PeeDThe J-20 should be a stealth Mig-31 for China, the difference is just that it has a higher endurance while being slower.
That’s just what an advanced country like China needs; a highly maneuverable air superiority fighter can’t be their objective.
Compared to other countries China has special capabilities.
-They have a vast LRSAM based IADS
-They have advanced tactical MRBM systems that can take out dangerous and high priority targets at ranges even 5-gen Fighter-bombers are not designed to reach.
Their AAMs are by now mature enough and I’m pretty sure they want just something stealthy, long ranged, fast with many missiles inside and a large radar.
What they need is something that can penetrate the airspace of a far away opponent and kill their entire air force over their own ground. If the back of the J-20 gets it’s LO features it will be the almost ideal aircraft for such a doctrine
PeeDSorry but those are the specs, radar is limited to 82 degrees and the gun is limited to 85.
You don’t have to be sorry, I’m talking here about advanced IADS. If you want change that advanced IADS by LD-2000 equipped HQ-9. The LD-2000 related to the Golekeeper is perfectly capable to engage vertical diving targets.
PeeD@SpudmanWP
Russian PDS systems cannot elevate their guns straight up nor can they tilt engagement radars straight up. The Pantsir S1 has a limitation of 82 degrees for the tracking radar and 85 degrees for the gun.
This is why a plunging attack has the best chance of success. In order to protect the S-XXX the PDS units have to be spread out, but doing that means that the guns will engage from the side instead of a merging engagement. This also means that the leading PDS units cannot defend (with guns) against a plunging attack that is aimed at the PDS itself. It will have to use missiles, of which it has a very limited supply, and will have to rely on target data from other units in the area. If network jamming is in affect the PDS CANNOT defend itself against a plunging attack from a PGM or HARM as not even it’s radar can see beyond 82 degrees.
An angle of something like 10-30deg from the LOS of the SDB should have no significant negative effects. A star pattern with 50m distance for example would still encounter as diving SDB at near frontal aspect. This is not comparable to a cross-target engagement and I see no reason why the PK should significantly decrease here.
It would be a huge design mistake by the Russians if the Pantsir or a battery of them would not be able to engage a vertical diving target. I don’t believe anyone would make such a mistake while designing a Anti-PGM system. Given its relation to the Kashtan CIWS, makes it unbelievable.
But let’s not concentrate on Russia or Pantsir.
The Chinese LD-2000 is surely able to deal with vertical diving targets, even alone.
PeeDWell, but they didn’t
When even Ahmadinejad admits stuxnet affected their centrifuges, the damage was obviously of such a magnitude that lying about it would be worse than admitting it happened.
The head of the Iranian nuclear denied it and the IAEO has also not seen Iranian centrifuges breaking down or going offline. But that’s not the problem, professionals check any software change.
[/QUOTE]There’s really no such thing as a “closed system” any more. Air defense systems obviously don’t work in isolation. And unless you are prepared to run wires all over the place, and guard the wires and their interconnections, and ensure that nothing in your system ever connects to anything outside that system of nodes and wires, you are vulnerable.
As others have pointed out, the Israelis were able to do it, allegedly with the help of the U.S. “Suter” system or something similar. And the USAF hasn’t been completely silent about developing that capability.[/QUOTE]
We don’t know if Israelis really did it and I doubt any worm would be able to enter via a data-link go into the IADS software and change it to shut down the system. Let’s leave this highly hypothetical topic.
@SpudmanWP
Sorry I was not clear enough. I was postulating that an attack on the main S-XXX system while being defended by a dispersed PDS will not have an effective engagement. When the PGM is not headed directly for the PDS the AHEAD rounds are attacking the PGM from a side angle.
Being that is from the side the gun has to track harder to lead the PGM. Also, the AHEAD round will not have an effective ‘stacking’ effect where if the PGM misses one shrapnel ‘disc’ it runs into the next one which is virtually on an identical flight path.
Yes side engagements are less effective but I’m talking about PDS used to closely guard MRSAM and LRDAM assets of the IADS. These guard systems would almost in all cases face a frontal attack. Anyway AHEAD by side, it’s just the most efficient munitions for gun systems, double or triple the necessary numbers of dumb API rounds together with the highest RPM rate you can get and your system will still have a very high PK against even small targets and still much cheaper than a SDB.
@netta
If there is a unit on the system receiving then its not closed. other ways would be cutting into underwater cable like the cold war or getting an agent to put a sleeper into the system via USB. We don’t know how Israel got in. But we do know that shut down ALL of the Syrian defenses. and we SPECULATE that they did it from the air. maybe they where Broadcasting the signal, I dunno.
I for my part don’t know that the Syrian even had systems able to attack the Israelis in their route. Therefore I have no reason to believe this story.
PeeD@SpudmanWP
The AHEAD rounds would be nearly worthless to a plunging PGM. For AHEAD to work the PGM has to fly into the AHEAD round after it explodes but a plunging PGM is flying a perpendicular route, not a merging route.
I don’t see any physical limits to launch an AHEAD successfully vertically except for gravitation looses.
The Millennium CIWS uses AHEAD and is certainly ready to handle plunging AshMs.
@netta
Take the Styxnet worm as example; it was supposed that an infected USB stick had infected to control computers of the Iranian Uranium centrifuge facility. Iranians replied that their IT-specialists check any software change of those high security systems and that they had detected the worm before it reached the computers. The Iranian software structure was a variant of Siemens software, available to such groups but what do they know about the software of the S-400?
The Israeli route and their ECM systems are perfectly enough to get there in the Syrian case.
I can also mention that there is no way in a closed system like a IADS to activate the worm on demand.
PeeD@Mercurius
I fear you may be ascribing an unrealistic level of performance to the Pantsir.
If my memory is correct, the maximum range of its engagement radar is about 30 km against a 2 sq m RCS target, so would be significantly less for an SDB-class missile. The cannon are effective only out to 4 km. A standard Pantsir can conduct two engagements simultaneously – one with radar tracking, the other with the EO tracker. With the newer phased-array radar, simultaneous engagements are possible – three with radar and one with EO.
My conclusion comes from a open source presentation of the 35mm AHEAD rounds, I can’t find it anymore but it was about the comparison of AHEAD vs. ordinary rounds.
At below 3km the reaction time for even maneuvering PGM is low enough for a high PK. Also the accuracy of the rounds increases of course.
Based on this I assume that the burst must be between 30-60 30mm rounds for a very good PK @~2km.
The Pantsyr with its track while scan FCS can set priority of dozens of targets, share the work and enable a very short reaction time. I’m talking about a serial engagement not a simultaneous interesting for its missiles.
PeeD@netta
Getting a worm into a professionally operated IADS should be close to impossible. The software structure is unknown and closed to the outside. Furthermore, even shoot&scoot systems can easily use cables for their Ethernet.
The U.S. also has the option of brute force. 2 Ohio class subs with 100 TlAMS each, and 2 B-2s loaded with 200 SDB, with 24 F-35s added, would almost certainly overwhelm any IADS you can imagine. You don’t have to hit ever radar and Missile lorry in the country, you just need a transit area for legacy assets
Saturating the IADS can work, it’s simply depends on the numbers, but even with the SDB the cost-effectiveness can still on the defenders side.
And sure, at this point no country could win a saturation war against the USA, I’m just talking about 5th Gen fighters against future IADS in general.
@wrightwing
This assumes that it is apparent to the SAM site, that jamming is occurring. Not all jamming is of the noise type, and it isn’t necessary to jam continuously to get inside the kill chain. Good luck in using HOJ against a non-noise type jammer.
Advanced multi-static ESM systems, “passive radars” would closely analyze any anomaly in the EM environment of the IADS. Therefore it’s likely that also non-noise “LPI” jamming would be detected and the radar warned if its own ECCM doesn’t detect the jamming.
Yes against modern systems HOJ is unlikely but it’s likely that the ESM system and the TI system could still provide enough data-link information for missile engagement.
Brute force systems will be more vulnerable, due to them giving every ESM system in range precise information, making it more difficult for them to use passive defense measures(relocation).
My point was about stand-off jamming of NGJ at ranges of about 100nm against high-power AESA systems such as the Nebo. The enemy would already attack the IADS if it feels necessary to activate a battery level Nebo (the Nebo is not really battery level even in the S-400).
The MALD J wouldn’t rely on overpowering a network, so much as using more discreet methods(i.e. distributed denial of service attacks). Other options are HPM cruise missiles, which would cause serious issues for an air defense network.
An advanced IADS would have secure and high-power EM systems. Its electronics would also be shielded. However you might be right about the vulnerabilities of the radar antennas against and EMP attack depends on the protective measures, the performance of the EMP weapon and the attack/interception point from the radars.
You have to look at the synergy of all the systems being brought to bear though. It’s not any single piece of the puzzle that’s the end all be all solution. It’s the fact that there’ll be large numbers of networked, stealthy platforms(with significant ISR capabilities), along with other platforms putting the EOB together, for situational awareness. This will make the task of hiding/jamming much more difficult. Then factor in these stealthy platforms having EA capabilities, along with MALD J, EA-18G, EC-130, etc… creating mass confusion.
Sure but the same counts for the IADS. The closer you get to the center of the IADS the fewer platforms will be available and the IADS will be more active in that region. The IADS in the periphery tries to be passive, only going active if the secure systems in the center or the ESM systems alarm them. The PDS in turn will protect the IADS assets in the periphery when they go online in order to kill the system detected by central IADS and ESM systems. This is also a complex puzzle.
That’s great except for the fact that F-22s have hit targets nearly 100 miles away with SDBs. It’s not likely that radar will detect an F-22 at that range, weapons bays open or not. F-35s will be able to launch their SDBs supersonically too, for that matter.
That point was about a high speed high altitude SDB attack to reduce the reaction time for the PDS. Just wanted to point out that there are limitations to that when the system is equipped with a strong battery level radar.
NGJ isn’t even in service yet, and it’s already questionable? The F-22/35 EA would use very narrow beams, which would be very difficult to spot/utilize anything like a HOJ, for counter fires.
Any extreme stand-off jamming against a powerful and advanced system supported by ESM systems is questionable. But it’s possible yes.
HOJ isn’t alone there, as said ESM and TI sensors will replace it if it fails.
It’d only take 8 F-22/35s to send 64 SDBs towards a single site. A squadron could launch 192 SDBs in a single sortie. A B-2 could launch over 200 SDBs in a single sortie. Even if the Pantsir has a 100 % PK, it still has to reload at some point.
8 is a good number for a strike package that suddenly detects an S-400 going into active mode to set a trap.
Intercepting 64 SDB with gun only would be hard for 4 Pantsyrs but not impossible. Once the attack is over the S-400 would go passive relocate while the Pantsyrs would reload their magazines.
Sending a subsonic SDB equipped B-2 against an advanced IADS could be risky.
Generally; the IADS elements in the centre with permanently online EW-Radars would be even more protected, such few core systems could be protected by so many PDS that a threefold simultaneous PGM attack could be intercepted (by guns). But such a massive central attack would activate the passive systems in the periphery, risking the launching platforms.
The PK of gun CIWS can reach close to 100% with simultaneous salvos, just add the next round, and the next to reach a very high PK. The costs will still be much lower than that of a SDB/PGM.
PeeDWhich all will be affected by the reduced detection range against a VLO airframe. IIRC, all those Russian PDS optical systems are for backup to the tracking module, not as an independent search device.
Yes they are only useful when radars give the coordinated of a small area for them to track. Therefore limitations in low-band radar accuracy or a faint echo or a short echo while the weapon bays are open is not going to stop angle tracking as well as identification by TI systems
How is an ESM supposed to get a return from a fighter that is running silent? The F-35&22 don’t need to go active in order to detect the S-XXX and can verify the target coordinates via EOTS or SAR (active single scan).
This was my response to your AESA jamming point. Any jamming will give away the location of the F-22/35 and the coordinates gathered will be enough to lock the TI systems on the F-22/35.
If the jamming continues for a longer time period, a missile can be even launched in HOJ mode as Trident pointed out.
So you are going to ignore all other F-35/22s? In that case you are toast. btw, the F-35 has an EODAS mode called YATO (You Are The One). It will let that pilot know that the missile is headed towards him and allow him to take evasive maneuvers. Don’t forget that the SARH missile itself can be jammed.
No not ignoring, such a future IADS system could use the several Pantsyrs and their TI systems and the agile beam of the Tombstone PESA to quickly change the target and enable multiply target engagement. New generation SAMs are not LOBL, they have their own INS system and secure data-link.
SARH missiles can be jammed but the S-400’s engagement radar has a very high output and the TVM/data-link system could use hybrid information when jamming begins via TI and ESM systems.
The NGJ will likely stay outside the SAM engagement envelope
Then the question is how effective it will be against networked brute force systems.
The purpose of the MALD and MALD-J (along with the NGJ and AESA based jammers) is to buy just 10-20 seconds of time while the SDBs perform their dive from high altitude. This ingress from high altitude allows them to be higher than the PDS units can engage (especially with guns)
I highly doubt that, modern PDS are designed to engage targets vertically and arranged in a smart pattern, some of the battery’s PDS will not need to engage vertically. At best the PK will be reduced.
The MALD Jamming is also unlikely to affect networked systems which get their surveillance data from a primary brute force system.
Your talking about a lot of “future” stuff here. While the NGJ & JDRADM are not here yet, they are funded and in the prototype stage. Beside, their lesser cousins (ALQ-99 & AARGM) are here and will do just fine.
Well such details are of course classified but all there technology is already there, it’s more a software problem than hardware. The question is whether the assets are as integrated as I say in these worst case scenarios.
The JDRADM can execute the same plunging attack as the SDB and enjoys a much smaller RCS than the SDB. Reaction times for the PDS units will be reduced even further than if it were a SDB (high speed ingress and lower RCS).
Right. A large number of expensive JDRADM could bring the reaction times of the IADS to its knees. My point is that the cheap F-22/SDB solution will likely not work against future systems.
Are you saying that the NEBO can engage a F-22 or 35 from 50+nm away… good luck backing that claim up (especially in the presence of heavy jamming form NGJ, MALD-J, and F-22/35 jamming as needed).
No I’m not saying that. It was my response to you close SDB release scenario for high speed and vertical drop. This should be impossible to archive at 50nm, at least when it come to speed.
For your scenario a release distance of 15-20nm is more realistic and then yes, the Nebo would likely become deadly at such a distance especially with opened weapon bays and TI systems which would get any faint echo provided by the Nebo.
Performance of the NGJ and more so the MALD-J against modern multi-band high power systems remains questionable and F-22/35 AESA jamming would be deadly in presence of ESM systems.
Thy may shoot vertically, but they cannot look (with sensors) vertically at a target approach at near mach speeds.
Depends on the PDS and their pattern/location but I clearly disagree.
You missing the main point. For your S-XXX to survive, every one of the inbound SDBs, HARMs, and JDRADMs has to be intercepted. That is the true impossible task.
The main objective will be to get the launching aircrafts, if this goes wrong the PDS are to protect the system for another chance during the next engagement. But I agree with you, a massive and concentrated attack would likely kill the system, it depends on the numbers.
PeeDWhen you consider the following, an SDB attack on a S-300/400 system has a good chance of success:
1. The VLO airframe of the launching platform will allow a launch of the SDB from a closer range and will limit the reaction time of the Point Defense System (PDS).
Yes, however reaction times of networked Pantsyrs are like that of a CIWS of course. They have independent search and track radars as well as optical systems.
2. The F-35 is pre-wired for NGJ which can seriously degrade the radars of the PDS.
3. The F-22’s or F-35’s AESA radars (F-22 Inc 3.1 with it’s jamming will start to be installed next year) can also support the jamming of the PDS radars.
