RSM55RSM55, can you tell us anything more about this “Relief” GLCM? I don’t think I’ve heard of it before.
It’s a GL variant of the sea-launched “Granat”.
Sandbox mode on.
Au contraire – I see the Russian road mobile ICBMs as a stabalizing element of MAD, since that is the only part of the Russian triad giving it credibility.
And moored SSBNs are sitting ducks also. Esp since all Russian SLBMs except Bulava are liquid fueled. Lack of adequat early warning effects them also.
Distiller, you’re wrong.
All mobile ICBMs are presently “moored” at permanent base due to arms control agreements. Deploying them takes lots of time.
On the other hand, I don’t get your remark about the inadequacy of liquid-fueled SLBMs in terms of vulnerability. It has definitely nothing to do with that. Liquid-stable-fueled missiles actually have a higher t/w ratio and final accelleration capabilities, BTW.
Russian EW systems are certainly not 100% operational, but the situation has much improved since the horrendous 90s, both on the space layer and on ground. The Belarussian EW node is on, and Voronezh-DM has gone operational as well lately and closed the North-Western gap.
It is as well time to bring the old myth about easy-to-detect Deltas and shadowy LAs lurking in dark waters to a halt. Deployed boats have their sanctuaries, and it is almost impossible to track a Delta-IV class when its deployment routine is done properly – and after that, it’s lost. When the Russians will finish their National Surface and Subsurface Integrated Warning System, which is well funded by the way, the situation will even worsen for a potential adversary.
On the other hand, it is not possible to argue that ABM systems in Europe and elsewhere, with no upper-limits set, are not a threat to strategic stability. The Russians certainly will have no less than 1700 warheads by 2015, as by this date, only the SS-18 will be completely retired. On the other hand, almost all SS-25 will be as well. The SS-24 is already history. SS-19 are faring better, as their service life has been extended and as the Russians got almost 40 “dry” Stilettos left to deploy. But the average number of deployed ICBMs/SLBMs will shrink – as in the US. But the US will have ABM, plus 7000+ deployed cruise missiles. The only thing one doesn’t want to happen is a situation where a gov thinks it might fare better to strike first than to wait longer, and ABM brings that out of balance:
1) on the one hand, the US can have an incentive for first-strike policy (take everything at hand out with cruise, SLBMs and stealth assets, then take out the rest with ABM interceptors).
2) on the other hand, Russia, knowing that, gets the incentive to launch everything Motherland has once it thinks an attack on its strategic assets is started.
Not a nice situation.
BTW, the US will face a strategic choice quite soon as well – as the Trident D5 is ageing and its retrofit is enormously expensive and lenghty (2 ms / month), especially compared to the success of the upgraded Minuteman III.
RSM55Interesting report is not the ICBM but Iskander missile. Domestic version alot more range and power. It will be I think world first ultrsonic billistic/Cruise missile combined characteristic.
I rather think they’re implementing a multi-armed, joint forces, common TEL and command vehicles, all dubbed as the “Iskander” system. The new missile appears to be a double-staged, “flat-flying” combination of Iskander and some GLCM, maybe even a re-staged “Relief” GLCM. Makes sense not to build a new TEL and service vehicle for every other missile system, as the SU did. On the other hand, all that adds to the impression that the INF is slowly but steadily being flushed down the tube.
RSM55What exactly is this new warhead/vehicle Pres. Putin revealed few years back? AJAX project? I don’t think it stands for Asynchronous JavaScript and XML. 😀
Does it maneuver heavily even while in space? Not just bang-bang left right but on many axis? I heard it almost skids on the atmosphere (Like the space shuttle on rare occasions). If so, doesn’t it render the GBI, specifically the EKV pretty ineffective. The warhead traveling at those speeds, even the slightest deviation by the warhead translates to a very large distance correct? The EKV intercepting something like that is 1 in a……..:confused:
Tech derived from AJAX, Oriol, Kholod and the like, if effectively operational, is so secretive that a info leak can only come after a political decision (impress/inform potential enemies/rival powers etc.). My info is that hypersonic hardware R&D is quite advanced in Russia nowadays, but I have no specific info about what has been effectively back-sourced to warhead engineering.
