Hi to all!
I hope we’ll get to see some good photos, maybe we’ll finally find out for sure whether it has a pumpjet etc. 🙂
Well, what you get is what you (are allowed to) see…
I’m quite happy that the vid confirms that she got one screw / pumjet / anything. The rest (i.e. almost everything) is either invisible or covered. Let’s wait till 2009 (again…) for the rest. Or someone will post new shots after tonight’s party at Sevmash 😀 (a not-so-improbable hypothesis BTW).
Photos:
Images courtesy of the NTV channel (and the VIF2NE forum)
See the video here: http://news.ntv.ru/107427/
Pay attention to the smart guy picking up the rests of the champagne bottle 🙂
I think it’s just a bunch of BS by the Russian General as people that go to those types of shows would have certainly noticed the I-21, unless they keep it hidden and shown on a per invitation only basis which would then really stretch the meaning of “being on display”.
—–JT—–
Let us put some points straight.
1) I-21 is no longer used as an official designation for the 5th gen. fighter project. Neither is PAK-FA actually, as the fighter is no more just a “frontal aviation” aircraft. Once they moved on full-scale testing, the project got a classified T-… (not T-50) internal designation for the Sukhoi plant. For the general public, it’s simply “5th generation fighter”. Period.
2) The aerodynamic outline is done and finalised.
3) The 3D CAD model is finalised.
4) Nothing is avaible as non-classified info about the shape of the thingy, except
a) no FSW
b) internal weapon bay
c) possibly supercruise
d) mysterious new “square-profile” shaped missiles for the internal bay.
5) No one who has no access to top secret classification level has ever seen even an artist’s rendering of the prototype. All the pictures that circulate are
a) either the products of imagination artists and/or misinformation campaigns
b) or the ugly offspring of not-so-good PR and boasting (unfortunately and regularly coming from India).
6) No model has ever been presented at any airshow/fair/pawn shop/game convent/fantasy role playing party. Of course, foreign officials involved with the pre-tier II planning have seen it (or parts of it, or artist’s renderings, or tech requirements and characteristics etc) but obviously if they talk they will end up with some not-so-nice material in their cup of tea 😉
7) India is currently not very interested in the matter because they can’t influence the overall requirements as much as they would like, as the programme is already very advanced. They will probably supply some avionics for a tentative export variant and fund some back-sourced and indigenous tier II R&D.
PS and “nod-nod, wink-wink” hint: I would not expect any open-source picture of the 5th gen. fighter/flying saucer/hypersonic frying pan well after its first flight. And its official “first flight” will not be its first either 😉
She’s almost 100% CGI. The design appears to have been based on the ANCHAR project (alternate to the Kirov). Nothing to do with actual projects. I know it’s a circular and unhelpful thing to say, but believe what you believe.
PS: to whoever drawed this: next time you do something similar, please have a glance at the international maritime flag code. Had a good laugh when I noticed that thanks to modern CG tech, soviet naval ensigns were flown at the bow… (where the jack would be – in port). Sometimes it’s such petty details that give a hoax away…
Of course they can if they want. It is their port facilities that they are leasing to the Russians.
Mighty my A$$. Their main role is a support role for their boomers and they are barely a credible force to do even that. They have no world wide shipping lanes to protect, they have no empire that needs command of the seas to maintain.
Of course I would think the revenue generated from the lease that actually makes them money is as much for their benefit as for Russia’s.Perhaps global warming will solve their problem soon enough. 🙂
Dear GarryB, just a few facts for you to ponder:
– the main role of the RN isn’t only to keep the water clear for boomers, they have internal waters for that (just look at a map, ever heard of the Okhotsk Sea?). Just in case you forgot, Russia has one of the largest maritime borders in the world (if not the largest) and the North Maritime Lane is becoming more and more a strategic asset to protect. The Baltic needs protection too, and with China fast emerging, the Pacific will not lose its importance. Don’t forget the Black Sea and the Straits, they’re vital for the RF.
