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perfectgeneral

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  • in reply to: Royal Navy/Falklands Cost #2040316
    perfectgeneral
    Participant

    So the fact that the US maintains 5-10 times the armed forces of the UK is irrelevant although it is solely opinion, the US has genuine threat scenarios to worry about and the UK does not. Iran is fighting a cold war against us through proxies in Iraq and Afghanistan (occasionally at home), but this is not a genuine threat scenario, even though we are struggling to find resources to meet this threat. Forces built up by other states (such as China and Russia) we are assured do not need a genuine threat scenario, they are non-hostile forces. Evidence of this is irrelevant. Evidence of shortages affecting capability and casualty levels in current operations is irrelevant and doesn’t represent a genuine threat scenario.
    :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes:

    Ignoring a point doesn’t mean you have ‘won’ a debate, it just means you haven’t learnt anything.

    in reply to: Navy news from around the world, news & discussion #2040467
    perfectgeneral
    Participant

    Perhaps the warship construction drumbeat should be one warship plus one OPV/C3 a year?

    in reply to: Royal Navy/Falklands Cost #2040471
    perfectgeneral
    Participant

    How rude!

    Well I’ve made a start on your answer, but when you refer to yourself as ‘us’ and dismiss my argument before you’ve hard it, I’ve decided that you don’t deserve the effort I was prepared to put in to educate you. This is some unedit quotes and notes that were going to be more extensive and logically argued. I post them in case someone can put up with your abuse enough to state the case of a vital argument. That would be for the benefit of those of ‘us’ that aren’t you.

    During 1989 the Berlin Wall was pulled down. An event that typifies the end of the cold war. UK defence spending

    was just above 4% of GDP. By 1995 this had dropped by a quarter to a hair over 3% of GDP. This is what you might

    expect from a peace dividend, but the cuts went further: 2.8% by the time New Labour got into power in 1997. Since

    then they have brought defence spending down to almost half the level at the tail end of the cold war (2.2%).

    For the UK armed forces generally:

    Recruitment and retention are a constant problem. The low level of wages compared to similar professions where one

    isn’t expected to risk your life so much. The poor standard of accomodation and support for families while you are

    away on active service for months at a time. These cuts and delayed spending make shortages in manpower more

    likely, which in turn mean that those in the services have to cover for the shortfall. Another cause for discontent

    and lower retention.

    ===========================
    Air Force

    Aircraft

    The airforce is short of transport helicopters and aeroplanes. While some 8 Chinooks have been adapted from a

    failed special forces role and 6 Merlins bought from Denmark this doesn’t fill the shortfall. It is the best that

    can be done at short notice. Other countries have placed orders that must be fullfilled prior to any more being

    built for us. We are slowly adding to the C-17 heavy transport squadron, but again it is spending that should have

    been made before a shortage arose.

    ===========================
    Navy

    Ships

    Speculation has been rife all year that Royal Navy’s escort force is to be cut from a paper strength of 25

    destroyers and frigates to just 20 – the four Cornwall-class Type 22 Batch 3 frigates plus one Type 23 frigate

    being seen as the likely victims. The RN had 35 frigates and destroyers when Labour took power in 1997, and it’s

    hard to see how the government’s interventionist foreign policy has reduced demands on the escort force. By

    comparison the another island nation – Japan – feels the need to maintain a force of about 54 modern frigates and

    destroyers despite its pacifist constitution.

    A quick ‘surf’ through some other elements of bad news in 2007:

    The Fleet Arm failed in its effort to re-establish 801 Naval Air Squadron due to a lack of qualified pilots, and

    instead in March 800 NAS was officially renamed the Naval Strike Wing, this supposedly comprises of elements of

    both 800 and 801 Squadrons – although equivalent in strength to just one 9 aircraft squadron

    The struggle to find Harrier’s to occasionally embark on the the UK’s Strike Carrier (HMS Illustrious) has became

    positively embarrassing, with the US Marine Corps, Spanish Navy and Italian all being persuaded to loan aircraft

    and help the RN to maintain basic fixed wing carrier operating skills.

    The reduction in the size of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary service continued, with RFA Brambleleaf and Oakleaf being

    unexpectedly being laid up in 200, and RFA Fort Victoria going to extended readiness. This reduction is probably a

    reflect of the generally low level of exercises and deployments that RN can currently afford to maintain.

    The first Type 45 – HMS Daring – will not now be in service until November 2010 – three year later than originally

    contracted, while the odds that two more units (i.e. the seventh and eighth of class) will ever be ordered for the

    Royal Navy have sink close to zero. Also rumours that two of the six Type 45 destroyers (Defender and Duncan)

    could be sold to Saudi Arabia that first surfaced in the summer of 2005 remain worryingly persistent – even the

    implication that the MOD has authorised BAE Systems to offer these ships for sale is disturbing given the urgent

    need to replace the ancient and nearly obsolete Type 42’s. It also remains unclear whether the MOD would order

    replacements if they were sold, or whether the RN would end up with just four of the twelve Type 45 destroyers that

    it had expected to get as recently as 2004.

    Despite reductions in capability, the estimated cost of the six Type 45’s on order has increased to nearly Ā£6.5

    billion – i.e. about Ā£1.1 billion or $2.2 billion each. It’s perhaps worth remembering that the American Arleigh

    Burke design was quickly ruled out in 1999 as an option to replace the Type 42’s on the grounds that it was too

    large and expensive, with a then sticker price of about $1 billion (Ā£600 million).

    The resignation of Minister of State for Defence Equipment and Support Lord Drayson in November on the implausible

    grounds that he wanted to go motor racing in America. The reality seems that an argument with civil servants over

    the procurements of the Army’s FRES was the final straw as he struggled to secure the funding needed to make the

    next version of his well respected Defence Industrial Strategy (issued December 2005) reality rather than just

    words. It remains to be seen whether the RN will still get the “drum beat” he promised of a new major warship

    every year, and a submarine every 22 months.

    Despite the interesting proposals of the S2C2 pathfinder study, progress on the Future Surface Combatant remained

    snail like, currently amounting to just a few low value study contracts supervised by a team of just four dedicated

    staff in DE&S. The last Type 23 frigate. HMS St Albans, entered service in 2002 and the current average age of

    the RN’s seventeen frigates is just over 13 – acceptable but increasing rapidly. It now seems almost impossible

    that the four Type 22 Batch 3 will replaced, even if they remain in surface until 2015-18 as is current the

    official published plan.

    The Ā£200 million a year in funding robbed from the Royal Navy’s support budget in July 2004 was not restored in

    2006/7 as planned, and the cumulative effect is that levels of equipment maintenance and serviceability are now

    deplorable. Ships often either remain alongside or deploy with major systems non-operational – the later being

    accepted on the basis that the system(s) in question were not vital for the envisaged tasking. Of course no

    allowance is then being made for the unexpected.
    – Navy Matters: Review of 2007 (c) Richard Beedall

    The Royal Navy has seen massive cuts in capability. Even the one warship a year promised amounts to only 25

    (eventually) from a level of 35 when Labour came to power.
    ===========================
    Army

    Cold War peace dividend cuts:

    The collapse of the Soviet Union, ending the Cold War, saw a new defence white paper, ‘Options for Change’ produced. This saw inevitable reductions in the British armed forces. The Army experienced a substantial cut in its manpower (The ending of the Cold War saw a 40% cut in manpower, reduced to about 120,000), which included yet more regimental amalgamations, including two of the large regiments of the 1960s — the Queen’s Regiment and Royal Irish Rangers — and the third battalions of the remaining large regiments being cut. The British Army in Germany was also affected, with the British Army of the Rhine replaced by British Forces Germany and personnel numbers being reduced from about 55,000 to 25,000; the replacement of German-based I Corps by the British-led Headquarters Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps also took place. Nine of the Army’s administrative corps were amalgamated to form the Royal Logistic Corps and the Adjutant General’s Corps). One major development was the disbandment of the Women’s Royal Army Corps (though the largest elements were absorbed by the AGC) and their integration into services that had previously been restricted to men; however, women were still forbidden from joining armoured and infantry units. The four Gurkha regiments were amalgamated to form the three-battalion Royal Gurkha Rifles, reduced to two in 1996 just before the handover of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China in 1997.
    – wiki rumour

    Cuts will leave Army struggling in the sand
    By Michael Smith, Defence Correspondent
    Last Updated: 10:38pm GMT 24/11/2002

    The deep post-Cold War cuts to Britain’s defences, which began in the early 1990s and have effectively continued under Labour through persistent under-funding, will leave Britain’s troops struggling to fight in Iraq.

    An exercise in Oman last year turned into a near fiasco as piece after piece of equipment failed in the heat and dust of the desert, largely as a result of ill-considered attempts to save money.

    A Daily Telegraph investigation has found that despite the possibility that British troops may soon be forced to fight in the desert, virtually nothing has changed and, again, the reason is money.

    Commanders and civil servants have been told that they cannot make any preparations that will cost even moderate sums. The problems have been exacerbated by a more commercially orientated system of defence procurement whereby everything from tank spares to desert boots can be ordered only when needed.

    Virtually nothing is stockpiled in a system that works for commercial companies with a steady flow of predictable business but is totally impractical for an army whose needs surge if it goes to war.

    The best-known victim of the Saif Sareea II exercise in Oman was the Challenger 2 main battle tank. The Ministry of Defence ignored the advice of commanders that it had to be “desertised” to protect it against sand.

    Half of the tanks deployed in the exercise were stranded within four hours of the start and the cost of replacing engines far exceeded that of modifications.

    Yet the MoD is “still considering” whether to desertise tanks, even though Vickers, the manufacturer, has given warning that it would take up to three months.

    The sand in Oman affected not only tanks. There were insufficient sand filters for armoured vehicles and helicopters. No new ones have been ordered.

    Efficient anti-tank guided weapons will be absolutely crucial against the Republican Guard’s T-72 tanks. The current Milan system was originally due to be taken out of service in 1995.

    A failed attempt to produce a joint European system and cost-cutting have delayed any replacement until 2005-6. Ageing rocket motors are now cracking, with the risk that the missiles could explode on launch.

    The probability that Saddam Hussein will use chemical and/or biological weapons rather than face defeat is a concern. The Army does not have enough nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) warfare filters for either armoured vehicles or soldiers’ gas masks.

    During the Gulf war there were only enough supplies of NBC suits for one week of intensive combat but there are now even fewer than there were then. Both filters and suits are dependent on only two sources of high-grade charcoal, one in Ukraine, which is supplying arms to Iraq, and the other in America, which has blocked exports to equip its own troops.

    Another of the problems thrown up by Saif Sareea II was the MoD’s decision that, to save money, it would not order desert uniforms and boots. Many troops bought their own. The MoD has ordered more desert clothing but not enough.

    Other problems go back to the Gulf war.

    The Army’s ancient DROPS ammunition supply vehicles and fuel tankers were incapable of keeping up with the troops and the tankers are prone to leaks. The FV432 armoured personnel carrier, which still forms the basis for many of the Army’s armoured command post vehicles, was also heavily criticised in post-Gulf War reports for failing to keep up with the advance.

    The Scimitar armoured recce vehicle is also too slow as well as being under-armoured, under-gunned and lacking full night capability.

    Delays and cancelled orders have also left the armed forces without any efficient communications systems. During the Kosovo conflict British troops had to use mobile telephones, operating on the Yugoslav network, removing even the very limited security their communications systems provide.

    Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will be vital for intelligence gathering. An upgrade of the Army’s Phoenix UAV to allow it to operate in hot weather was put off to save money.

    Deep cuts to the forces’ medical services have left them desperately short of doctors and other trained staff. They will need to call up large numbers of reservists for any big operation in Iraq, putting immense strain on the NHS. Plans for 200-bed hospital ships costing Ā£70 million were delayed last year.

    -the Telegraph november 2002

    The reduction from 40 to 36 battalions (10% of frontline infantry)

    Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon has rejected claims from a top general that looming cuts will leave the British Army “dangerously small”.
    Speaking on BBC One’s Politics Show, Mr Hoon said he did not share the views of former head of the Armed Forces Lord Guthrie, printed in a Sunday newspaper.

    Lord Guthrie told the Sunday Telegraph that cuts due to be announced this week would leave it “dangerously small”.

    But Mr Hoon said he thought the changes would leave the Army in better shape.

    The proposed changes include cutting Scotland’s six single-battalion regiments to five and merging these into a super regiment, which may affect the Black Watch which has now returned from duties in Iraq.

    Battalions cut

    He said: “What we are trying to do is ensure our armed forces, and our Army in particular, are organised to face the challenges of the 21st century.

    “The nature of the enemy has changed even in those five short years that I have been in this job.

    “We have got to make sure, indeed it’s my obligation and responsibility, to make sure that our armed forces are equipped and organised to face the kind of challenges we face today, not those of a previous generation.”

    Critics say cuts will affect the army’s ability to serve

    The government is expected to announce this week cuts that will reduce the Army’s size from 104,000 to 102,000, with the majority of cuts amongst infantry troops.

    Cuts are also expected for both the Royal Navy and The Royal Air Force.

    The number of Army infantry battalions are expected to be cut from 40 to 36 – one from Scotland and three from England.

    -BBC news december 2004

    THE government is set to announce another round of drastic cuts to Britain’s over-stretched infantry as part of a radical shake-up of the Territorial Army, The Scotsman has learned.

    At least one territorial infantry regiment is to be axed and three centres will be closed as part of the changes to be announced by John Reid, the Defence Secretary (as was), within the next two weeks.

    Historic regimental names will disappear as the TA units are amalgamated into the new super-regiments that the government has deemed essential to the overall restructuring of the British Army.

    In Scotland, that will mean that the Lowland and Highland regiments become the 6th and 7th battalions respectively of the Royal Regiment of Scotland. The plans, which will effectively see the part-time force merge into the regular army, is set to be every bit as controversial as the recent loss of four regular infantry battalions and the amalgamation of the Scottish regiments.

    Many soldiers who signed up to serve as part-time infantry will find that their role has been abolished. Instead, the MoD intends to try to persuade them to take on new tasks to fill the gaping holes in its ranks of specialists left by previous defence cuts.

    The timing could hardly be worse, with the infantry already pared down to the minimum required for operations and British troops committed indefinitely to Iraq and Afghanistan.

    Mr Reid recently revealed that gaps between deployments for regular infantry units had shrunk to 21 months from the recommended 24 months.

    Mr Reid is expected to announce the closure of a number of TA centres, leaving volunteers facing long journeys to training sessions if they want to remain in uniform. Many are expected to quit…

    …The infantry is already stretched to the limits and has relied heavily on the TA to make up the numbers in Iraq, with about 11,500 soldiers deployed since the start of the war in 2003.

    Officers and senior NCOs say that they have integrated well and have done much to rid themselves of the “weekend warriors” tag.

    But the additional demands on its members have taken their toll on retention figures and about 13,500 have resigned in the same period.

    Some have expressed concern about the length of deployments – up to nine months in some cases once training is included – and there have been problems with unsympathetic employers who have refused to keep jobs open for those who volunteer for duty.

    -The Scotsman february 2006

    Army manpower stands at about 98,000 (from 120,000 ten years ago)

    in reply to: Royal Navy/Falklands Cost #2040486
    perfectgeneral
    Participant

    1. They have always been speaking out, since the very dawn of time, do the words ‘we want eight and we wont wait’ mean anything to you?

      [*]The armed forces are just like any other faction of government, that is they are perpetually engaged in a tussle for money.

      [*]3% is a meaningless figure unless you actually quantify what you are spending it and thus far, for all the ranting about preparedness, no one has actually specified why it should be spent and on what.

    (1) I said that this was the worst underspending since the early 1930s and you harked back to before the first world war to ‘prove’ that chiefs of staff are always speaking out in public.

    The Liberal manifesto at the 1906 general elections included a commitment to reduce military expenditure. Lloyd George strongly supported this writing to Reginald McKenna First Lord of the Admiralty “the emphatic pledges given by all of us at the last general election to reduce the gigantic expenditure on armaments built up by the recklessness of our predecessors.” He then proposed the programme be reduced from six to four dreadnoughts. This was adopted by the government but there was a public storm when the Conservatives, with covert support from the First Sea Lord Admiral Jackie Fisher campaigned for more with the slogan “We want eight and we wont wait.’ This resulted in Lloyd George’s defeat in Cabinet and the adoption of estimates including provision for eight dreadnoughts.

    – wiki rumour

    (2)This may be the view from the treasury, but the MoD has an unique role that is the first duty of any government. There is a big difference between haggling for more and pleading for at least the minimum.

    (3)The reason no one has itemized the things 3% would be spent on and why they are needed is that it is an enormous task. You ask a lot, but I will try to compile a list of the major areas of shortfall. It may take me a while, so please be patient. Please don’t refer to my debating style as ranting. I find it an offensive term in this context. šŸ˜Ž

    in reply to: Royal Navy/Falklands Cost #2040609
    perfectgeneral
    Participant

    pg commends that burden for the Big Five, which would protract the oddity of WW2 victors subsidising the losers.

    Unless Japan and Germany were invited to join the permanent members? I take your point that it would be unfair to give them a free ride, but don’t they anyway at the moment?

    in reply to: Royal Navy/Falklands Cost #2040621
    perfectgeneral
    Participant

    I never said that we should not be prepared, the point I am making is that we are adequately prepared as it is.

    😮
    2.2% of GDP is the least prepared we have been since the early 1930s. If this is adequate, then why have so many retired chiefs of staff spoken out and joined the UKNDA (which is calling for a defence budget of 3% of GDP)? This is an unheard of step taken by these expert military figures. If funding is adequate, why do you suppose they have chosen now, after all these years, to speak out?

    in reply to: Royal Navy/Falklands Cost #2040626
    perfectgeneral
    Participant

    I think there is a good argument for permanent members, of the UN security council, spending a minimum of 3% of GDP, per annum, on defence. You rarely if ever know when you are going to need defence, but on the UNSC you will need it. You can’t just snap your fingers and have a defence industry that will arm you overnight. The all butter and no guns argument is madness.

    in reply to: Royal Navy/Falklands Cost #2040689
    perfectgeneral
    Participant

    Complacency over need for 3%

    [QUOTE=sealordlawrence;1198399]

    Common mis-conception, count how many tanks France had in 1940 and how many German had, Germany simply took the initiative and France lost.

    Germany had superior tactics and strategy because they had experience from the Spanish Civil War: Currency. You can build up forces quickly if you can delay (using the English Channel say), but some forces take too long to build up. Ships take years to build, fleets take decades. Defence spending was as low in the early 1930s as it is now, in proportion to GDP. The difference is that back then we had a very large fleet to protect trade and our coastline.

    in reply to: CVF #2041056
    perfectgeneral
    Participant

    Sorry, so that’s CAMM not CAAM.

    The UK Ministry of Defense is funding an MBDA study of future family of
    ‘anti-air’ weapons known as the Common Anti-Air Modular Missile (CAMM). The new weapon will utilize the airframe and some of the components used with the Advanced Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile (ASRAAM) and introduce advanced
    and enhanced capabilities for aircraft currently deploying this short range, heat seeking missile. But CAMM will be aimed at more applications than AAM
    enhancements. By meeting tri-service requirements, the new missile could be
    used to replace existing weapons such as the land-based Rapier point-defense
    missile system, and naval Sea Wolf missile. CAMM is expected to be available
    for deployment from around 2018 onward, coinciding with the planned retirement of the SeaWolf system. Rapier systems are scheduled for retirement by 2020.

    http://www.defense-update.com/events/2007/summary/dsei07_missiles.htm#c…

    Aster 15 range 1.7–30 km (13km vertically)
    CAMM range 300 m – 18 km
    Bofors 57mm range 300 m – 17 km
    Goalkeeper 30mm range 350 m to between 1.5 km and 2 km

    Aster and Goalkeeper would offer the greatest range of air cover with minimum overlap, but a layered defence would include CAMM or the Bofors 57mm CIWS. I want both for a high value asset like CVF. If anything is going to be on the receiving end of a saturation missile attack it is an aircraft carrier.

    in reply to: CVF #2041158
    perfectgeneral
    Participant

    Remember that all those missiles are only useful if the sensors and electronics system can intercept multiple targets at a time. Something like PAAMS is expensive – the carriers would have a less sophisticated package that would only be able to take on a few missiles at a time, so it’s questionable whether 48 cells would be needed.

    In the ideal world I was alluding to CVF would have Sampson fitted (nice and high) combining it with LM Cooperative Engagement Capability on CVF and maybe the Darings too. As you say, this is expensive (not going to happen in ‘peacetime’). As I say they will just get Phalanx 20mm CISW and no targeting radar apart from that on Phalanx. Long Range Air/Surface Search and IFF: Alenia Marconi Systems S1850M probably.

    Something from wiki on Phalanx:

    The Phalanx system has never been credited with shooting down any enemy missiles or aircraft.

    February 25, 1991, during the first Gulf War, the USS Missouri and the Phalanx-equipped USS Jarrett were in the vicinity of an Iraqi Silkworm missile (often referred to as the ‘Seersucker’) that had been fired, either at Missouri or at the nearby British destroyer HMS Gloucester. After Missouri fired its SRBOC chaff, the Phalanx system on Jarrett, operating in the automatic target-acquisition mode, fixed upon Missouri’s chaff and fired a burst of rounds (not destroying the incoming missile). From this burst, four rounds hit Missouri which was two to three miles (5 km) from Jarrett at the time. There were no injuries. The Silkworm missile was then intercepted and destroyed by a Sea Dart missile launched from Gloucester. Incidentally, this is the first validated, successful engagement of a missile by a missile, during combat at sea.

    Maybe they should fit Sea Dart? In any case I don’t think that the Phalanx automatic target-acquisition mode is good enough.

    in reply to: CVF #2041230
    perfectgeneral
    Participant

    Layered air defence for CVF

    I’m sure the budget only runs to 20mm CISW from retired vessels, but I really think CVF deserves a proper layered air defence.

    36 Aster15, 12 CAAM quad packs, 4x 57mm bofors and 4x 30mm goalkeepers šŸ˜€

    in reply to: Engine for LCA? #2538646
    perfectgeneral
    Participant

    F404: length 159ā€ overall; diameter 35ā€; 11,800 lb.s.t. (17,700 lb.s.t. with afterburning)
    F110: length 181.9″ overall; diameter 46.45ā€; 16,600 lb.s.t. (28,000 lb.s.t. with afterburning)

    The better fit would be the F414 (upgrade of the F404):
    length 154ā€ overall; diameter 35ā€; 14,756 lb.s.t. (22,000 lb.s.t. with afterburning)

    The main difference with the two is in the airflow capacity:
    F404: Inlet diameter 27.7ā€; Airflow: 146 lb/sec
    F414: Inlet diameter 30.6ā€; Airflow: 169 lb/sec

    The airframe changes would be relatively minor, mainly in the intake & ducting size/shape.

    The EJ200 (the Typhoon uses two) offers a similar size and performance to the F414, but is much lighter. It is probably more suited to a light fighter.

    weight 2200 lbs
    Airflow 170 lb/sec
    length 158ā€
    diameter 33ā€
    thrust 13,500 lb (20250 lb reheat)
    max inlet diameter 29ā€

    in reply to: More of the same or…. #2043040
    perfectgeneral
    Participant

    This is yet another call for 3% of GDP

    I think that the UKNDA have decided that repetition is the key to gaining the government’s ear. I really hope that they succeed. If they don’t, we might all be paying the price in blood.

    Maybe this leak isn’t the UKNDA at work, but if there was no band waggon to hop aboard, would this leak have happened? Maybe. After all it is very important that we realise how bad things have got. 😮

    in reply to: CVF #2043585
    perfectgeneral
    Participant

    Daring is the duck gun

    If you answer that PAAMS will do what Cats/Darts/Slugs could not, then with respect: Quack

    Hardly a compelling logical arguement is it? Why do people think that saying ‘with respect’ makes it okay to be rude?

    in reply to: Defence funding to 3% of GDP #2546764
    perfectgeneral
    Participant

    Planes cost

    http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/7111979.stm

    Lord Robertson thinks that it is a matter that we should all be concerned about.

    Personally I can’t see how you can buy F-35b or Typhoon or A400m, etc. without a defence budget.

Viewing 15 posts - 46 through 60 (of 66 total)