The new missile/warhead’s purpose is actually to spend so little time in flight as possible. I doubt that it has outer-layer skimming capabilities, it is by far more accurate to suppose that it does some evasive manoeuvres in outer space and then enters the dense layers without losing speed (as it is self-propelled) and on non-ballistic flight paths. Together with some “heavy” decoys, it’s more than enough to defeat any ABM.
RSM55You don’t seem to know much about Peacekeeper. The missile itself was great and it’s accuracy in the words of one general was “eye-watering”.
Well, I know enough about the LGM-118A, if that’s the question – my assessment was about the system – not just the missile, which was very ok indeed. The problems were
a) badly designed silos and deployment areas
b) high-cost materials that did not bring a real breakthrough in terms of secondary specifications (thrust/weight ratio, acceleration, time-till-impact reduction)
c) some support-heavy electronics and hardware, especially the gyros – it was found out that it was very ill-advised to shut them down once started (component collapse), and that meant they had to run for ever or not to be installed at all, which effectively either reduced the missile service life and increased malfunction risks or transformed the missile into a dummy.
Given that all we’ve been hearing is that all Russian ICBMs will have manuevering, terminally guided warheads exactly what kind of target would require more than 50kt from a terminally guided warhead?
Walmart. And all its clients miles around. 😀 That’s the point about strategic weapons: kill the maximum number of human beings.
It has less to do with math than it does the accuracy of your information. For example SM-3s would NEVER be counted as they are not ABMs. Nor are THAAD and PAC-3. Secondly there are what, 14 ABMs in Alaska and TWO in California. Are you going to tell me there are fewer than 16 ABMs around Moscow?
I did say I don’t ask you to count the SM-3s, even if they do fulfil a (specific) ABM role. As for the numbers of ABMs in Alaska and California, if you would be so kind to look at the official sources again, the short-term planning is 50 interceptors, + a certain number in Europe. The “A” system is not in its prime, and it would be very unrealistic to suppose all its m100+ endo-atm. interceptors are operational.
Works both ways. Who’s to say Russia won’t deploy more ABMs? Nobody.
Of course. But that doesn’t change a iota in my argumentation.
Why should it be any other way? Would you suggest the US declare when Russian ICBM deployment is complete? Of course not. Why should it be any different with the US?
Wrong example. The US had, and still has, something to say about the Soviet / Russian ICBM deployment (SALT, STARTs, Moscow Treaty) and it worked both ways, quite well actually. ABM Treaty is dead, I’m not saying it should be otherwise, I’m just stating that regarding the fact that the US is not obliged to limit the interceptors numbers, nothing guarantees to Russia that they won’t deploy hundreds of them in some future. That can make them nervous, you’ll agreee. Period.
Who cares? Since the US can watch Russian ICBMs from lift off as it is what difference does a radar in the Czech Republic make? After all the ABMs in Poland would be worthless against Russian ICBMs.
Dear sferrin, “watch” is not a term used in ABM. Before putting ABM assets in Europe, they could detect the launch occuring (DSP), extrapolate its trajectory and after some time detect and discriminate the trajectory of the warheads. After installing the radar, they will be able to do a much more exact path prediction almost immediately after launch, which gives them much more time to provide accurate targeting data for mainland- and sea-based interceptors. And all this utter BS about ABMs in Poland being worthless against Russian ICBMs is beginning to drive me crazy (I’m not attacking you here, only the nonsense that is so widely spread): in case of Russia targeting the US, only about 50% of Russian ICBMs will fly on the North Pole route, the rest will target strategic assets on the East Cost and fly directly above the Northern Atlantic / Northern Europe area.
Funny, the US is getting all kinds of life out of the Minuteman IIIs.
…which will not last forever, either. The Russkies don’t plan to phase out all their SS-19s and Satans before 2015/2020 either, but they prefer (strangely enough) to build 20 missiles a year or so rather than 200+ in a couple of months once all the old junk is in the scrapeyard.
By that rational the US needs to start cranking out ICBMs immediately as they have less land mass than Russia.