As for the Black Sea Fleet case, Ukraine is bound to lease Sevastopol till 2017 by common inter-governmental accord. The problem for Ukraine is that this very document also aknowledges current Ukrainian borders. If they decide to withdraw from this comprehensive treaty unilaterally, Russia will immediately claim the Crimean peninsula back (and they even might have a lawful argument to do so, as it was retroceded by Khrutschev in more than strange and unconstitutional circumstances).
PS and nota bene: the number of operational order-of-battle vessels in the Ukrainian Navy is 2 (two).
Hi guys, first of all my apologies for “disappearing” from your radar screens, have been away and far from any WWW plug…
Will try to answer your questions as well as I can:
…regarding noise level reduction techniques in Soviet Submarines. Wich was the first submarine that used the active noise cancellation technique?. I have reports that both, 971 “Schuka-B” since first series and 667BRDM introduced it. No idea if 945/945A used it. Now, accord to an article writed by a 1st Rank Captain some time ago at “Red Star” Jurnal, talking about “Sankt Petesburg” 677 Lada SSK, this technique “only now” could be used due to extenous needs in computer processing that were not in service then…What’s the true regarding ANC?…it was improved since them?.
When one tells something about noise reduction, better ask him what’s his/her defininition is… Noise reduction techniques have been used since WWII at the latest, ANC is a matter of definition as well. I suspect that the Red star report is actually about an all-active NC technique, thanks to which it would be possible to cancel internal radiated noise (especially pump and reductors noises) by insulating them with active conduction apparatus that radiates at inversed acoustic wavelenghts and -pitch levels (similar approaches have been tried in 4/5th gen. fighter jets, e.g. Rafale – applied to radar detection of course). Now, this sounds well in theory, but in practice you need extremely accurate internal sensors and an enormous processing capacity, neither of which was available in the SU (and even in the US). You just reach a technical barrier at one stage. And you also need to model all your aggregates and apparatus exactly, having a database that can’t include all the possible noises and noise levels… Plus, this kind of ANC is not a panacea, as it can properly operate only at low radiation levels (i.e. at low speeds for ex.). The best technique is yet to combine ANC and passive noise reduction tech such as anechoic, contact-free internal frames with active movement cancellation: this, however, supposes you have enough space (so big displacement), which is not appliable on the Lada, what should explain why the Russian navy was so eager to introduce this “new ANC” on that type of boat.
BTW, I would be extremely critical of anything published in Red Star, not only because it’s the official MoD paper, but especially for the reason that their redactional level is extremely poor and a lot printed there is pure PR.
Which advances do you think were the main bosters to noise level reductions in Soviet subs since 671RT?… I know 671RT (Victor-II) introduced rafting techniques for noise reduction of the main machenry systems. You mentioned 671RTM used 2 tandem 4-blade screws (but I have what seems a pic of a 671RTM with a typical 8-blade screw, in fact the Victor-III that participated in the “TASS” actions out of American Coasts
You’re absolutely right, that was the K-324. If I remember well, it was the 7th vessel of the Komsomolsk line and she was modified in 1985, so after the incindent you mentioned (dated 1983 AFAIK).
Anechoic tiles (wich Soviet submarine did introduced it?) was a main factor regarding active-sonar reduction levels, but noise-level reductions?. I know because Soviet Nuke Boats like 671RTM uses two-hull arrangements, they used to use anechoic tiles in the outer hull (against active sonar) and in the inner hull (against sound from the submarine’s machinery). Was this arrangement efective?. Did 671RTM introduced it?. I have some information (pretty basic one) regarding new generation anechoic tiles used in 971 “Schuka-B”, in that they were 2 and half inches of thickness…anything similar for 671RTM?
