (as more than mere hyperbole to scare up additional funds for USN). And then of course there are other angles from which it deserves at least a raised eyebrow.
I’d stack our current Fleet submarine force against the Russian one even out past the mid-term. That’s not quite the same thing though is it!
Really? Numbers do matter, and the Russians should have little difficulty fielding (and, crucially, operating) enough nuclear boats by 2025 (at the very latest) to more than offset any qualitative advantage the RN may have.
RiiWas there even in any question of that, in terms of the nuclear boats especially? I don’t think so.
I would’ve thought it was the other way around — that if anything it is the diesel boats that give Russia the edge over the UK. Regarding nuclear boats alone, it’s questionable whether Russia today can really deploy any more SSNs than the UK can, while the SSBN force seems broadly comparable until the three Borei boats are truly in service with operational Bulava missiles. I think the claim that Russia’s submarine force lags only the United States will be more justifiable over the medium-term than it is today. Even five years from now one would probably not question the assertion. But today?
Rii*hums the Jaws theme*
RiiThese are not massive force structure increases but replacing in service equipment with modest and affordable upgrades.
Well, umm, no. Just from your own post, new or significantly expanded capabilities relative to previous plans include:
— doubling the number of P-8s
— armed medium-altitude UAV for Australian Army
— medium range air defence system
— land-based anti-ship cruise missiles (this will be the first thing on the chopping block)
— doubling the number of SUBMARINES
The last is most significant in a budgetary sense and is also the most revealing insofar as the notion of doubling the number of submarines:
(1) would leave Australia in the remarkable position of being perhaps the only nation in the world to have more submarines than surface combatants. How such a remarkably skewed force structure fits with Australia’s strategic requirements is anyone’s guess.
(2) originated from a literal thought bubble from former Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, in the total absence of any supporting analysis or requirement.
(3) given that a fleet of twelve submarines will almost certainly not emerge, the fact that the notion persists in the White Paper reveals its purpose as an eminently political document designed to satisfy various constituencies — namely the right-wing of the Liberal party, and electoral constituencies in South Australia. Realism has political costs whereas, given that the white paper makes no funding commitments, an ongoing lack of realism is politically expedient. The music won’t stop until everyone involved has moved on, is out of office, or has retired.
The other fact is the Australian Defence Department is already underspending each year and has done so for at least the last four. Underspend combined with gradual increases in the Defence budget to the target of 2% of GDP will provide the necessary funding.
Yeah, and this is precisely what will not happen. With external pressures on the treasury growing as a result of both long-term demand (ageing population) and supply (end of the mining boom) issues, the notion of a sustainable increase in defence outlays rests upon a significant reconfiguration of the political consensus in Australia. And there is very little prospect of that happening.
As anyone who has observed the various attempts by the Liberal party over the last few years to enact (and campaign for office based upon) significant shifts in policy and funding priorities has observed: favoured Liberal policies are almost invariably electorally disastrous, forcing a constant process of backtracking, compromise, Judas-like denial of previous policy positions (WorkChoices is dead! Dead I say! Please trust us!), adopting of watered-down versions of Labor policies, and even clumsy attempts at claiming Labor’s territory as with Abbott’s ludicrous Paid Parental Leave policy. In the Howard years the Liberal Party was able to push its agenda of structural reform off the back of the remarkable prosperity then being experienced that allowed him to simultaneously buy the support of the electorate with middle-class welfare — but those years are over.
In the short-term, what this means is that the path of least resistance for the current government is to abandon its pledge to fiscal conservatism, making everyone happy at the cost of the national debt (and kicking the can of state funding issues down the road). In the long-term, such policies are unsustainable and something will have to give. And what will give is the commitment to Australia having a STRONG MILITARY, as undoubtedly the weakest pillar — probably the weakest pillar even within the Liberal party itself — with the narrowest support base.
TL;DR: the notion of meeting and sustaining 2% GDP on defence spending implies significant modifications to the Australian political consensus. These reconfigurations will not succeed, as anyone who has witnessed the fumbling attempts of the Liberal party to enact much milder reforms — with the last major retreat (from a GST increase) being as recent as last week — would have to concede.
RiiJust some soundbite you might want to put it across to Pentagon to get your Funding 🙂
Sure — but then why not say China? Particularly when that’s more his region of concern.
RiiI hope the UK leaves because it makes for better drama and, as a certain butler played by Michael Caine once said, some people just like to watch the world burn. As a student of history, the slow pace of the present in the context of my own limited lifespan is often rather vexing. I’m tired of living in the shadow of the Cold War and the American unipolar moment! Bring on the next chapter!
