What 10% of the science Russia has produced? The ones they copied from WWII German scientists? While the rest of the world developed the Transistor, the Microwave, the Magnetron, the Microprocessor, the Internet?

Well if you want to look at it like that, then U.S. industries ARE the ones built by ex-German scientists/tech you better do your research before commenting on this subject.;)

In other words if the US deploys its ABM shield the Strategic Rocket Forces of Russia will get a new heavyweight ICBM with lots of MIRVs…

Look forward to hearing the whining about this.

And of course this suggests that the next round of nuke reduction talks would likely have involved the Russians wanting to go down to 1,000 strategic warheads each so they don’t have to have too many ICBMs.

But with the US ABM system they will likely want to stay at 2,000.

The U.S. ABM system is nothing right now, go look at the numbers of missiles radars, and compare to Russia’s ABM/Nukes, I sure wouldn’t wanna be in Washington if Russia decided to attack.

The 40N6 may have ATBM capability like the 48N6 series, but the new ABM/ASAT type weapon will be found in the S-500. Think of the S-500 as an S-300V on steroids designed for integration into the national IADS rather than tactical deployment.

Russia has had ABM capabilities for over 40 years:

1. “Over the past decade, Russia has deployed thousands of S-300V and Antey-2500 missiles around its key military and industrial complexes. In addition, it has exported these systems throughout Asia, Europe, and the Middle East as a means of financing its ailing economy in the wake of the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse. According to Aviation Week & Space Technology, “in the worldwide competition to sell ballistic missile defense systems, the Russian Antey Corp.’s S-300V is a main contender.”(8) The advantage for buyers of Russian surface-to-air missiles is that, unlike buying from the U.S., there are no political strings attached and, more often than not, the weapons are significantly cheaper than their U.S. counterparts”
http://www.missilethreat.com/missiledefensesystems/id.51/system_detail.asp

2.” Outgoing Russian defense minister Marshal I.D. Sergeyev, who provides drawings in a 1997 book of three new phased-array radars scheduled to be deployed in 2002 and 2003 as part of Russia’s ongoing upgrade of its national missile-defense network.”
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_16_17/ai_74337128/pg_3

3.” However, Soviet and Russian sources, including former Premier Alexei Kosygin and the Chief Designer of the original Moscow ABM system, confirm that: the SA-5 and SA-10 were dual purpose antiaircraft/missile systems (SAM/ABMs), and that the Hen House and LPAR radars provided the requisite battle management target tracking data. These and other sources cited in The ABM Treaty Charade are not exhaustive.

Nevertheless, CIA has not revised its position on this issue, nor have the U.S. Congress and the public been informed that the ABM Treaty was a valid contract from beginning to end.

In the late 1960s the U.S. sacrificed its 20-year technological advantage in ABM defenses on the altar of “arms control.” As Russian sources now admit, the Soviet General Staff was in total control of Soviet “arms control” proposals and negotiations, subject to Politburo review, which was largely pro forma. The Soviet military’s objective was to gain as much advantage as possible from “arms control” agreements (SALT).”
http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html/function/view/categoryid/170/documentid/440/history/3,2360,652,170,440

4.” Critics of the ABM treaty argue that the
treaty is no longer binding because the Soviet
Union no longer exists and because the
Soviets were, and the Russians continue to be,
in violation of the treaty. They contend that
the Russians have more than the one ABM
system permitted by the treaty.

Joseph Arminio, chairman of the National Coalition
for Defense, states:
Not only did the U.S.S.R., unlike the
U.S., deploy the one missile defense
permitted by the treaty, ringing
Moscow with the 100 interceptors
sanctioned by law. It also littered
about Soviet territory with another
10,000 to 12,000 interceptors, and 18
battle-management radars. Together
the Moscow defense and the vast
homeland defense formed an interlocking
system—nearly all of it illicit.10

The “10,000 to 12,000 interceptors” to which
Arminio refers are SA-5, SA-10, and SA-12
anti-aircraft missiles that some ABM treaty
opponents argue have an anti-ballistic missile
capability.1″
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa337.pdf

5. ” First, the SA-5 system was tested and developed at the officially declared ABM test range, Sary-Shagan.28 Second, medium- and intermediate-range missiles were fired to impact areas located at Sary-Shagan. Senators John “Jake” Garn and Gordon J. Humphrey have charged that many of these missiles could have served as the targets for ABM intercept programs.29 If so, the target most closely approximated in terms of range, radar cross section, and trajectory would be SLBMs. Third, if such a system as the SA-5 were to act as a terminal atmospheric defense weapon, it would require all-azimuth radar data for warning, acquisition, and pointing inputs to the SA-5 intercept radar. The Hen House long-range radar deployment was coincident in time with initiation of the SA-5 deployment.30 Hen House radars are deployed (in accordance with the ABM treaty) on the periphery of the U.S.S.R., scanninig outward over U.S. SLBM launch areas.31 As a linear array radar, Hen House can handle multiple targets limited only by internal computer configurations that can never be physically seen or assessed directly by U.S. intelligence.32 Acknowledged ABM radars such as the Dog House and Cat House also possess the capability to be used by the SA-5 in an ABM role as does a new class of large ABM capable phased-array radars publicly announced by Senator Garn.33 Fourth, and most important, the assessed technical characteristics of the SA-5 system itself indicated a clear capability to perform as a terminal ABM system to destroy ballistic missile targets of the SLBM variety given adequate radar acquisition data.34