The first anechoic tiles were used (experimentally) in the Lira project, both for active sonar effective range reduction and noise reduction (the latter were applied directly to the inside of the strong hull, which proved to be absolutely useless). In-between hulls arrangements proved to be highly efficient for some wavelengths, but led to an increase in acoustic radiation when the wavelength was consistent with the space between both hulls (classical raisonnance box effect). Thickness of the anechoic tiles is not consistent with their effectiveness, it only reflects advances in manufacturing (increase of inner “worm holes”). The Victor family had quite a basic coating that could not radiate the active pings away in the water in a very effective way. The other reason was that the Victor was hydrodynamically not as “perfect” as the Lira (the hull of the latter was in itself “anechoic” as its mere form acted as a diffusion factor for incoming pings).
Accord to a non-secret chart of the US Navy late-80s-early 90s about broad-band noise levels of both american and soviet/russian sub (you could find it at FAS.org per example) they comment on TWO Victor-III clasess. One Victor-III and “an Improved Victor-III”. Improved Victor-III is clasiffied as having lower noise-levels that “Akula” (basic one)
This report’s aim is to prove that the Toshiba gimmick did its job. Its statements are not consistent with what my sources tell me, and if I believe them, RTMK doesn’t come near Akula in terms of noise reduction. Akulas benefited from the Toshiba MMM as well anyway. And it’s quite strange to mention broad-band radiation when the matter is about screws…So I’ll consider this report with a lot of caveats.
About Nuclear Reactors, Norman Polmar’s book “Cold War Submarines Design”, said that Nuclear reactor for 945 used “natural circulation” while at low speeds (5-to-6 knots) making no use of pumps. Now, did 971 used also this technique?…was natural circulation reactores further pursued by Soviet Designers or introduced in any other Soviet/Russina Nuke boat?..
Yep, some say that 971 benefits from the same feature (also at low speed levels). Don’t know about the Sierras, though. Quite sure that later 949As ,the 941 and later BDRMs have it as well (in spite of dissimilar reactors but for reasons obvious enough).
And now (IMHO my most important question to you), is…WHAT impulsed the soviet Navy and designers to pursue such ambitious noise-reduction-levels programs since 1975(or so) when 945 and 971 plus 671RTM were developed?….what was the “detonant” that made the Soviets to consider so-seriously the noise levels of their subs, and what allowed them to improve so much in so much little time?
This is a very good question indeed, and I’m glad to be able to answer it. However, I have to warn you that you won’t find any corroboration for my info anywhere, as this matter remains quite shrouded to this day due to reasons that have nothing to do with naval stuff. The “detonant”, as you put it, was a man killed in a plane crash on Feb. the 7th, 1981, alongside with 50 top brass officers of the Soviet Pacific Fleet: Admiral Emil Nikolaevitch Spiridonov. He was an excellent specialist, the most highly skilled and the most able soviet naval commander of his day, and enjoyed enormous respect and authority within the Navy establishment. His was the impetus that shifted the focus from quantity to quality. As the Commander of the Pacific Fleet, he knew too well (contrary to the Northern Fleet officials) that he couldn’t rely on on-shore support and closed seas in case of war, and his sub commanders were extremely honest in their reports to him. Gorshkov, on the other hand, was enamoured with speed , it was the only factor that seemed interesting for him for a sub to have. Spiridonov assembled an excellent group of top officers under his command who devised a long-term strategy for the whole Fleet, which still remains valid to the present day, and managed to force Gorshkov to implement it. Unfortunately, as said above, he died after attending a command exercise in Leningrad, after the Fleet’s Tu-104 failed to take-off and crashed short after the runway. 50 of his best officers and friends (16 generals and admirals among them!) died instantly. The question about the need to pack the best brains of the Fleet in a single outdated plane that even Aeroflot didn’t want to fly anymore remains unanswered. All the inquiry conclusions remain classified. I’ll leave the rest to conspiracy theorists…
…while 671RTM introduced tandem screw 2×4 blades, did the ones of the 671RTMK that benefited from Toshiba MMM machines were better?. Did K-387 received tandem screws as a part of an overhaul/upgrade or from yard?…
No, the decision to replace them with tandem blades extended to ALL Victor III subs, the upgrade having been discontinued for costs reasons (and the venue of the Akula). K-387? If you mean K-388, yes.