Future advanced IADS assets will have ESM systems around which could calculate the location of the F-35/22 while new generation TI systems could track them at distances which are longer than the SDB max range.
Once angle tracking is established an S-400 could launch the missile in theory while concentrating the Tombstone engagement radar on that point at max. Power output until the missile SARH seeker gets a return.
Active jamming at anything less than 75km distance to the SAM system could become very dangerous.
4. MALD-J can be launched to arrive in the target area to provide additional jamming of the PDS target tracking radars.
In networked systems the high power Nebo AESA could pass necessary target coordinates to the Pantsyrs, jamming such a low-band brute force system could become very difficult for a MALD-J
5. MALD can also be used to confuse & overload the PDS systems.
Any decoy can be analyzed via radars, ESM and foremost modern TI systems. One a MALD had been identified it will be ignored by future highly automatic IADS.
6. JDRADM can (2018 timeframe) add a high speed & VLO aspect to the engagement thereby reducing the reaction opportunity to almost nill.
A JDRADM approaching an S-400 would close directly into the low-band AESA, with the detection range increasing disproportionally, exponentially. If there is any small echo the Pantsyrs TI system would check to coordinates and classify the threat, giving it high priority and launching missiles against it.
7. The SDB can be launched from a very high altitude (50,000+ ft), glide to say 20k ft, then pitch over into a vertical dive (bunker penetration flight profile). This will be beneficial in several ways.
A. The high speed of the approaching SDB will reduce the reaction opportunity of the PDS.
While risking the launch platform. The benefit of the F-22-SDB combination is the release range and the VLO benefit; to threat the reaction time of modern PDS you need to close to a dangerously close distance against Nebo low-band systems.
B. The PDS is limited in their radar acquisition angle, ie they cannot see directly above themselves.
C. The high speed of a plunging SDB will make a guns defense impossible and necessitate the use of the missiles which have a very limited supply.
Arranged in a smart pattern and the right distances would neither pose a real angle problem for the radar/optical systems nor for the gun systems. Modern (also old) AAA systems can shoot vertically and the PK will remain high because it’s completely automatic.
Now I know that not everything I proposed is perfect and will work every time. But, I do think that when you take the system as a whole (VLO launch platform, SDB1&2, plunging attacks, NGJ, launch platform AESA jamming, MALD, MALD-J, JDRADM), I think the likelihood of the SAM destruction is good.
Same here, such a system must be extremely well networked and its software must be very complex and smart.
It all depends on the F-22 performance against low-band high-power AESAs. If they are too powerful, efficient (fuel, munitions-cost), high level, high speed and therefore long-range SDB attack scenarios would become impossible.
@netta
What about wind corrected munitions? can they hit the bomb before it disperses? or breaks away into segments?
A good idea, better using a shotgun to attack a bird rather than a rifle.
In theory once detected a classification via the TI system could take place and a missile launched given its priority. But even if it’s just classified as PGM, a gun attack at 3km should be before sub-munitions release point of an ordinary cluster weapon.
Of course I’m talking about a horizontal stand-off release, not a dangerous steep over head release.
@djcross
The IADS VHF/UHF radar will know the F-35s are present, but their VLO return is too faint for the S-300’s acquisition or fire control radars to find.
A highly advanced S-400 could use its Pantsyrs to scan the area of the faint F-35 echo. Tracking would be possible outside the F35-SDB release distance and at least angle tracking information could be given to the S-400 missile via data-link while the Tombstone tries to paint the F-35 with high power pencil-beam. If lucky the TVM will get a positive response in the last seconds of its flight.
PeeDWell as far as cost for launch platforms for the GBU-39s, that’s not nearly as relevant, because they’ll be firing outside the WEZ of their targets. An AH-64D costs a lot more than a truck, tank, APC, but you never hear that sort of comparison there. The point I’m getting at is that most foes can’t afford to shoot down $20-30k bombs with $500k-1m missiles for prolonged periods, aside from the fact that there are going to be more SDBs than missiles.
It’s not needed to use expensive LRSAMs against targets like the SDB.
