Do you know what new changes have they made as part of full overhaul , I guess full overhaul in Russian term means a mid life upgrade

Basically yes. She got new comms, though. Rumour has it that she got a new reactor pump and new missiles, but I do not believe it.

Meanwhile, the aforementioned Marshal Ustinov suffered an engine fire that cost the life of 2 seamen, confirming her reputation as the worst-kept and worst-trained vessel of the Pacific Fleet. She returned to base and the damage is estimated at 15 million RUR (something like 700 thousand USD).

But there are other and much more significant news (almost live news 😀 ):

RN tests successfully a Bulava SLBM.
Today at 18.45 Moscow time, the Dmitry Donskoy fired a Bulava missile at the Kura test range. Test warheads have reached their aimpoint and the whole launch was conducted according to plan.

Will duplicate this info in the space and missiles section.

Maybe in a similar way as the Rafale F1 was. The examples built are at the test ranges to get it combat ready in some years from now.
The timescale of the intended production run will give you an idea about that. 😉

No, no, no. 🙂 Again, and that should be hammered in the head of all fanboys of all fronts, the Soviet/Russian acceptation system differs from the Western one:
1) any piece of weaponry has to complete:
a) experimental trials, and then
b) “factory” trials
c) pre-production trials
d) state combat trials.
When it completed d), it has to be full combat ready. Otherwise, no series. Period. The problem is that sometimes the first batch is not as capable as it could be later. It is then upgraded, if needed. But the difference with the Block I, II, III etc iterations is that every block is fully operational and has to conform to the original “technical assignment” (ТЗ) before full acceptance and completion of state trials.
This is true for missiles, airplanes, subs etc.

For all those who wished an overview and an update about the conflict, quite a good source is the latest Moscow Defense Brief released today: http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/3-2008/

Said Aminov’s article about the Georgian AD could be of interest here (some excerpts):

First, Georgia acquired a 9К37М1 Buk-M1 (SA-11) battalion (…) eight self-propelled launcher vehicles 9К33М2 Osa-AK (…) two modern 36D6-M radars (…) another four Kolchuga-M and one Mandat electronic warfare systems (…) upgraded the obsolete Georgian P-18 Spoon Rest radars to the P-180U version (…)

Thus, by the time Georgia invaded South Ossetia, its air defenses had acquired significant capability to detect, locate, and destroy air targets. The Georgian forces that advanced into South Ossetia were the equivalent of about a large division (nine light infantry and five tank battalions, up to eight artillery battalions, plus special forces and Ministry of the Internal Affairs troops), were protected by an air defense echelon that included one Buk-M1 SAM system battalion, up to three Osa-AK/AKM SAM system batteries, a large number of man-portable SAM systems, as well as a few С-60 57-mm anti-aircraft guns, ZU-23-2 twin 23-mm anti-aircraft guns, and ZSU-23-4 Shilka quad 23-mm self-propelled anti-aircraft gun systems. Thus, the air-defense system of Georgian attack groups was about the equivalent of a best frontline Soviet divisions during the late 1980s – early 1990s.

Georgia’s air defenses reportedly relied on data received from the Kolchuga-M passive electronic monitoring radar systems, minimizing the use of active radar, while the Georgian Buk-M1 and Osa-AK/AKM self-propelled SAM systems used ambush tactics

the Georgian Buk-M1 SAM systems shot down four Russian aircraft on the first day of battle on August 8: three Su-25 Frogfoot attack planes and one Tu-22M3 Backfire long-range bomber. Moreover, according to unofficial sources, Russia lost another three airplanes (one Su-24MR Fencer E reconnaissance plane on August 8, one Su-24M Fencer frontal bomber on August 10 or 11, and one Su-25 attack plane on August 9) as well as perhaps one Mi-24 attack helicopter. Both Su-24 were probably shot down by Georgian Osa-AK/AKM SAM systems or man-portable SAM systems, and the Su-25, according to several reports, fell victim to friendly fire from a MANPAD wielded by Russian servicemen.

following the unpleasant surprise arising from Georgia’s effective use of Soviet-made SAM systems on August 8, the Russian armed forces threw all of the resources at their disposal against Georgia’s SAM and radar systems. Both S-125M SAM battalions, the majority of Georgia’s military and civilian radars, as well as the most part Buk-M1 and Osa-AK/AKM SAM systems were destroyed. It would appear that the only remaining threat to Russian planes and helicopters in the last days of combat came from Georgian MANPADs.

