RiiWhat are they looking at for a sub replacement program?
There are currently six Collins-class boats of dubious readiness; recent Defence White Papers (QDR seems to be the closest American equivalent) have advocated an expansion of the submarine fleet to twelve units. In terms of operating characteristics, it is desired that the new submarines be even larger than the Collins-class boats so as to be suitable for long-range deployments and carriage of special forces units, etc. At one point (the era of maximum fantasy) nuclear propulsion was even considered. More recent discussion has focused on cooperation with Japan (see: Soryu-class) which has similar requirements for its SSKs.
RiiAnd now for the reason I reactivated this thread: Former Liberal Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser is about to release a book, Dangerous Allies, that should be of interest to folks here.
In Dangerous Allies, Malcolm Fraser argues that the greatest security threat facing Australia today derives from its unhealthy relationship with the United States. Excerpts from his plug-piece for The Age:
My latest book Dangerous Allies focuses on Australia’s strategic dependence – first on the United Kingdom, and then on the United States. It tells the story of sometimes enormous sacrifice and loss of life, and of fighting wars that were not always in Australia’s direct interest.
The need for dependence on a major power lies deep in Australia’s psyche. It is in our DNA.
Since 1991, we have become more closely entwined and committed to US policy than ever before.An Australian, Major General Burr, is second in charge of 60,000 US troops in the western Pacific. We have a frigate periodically acting as one of the escorts to USS Washington stationed in Japan. We have US marines in Darwin. That military force is turning step by step into a hard hitting, aggressive one, capable of exercising power anywhere throughout the region. With the development of new weapons technologies, the purpose for which joint Australia-US defense facility Pine Gap is used has been subtly and dangerously altered. It is now integral to the targeting of a variety of weapons systems, including drone killings, even of Australians in Yemen.
The next chapter is starting to unfold. The US has embraced a policy of containment of China. Military relationships from Japan all the way south through the Philippines, Singapore and Australia are being strengthened.
Hugh White has said, and I agree with him, that a clash between China and Japan, who are not really talking to each other, is highly possible. While technically the US remains neutral over disputed islands in the East China Sea, they have de facto sided with Japan.
If the US is involved with a war with China as the result of Japanese provocation, Australia, on current policy settings, would inevitably be involved. Our national interest would require us to stay out of such a war, but the marines in Darwin and the current use of Pine Gap would make it impossible for us to stay neutral. We would not be believed, because we are hosting an aggressive military force which is integral to the firing of a variety of weapons systems.
In distant days, if Britain went to war, we also were at war. We have now tragically put ourselves in the same position with the US, in circumstances far more serious for our future.
That is the decision Australia faces today. Some commentators have argued that Australia has to choose between the US and China, which is nonsense. I want Australia to be strategically independent, to have the capacity to make our own decisions, to not to be bound by US decisions and not be allied with the US or with China.
This book is remarkable for two reasons: first, it is the rare articulation of the thesis, from an establishment figure — a former right-wing Prime Minister no less — that Australia’s relationship with the United States is unhealthy and potentially catastrophic for the nation.
The book is remarkable also because it necessarily involves an unusual degree of self-criticism. As Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser was involved in sending young Australians to die in Vietnam, a war he now believes was a mistake to have been fought at all, and which in any case Australia should never have gotten involved in.
I look forward to reading it. I wonder if he has anything to say about ‘Junior Sheriff’ Howard and Australia’s commitment to the F-35 program…
RiiRepost from F-35 thread:
Professor Hugh White writes about the funding challenges facing the Australian military in the wake of the F-35 announcement. He strikes a measured tone which somewhat masks the extent of the problem. A more tabloid-esque title could well have run: “Did Tony Abbott and F-35 just doom Australia’s next-gen submarine plans?”
The Age – Reconciling Australia’s Warfare Shopping List With Reality
It’s safe to say that plans for platforms such as Triton will vanish into the ether, to say nothing of Scooter-esque fantasies of F-35Bs for the Canberra-class LHDs. But as the least-formed and biggest-ticket (and arguably most important) item around it’s undoubtedly the next-gen submarine program that will feel the brunt of the oncoming crunch. Forget about expanding to 12 units, we’ll be lucky to replace the Collins-class boats 1:1.
Of course governments with more foresight and courage over the previous decade would’ve made choices like not acquiring fripperies like C-17s, Abrams, LHDs, etc. in the first place, and probably not have approved a dedicated AWD design either. Nor, needless to say, would they have pissed away billions in Afghanistan or Iraq. Rather they would’ve invested in replacing Australia’s air combat capability with a single type (not F-35) at a much earlier date. Alas, the military’s reach has outstretched its grasp yet again, and its unrealistic ambitions have either been enabled (Howard) or gone unchecked (Rudd and Gillard) by successive governments, and it is truly necessary capabilities such as Australia’s submarine fleet that will suffer the long-term costs of such foolishness. But the Americans are happy with us, and that’s what really matters…. right?
To bring things back to the subject of the thread: the delays in the F-35, coupled with Australia’s ridiculously premature commitment to that program, and irresponsible funding decisions in the interim, have combined to ensure that the full costs of Australia’s air combat replacement program will be eating all available funds alive through the 2020s and crippling future investment programs, most significantly for the Collins-class replacement.
RiiJust a repost from the ‘Chinese Air Power’ thread courtesy of deino:
Nice production values. Can’t blame them for celebrating in style.