???:confused: Because Russia deploys ABM assets, airbases, S-400 armed destroyers and laser-beaming Candids next to US borders??? If it’s the case, then yes, you’re right.
You must have missed the “invulnurable to any conceivable defense” press release 😉
I was not writing about press releases, I was explaining the logic behing any sound decision implying strategic deterrence. Even if your almost invulnerable system is rendered 1% less efficient by a counter-system, it means that you have to increase the effectiveness of your own by 1 or 2% again. Just to be sure. Regardless of being friends, strategic partners, old chaps or new/old/recycled Europe.
RSM55Let us not maim this thread again with political rants and considerations about soundless US policy / Russian hypocrisy and the like.
Well now we know why Putin has been crying about ABMs in Poland so loudly. Needed justification for a new ICBM.
No one needs justifications for a new ICBM, neither the US nor Russia, or even France. As a matter of fact, they need to replace their old ICBMs – period. The choice is either to have a strategic deterrent in the future or not. When the US will have to replace their Trident and Minutemen, they’ll do the same. The timing is, of course, political.
Anybody who thinks this is a response to the ABMs in Poland needs their head examined as this would have had to have been in the works for years.
Again – this a political argument. Nevertheless, it is as well a (political) response – a classic diplomatic ping-pong game.
Why did we get rid of Peacekeepers again?
Because it was a preposterously overpriced, badly managed, badly designed, half-efficient and complicated system. It could be of some use within a Cold War, warhead-maximum and first-strike logic. Its mobile variant would have been somewhat of a breakthrough, though. And within the framework of the Moscow Treaty (~2000 deployed warheads), what would be the justification for a 10+ warhead design if one doesn’t have to reduce deployment costs?
Poseiden could carry 14 warheads and it didn’t have a huge amount of throw weight.
Yep, but Poseidon (like the R-29R/R-39) carried very low-yield nukes, they weren’t primary strategic strike weapons. It would be very surprising if the Topol-M or the RS-24 carried a warhead in the ~100kg range. This has nothing do to with decent or undecent design. It’s a matter of purpose and role. As far as I can see, the primary Russian strategic deterrent can not be restricted to target SAM sites, airfields and the like.
You make it sound like the US is cranking out thousands of ABMs. Even when deployment is complete there will be fewer than Russia has around Moscow alone.
First, no. Do the math (and please include the US mainland sites – I don’t even ask to add the SM-3). Second, who decides when the deployment is complete? Right, the US. Unilaterally, as it is. Third, the key words in your post are “around Moscow“. Not in Cuba, or Venezuela, or Quebec 😀 . And I always said that the main issue here is actually the radar, even if the Russians (and the US) don’t mention it publicly too much.
As for the RS-24, it might well be that it’s “simply” a MIRVed Topol-M – even in the light of the footage showing some of the RVSN top brass in front of the TEL container, where it appears to be quite larger at the base than the usual Topol carrier -~2m in dia (another point is that START prohibits re-naming older missiles if certain parameters remain unchanged – like the overall weight for example – and doesn’t just restrict the MIRVing). But that doesn’t change the logic:
a) the Russians badly need to renew their strategic forces (Satans and Stilettos can’t carry on for ever)
b) The Moscow treaty sets a rather low limit for deployed nukes
c) New tech (ABM, ABL, SBL, SM-3, stealth assets) and the reduction of the national landmass since the fall of the Soviet Union decreases the range between the launch sites and areas on the one hand and potential threats to ICBMs/SLBMs just after launch on the other.
d) Enhanced long-range data collection (and the installation of new radars in the vicinity of Russian borders) permits improved target and flight path discrimination – which in turn improves the chances for successful interception
Conclusion:
=> ICBMs are (slightly or less so) more vulnerable than, shall we say, 10 years ago.
=>> The aim is to ensure that every warhead hits its target
=>>> In vulnerability conditions, it means that the optimum is: 1 missile=1warhead (=1 sub, but that is, of course, purely theoretical)
=>>>> The aim is to achieve the maximum missile/deployed warhead ratio within the limits of the existing treaties and economic possibilities.
