I ‘m pretty certain any senior IAF officer would want to drastically cut back on the number of types.

And how would they do this? Would they retire aircraft ahead of schedule simply to make the books look tidier? Would they cancel FGFA? Would they trash Tejas and AMCA, thereby consigning India to reliance on foreign imports in perpetuity, with all the lack of affordability and sovereignty that implies? Would they cancel MMRCA? This last is the only vaguely defensible option, and the answer, apparently, is a resounding “no!”

It is all well and good to say that India is inefficient and that efficiencies should be sought. But when most of the suggestions for creating this efficiency reveal themselves, on even slight inspection, to be profoundly stupid, you have to question the premises of the argument. Again, take India’s three (or four, if we include IN’s Ka-31s) AEW platforms/projects — an example you brought up yourself — which of these was/is ill-founded?

The comparison with China is unfair [….] Furthermore almost of China’s efforts apart from it’s SU-27 rip offs, are home grown.

The comparison with China is perfectly apt, indeed India and China are uniquely comparable. There are no other nations with large military-industrial complexes experiencing such rapid transformations and the corresponding growing pains. Russia is probably the next best point of comparison for each nation, and there too we see a chaotic assortment of platforms and programs.

You could assemble the most august planning staff in the world, with unlimited authority and guaranteed budgets, currency values, political and strategic imperatives some fifteen years in advance, and the result would still be chaotic by anyone else’s standards. India is inefficient, will continue to be inefficient for the forseeable future, and must necessarily be inefficient if she is to realise and balance both short- and long-term objectives whilst mitigating risks along the way.

Undoubtedly there have been some questionable decisions made over time, but most of the diversity in India’s fielded platforms and programs is simply a consequence of its diverse relationships and strategic imperatives, and rapid economic and national development. On the latter point, China is the most comparable nation, and there too we see the consequences in the form of what would otherwise be a strange and eclectic mix of aircraft, ranging from J-7s and Q-5s through JH-7s, J-10s and J-11s, to J-20 and UCAV prototypes — all at the same time. Same in the field of AWACS where China has four or five different types. These are growing pains, and reflect the dynamism underlying both powers. It would be as foolish for India to try and replicate the consolidation and efficiency of e.g. the UK armed forces as it would be for the UK to emulate India’s eclectic mix.

The article raises good points about risks and timelines associated with a more ambitious design, however the overriding question, I think, is the make-up of the air wing. The STOBAR carriers can be populated with a combination of MiG-29K and Tejas. What options exist for a CATOBAR carrier, and how do the associated timelines, costs, and risks match up with those for the vessel itself?

Rafale
F-35B/C
Naval AMCA?
Naval PAK FA?
Naval IUSAV?

Crew of 4-5,000? Whatever happened to the Russian penchant for automation? Even the new American carriers are down to 4200.

Why is it not a high-end system again?

Subsonic, limited payload, no anti-air capability, likely limited sensor suite.

Oh, i actually do think there will be another manned combat aircraft. Anglo-french, no less. Twin engined and slightly more fighter oriented f-35 like plane, if you will. All this is just a hunch, of course. But there is really no other option for the European air forces 20-30 years from now. Unless they all want to be buying US planes.

Shopkeeper mentality means UK will dither and eventually cancel homegrown/European solutions in favour of F-35E or F/A-XX (same could well happen with Taranis).

France will lead a joint project with Germany, with minor contributions from other European powers, possibly Brazil also.

I don’t imagine the UK will develop a high-end combat aircraft ever again. Sad really. Typhoon is the last hurrah.

And at least five years before the F-22 gets any real competition.

India seems insistant on giving the IAF a plane even it’s own government audit department has said is not fit for purpose.

Do you think PLAAF/PLANAF were happy with their J-8s and JH-7s? Do you think they are happy to still be flying J-7s and Q-5s? The services must make do with what is available, where what is available is dictated by the whole national situation including budgets, foreign relations, development objectives, etc. China has done the hard work over the course of decades and is now all but ready to join the first rank of aerospace nations, with engines alone the sole remaining deficiency. If India ever wants to be in the same position, it too will have to do the hard yards with less than ideal indigenous solutions in the interim.

Fortunately, India can also draw on the international market to address immediate requirements in the context of the strategic environment. Of course, such international solutions are expensive, so it must necessarily be a balancing act. The fundamental requirements have been met: India has both large numbers of modern and capable combat aircraft sourced from aboard (300 Flankers and upgraded MiG-29s and Mirage 2000s, rising to 400 over the next few years with delivery of additional Flankers and handful of Rafales) and has simultaneously brought an indigenous platform to production and service entry status.

Simply better to cut your losses or pin your hopes on the MK2 which will be based on the MK1 and be created by the very same organisation.

We have already covered this. The IAF needs new airframes now, not 5-7yrs down the track when Mk. 2 is ready.