They also have about 48 modernized Su-27SM, they will probably keep them too. Also, there are a few batches of Su-30 ordered, probably for the naval aviation to replace Su-24?
Also, keep in mind that they don’t really need as many interceptors as before, they do have things like Su-34 that could be used in that role too.
So basically something in the class of 737AEW will have difficulties getting data on targets of the Harpoon/Kh-35 class and will detect them at about let’s say 100km?
Also, if the data is so unreliable, I presume that it is useless for guiding ship-based IR homing missiles over the horizon against the sea skimmers (relying purely on the data from the 737, I’m not sure if the airplane could even communicate with the missiles directly)?
Anyone? At least any examples for over the horizon guidance of SM-2 Block IIIB will be greatly appreciated.
Thanks a lot for the help, as I understand my assumptions have been correct.
All in all, currently I am involved in the design of a board based (internet board) game that involves a modern asymmetrical conflict involving an amphibious landing against certain opposition (the landing side is based on a perceived Turkish Navy fleet in 2024). Because of that the escorts of the landing crafts have to intercept an expected salvo of subsonic sea-skimmers (between 32-128), I am having a heated discussion with my friends about certain parameters and a few new questions appeared:
1. Assumed launch interval between ESSM/SM-2/RAM missiles is taken as 1-2s
2. Another assumption is that 737AEW cannot possibly provide direct mid course guidance for SM-2 Block IIIB for over the horizon engagements (as that block has a thermal imaging seeker) or sufficiently accurate data to the ship command system in order to attempt such engagements (given that a sea skimmer has its small engine underneath the airframe the thermal signature should be low and the accuracy of directing the missiles to use their seeker should be insufficient). I do know that such attempts have been made with a Hawkeye and SM-3 with AMRAAM seeker, but that is not the case for the SM-2/737AEW combo. Am I correct? At least my assumption is that the 737AEW is mostly useful in directing battles between aircraft.
3. From the above thoughts the only useful info that an AEW could give to the ships will be of the vector of attack and rough arrival time. Also, I have my doubts that 737AEW could see small targets at sea level from its maximum range.
4. I am modelling the TF-2000 frigates on the Sachsen Class, however I think it is a bit of an overkill as the Germans appear as something utterly capable AND expensive. What should be the ammount of targets engaged by a frigate based SPY-1 coming from one direction? I know that it depends on AN/SPG-62 mounted, but given that two are provided for illumination, they should manage attacking 8 targets simultaneously?
5. From all of the above – any engagement against sea-skimmers (modelled on Kh-35) should start at about 20km, give or take a few kilometres depending on waves, weather, and luck. At that point on till the missiles hit, the flotilla attempts to shoot at least two SM-2/ESSM for each incoming missile. Any self-defense like Phalanx or RAM is used only if the missile is coming directly against the ship with the CIWS itself. Are these assumptions correct?
6. From point 5 – the close in “dead” zone of SM-2 is important and it is about 7-8km in my assumption, I hope that is correct? For the dead zone of ESSM I assume something like 2km.
7. For older ships of the formation like any Perry class frigates – won’t the number of air targets in the air (over 300 if things happen simulatenously) saturate the onboard radar, forcing it to ignore some tracks? (modelled as reduced efficiency and kill probablility)
8. Against skimmers I use probability to kill of 0.7 for SM-2 and 0.8 for ESSM, that should be reasonable?
Hatches flanking UKSK silos are for the Paket torpedoes.
By the way, I always thought that UAVs are hard to jam from anything ground based because their antennas point up towards space and not down. Thus I don’t think that they could have jammed the thing properly from the ground. What kind of airborne ECM systems does Iran have? As the UAV doesn’t have a radar and was deep enough into Iran to be outside US radar coverage, is it possible for an Iranian jamming aircraft to come a few hundred meters above the UAV and then try to jam the satellite link? The operators of the UAV could not know about the presence of the craft and will have lost connection. From that point on, the Iranians could observe where the UAV is going on its own and if it tries to leave their airspace perhaps just have a jet to move in fast nearby and get the UAV into a spin that the system inside could not compensate without operator control?
The head of the Navy is heavily in league with the manufacturers of the missile system (perhaps bribed) and he agreed to accept the ship without accepting the SAM system. So they didn’t really have to worry about making a system that actually works. From all the rumors about Furke, it will never work properly and adding a Poliment in its place is perhaps the best solution.
9M96 flies ok, but the problem is Furke radar. There was one attempt to fire 9M96 from the corvette but it failed to hit the target. So yes, accepting into service without a working system.
Low-flying Navy Aviation Su-24s
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=tH3TtpwPLqw#!
Some were lost over Georgia, 1 or 2…
It is a PR mission.
Well, taking common sense into account, the S-300 battery has to protect whatever it is protecting, not to destroy every aproaching aircraft. Thus, it could just switch off its radar once it believes that someone is attacking the battery and not the actual target, move a few kilometers, switch on again and so on. A mobile battery is not a battleship – it could just melt away in a forest and reappear an hour later, not just sit in the water so that anyone could see it. The fact that the battery is still alive will probably be enough to keep large strike groups away or force them to go lower, thus making short range SAMs effective. Also, the Russians have developed extensive electronic decoys, which could make detecting the real battery quite hard.
Another best selling tactic in the August War between Georgia and Russia was to position the batteries (the shorter ranged Buks though) not in the open field or on top of a mountain, but at the bottom of a small valley. Thus, enemy jammers and ELINT aircraft could not see them, while aircraft passing overhead were fired at from point blank range. Granted, such ambushes may not be able to protect the real target completely and limit the field of view of the battery, but could get you some high-profile shootdowns.
I think that in the end no single munition is going to be that effective against a complex air defence network. Multiple attack vectors, different munitions and as heavy electronic warfare as possible is the best solution. At least in my opinion the destruction of air defense assets in not the most important task in a war – there are usually much more meaningful targets and the air defenses just have to be suppressed long enough for a strike group to get in, bomb the target, get out. Going after every S-300 battery the enemy has could quickly turn into a neverending nightmare.
Don’t forget that an S-300 battery will probably be guarded by a number of Pantsyr/Tunguska/Shilka and the odd AAA gun and random platoons armed with Iglas. This makes a low approach to the target quite a challenge because the attackers will be in range of so many relatively cheap weapons. Also, don’t forget that an anti-radiation missile, depending on engine used, could have a top speed of Mach 2-3, but that is only for a fraction of the flight time. When used at max range, the motor would have burnt out by the time the missile is near the S-300 battery and going much slower. Which in turn makes the intercept using Tor much easier. Also, don’t rule out electronic warfare on the side of the S-300.
Bulgarian Airforce practice over the sea (relocation to Balchik air base for a few days).
http://www.pan.bg/view_article-1-4499-Iztrebitelite-kacnaha-v-aviobaza-Balchik-fotooko.html
http://aviationlistonline.com/v1/gallery/?album=25&gallery=58
As far as current plans go, by 2012 MiG-21 and Su-25 will be gone, the only flying machines wil be a dozen 29s and that’s that. There are rumors about a possible purchase of 6-8 Gripens, but that won’t happen in the next 4-5 years. For that time MiG-29 will be the only fast jet we have.