RiiActually it would be interesting to see what American economies of scale could achieve with Gripen E|F.
Rii[ATTACH=CONFIG]234500[/ATTACH]
Even did a little graph for you based on the more “21st century” measure of working age starting at 20yrs and extending to 69yrs of age, instead of the traditional >65:15-64 measure (which is the basis for numbers cited in previous post).
your data and predictions are always wrong. see Brazil example.
Still waiting for you to link me the post where I described Brazil as a future or even potential superpower. :rolleyes:
Riilol you are such a fruitloop JSR.
In 2030 China will have 24 elderly persons per 100 working-age population; Russia will have 27 and the United States 33.
And India will have 12.
RiiBoth J-20 and J-31 is funded by PLAAF, and PLAN clearly stated they have no desire to field J-31. mk1 eyeball inspection tells me there is no provision on J-20 for arrester hook. I may be well wrong on this one or PLAN may just change their minds, however, that is my opinion/estimate for the next decade.
I think it is entirely plausible that China will not field a next-generation naval manned combat aircraft until late 2020s. Where we seem to disagree is what this suggests about China’s progress, either in absolute terms or relative to the global state of the art. I contend that a mature, CATOBAR variant of J-15 would be a formidable asset right through the 2020s and beyond, and as such am unmoved by the prospect that there may be considerable time before China fields an ‘answer’ to F-35B/C. I wonder if it is partly a matter of perspective: China is not attempting to impress us in the present, but rather to lay the foundations for a sustainable path towards global (or perhaps should we just say ‘USN’) standards over the next 20 years. Such a path must navigate cost, risk, and timeline constraints, and occur in the context of evolving national capabilities and requirements. Broadly speaking, and to the extent we can assess, I think China has plotted and executed her course very well to date, and I see no evidence that the nation’s carrier program is an exception to this.
RiiInteresting; only a few months back we were hearing that new, skeptical eyes were re-examining the technical and financial feasibility of TF-X. Evidently the project has survived this scrutiny mostly unscathed.
Rii
RiiThink of it this way. when Kuznetsov enters refit, shipyard engineers will re-open every technical drawing, mathmatical analysis, graphs etc to see what is doable and what is not. They will asses the design, and see which parts of the load bearing structure are more prone to failuers (so maintanence can be arranged), or which wall should never be drilled/cut to make room for equipment etc etc.
You are assuming that China has not obtained access to these materials from Russia or Ukraine, clandestinely or otherwise. As the sightings of J-15s equipped with UPAZ refueling pods demonstrates, there has evidently been some kind of rapprochement between Russia and China in this area.
I don’t deny that. But in the next decade, US, UK, Italian Russian and potentially more navies will adapt 5th gen aircraft, Chinese -appearantly- don’t have such desire. You compare J-15 with Super Hornet, but SH is 15 years old now. I would expect something more ambitious than fielding J-15 to match those navies; if thats what they want.
Why do you conclude that China has no desire to field a 5th (4th)-generation carrier-based aircraft? I think they will almost certainly seek to field such an aircraft — that they are exploring CATOBAR for J-15 as well does nothing to change that. Indeed, such a dual-track strategy would seem to align several priorities simultaneously, in terms of research and development, timelines and risk, and operational requirements. Such a strategy would be perfectly in keeping with China’s record to date.
RiiThat I doubt. Paintjob surely looks better, but Kuznetsov actually works, and Liaoning doesn’t. To me Liaoning is a Ferrari body with suspension components from a Ford, and drivetrain from a Chevy.
Leaving aside the question of Kuznetsov‘s current condition, it appears to me that your deprecation of Liaoning is based merely on emotive supposition rather than evidence.
Eventually yes, it has that potential. I question “when” it “will be”? 1 year? Ok, impressive, 5 years? Ok, it will have some use. 8 years? Way too late to introduce a 4th gen aircraft.
Why is this? The qualities that make a mature, potentially CATOBAR evolution of J-15 compelling are, for the most part, not seriously compromised by the continuing slow introduction of ‘stealth’ aircraft to the scene. Her payload, range, and performance in the AAR, CAP and potentially Growler roles will all continue to be valuable throughout the lifespan of the aircraft, just as with USN’s Super Hornets.
you did all the way upto 2030 and 2050. brought link to some worth less paper written by a investment house.
I never used the word ‘superpower’ in relation to Brazil, as you claimed. Brazil’s mid/long-term prospects were and remain bright. Her recent difficulties do not significantly affect long-term projections, anymore than Russia’s do.
Riihow is your prediction of Brazil as superpower coming along?
Never made any such prediction.
How does it feel to know that Russia’s GDP will shortly be surpassed by India?
RiiThe current MiG-29K is much better than the Soviet-era MiG-29K for one thing (even if you ignore JSR’s rantings).