Russian forces were able to seize five Osa-AKM self-propelled launch vehicles, a few ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns and a few ZSU-23-4 Shilka self-propelled anti-aircraft gun systems as trophies from the retreating Georgian forces. Near Gali and Senaki, Abkhaz and Russian forces captured minimum one Buk-M1 battery, as witnessed by published photos. According to one unofficial source, Russian forces were able to capture or destroy almost all of the self-propelled launcher mounts for the Georgian Buk-M1 SAM systems.

The war in South Ossetia marked the first time when air power faced off against new-generation SAM systems, like the Buk-M1, which were brought into service in the 1980s. In all previous military campaigns, such as the War in Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967, 1973, and 1982, combat actions in Chad and Libya in the 1980s, the NATO campaigns in the former Yugoslavia of 1994 and 1999, and the Wars in the Persian Gulf of 1991 and 2003, the air-defense systems in question were all designed in the 1950s and 1960s (this excludes, of course, the use of modern MANPADs). Moreover, in Georgia, the Russian Air Force for the first time in its history fought against modern air-defense systems, and relatively modern and numerous SAM systems at that.

If it is true you should know what it means for an a/c to endure more than 11G in pull-out without breaking. It is ultimate G load, not service limit, but it gives a very good picture about a/c strength.

I’m sorry, but no it doesn’t say anything about a/c strength. The human body can endure 25G during a very short timespan without endangering the life of its owner either – it doesn’t mean anything. Hell, I mean at 30G it would not even “break”, depending on the G-force vector. You’d just die, that’s all.
What is telling is a sustained high-G tolerance combined with sufficient elasticity-rigidity acceptancy, without reverberation and resonance. The Foxbat is not the best in this aspect, but still doing very well (you’d be surprised how the Starfighter performs in this respect actually – by that I mean that is really is not something that matters out of context).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siberia_Airlines_Flight_1812
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1579536.stm

The time scale in mind it has to be a variant of the W 880. When you have other details, please do present that.

Of course I will.
The S-200V is officially unable to hit a target at ranges exceeding 220 km.
The S-200V accidentaly shot down a target at the Shary-Shagan test range (Tyuken firing range) at an effective range of 386 km.
In the MKhI regime (monochromatic illumination/radiation), targets can be aquired by the 5V28V missile at ranges of 390-410 km and auto-followed by the missile alone at ranges exceeding 300 km.
The Ukrainian PVO crew used the MKhI regime (and not the more common FKM – “phase-coded manipulation” mode) because it knew that their training targets will come from a range not exceeding 40 km and that these targets were small-sized ones. Not willing to get a bad mark by missing the target (and FKM mode needs more time to tilt in), they switched to auto-target mode and MKhI.
Therefore, all the ingredients of the tragedy were set in place: The Ukrainians had no real idea about the real capabilities of their hardware, they have neglected to secure a 2x bigger safety zone than you normally need (the S-200 was only combat tested in Sary Shagan, even in the Russian Far East all combat application S-200 shots were banned), the operators choose the MKhI mode.
Thus, they made it possible: the MKhI mode functions with 3 variables: azimuth, angle (incl. approx. altitude), velocity. FKM adds range. The operators did not have range bearings.
The operators extrapolated their power output and input variables expecting low-level, low-radiating targets (Reis- or BSR-type). As the test range was small, they choose speed and not safety (therefore the MKhI mode). They also choose a 4/4 deg / 8/8 deg. scanning arc: maximum power output, minimal scanning, perfect for small targets popping up at fast speed. The problem is that it’s the perfect combination for hitting a target at 300 km that happens to be in sight.
The S-200 missile does not have a proper self-destruct mechanism: when illumination is lost, its head goes active and switches to broadband scan before pinpointing at 30KHz. The only failsafe selfdestruct mode presupposes the installation of a operating-time sensor, that f.e. orders the self destruction of the missile when it trespasses, let’s say, 50 km and has not any inbound in sight. This mechanism has only been used in Russia at Ashuluk and Sary Shagan and presupposes the dismemberment of the 2nd compartiment of the missile and quite a lot of work and tech expertise – something that the Ukrainians neither had nor bothered to do.