*671RTMK were the only Victor-III subs that could use “Granat” SLCM isn’t?
No. K is not consistent with Granat, regardless what open sources tell. Some RTMKs could use Granats, some RTM also. But only the Sierras and Akulas effectively got cleared for their use.
* SOKS…?
Yes, an improved version is installed on the 971s. Pretty sure that Yasen and Borei will have it as a part of their standard a-suite.
*
The thingie of the Command Posts. Polmar book talks about 971 using an integraded GKP or “main command point” like the one in the “Lira” class of Interceptor SSN. I’m a little bit confused with the platforms of the 671RTM/RTMK, so let me try to understand it:
671RTM used first Viking and then Omnibus? or it was the inverse?, you talk about a BTch-7, what is exactly this?, is a part of Omnibus or is Omnibus a part of BTch-7?…what did BTCh means in russian BTW?
K-502 uses “Akatsia” special targetting C3 system for use of the Granat system. Did K-502 also used basic “Omnibus” command post?.
Understand your confusion. “Viking” was the first BIUS on the 671RTM, replaced by “Omnibus”. “Omnibus” is a battle command system, not a battle post. BIUS means “Boevaya Informatsionno-Upravlayushaya Sistema“: litteraly, “battle command and information system”. The first viable BIUS was the “Accord” on the Lira. GKP simply means “main command post”, so it denotes an actual location in the sub. “BTch-X” means “battle station-X”, i.e. the actual battle station in the Xth watertight compartment (but the numbers are not always consistent with the compartments). A BIUS comprises many sub-systems, so “Akatsia” is a dedicated targeting system and is integrated in the Omnibus BIUS.
Using metaphors:
*any BIUS = LAN Network
*GKP = main server room
* “Akatsia” and the like = external drivers, printers, mouses etc.
* “BTch-X = your working cubicle with family photos and bonzai.
Omnibus was painstacking to integrate because of electronic incompatibility with some other components, vibration over-sensitivity, poor microchip reliability and tendency to over-heat (looks like Microsoft tried to do some hardware there…).
…what is the experimental MNK-100?, is a sensor that fuses the SOKS and Sonar (active/passive) information?, was this MNK-100 installed in the other SOKS-users of the 671RTMK/945/945A/971 proekts?. Is SOKS perturbable by what class of phenomena?
Yes and yes. SOKS is perturbable by transient and irregular water conformation: abnormal salinity, abnormal waterflow, wake and the usual bathycelemetric layer dead zones. And if something blows up somewhere near and disturbs the water patterns, you’ll have to start from the beginning.
AFAIK no flank arrays like the ones on the 688 were used in the Victor series. Flank arrays on the Akulas are probably a subsystem of the SOKS, but who knows…
Skat sonars include parallax and dynamic analysis algorithms that enable them to scan a database of known SSN/SSBN acoustic and mouvement patterns and compare them automatically. Put in a dumb way: something that sounds like a shrimp but makes a V-turn every 14 seconds travelling at 7 knots due North is not shrimp. No one knows for sure how many targets a modern Russian SSN can track simultaneously.
[QUOTE=Pit]
From what I know, both 945 and 971 have the same “test depth” at 600m without regarding its different class of hulls…
[QUOTE]
Published “test depth” figures are the greatest hoax since the Philadelphia experiment. You know what is the “official” “test depth” of an Antey according to recent Russian publication? 300 m 😀 😀 😀
[QUOTE=Pit]
Have you heard of the “Impostor” decoy?…was this thingie used in Atrina/Aport?
[QUOTE]
I pass here, pal. Never heard about anything called “Impostor”. What is it?
BULAVA 1st LAUNCH!
(INTERFAX-AVN).
“27 sept 2005: today a Bulava 30 SSBN was launched from the White Sea towards Kamtchatka. All systems worked properly. It was the first live launch of the Bulava. The SSBN started from a modified Typhoon (Dmitri Donskoy) submarine, under the command of Cpt 1st rank Arkadi Romanov. The missile is intended for the Borey-class (project 955) submarines. Ministry of Defense officials stated that the programme is funded at 100% at that the first ship of the class, the Yuri Dolgoruki, will be operational in 2006. A second ship of the Borey-class, the Alexander Nevski, will follow in 2007. Bulava will further be modified into a unique common system for both the Navy and the RVSN. The GlavKom of the Russian Navy, Adm. Masorin, thanked the crew for “its professionalism”.
Seems that one has had good reasons to remain an optimist. 🙂
PS: according to Dygalo (the Navy’s press officer), the sub launched the missile while submerged ( 😮 quite confident for a 1st test!). Launch time: 17:22 Moscow time (which means that they’ve informed the media even before the warhead reached Kamtchatka: someone got quite euphoric over there 😀 ).
Thanks a lot Pit & Austin, great to have such grateful readers.
There is a lot of conflicting info about the pr. 885 (Yasen) status, she seems to be even more secret than the Borey: no one knows for sure how many hulls are being constructed right now (numbers range from 1 – Severodvinsk itself – to 3). Official sources say that in 2004, Borey was 30% ready and Severodvinsk 85% (!), while emphasising that SevMash got in trouble getting the steam turbines and other propulsive apparatus from the Kaluga plant on time. In 2005, the financing was 1,5 times higher than 2004. So it seems probable that the new SSN will closely follow, if not precede, the Borey sometime around 2006-2007. Remember that 955 and 885 share a common layout and a lot of common systems, so a problem with one project will be echoed at the other.
Other sources suggest an altogether different source of problems: the integration of the all-new (and enormous) frontal sonar sphere. It has been suggested that the Yankee sub modified by Rubin in the 90’s (Yankee POD, aka Akson-2 aka pr. 09780 aka Kasan) has been designed to test exactly this equipment. As she was very often observed in active service in the last 4 years, it has been suggested that the sonar system still needs refinement. Another special-purpose sub whose activity goes in parallel with the construction progress of the Borey/Yasen is the 667AN Orenburg, whose official purpose is geophysical mapping. No idea how this could be connected with the 885/955 projects.
From open sources, it remains difficult to say what kind of armament (and in what quantity) the Severodvinsk will carry. Some mention 24 Onyx/Yakhont missiles in VLCon, but that could be seriously put in doubt: Yakhont’s calibre is 650 mm, so it could even be launched from “fat” TT, and for unknown reasons the Russians decided to put them in VLS and classify the actual numbers carried. Some have even suggested that each launch tube could actually fit 3 Yakhonts inside… no idea why the Navy doesn’t want to disclose the actual numbers. But that’s a hot topic anyway: just to give you some food for thought: the Barracudas more or less officially carry 40 missiles (all in all), the 971 (Bars iteration) officially carries a much smaller warload while sporting a 1,5 times bigger displacement… Add to this that the Granat is a bit thinner but definitely longer than the Yakhont (because of the booster stage) and you’ve got quite a bizzare picture…
PS: the VLS for the 885 has been tested on the pr. 06704 (modified 670M, B-452) successfully and has been cleared for integration.
PPS: after the Russians and the US agreed to remove all tactinukes from their subs, the Granat and Shkval missiles had to be put in store. As a result, the Barracudas were supposed to lose their “cruiser” status and the letter K in their code (which was replaced by a plain B and was met with fierce resistance by the submariners who are, as we all know, a conservative folk…). But the Akulas didn’t lose it. Add this detail to the picture above and it becomes even more shadowy…
Just an appendix for a subject I’ve only overflown before:
RMS55 some doubts:
4) There was any problem with the Pelamida/Python towed array of the
to be exact, the problem with the array was that at speeds lower than 10 knots, the flow around the hydrodynamic fairing bulb became consistent with the 671 tandem blade succion zone, so when the array was towed back into the fairing it curved gently just before the aperture above the max. degree level allowed. Therefore the sub had either to accelerate and let the flow around the bulb negate the succion zone or to follow a complex sinusoidal tragectory (rudders up-wait-trail back / rudder amidships – stop trailing / rudders down and again) with all the inconveniences that such procedures entail (cavitation noises, elevated waterflow and wake and inevitable hull expansion clanks in the second scenario).
Very quick answer to all (have to go, sorry):
First of all, thanx for answering and a few points:
1) please remember that the project number 22350 is not official yet
2) the tentative drawings shown by Blackcat above give a certain idea of it. However, both Northern yards AND Balttechnoprom conduct studies that feature outriggers and trimaran-shaped hulls.
3) I DO NOT hate the 22380, she’s fairly pretty and fair, I just question her necessity in times where there is no yet a clear definition of what the Fleet wants (a Visby-ski or a super-corvette) and seriously doubt her C3ISAR. XX-2 version is quite OK
4). Udaloys and Sovs are likely to be held alive till they reach the end of the tether and the new “frigate” replaces them.
5) Ushakov will raise from the ashes and joint Peter, but the rest is definitely dead.
6) 1 Typhoon is already being cut in pieces, the fate of 2 others is sealed…but this being Russia, everything is possible. If Borey has problems they’ll quickly convert them in Bulava carriers.
RMS55 some doubts:
1) Did pr671RTM(K) included new screws and propeller system than 671RTM? (Victor-III)
2) What was the name of the non-acoustic sensors of the 671RTMK series (were used by good effect during Aport Operation to track US SSBNs), I have “Kolos” from a west source and “SOKS” from deespstorm.ru…anything regarding the history of these sensors?
3) Is there a command and control system called “Viking” in 671RTMK?
4) There was any problem with the Pelamida/Python towed array of the Victor-III?, I read in western sources something related to materials deficences…
5) Did any soviet submarine of the 971 or 945 proekt class have any non-acoustic sensor for detecting subs or countermeasures sensors?Hope you can help me!
1) No, actually the new (tandem-screw, 2×4 blades) propellers were already chosen as the main system during the construction of the first RTM batch. And the first sub to use the noise-reducing experimental tandem scheme was actually the first 671RT (K-387 built in Gorki at the Krasnoe Sormovo yard and modified in Leningrad Admiralterskyie yards)!
2) It is sometimes said that the “K” in RTMK was added to the subs that received SOKS (not Kolos). That’s only partly true: some “clean” 671 became 617K after being fitted with SOKS while some 617RT modified along the same line didn’t receive any appendix at all. On top of that, K-502 (Commander: Cpt1r Smetanin) was a RTMK without SOKS but with a very characteristic bulbous appendix on the foredeck right after the fairing (6m long, 1,5m wide/high) hiding an experimental “Granat” launch pad and the experimental “Akatsia” targeting C3 system (using the same hardware as the “Omnibus” overall C3 suite but having a “battle post” of its own, namely BTch-2 while OMNIBUS was located in BTch-7).So much for consistency! 😮
(Some sources suggest that the K stands for “Krylataya raketa”, i.e. cruise missile, i.e. Granat in that case, but it’s highly speculative).
SOKS is a very sensitive (for its time) “keel-water wake detection system” (Sistema Obnarujenia Kilvaternovo Sleda) derived from the first Soviet torpedo-mounted systems. During Operation Aport the K-147 (a “clean” 671 fitted with the SOKS and the experimental MNK-100) managed to follow a Lafayette-class (probably Simon Bolivar) SSN for more than 6 days (other sources say it was a Los A. SSN, but it’s hard to believe). The point is: you can’t detect anything just with the SOKS, you need (passive) acoustics as well (because of basic physics) and the whole thing’s name is MNK-100: the wake of a sub changes the density of the water, filling it with microscopic bubbles. This effect can last for hours and hours, so you need to go through a complex process of measuring these parameters when they’re still detectable through acoustic (passive) and hydrooptical means (as it seems that trying to detect this effect by measuring the relative salinity values has not proved reliable).
3) Yes and no. RTM(K) were the first subs in the Sov.Union to receive an integrated battle information system (BIUS), and the first was called “Viking”. It was afterwards completely (and very painfully) replaced by the more advanced “Omnibus”.
4) Problems arose mainly from the difficulty of towing back the array in the bulbous canopy of the Ruza system. Skat (all systems) is said to have been highly reliable.
5) Yep, both Akula and Sierra have non-acoustic sensors. Strangely enough, the acoustic suite of the Sierra is less efficient than the Akula’s (Skat-KS with analogue processing) but this is probably compensated by greater operational depth. Countermeasures are still classified for all subs (they have been used during “Aport” and “Atrina” ops though), however, it is possible that the experimental, 300m/sec 2nd stage submarine rocket APR-3M can also be launched individually and not only with the first stage, as a “last chance to cut-the-wires” means.
RSM55:
Your response was absolutely awesome and much more than I expected!!!
I will answer in lenght in a time
Pit
Thanx a lot, and as soviet pioneers used to put it, “ever ready!” 😀
As I writte in the title, I’m intersted in the russian perspective regarding the influence that the Multiaxis Milling Machine the Russians bught to Toshiba during the mid-80s had in the research/construction of improved submarine design’s propellors if any…
I suspect that the “Improved Akulas” from Severodinsk, could be benfited from this equipment, and also the 945A “Barrakuda” SSN called Sierra-II in NATO.
Pit 😀
You can imagine that this aspect is met with mixed feelings by most Russian commentators. While not denying the fact the Toshiba supplied such a machine to the (then) Leningrad yards, they emphasise that
1) the scandal occured almost 20 years ago (1987 to be exact),
2) the sudden and tremendous improvement in noise level reduction was not at all sudden and not tremendous and is the MMM is therefore not to be credited for all the apparent noise level reduction,
3) the “smoothing” of sub screws as a result of the MMM use is only one factor out of many. The sub type that mainly benefited from that was the Victor III RTM(K) version, and significant noise reduction was achieved not only thanks to Toshiba but mainly through design improvement (among others: brand-new anechoic coating and the choice of 2 tandem, 4-blade screws in lieu of a single, 8-blade one).
What’s definitely true is that older Soviet milling machines were certainly not as good as Western ones, and the Leningrad yards were glad to get something better than their usual Almaz milling machines with Bulgarian electronics. It’s one of the strangest discrepancies of the Soviet legacy: while retaining state-of-the-art material science on the R&D level (from metallic alloys to nanotechnologies), Russian heavy machinery construction is still in its infancy viewn from a technological level (which is quite amazing if one considers the huge number of soviet/russian enterprises that feature a “-mash-” morpheme in their name).
While the Toshiba machine might have seriously improved the performance of later Victor III versions (as stated above), one should seriously doubt claims that this represented a kind of “paradigm shift” for the Soviet/Russian submarine fleet (or plainly: fleet, as submarines aren’t the only ships to use screws 🙂 ). The noise reduction observed in the Akula (Shuka-B) and Sierra (Barracuda) series can only marginally result from better screw shape. And anyway, Russia has now the possibility to purchase almost all the heavy machinery it needs (and has effectively done so, be it by upgrading its own products to Western standards or simply bying it off-the-shelf in Germany and Switzerland). Almost all of this kind of tech is dual-use, and would hardly be subject to any control as has effectively been the case during the Cold War. Therefore, one cannot state with confidence that later Akulas (or Barracudas) have benefited from the Toshiba MMM (regardless of what the Times wrote about Gepard). AFAIK, the machine in question died and was partly cannibalised a long time ago anyway.
2 Austin:
Well, nothing is really known about the RN future destroyer requirements, it’s even more difficult to obtain info about them than about project 20380. However, with more or less confidence, it has been reported that the RuNavy has chosen IBM PLM-solutions based environment for project design (with CATIAv5/DELVIA as system testing progs. – probably the Russian analogues to be exact), which were incidentally chosen by Northrop for its DD(X) programme: that should give a hint about the complexity of the gimmick.
The targeting and nav. systems are said to be based around a new iteration of the Fregat/Podberezovik systems, with a kind of “AESA” feature. It remains unclear wether an “improved Voskhod” (i.e. better than the already 3-dimensional MR-600) will be developed for surface search or whether the new sensor will take over that particular role as well.
As of now, the operational Akulas (I and II) number probably 13 units. Pantera (K-317) is being slightly upgraded now in Severodvinsk (but she’s considered operational as well). One should refrain anyway from using the “Akula I/II” terminology, since it is absolutely not consistent with the Russian one: there is only Shuka-B and the boats built in Severodvinsk can be considered as improved compared to the early (Komsomosk-buit) hulls. The Russians sometimes call the “improved Akula” Bars, since it is the name of the first sub built in Severodvinsk. The major upgrade programme in the coming years involves new sensors and comms suites, on the Gepard level, Gepard herself being an improved version of the already improved Vepr.
Concerning the Typhoons, 3 are effectively in active service (Severstal, Arkhangelsk and Dmitri Donskoy). No. 712 and 713 are to be scrapped in SevMash. Dmitri Donskoy has been modified to test-fire and then carry the new Bulava 30 missile, she’s likely to stay in service for some time.
2 Pit:
for the Akula upgrades cf. above,
Tigr was apparently only refitted, although some sources suggest a new (Gepard-type) TA and sensors.
There are no consistent (and unclassified) sources about the origin and the classification of the the new TA. It is rumoured that the TA is absolutely new, and is also to be used on the Borey and Severodvinsk subs.
Severodvinsk is suppose to hit waters by 2006 , Also we could see 4-6 more Amurs as series production has started.
Also a new Destroyer replacing the Sov , it would be similar to the USN Aeiges Destroyer, Things are looking Brighter & Better for the Russian navy.
Agree with last proposition, but the new destroyer project is in no way similar to the Aegis-fitted types (what do you refer to by this exactly? Burke? Tico? the Japanese ones?), except the phased-array feature, which can be hardly considered as a all-new thing for the Russian navy. The Amur production line is to start yet, but official plans are to launch at least 8 subs in the coming 5 years. Let’s be optimists.
There will be project 20380/82 corvettes plus new destroyers (likely along the lines of improved Udaloy 2). Eventually also additional carrier.
Improved Udaloy 2? :confused: If you think about Novik, she’s dead and buried (well, actually she will serve as a training/test ship). 20380 is a lame duck, over-corvette and under-frigate, with too much firepower and not enough range and C3ISR capability and she’s facing a lot of criticism from the Navy itself. Likely that the project will thouroughly change after the first line unit (Uran replaced by Onyx and the like).
Aircraft carrier development is scheduled to start in 2015 – imagine when such a project will leave the dry dock.
Emphasis is on the Borey and Severodvinsk SSBN/SSNs series, and the modernisation of Akulas (both I and II) and restauration of the second Sierra. Borey is scheduled for 2006, 2007 being more likely since 2006 is deemed “the year of the Air Force” and since Bulava is not ready yet.
There are plans to resurrect at least one derelict cruiser of the Kirov series, Peter t. G. remaining quite active.