More powerful engines, better radar, and so on.
Same for J-15 (minus the engines) and any prospective Su-33M.
RiiActually, I wouldn’t be surprised if the MiG-29K was better suited than Su-33 for a Kuznetsov sized carrier. If economies were in question, they could have just went for a thorough Su-33SM type overhaul, and saved money until Kuznetsov comes out of refit/Naval T-50 appears/whatever.
I hope Russia doesn’t waste money on lofty carrier goals in the future either way.
The scope of Kuznetsov’s refit is very much up in the air right now.
It’s possible that MiG-29K is better suited for a vessel of Kuznetsov‘s size, but then how does one account for the results of the Soviet-era evaluation? Regarding the possibility of overhaul, I was under the impression that replacement was required because the airframes are approaching EOL. In any case, at the very least I think we can state that J-15 is comparable to MiG-29K.
As we have discussed earlier, I agree that Russia has many greater priorities than Kuz and potential future carriers/aircraft. I think it is a real question whether future investment in carrier capabilities would be justified at all given Russia’s geopolitical circumstances and in the context of national finances and priorities.
RiiIn those years, IF everything goes right, Liaoning will become what Kuznetsov should have been 10 years ago; Filled (as opposed to half-filled on Kuznetsov) with modern, multi-role Su-33s (or copies at least), and properly escorted by its task force. If not, well, they will break something seriously during tests, or determine their carrier is not suited to their desires of following US Navy examples, or not suited for anything at all; in which case Liaoning will still remain a test ship; providing valueable experience China clearly needs.
However, when Kuznetsov emerges from its refit, you can bet the house it will at least have the necessary modifications for operationg navalized PAK-FA, powerful radar sets and modern air defenses etc, let alone many more ambitious rumours. In foreseeable future, only thing that Liaoning can operate is J-15, or maybe Su-33 or MiG-29K if all else fails. Surely, J-20 wont be flying from ski-jump anytime soon.
There is no indication that Russia’s plans for a future carrier-based aircraft are any more advanced than China’s, and certainly her plans for future carriers are both more distant and subject to greater uncertainty. Liaoning herself is almost certainly in much better condition than Admiral Kuznetsov. When Kuz emerges from her refit she may well be superior to Liaoning in terms of equipment fit, but then China will be deep into construction of a second aircraft carrier at that point.
Turning to aircraft, it is likely that PLANAFs J-15s are and will be superior both to Russia’s current EOL Su-33s, and to her future MiG-29Ks. Despite JSR‘s protestations to the contrary, we know that Su-33 was selected as the superior platform back in the day, and that Russia’s decision to opt for MiG-29K this time around was driven by external considerations regarding economies of scale (with MiG-29K already having an active production line for the Indian Navy) and the state’s interest in propping up MiG. Indeed, recent images suggest that China is investigating a CATOBAR variant of J-15; if realised such an aircraft would not only represent a considerable development over Russia’s own Su-33, but would potentially offer capabilities superior to all existing naval fighters (in terms of range, payload, AAR role, Growler role). Of course the realisation of such potential would depend upon a variety of factors.
RiiThat India may one day have to fight a two-front war is a possibility grounded in longstanding political and geographical circumstances. As such, the armed forces must prepare for such an eventuality. The likelihood that India could prevail in such a conflict is a function not only of the strength of India’s armed forces, but also of the precise nature of the conflict. In some possible permutations, India’s current and likely future strength would suffice. In others, not even the significantly greater levels of funding sought by the armed forces would suffice to avert defeat. The basic insecurity this implies is a reality for all but a handful of nations around the world (those facing no credible threats, such as the USA and UK, and which are therefore free to wander the globe in search of monsters to destroy) and is no failure on India’s part.
The simple truth is, all armed forces everywhere want more — more funding, more people, more expensive toys, and will use whatever tools are at their disposal to get it. For the IAF, the shortfall relative to the invented figure of 45-squadrons makes a convenient spectre to dangle in front of Indian politicians and ensure the maximum number of coins are shaken from the national purse. It is simply theatre. The real story of the IAF’s progress or lack thereof is to be found in specific programs such as LCA, Su-30MKI, FGFA, etc.
RiiGiven the lack of progress over the past 72 hours, it is safe to to say that China’s carrier program has ground to a complete halt, and that PLAN has been duly chastened by their evident inferiority to mighty American carriers, personnel, and onboard cuisine.
On a serious note, China will overtake Russia in carrier operations as soon as Kuznetsov goes in for her long-delayed multi-year refit. That is to say, 1 semi-operational carrier > 0 operational carriers, combined with the prediction that by the time Kuz re-emerges, China will be putting as many or more flight hours in as the Russians, and could well have a second hull in the water as well, while Russia is not expected to commission another carrier for at least another decade.
Riilolwot
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