look at the Tejas, that will only become fully operational in Mk. II form

Wot?

I’ve always thought SR-71 was overrated aesthetically, but that’s a great shot — possibly because you can’t actually see very much. 😉

France will not push Dassault to sign something impossible to do. The goal is to get a stonger “eco system” for the Rafale and if possible, to earn money, not creating an eco system and close to it a black hole that will swallow everything.

Obviously the deal must be financially viable. But if negotiations are at all compromised by intransigence or greed on the part of Dassault or the French government, as has occurred in the past… well, it might be time to bring back the guillotine.

Also, the idea of pressure from EADS is laughable. What can Typhoon offer but more of the same (capability/technology/price) with bonus further delays? The only external threats to Rafale, assuming magical Modi is not completely off his rocker, come from Tejas and Su-30MKI/FGFA.

They’ve not built a medium conventional carrier hull from scratch yet and the theory is to go straight to a nimitz?

The link suggests a single Kuztnetzov-type indigenous carrier (hull number #17) before shifting to the supercarrier design.

they’ve got a good decade before they’ve built up their understanding of basic multisquadron air deployment at combat tempo’s. Strategic fleet maneuver, deception ops, unrep and support will all need to be developed in the same window. This all on the simpler stobar hull.

I’m not sure how this affects the proposed supercarrier program, which would certainly not bear fruit before 2025.

It is likely that Liaoning will be joined by an indigenous STOBAR carrier around 2020. The question is whether the following decade will see China build more medium carriers or whether they will then move to a supercarrier design with all the bells-and-whistles.

Given that the PLAN has, so far, appeared to show an appreciation of the need to resist foolhardy shortcuts and to properly learn the business of naval aviation this model looks very speculative. Possibly more the work of an enthusiastic amateur as opposed to a realistic design.

It is certainly a change from China’s conservative/incremental progress to date, but it could be that such a leap is called for at this juncture. Playing such a foundational role, and with a 40yr lifespan — a period that will see China emerge as the world’s foremost military and economic power — one could argue that this is precisely the place for China to risk such a leap, rather than getting caught up investing considerable resources in a second-class carrier fleet that the nation will rapidly outgrow. The counter-argument, in my view, is that China actually has a long-term interest in maintaining two carrier types — the first for the regional environment, the second for global power projection — and that the nation’s military, industrial, fiscal and strategic interests are all aligned in favour of incremental development.

Previously I would’ve thought that the conservative/incremental approach would win out, and that we would therefore see at least three medium carriers from China before transitioning to a larger design. But this image seems unlikely to be a fanboy design. From Bltizo over at SDF:

these were supposedly taken at the Zhongshan Navy Exhibition, the same place where the 032 SSB model and the trimaran MSA cutter were taken, so it’s possible that this carrier model is very authentic.

As is the usually the case with India there is a lot more smoke than fire. All we have to date are rumours. Personally I still expect the deal for the full 126 aircraft to be signed this year. If not, c’est la vie. Of course folks are free to indulge in whatever fantasies of MMRCA failure they may have, but it is a shame they have to clog up the main IAF thread to do it.

Umm, this Typhoon discussion is completely irrelevant. If, hypothetically speaking, MMRCA were to be scrapped and emergency measures required, by far the most sensible option would be to extend Su-30MKI production past the planned exit date of 2018 and to explore options for scaling up Tejas Mk. 1 production.

The Rafale will inevitably cost far far more than the Tejas and be outperformed by the PAK FA. Its simply a bad idea to be inducting it it past 2022 (if not earlier) when China would have switched over to the J-20 and J-31 and its adversaries in the Pacific would be operating F-35s in strength (with domestic stealth aircraft in an advanced state of development).

Like Russia, India, and Pakistan, China will almost certainly be inducting fourth generation aircraft well into the 2020s. Whether or not it is sensible for India to extend Rafale production into the mid-2020s will depend upon a variety of factors involving Tejas, FGFA, AMCA, Navy requirements, Indian finances, and external developments, the precise confluence of which is impossible to assess at this juncture.

There is no political opposition to the deal (unlike Canada or earlier Brazil & Australia). The govt’s problem with it is purely financial. So far its only examining the downsizing proposal and they’ll likely find out its a bad idea that’ll simply hike the price for already unaffordable deal.

The proposal to truncate the acquisition, not being founded in any rational assessment of the cost & benefits of doing so, is obviously intended to bring the sticker price down to a level that is politically palatable, most likely that which was provisionally approved when Rafale was selected, in order to secure the overriding priority of signing the contract and commencing deliveries ASAP.

ToT is likely the most ruinous part of the deal. There’s (i) no way to assess the extent to which its being assimilated, (ii) the entities involved in fighter jet development (DRDO/ADA) are not involved in the Rafale production, (iii) adds to the MMRCA’s already high cost and if that didn’t already nix it, (iv) it comes too late to assist the Tejas program with the AMCA too far off.

That it is not possible for lay observers to assess the extent to which technology transfer will be made and can be assimilated, and the use to which it can then be put does not suggest negative answers to these questions. It is entirely possible that India could obtain less-than-satisfactory results from such an arrangement, as it has experienced in the past. That is why such care must be taken in negotiating the details of the contract. Your suggestion that the endeavour is a lost cause goes beyond the warranted caution.

In the 2020s with the PLAAF inducting J-20s and J-31s (perhaps even the PAF), would the IAF want more Rafales as opposed to more FGFAs (the latter may even be cheaper) ?

Well that’s the benefit of having multiple sources to choose from, isn’t it? A plethora of options can hardly be construed as a negative. In any case, if a truncated buy is approved this year, execution of that contract would likely conclude by 2022, with a decision on extending production due some 18 months prior. IAF at that point should have very good information on the cost and availability of both FGFA and Tejas Mk. 2 (and a more realistic handle on AMCA) with which to make their decision. Indeed, pressure from those platforms could well contain the price escalation that Dassault would otherwise be tempted towards for any follow-on contract.

As for whether production would be extended … well, the proposal doesn’t make much sense otherwise: India would likely be paying ~85% of the full contract price for only two-thirds the number of aircraft*. It’s obviously a political figleaf to generate the required figure. But if such a figleaf (i.e truncated initial buy) is what it takes to get MMRCA approved this year, then it is an easy decision for everyone to make. It is far better than compromising on ToT, or — horror of horrors — going back to the drawing board.

* Given fixed setup costs, non-linear ToT costs, and the fixed initial French production batch.