Never heard about that, where did that claim about the Georgian capabilities did come from?

No wonder you don’t hear about that among all the whining about “poor little Georgia” and the “entire 58th army” pouring South with “3000 tanks” and “weapons of mass destruction” (copyright Saakashvili). Well, err, I don’t know, check the UN register for example. Arms exports, that sort of thing.
The Georgian had modified Buk batteries, and were trained by Ukrainian instructors (fair game, nothing terrible about that imho)
The Georgians had Israeli long range battle mangament radar and systems.
The Georgians had Ukrainian passive detection systems.
The Georgians had T-72Sim tanks, with Israeli fire control systems.
The Georgians had 1500+ ATGM in their inventory.
The Georgians had night-capable Su-25 modernised by Israel.
The Georgians had US, French and Israeli encrypted digital comms.
Should I continue?
The wonder is why they didn’t stand up to a Russian force that was outnumbered 1:12 at day 1 and 1:3 at the end of the conflict (and I don’t count Georgian reservists etc.).

You did make up your own reality about that incident, do you. Maybe you missed the post below, did you? 😉

Check what mod downed the Russian jet.

What do you make of the Israeli victories over the Russian crew during the wars? I think it was more of being caught off guard and without proper support which did the trick.

Well, the real question is why the Arab crews got decimated.
Regarding Russian crews (i.e. mostly manning the Foxbat), I think the occurences of “victory” are statistically far too negligible compared to the number of sorties in order to draw a definite picture. It’s like talking about the “victory of the North Vietnam AD against US air force crews”. Doesn’t mean anything out of context. The Israelis had great training, great pilots, great motivation, a lot of guts and after a certain time better hardware (or AD).
You know, it’s like asking why the Georgians didn’t down the whole Russian AF/destroy all their forward armoured elements in spite of having a rather modern integrated AD system, better tanks and better Su-25 than the Russkies have had. The question cannot be reduced in such a manner.

The practices in Soviet military aviation are not unlike elsewhere in the world.

There were some typically Soviet particularities, though – f.e. the “premial” system and various honours for engineers who “overdid” the required specs or managed to “rationalize” the airframes. Thus sometimes the factory big bosses got artificially high requirements, which translated into a more potent/heavy/expensive hardware, then re-negociated the specs in order to lower them, and “rationalised” the hardware towards specs reduction thus getting their medals, badges and money grants. 😎

[QUOTE=Schorsch;1294069]Oh, we heard about 11g before.
11G was the G-force peak. What was surprising is the fact that the Foxbat retained structural integrity after suffering several seconds at 7G.

Too much for the civilians it killed. Using such incidents to show us the supremacy of Soviet designs is pathetic at best. How far did the cloud of Tschernobyl reach? Another big achievement!

Don’t ever try to misinterpret my words in such an insulting way, I might get angry. You perfectly understand what I meant: without this incident, we would not have known that the S-200 actually can down a target at 280km+ and not the max. 180-200km specs. And no one is talking about “supremacy of Soviet designs” here (well, at least not me). The only fact is that the Sovs/Russians have a tendency to downgrade their official specs (not in every field, though). Stichwort MiG-29, Osa-AKM, the recce Foxbat version etc…

One way range with no fuel “landing”, when compared to radius with reserves and actual landing, is something like factor 3.

Don’t compare a swept-wing fighter, the canopy and pilot missing, with a glider. The “refugee” MiG-23 flew straight down after burning off its fuel, then had a short glide at low level when it gained speed after the dive and regained some lift.