At some point the tactical situation will become clear to the SAM system i.e. numbers of incoming targets, classification of the target via its behavior and optical identification of the target.
An S-400 battery protected by something like 4 Pantsyr-S1 can then chose how to handle the threat, especially if they assume that they are in a saturation situation including electronic warfare and decoys.
This could get so far that 4 alone and simultaneous incoming SDB’s would be regarded as low threat targets and attacked by the concentrated fire of the Pantsyr’s. The PK of 4 Pantsyr salvos at one target at 3km is likely high enough to take out a SDB. The number of shells could be as low as 36 rounds in exchange for a SDB and its clear who has the cost-effectiveness on its side.
So against slow targets like the SDB it’s very unlikely that an advanced enemy would use missiles, more so if it’s clear that the opponent tries to saturate the IADS.
SHORAD missiles can be pretty cheap, the Chinese marketed their HQ-7 Crotale copy for 25,000$ in the late 80’s, not to talk about how much it costs for themselves.
Therefore I’d say that the saturation game can have negative results against an advanced opponent.
Another option is electronic warfare against the SDB navigation system, decreasing its accuracy and making it useless against hardened targets or further increasing the numbers needed to take out a multi layer SAM battery.
PeeDTake 5 graduate students, a selection of current text books and some time and they design you a fighter. Great. But doesn’t help. There is no particular knowledge about how to do all that stuff.
First thing the Iranians would need to do is producing engines. As long as they don’t do that, we can easily trash all the rest. Fortunately the lack the industrial base.
Yes that’s the point; it’s most likely a student project. However the engine can well be a J79 locally built and given the advance in software and computer technology a group of skilled students can use modern FEM and fluid dynamic software to design something more serious than just a nice looking CAD model. It’s this area where Iranian elite universities area ahead of many others of comparable nations and even more advanced ones. What they really lack is first hand experience to handle problems not included in the simulations and advanced production technology and management to produce an advanced industrial product.
PeeDThey said that they have completed the design phase of this stealth aircraft which most likely means that they have a CAD model which flies in simulations.
This is possible, because there have been such projects already in the past. It’s likely not a large supersonic high performance aircraft but nonetheless a serious engineering project. However it’s very unlikely that they have worked out a concept to mass produce such an aircraft not to talk about production technology for an Iranian engine. The industrial capability to mass-produce a modern fighter jet doesn’t exist in Iran at this point.
PeeD@SOC
Off-Topic but that’s exactly how it’s done. A sometimes small battery at a fixed base, able to be activated if there is a sudden strike, transformed to a mobile full strength battery moving out of the base.
The protection offered by fixed and hardened sites is much less than the protection offered by being mobile.
PeeDWhats the problem with believing that Pakistan can built a CM like the Babur ?
The only real problem is the mini-turbojet engine needed and the technologie for it can be easily provided by China. Iran is mass producing such a mini-turbo jet, Pakistan would only need a small production facility for the small numbers of Baburs needed as nuclear delivery system.
Pakistan is fully capabel to built the missile body on its own, the last problem would be the navigation system, mainly the INS. This and other hardware high-tech parts can be easily imported and built into a capabel navigation system, an altimeter a computer coupled with a GPS system together with the INS and the Babur would be capabel to fly at a save 50 meters for more than 500km. The missile is big enough.
Iran has built its own 350km range turbojet AshM with a selfmade aerodynamic missile design all thanks to the cooperation with the Chinese which enabeld them to build their own independent designs.
If the story about the crashed Tomahawk is true, this could be the child of Chinese and Pakistani work on it, even if only the technologie for the missile-body could be rescued. Something like this would be a reason why Pakistan had such a kick start. The smaller numbers of Baburs built would also be a help, no need for complicated large mass-production.
Pakistan is one of those countrys which have a capabel elite of people who can work on strategic projects, this elite can’t be used on many projects but the Babur and the Shaheen series are some examples.
PeeDThis somehow doesn’t sounds like IRNA and nothing like that is to be found on their site.
Any link ?
It seems to be fake.
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