Therefore: No need for 10+ MIRVed ICBMs.
The optimum strategic forces layout (for any country) would look like:
1 warhead = 1 missile = 1 vector (sub, bomber, etc…), which would mean 2000+ carriers within the Moscow treaty limits and is of course unsustainable.
The possible strategic forces layout for the Russians would be:
~400/500 warheads on SLBMs (single type)
~1000 or more on 3 to 6 MIRVed ICBMs (single type); or a mix of multiple/single warhead Topol-Ms/RS-24
~500 or so on ALCMs (depending whether the ALCMs are single-warhead designs or not)
The fun thing is that after the Moscow Treaty, which restricts only the number of deployed warheads, the most flexible force in terms of short-term flexibility is the AF – which helps to explain why the Russians are starting R&Dying a new strategic bomber.
The wild card is of course the number of tactical nukes which will be deployed on Iskanders and the like. The Moscow Treaty doesn’t explicitely state anything about them.
RSM55I should note that this new heavy missile may well be closer to the mighty and fearful SS-18 as easily as it could be the SS-24.
…but we don’t know whether it’s “heavy”, do we? And the MIT never designed the kind of RS-20 before.
RSM55So, hypothetically RS-24 will be something like a Scalpel with a guidance package borrowed from the Topol-m? :confused:
…or a Scalpel-style boosted Topol-M with multiple warheads. Or something completely different. Let’s wait and see (the Memorandum’s appendix – when they’ll update it).
The arguments for a all-new type are: a) the official statement regarding the replacement of Stilettos and Satans – the RS-12M2 doesn’t provide that capability; b) the use of a new starter pad c) the surprise and secrecy surrounding this event
The arguments for a MIRVed Topol-M are a) Okham’s razor b) Economics c) Legal issues.
RSM55Let me be the first to say: really?
Didn’t know anything about this… Whats the point? I thought TOPOL-Ms were supposed to replace SATANs etc?!? How do you know its heavier? How many warheads?
Well, it is real, official and confirmed. Everyone knew about the Iskander test from the southern test range, which now appears to have been primarily used as a cover for this one.
The speculation is rather whether it is a all-new missile type or just a derivative of the Topol-M that they have to present as a new one because of international agreeements (no modernisation by MIRVing of previously single-warhead missiles), which is possible but quite unlikely as they have conducted multiple-warhead tests before without notifying them as such and as START is in agony (and will quietly pass away in 2009 in any case).
It is heavier than the “normal” Topol-M anyway, as it carries a bigger load 😀
As for range etc., one can only speculate (or hope that the specs will be released as part of international arms control agreements – as it partly was the case for the Bulava). It is not even clear whether the system will be mobile or silo-based. Intercontinental range is a given, but whether it is 9000 or 12000 km or more, or less…who knows. The Kura test range is only about 6500 km away from Plessetsk.
My bet is that it’s a hybrid of the Topol and the RS-22 – which explains why they had to build a new starter at Plessetsk and could not use the existing ones used for the Topols. I don’t see the Russian military wasting cash on useless gimmicks if it’s not part of some general’s pension plan 😀
RSM55Russia tests new ICBM
Seems they’re gone ballistic (and did some new R&D no one knew of):
Moscow, May 29 – [short summary] Russian Space Forces have conducted the first flight test of a new ICBM, the RS-24, from the Plessetsk Cosmodrome test range. All warheads reached their target in the Kamtchatka peninsula. The RS-24 carries multiple warheads and was launched at 14:20 Moscow time. The launch was carried from a modified mobile pad [(the Russian word used in the original is a general term: it could mean anything from “pad” to “TEL”)] that was specially adapted for the test launch (source: MoD). The RS-24 is designed by the MIT, with Solomonov as the Chief Designer. The RVSN press officer (Koval) stated that this missile used some components of the TOPOL-M system, which eased its design and reduced R&D costs. He also stated that this missile is designed as a replacement for the RS-18 and RS-20 (Satan) missiles, and will become the backbone of the RVSN in the future, together with the TOPOL-M system.
Source: RIAN.
And no, it’s not a MIRVed Topol-M. It’s quite heavier.
RSM55To continue the nice little discussion you guys had about the Akson-2, I do have some questions.
Is that a Yankee Stretch or Yankee Pod?
…
But then again, one of the few pics floating around on the east-to-find internet showing the Yankee Stretch is identical to the picture in this thread of the Akson-2.
The picture on the left shows the same submarine as on the right, i.e. the Kazan (Akson-2) aka Yankee Pod:
* sub K-403 (project 667A Nalim class/Yankee class)-> converted in the 80s into project 667AK (Akson-1, hydroacoustic trials for 3rd gen. subs) -> converted into Akson-2 in the 90s -> decomissioned on Dec. 9 2005 (project 09780
*Yankee Stretch: sub K-411 (id.) -> converted into minisub carrier (sometimes called project 667AN – project 09774) in 1990.
RSM55It may be an option to save the INF. To build BM and CM with a high accuracy and conventional a silo-buster warhead. Some Russians says Iskander range can be extended from 400 km to 500+ km (I wonder if this doesn’t degrade accuracy). This with a “long range” supersonic land-deployed BrahMos (that’s the thing that Indians are testing now). Both systems deployed in Kaliningrad in low numbers will permit to save the face of some Russian hardliners without threatening the real (aka.”old”) Europe.
Let’s wait and see.
Long-range land-based cruise of ballistic missiles are banned by the INF. If they do that, they’ll open a door for the installation of GLCMs next to their borders, and they won’t like that. The best option would be to make them air-based (there was a plan to launch the Iskander, and Brahmos/Yakhont, from a mid-range bomber). No restrictions, more difficult to trace and monitor.
RSM55CFE almost dead
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070426/64462473.html
An unsurprising new.
This kind of “asymmetric” response is going to cost them way too much… Or it is just a way of make a missile-armed fortress out of Kaliningrad once again…
RSM55How compare the capability of the new Russian LPAR respect to the Don-2NP. As far I know this one surely have battle management capability. But have the Volga and the Voronezh-DM able to provide tracking-quality data or are they just early warning radars that provides signals with low resolution?
Don-2P is a tracking and battle management radar. Its primary function is to provide target data to the A-135 missiles, not early-warning (even if it is the everyday-use function). Its performance (along with others EW Russian stations) was demonstrated during joint tests with the US Space command and Stratcom (high-resolution target discrimination and acquisition – measured on space-deployed microspherical targets of different sizes) where the Russian system was able to detect and track smaller-sized targets than the US one (that was in part due to the fact that the Russian algorithms were proven better suited for that – it’s not surprising since the Soviet math academia was still at its very best back then).
Volga and consorts are basically just EW, but with certain non-negligible target discrimination capability (they’re used for space surveillance as well). The performance of Voronezh-DM is classified, but it doesn’t seem that it has target acquisition and guidance functions. It is however designed to provide high-resolution tracking data. Rumour has it that they’re currenctly curing some problems on it – it exceeded design specs on sensitivity and is subject to too much clutter noise (“white screen syndrome”). They’re adapting the hard- and software on it presently.
RSM55it really is a wonder to me why they bought wire guided torpedoes, then.
http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/weapon/test71.asp
They bought them
a) because they had to – the Russians trained them on their own boats first, and didn’t want to spend money on buying new rounds (it was in the 90s, remember)
b) because they wanted to have a close look at the technology involved.
You’re right of course, I was speaking about the basic export version of the Kilo, not the later one.
RSM55Realisticly I can’t see any new strategic airplane on the Russian horizon.
Max an evolution of the Blackjack, which is basically a good design.
That talk about matching/surpassing the B-2 etc is just putinesque nationalistic hot air.
What Russian would like to match an utterly subsonic, overpriced and extremely infrastructure-dependent design? It does it job well, no question, but if you look at the first post, the requirement are quite different. I would rather expect a kind of blending between the Backfire and the Blackjack. The rough airstrip requirements are standard, the same requirements were made to the Tu-142/-95MS design. The new aspect is stealth, and the mulirole capability.
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