P.S. Once the UK leaves the EU I hope Scotland leaves the UK too. Drama, delicious drama!
RiiI hope the UK leaves because it makes for better drama and, as a certain butler played by Michael Caine once said, some people just like to watch the world burn. As a student of history, the slow pace of the present in the context of my own limited lifespan is often rather vexing. I’m tired of living in the shadow of the Cold War and the American unipolar moment! Bring on the next chapter!
P.S. Once the UK leaves the EU I hope Scotland leaves the UK too. Drama, delicious drama!
RiiThe Australian Defence White Paper has just been released.
As expected Australia has recommitted to 72 F-35A aircraft to begin operational service in Australia in 2020 and a decision on the Super Hornets will be made in the early 2020s for replacement by the late 2020s. Growler is expected in service in 2018 and will be periodically upgraded to maintain commonality with US Growler aircraft.
http://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/
No real surprises for the future RAAF fighter fleet. F-35 was always the choice going forward and the Super Hornets were always viewed as an interim capability.
Interesting separate aviation reporting
– Potential/intended acquisition of two additional KC-30 AAR aircraft to bring the total to 9. This would be two additional above the two conversions that will be occurring over the next couple of years.
– Total P-8 fleet is expected to be 15 with a second tranche purchased and in service by the late 2020s supported by 7 MQ-4C Triton UAVs.
– Australian Army to receive an armed medium altitude UAV in the early 2020s.
– New short range air defence systems, replacement for RBS-70, in the early 2020s and medium range air defence by the mid to late 2020s.Interesting non aviation white paper info
– Australia to acquire land based anti-ship cruise missiles.
– Commitment to 12 submarines.
– Future Frigate brought forward.
And if you believe that even half of the above will come to pass, I have a bridge in Brooklyn to sell you. These ‘commitments’ (read: mastubatory fantasies with no money behind them) are about as realistic as DoD’s plans in the early-mid 1990s: DD-21s, SEAWOLVES, RAPTORS, NATFS AND FLYING IFVs AS FAR AS THE EYE CAN SEE FAP FAP FAP. The eventual bloodletting will at least be entertaining, even if it means the nation will, like the United States, end up with a rather less capable defence force than the one it could’ve had if force planners had incorporated more realistic budget projections in the first place.
RiiHere’s something to bolster the Russian ego:
[Admiral] Harris said that Russia “has the most capable submarine force in the world after ours.”
A strong claim, but not an indefensible one.
RiiNationalism is a helluva drug.
RiiIran wants local production because that is the level Iran is at: it is a medium-size nation that needs to almost totally recapitalise its armed forces over the next 10-15 years and which has a non-negligible industrial and expertise base in aerospace and other defence manufacturing that was planted prior to the 1979 revolution and has been sustained (albeit at a marginal level) ever since out of necessity.
It is not the UN sanction but banking sanctions from EU/US. why almost all money of Iran is spread around those banks or Chinese banks connected to west. and not in Russian banks. despite all this Russia did manage to built the nuclear plant and now selling more advance version of S300.
So why didn’t Russia supply S-300 to Iran earlier if they are such great friends?
I am not saying that Russia’s actions were unreasonable, only that Russia is not Iran’s “friend” — real nations do not have friends — rather Russia acts in (what it perceives to be) its own interests and will continue to do so. There is good reason to think that Iran and Russia will continue to have common interests going forward and consequently a healthy relationship, but such assumptions are not a suitable basis for decisions with implications for the long-term security of the nation — not when there are alternatives readily available (i.e. from China or even the west) that could mitigate the risk associated with any deterioration in Iran’s relationship with Russia. Of course Iran should buy Russian hardware, but it does not follow that Iran should only buy Russian hardware.
RiiGiven the fact that Russia only went into Syria when Iran convinced it to, not buying Russian would be a shocking turn. The political ties currently are stronger than with any other large power. Russia also was key in helping Iran through the nuclear deal mess.
Russia also played a role in getting Iran into that mess; Russia could’ve obstructed western attempts to strangle Iran via the UN a great deal more than it did. Even now with this talk of no Su-30s being possible before 2020 on account of a UNSC resolution — who allowed that resolution to pass? Over the last fifteen years as at all other times Russia has acted according to what it has perceived to be its own interests, and so Iran must act as well. And no nation with Iran’s modern history can willingly accept becoming dependent on a sole source for such a significant capability.
Sign In