RiiProfessor Hugh White writes about the funding challenges facing the Australian military in the wake of the F-35 announcement. He strikes a measured tone which somewhat masks the extent of the problem. A more tabloid-esque title could well have run: “Did Tony Abbott and F-35 just doom Australia’s next-gen submarine plans?”
The Age – Reconciling Australia’s Warfare Shopping List With Reality
Last week the government decided to buy 58 F-35 fighter aircraft for $12.4 billion. When asked where the money would come from, the Prime Minister reassured us that it was already there. “It’s money which successive governments have carefully put aside to ensure that our nation’s defences are strong,” he said.
Alas this is not true. After Labor’s last budget in 2013, Mark Thomson of ASPI calculated that the gap between the two sides of the Defence plan – between what they plan to buy and what they plan to spend – was more than $30 billion.
That happened because both Rudd and Gillard cut the defence budget but couldn’t bring themselves to make matching cuts to their shopping lists, for fear of looking weak on Defence. The Coalition government has thus not inherited from Labor a nice full piggy bank, but a funding shortfall of over $3 billion per year. Tony Abbott’s kind words last week about Labor’s defence legacy suggest he does not yet understand this.
That puts the spotlight on four big new capabilities planned for the next decade. They are the new submarines, a new class of warships, a new fleet of armoured fighting vehicles for Army, and the F-35s. Without massive defence budget increases, at least one of these projects will need to be scrapped or drastically scaled back if the government is to produce a financially credible defence policy.
It’s safe to say that plans for platforms such as Triton will vanish into the ether, to say nothing of Scooter-esque fantasies of F-35Bs for the Canberra-class LHDs. But as the least-formed and biggest-ticket (and arguably most important) item around it’s undoubtedly the next-gen submarine program that will feel the brunt of the oncoming crunch. Forget about expanding to 12 units, we’ll be lucky to replace the Collins-class boats 1:1.
Of course governments with more foresight and courage over the previous decade would’ve made choices like not acquiring fripperies like C-17s, Abrams, LHDs, etc. in the first place, and probably not have approved a dedicated AWD design either. Nor, needless to say, would they have pissed away billions in Afghanistan or Iraq. Rather they would’ve invested in replacing Australia’s air combat capability with a single type (not F-35) at an earlier date. Alas, the military’s reach has outstretched its grasp yet again, and its unrealistic ambitions have either been enabled (Howard) or gone unchecked (Rudd and Gillard) by successive governments, and it is truly necessary capabilities such as Australia’s submarine fleet that will suffer the long-term costs of such foolishness. But the Americans are happy with us, and that’s what really matters…. right?
To bring things back to the subject of the thread: the delays in the F-35, coupled with Australia’s ridiculously premature commitment to that program, and irresponsible funding decisions in the interim, have combined to ensure that the full costs of Australia’s air combat replacement program will be eating all available funds alive through the 2020s and crippling future investment programs, most significantly for the Collins-class replacement.
RiiSo, err, do you actually have any criticisms of the article? Seems to me you’re the only one making Sweetman ‘part of the story’ here.
RiiNew engines would run counter to the argument that further MiG-31 upgrades are justified by the amount of spares — including engines — on hand.
I think this is the key sentence:
After refit, the aircraft will be employed not so much on air-defense duties and more in the interests of the Air and Space Defense [Command]. This will be possible through exploration of the high potential of the airframe and powerplant.”
MiG-31 as an anti-satellite platform? Like the 1980s F-15 ASAT program but with a rather more capable airframe and an additional 40 years of missile development? Apparently MiG-31 can get up near 100,000ft…
Consider also what is known and rumoured about US hypersonic plans: X-37, Prompt Global Strike, etc.
I expect Russia is considering a range of options to counter these and future developments. Further upgrades of existing MiG-31s would be the lowest cost/risk/time/capability option, whereas the evolved ‘MiG-41’ rumoured recently would be a medium option, and a clean-sheet aircraft at the upper end of the cost/capability matrix. The latter could probably only be contemplated if it were also designed to replace/supplement Tu-22M3 and Su-34.
RiiAre you just trolling or are you serious? The Navy has cut money because of the sequester. They don’t have money to stick to a plan they drew up before the sequester.
And yet they have the money to plan for an eventual >2000 F-35s. /snicker
The Navy can’t even afford to fund its basic shipbuilding programs, look how they’re screaming for a bailout on SSBN(X) a decade in advance.
It’s pretty hilarious how the American services continually embark on programs with no regard for realistic budgeting and then cry foul when the money isn’t available to service their fantasies.
Riielected or self-appointed leaders havn’t got the best track record of judgement either, nor are they held accountable, typically.
Indeed; the flaws in the system are obvious, but I’m not convinced that it wouldn’t be an improvement for most nations, most of the time. It’s hard to imagine such a process here delivering a more ridiculous result than the one we actually got with JSF and Super Hornet.
RiiIn Russia, helicopters carry EFTs and fighters don’t. 😮
RiiToo many decades btw…
At production rates the United States will actually be able to afford, F-35 will have to remain in production for 30 years just to fill the domestic order books.
RiiNo comment on the physics but that ~150kN thrust figure is only for the interim 117A engine.
RiiAnd this is what i call good news for the JSF program
Another appalling decision from a government that knows no other kind.
RiiNever have so many words been spilled about so little. Okay … not since last week. Can we get back to Rafale discussion now?
In any case I’m not sure why folks would think Dassault’s PR is any more credible than that from LM, Sukhoi, et al.
RiiIt is hardly reassuring to observe so-called great nations behaving like schoolboys comparing who can **** the farthest.
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