Because of this relative wealth of uncertainty, the final ABM treaty included an explicit obligation in Article VI not to test SAMs “in an ABM mode.” Since the ABM testing of the SA-5 could have been completed for some years prior to 1972, the treaty’s impact on an SA-5 ABM capability would be slight. Even at that, the reported repeated violations of the treaty after 1972 by the use of the SA-5 radar in tracking ballistic missiles resulted in Soviet tests against missiles similar in range to a normal SLBM trajectory.35 The Soviets claimed (and the administration) accepted) that the SA-5 radar was not being tested in an ABM mode, but rather was being used in a “legitimate range instrumentation role.”36 Whether it is designated as a “range instrumentation radar” does not alter the fact that it has been used in a missile-tracking role. Its ability to track missile warheads on the range is therefore prima facie evidence of its ABM capability. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird claims that thousands of SA-5 interceptors have been deployed in hundreds of sites around some 110 Soviet urban areas, principally in the European U.S.S.R.37 Such a deployment could play havoc with the surviving 1440 SLBM RVs.

The SA-5 anti-SLBM defenses are unorthodox and even “sneaky” in that they exist in the context of an ABM treaty under which the United States officially assumes they do not exist and takes no actions or precautions to counteract the capability. And an SA-5 ABM capability only makes sense in an overall damage-denial scheme which negates ICBMs some other way and reduces the number of SLBM RVs by ASW efforts to levels which can be countered by active SA-5 defenses, civil defense, and hardening of key targets.38 “
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1981/sep-oct/barlow.htm

6.” The SA-5 was designated the S-200 Volga by the Soviets — the SA-5A and SA-5C are conventional versions; the SA-5B is nuclear. The warhead probably has the option for either command or proximity detonation. It was designed in the 1950s to counter American high-altitude aircraft such as the B-70 Valkyrie and SR-71 Blackbird, as well as the new stand-off missiles such as the Hound Dog, Blue Steel, and Skybolt. The United States has long claimed the SA-5B has an ABM capability (and was tested in this role in the 1970s), particularly given the sizable 25 kiloton nuclear warhead it carries. Over 2,000 missiles are deployed (the percentage of the nuclear SA-5B version is unknown), though the aging SA-5 has increasingly been replaced by the SA-10 Grumble. However, the SA-5 has received numerous upgrades and modifications, including terminal maneuvering capabilities.”
http://www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/database/rusnukes.html

7.” In March 4, 1961, in the area of the A testing ground the V-1000 ABM with a fragmentation-high-explosive warhead successfully intercepted and destroyed at an altitude of 25 kilometers the R-12 BM launched from the State Central Testing Ground with a dummy warhead weighing 500 kilograms. The Dunai-2 radar of the A system detected the BM at a distance of 1,500 kilometers when it appeared over the radio horizon, then the M-40 central computer found parameters of the R-12 trajectory, and prepared target designation for precision homing radars and the launchers. The ABM was launched and its warhead was actuated by the signal from the command post. The warhead of the ABM consisted of 16,000 balls with a carbide-tungsten core, TNT filling, and a steel hull. The warhead had a fragments field shaped as a disk perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the ABM. The warhead was actuated by the signal from the ground with a deflection necessary for formation of the fragments field. The warheads of this type were designed under the supervision of Chief Designer A. Voronov. The M-40 central computer was designed by the Precise Mechanics and Computer Research Institute of the Academy of Sciences under the supervision of Academician S. Lebedev. The computer could make 40,000 operations per second.

The V-1000 had two stages. The first stage was a solid-propellant booster, and the second stage was a sustainer stage with a warhead which was equipped with a liquid-propellant engine developed by the Design Bureau of Chief Designer A. Isaev. In addition to the fragmentation warhead a nuclear warhead was also designed for the missile. The flight tests of the missile, which could intercept targets at altitudes of up to 25 kilometers, started in 1958. The parallel approach to the target at a strictly counter course was chosen as the method of the ABM’s homing. The V-1000 was delivered to the trajectory calculated according to the homing method along the regular curve, parameters of which were defined by the predicted target trajectory. P. Kirillov was the Chief Designer of the missile’s automatic pilot. On March 26, 1961, the ABM destroyed the warhead of the R-5 BM with 500 kilograms of TNT. Overall, during the trial of the A system 11 launches of ABMs were performed which destroyed warheads of BMs, and experimental ABMs with heat seeking self-homing warhead, radio-controlled fuses, and optical fuses were also launched. The S2TA version of the V-1000 ABM with a heat seeking self-homing warhead was tested at the A testing ground between 1961 and 1963. The flight tests of the V-1000 with the nuclear warhead (without the fissible material) designed in Chelyabinsk-70 were conducted in 1961. For this warhead two types of proximity fuses were designed and tested: the optical fuse (designed by the GOI under the supervision of Chief Designer Emdin) a and radio-electronic fuse (Chief Designer Bondarenko) for the R2TA and G2TA versions of the missile.

Systems for surmounting of air defenses intended for domestic BM were also tested during the trial of the A system. The launched target ballistic missiles were equipped with inflatable false targets Verba, unfolding false targets Kaktus, and Krot active jammers. Overall, the field tests of the A system showed a principle possibility of BM warheads interception. Experiments under the coded name Operation K were conducted (K1, K2, K3, K4, and K5) to check a possibility of the A system functioning under the influence of nuclear explosions at altitudes of 80 to 300 kilometers between 1961 and 1962 at the Sary-Shagan testing ground. The A system showed its capability to function even when a conventional enemy used nuclear weapons.”
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/soviet/990600-bmd-rus.htm

What assumptions am I making? That almost 99% of all S-75s fired at B-52s failed to destroy their targets? I think we have agreement on that, but it’s why this happens to be the case or to what extent that the bomber’s on-board ECM is responsible for the low kill rate none of us can be sure of, can we?

31 were downed but as I say again the U.S. doesn’t give sopecifics 40+ years later on which were brought down by SAMs: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B-52_Stratofortress#Vietnam_War

There is nothing ridiculous, without the related details. Around 6800 launched and over 8000 reported gives an error margin of ~25 %, what is not bad for wartime conditions.
That ratio did come from number of all sorties flown over NV. If all mission came under real SAM is questionable. In reality to every downed aircraft by AD did come three further damaged ones. Just the related statistics in mind.
Like every statistic it can differ considerably from medium values in special cases, with peak values. The statistic gives away, that from the three damaged ones a further one is a w/o.
So it is up to the participants, which values they will choose to bolster own claims.
When the statistical direct kill is around 1%, the practical result is more around 2%, when the mission kill-rate is even higher.
Whatever you choose, NV was unable to prevent or even fend-off US-attacks with that SAM-systems at hand.
A further question can be the share of each branch of the AD. To avoid one threat or getting damaged by one can result in falling victim of another f.e.
But the results in the more densely protected battle-fields around Israel did show, that the direct results from SAM were limited, when the indirect results did fullfill the demands for some periods at least, when they did limit the effect of the IDF-AF over the direct battle-field or did prevent critical recce reports to be available, what the military were accustomed to have before the 70s.

Those numbers are 100% wrong, the U.S. Gov doesn’t give exact figures out of embaressment, it’s been 33 years scince that war has been over, it is very easy for the Gov to simple post a site that shows all the planes/helecopters that were shot down between 1961-75 by AAA/SAM/MANPADS/MiGS, but if you go to Google you’ll get all sorts of “conflicting” reports, all I know is between 2003-2008 wikipedia had 3223 planes/helecopters downed over Vietnam, by SAMS/AAA/MANPADS/MiGs, and at the bottom of that wikipedia article it listed sources (some government) now in 2008 some one changed the number, so it’s my conclution that the U.S. Gov/Mil doesn’t want anyone to know the real number because it’s higher that what people expectes, I’ve read in Airforce magazines how the Sa-2 was effective and the Airforce had to start using ECM’s and thats why the SA-3 came into play, you people make it seem as if the SA-2 without U.S. ECM’s was usless.

No the last plane manufacture AND entering the RuAF is a MiG-31 in 94.

Always a pleasure reading your posts sir.

OH YES PLEASE!

* Important:

This one is for all of you experts. There is allot of Raptor Techno talk. But shall we review for the benefit of many of us beginners/amateurs/simple enthusiast?

ATF/F-22A official/semi-official/un-official specs:

RCS 1/1000th of the F-15. But whether it is just frontal or all aspect not known. The value of the F-15 RCS taken whether it is either the minimum frontal RCS of RAM employed F-15 or a normal one F-15 carrying 4 AIM-9, 4 AMRAAM and 2 drops tanks is also I guess is also not given?

RAM on the F-22 is only on the edges of the wings,tails,nose everything else doesn’t have Ram.

1MAN

I think it’s OK to ask for proof (and I agree that the West has at certain times exaggerated), but when someone shows you that proof it’s a good idea to come back and acknowledge it.

What proof have I not acknowleged:confused: