The original count of spikes was 1,676, but that is completely wrong, as we already know. The number of valleys is ~1,624 (too lazy to count)..
Now, according to the drawing, last two valleys on each edge don’t have their own TRM. That means four valleys in each row. The row count is 52 lines = 208 TRMs less. 1,624 – 208 = 1,416 TRMs. Plus minus a few, give or take..

The 1-to-1 arrangement doesn’t look similar to what we can observe on the APG-81 picture, I believe there will be APG-81(V)2 one day with higher TRM count, different arrangement and increased output power. But we’re not there yet.

The half spike in each line wasn’t counted in the first place
according to the pattern each line have 2 spike that isn’t TRM
so 52× 2= 104 TRM less
1676-104 = 1572

Btw neither of the pattern actually look exactly like F-35 TRM, so we only speculate here ( keep in mind that APG-81 use the latest gen TRM at the moment )

I have no doubt that the APG-81 can be used as a jammer.
On the other hand it is X-band only and limited to 60-deg. off the nose.

one small mistake there
APG-81 angular coverage is actually 120 degree ( 60 degree left and 60 degree right)

While X-band is used for some SAM tracking radars, there is a growing number of lower-band radars that can direct a missile into seeker range. For instance, the Sea Ceptor (CAMM) is intended to operate directly with the E/F-band Artisan.

still the majority radar of fighter, AWACS, Ship, SAM are X band
and APG-81 isn’t the only jammer that F-35 carry, it can also transmitt jamming signal through ALE-70 ( similar to the way F-18 E/F use ALE-55) , there are also MALD-J, and in future F-35 can integrate NGJ as well.
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Also, in order to perform continuous jamming, the “stand-off” jammer has to keep the target inside the arc of coverage, which means that it is closing the range to the target.

You can have 2 fighters taking turn jamming enemy’s radar

What an humorous ability.

I place currency on wager that users of F-35 will make sure of integration of EW pods and specified wingtip jammers.

You do know that the only reason this ability of APG-81 exist only to provide a jamming capability because to place external jammers would ruin all the painstaking effort to improve by 95% over 4th generation aircraft?

If you wish to verify,
[ATTACH=CONFIG]239407[/ATTACH]

It become obvious to say that this ability is very unuseful, as it turns the jammer to a very high probability of destruction beacon.

This radar mode is only useful against third world nations with no IADS worth speaking of, where passive sensors simply do not exist.

F-35 can also carry ALE-70 ( work in similar fashion with ALE-55), so it can jam by that as well, the advantage of AESA jamming is that it can focus power into a narrow beam, thus achieved high ratio noise to signal at target place

While F-35 is capable of stand-off jamming for other aircraft — providing 10 times the effective radiated power of any legacy fighter

https://www.f35.com/about/capabilities/electronicwarfareIt’s low RCS also benefit jamming


http://www.rfcafe.com/references/electrical/ew-radar-handbook/radar-cross-section.htm
and it have been explained like a thousands times RWR cant really provide firing solutions again moving airborne target

WHAAT? Mig-31 doesn’t get really new features when compared with Foxbat?
Turbofans instead of turbojets

well, with tuborjet engine Mig-25 will have better performance than Mig-31 at very high altitude

, two seater,

well there is also a version of Mig-25 with 2 seat

4 long range missiles with TVM (track via missile, given your last exploit better to write it in full words),

R-33 is SARH
R-37 is ARH + mid course guide + SARH
i dont think either of them have TVM capability
TVM would required 2 way datalink

first airborne PESA radar…

F-16E changed to AESA radar, and it’s performance isnt much difference from F-16C/D

And you even use it as your nickname…

what i mean is, there isn’t that much significant change between Mig-25 and Mig-31 compared to F-16 vs F-35
New radar? : well most fighter have new radar in every block upgraded
New engine? : it quite common that fighter have new engine in their upgraded block
New weapon? : quite similar to these above

I think your time on afterburner calculation is meaningless in real world conditions unless you want to burn all your fuel at sea level conditions.
For example, given that air density represents the mass per unit volume of air, a jet engine will produce far less thrust at high altitude where the air is less dense, and since we know that fuel flow is directly related to thrust (it is thus thrust-specific) and that for example, in supersonic cruise conditions thrust equals drag (and there is so much less drag at high altitude), the plane can go very fast for longer time with far less thrust using less fuel compared to sea level conditions.
You can`t just use the sea level static thrust numbers for engine max power and thrust specific fuel consumption number to calculate for example the range and time on burner at higher altitude without knowing the engine thrust numbers at that specific height and drag of the plane at given speed and height. The performance figures for two different planes, such as Su-27 and F-35 will be different even if they have the same time on afterburner at similar conditions. One can for example travel at Mach 2 speed and the other can travel at Mach 1,6 for that period of time. That would be a huge difference in performance.
Also, TSFC is not constant, it varies (probably not that much) with altitude, flight Mach number, ambient temperature, throttle setting etc.

Yes i do aware that TSFC isn’t a constant value, in fact if you read several pages ago, i was the one correct MSphere on that,
TSFC go up as speed go up and go down as altitude go up,
my calculations was only meant to show the time on afterburner of these aircraft relative to the other in a given conditions, in dogfight, aircrafts are likely to fly at around the same speed around mach 0.7-0.8, ( no one will accelerate to mach1.6 or mach 2 in dogfight) and fly at same altitude, thus the effect of air density will affected them in quite similar fashion, as a result their respective ratio of times on afterburner will be quite similar.
For example : my calculations shown F-15 on internal fuel can have maximum 6.9 min at full afterburner at sea level, F-35 have about 13 minutes, in reality the time of both will be more or less depending on the altitude they fighting, but the F-15 on internal fuel wont have more time on afterburner than F-35, that the point

When we talk about maneuverability/agility it is also very important to be very specific about number figures and almost every information about F-35 is not that specific. For example, they say it has ability to exit at 50° AoA in controlled fashion and it seems that this is enough to assume that it has F-18 high AoA nose pointing ability?
I don`t think so because we don`t know about its pitch, roll/yaw rates at that conditions. I`m not saying it is inferior than F-18, I really don`t know, but other than 50° AoA there is not much useful information. F-18 is rare plane that can comfortably roll at high AoA and can point its nose in every direction,

according to test pilot F-35 have the high AoA characteristics of F-18, that all we know, it is very unlikely that we can get F-35 EM graph any point in near future ( same for all 4.5 and 5 gen fighter) , so the best we can do now is make educated guess.
btw here is the only video of F-35 in post stall, high AoA test that i can find
http://theaviationist.com/2013/05/21/f-35-aoa-test/

but for the time it can finish 180° roll at 35° AoA, Su-35S can finish 360° roll at almost two times higher AoA. In other words, both planes can roll at 35° AoA but the difference in roll rate will be significant.

i dont think Su-35S at 70 degree AoA can roll 2 times faster than F-18 at 35 degree AoA

And if the F-35 is sluggish at high angle of attack conditions, than its ability to exit 50° AoA is not of much use.

well, everything are more sluggish in high AoA due to high drag, they are not going to fly as fast or turn as fast as they normally do at low AoA

no, because F-35 didn’t have anything going for it performance wise compared to the old underpowered F-16D with two tanks

wasn’t an actual pilot explained this like 20 pages ago
http://forum.keypublishing.com/showthread.php?135460-test-pilot-quot-F-35-can-t-dogfight-quot/page9

Well, since most of theis is classified it has to be. But just going on facts instead of how jamming and radar works we can look at history yet again.
From Allied Force:
It was only carried on US F16 and being the jet flying most dangerous missions (low and medium alt daytime) + following the F117 on all nightly raids.The F16s had a sortie rate of well over 2:1 compared to the F117 and only half as many hit aircraft. Surely not all of this can be attributed to the AN/ALE-50, but according to pilots it had a huge impact on survivability.
In the end the F16 had a ratio of missile evasion of just above 4:1 compared to the F117 on a sortie by sortie rate.

F-16 didn’t fly the most dangerous mission, F-117 does, at least according to USAF
also ALE-50 was used again relatively old SAM system

Coincidentally pretty close to the succesrate I attributed to the far more superior BriteCloud when fired in swarms of 3.

Most AAM also have ECCM capabilities themselves so the effectiveness of BriteCloud again Meteor, AIM-120D is also questionable, Even if we discount the ECCM ability of AAM, they can still be supported by the launching aircraft through data link and it is alot harder to jam the aircraft radar compared to a missiles especially if that aircraft have AESA radar ( i dont think Britecloud can do that)
AAM will also have AESA radar seeker in future making it even harder to jam them ( from what i know, Russian already making prototype of AESA seeker for R-77, Japan cooperate with MBDA to make a new version of Meteor with AESA seeker for their F-35)
And there is nothing say that future long range AAM cant have IIR seeker, we already have a few of them like MICA IR, NCADE, R-27 IR… etc, Israel also have a programme to convert their Sturner SAM to AAM, stuner have both EO and RF sensor.
P/s : i think most on battlefield most soldiers would prefer to have a gun than a bullet proof vest and a knife

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Now who is pulling numbers from their a$$? You can expect radar detection range, in real life, to be from roughly 0-200km in a jammed environment. The lower end is less likely but was demonstrated by Su30MKIs vs F15C.

F-15 in these exercises only have MC radar, thus they are alot more vulnerable to jamming compared to AESA radar
Most common method used to decoy missiles, enemy radar is deceptive jamming (or DRFM) which have been used widely on many jammer such as ALQ-211, ALQ-184, ALQ-214. Some people (I.e. Kopp and Goon) see as the end-all in air-air warfare. However, repeater jamming depends on picking up the radar emissions of the missile/aircraft – if the ESM doesn’t detect the radar and recognize it (such as if the radar is AESA LPI set, APG-79, APG-80, APG-81.. etc ), it doesn’t have any signal to repeat back to the receiver, and so it can’t create false targets.

For DRFM to work, it has to detect a signal (radar pulse or pulses) to memorize and to generate the false targets. LPI radar on the other hand tries to hide the real radar signal in noise to counter that. The problem for jammer is that it doesn’t know what kind of signal the radar is sending (mismatched filtering), but the radar of course does (matched filtering). This is not a problem with relatively simple radars as the signals they send are also simple and do not change. So once the signal is detected, it can be stored and easily used against the radar.

Modern LPI radar on the other hand does a lot of things to make things very difficult for EW systems. They send complex waveforms that is like noise and can only be made sense with filtering. The radar uses matched filtering as it knows exactly the characteristics of the radar signals it has sent (like frequency, PRF, modulation, pulse width). The EW receiver of course does not and must only guess the parameters and thus uses mismatched filtering. Even if the LPI signal is detected and stored, it is not that useful as the radar has already changed the signal parameters and the stored signal will not even give the radar extra work as it would not match the changed filters. AESA sets add the challenge of being able to quickly switch between every parameter at a moment’s notice and very randomly, which will put the jammer behind the radar

Jamming is likewise much more difficult against an AESA. Traditionally, jammers have operated by determining the operating frequency of the radar and then broadcasting a signal on it to confuse the receiver as to which is the “real” pulse and which is the jammer’s. This technique works as long as the radar system cannot easily change its operating frequency. When the transmitters were based on klystron tubes this was generally true, and radars, especially airborne ones, had only a few frequencies to choose among. A jammer could listen to those possible frequencies and select the one to be used to jam.
Most radars using modern electronics are capable of changing their operating frequency with every pulse. An AESA has the additional capability of spreading its frequencies across a wide band even in a single pulse, which equates to lowering the emission power, making jammers much less effective. Although it is possible to send out broadband white noise against all the possible frequencies, this means the amount of energy being sent at any one frequency is much lower, reducing its effectiveness

http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/aesa_radar

AESA radar characteristics such as random scan pattern, random frequency, random PRF all make it very resistance to DFRM deceptive jamming.

In general, high PRF radars are more resistant to ECM because their average power is greater. Changing the PRF in a random fashion is an effective counter to deception because deception ECM depends on predictability of the radar. However, because PRF is related to the basic timing of the radar, this technique results in additional complexity and expense. Random PRF has been employed as a very effective ECCM feature in some radars for many years and has the additional benefit of elimination of MTI radar blind speeds.

Scan pattern. The radar scan pattern can influence ECCM capability because it influences the amount of energy directed toward the radar target. An active tracking phased-array radar is quite ECM resistant because of its ability to rapidly scan its radar beam in a random fashion than in the regular circular or sector scan pattern of conventional radars. This irregular beam positioning would give the opposing ECM system little or no warning and make it impossible to predict where and when to transmit false signals. In systems where scanning is performed in the receiver rather than in the transmitted beam, such as those mentioned in the section on angle deception, ECM has no direct access to the radar scan pattern and thus has difficulty using that information to interfere with the radar system operation.

Frequency. Frequency agility is a significant ECCM design feature. Using components such as frequency synthesizers (something like those employed in radio scanners) instead of conventional crystal-controlled oscillators, some radars are able to change frequency within one pulse repetition time (PRT). This makes deception and jamming very difficult. The radar can be designed to change frequency automatically within a certain range, or this can be done manually.

http://fas.org/man/dod-101/navy/docs/fun/part11.htm

it was revealed by the RAAF a few months back in testimony to the Australian Parliament that DRFM jammers can be defeated easily by AESA radar

Air Marshal Brown: I think if you have a look around on an F16 sometimes that is not wonderful either. But getting back to the situational awareness, the ability to actually have that data fusion that the aeroplane has makes an incredible difference to how you perform in combat. I saw it first hand on a Red Flag mission in an F15D against a series of fifth-generation F22s. We were actually in the red air. In five engagements we never knew who had hit us and we never even saw the other aeroplane at any one particular time. That is a current fourth-generation aeroplane.
The data fusion in the stealth makes such a difference to your overall situational awareness it is quite incredible. After that particular mission I went back and had a look at the tapes on the F22, and the difference in the situational awareness in our two cockpits was just so fundamentally different. That is the key to fifth-generation. That is where I have trouble with the APA analysis. They tend to go down particular paths in the aeroplane, whether it is turn rate performance or acceleration. These are all important factors, but it is a combination of what you have actually got in the jet and the situational awareness that is resident in the cockpit of a fifth-generation aeroplane that makes the fundamental difference…

To me that is key: it is not only stealth; it is the combination of the EOS and the radar to be able to build a comprehensive picture. In that engagement I talked about at Nellis, in Red Flag, the ability to be in a cockpit with a God’s-eye view of what is going on in the world was such an advantage over a fourth-generation fighter—and arguably one of the best fourth-generation fighters in existence, the F15. But even with a DRFM jamming pipe, we still had no chance in those particular engagements. And at no time did any of the performance characteristics that you are talking about have any relevance to those five engagements .

http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22committees%2Fcommjnt%2Ffb49a6a2-5080-4c72-a379-e4fd10cc710a%2F0002%22

Another kind of jamming that work well even again the most sophisticated AESA radar are broadband noise jamming, because it is basically just like blind enemy receiver with overwhelming noise signal ( think of it like shinning a very bright light at some one so they cant see), however stealth fighter have significant advantage in this case due to their tiny RCS


http://www.rfcafe.com/references/electrical/ew-radar-handbook/radar-cross-section.htm

IRST in semi decent contitions can spot and track targets from 40-90km depending on aspect ratio and the potential use of afterburners.

according to Typhoon pilot their PIRATE can detect a supercruise F-22 from 50 km ( head on)

Assuming the pilots are retards flying at low alt from the moment they leave the tarmac.

how do they know when to flying low though ? if they flying high from the start then they would be detected from very far away

And that goes both ways. Shooting a target at low alt (as I took as an example for the ingress only) will reduce the range of the aggressors missiles as well.

Missiles launched from higher altitude can trade potential energy for more kinetic energy while the one launched from aircraft fly at low altitude will have to fight again gravity so they may not even able to reach target
the AMRAAM-ER for example is an improvement of AMRAAM with more than 4 times the range ( due to much bigger size, actually an ESSM fitted with the guidance section from the AIM-120) , when launched from ground, it’s ceiling is only 45k ft
i really cant imagine how a MICA or AIM-120 launched from sea level can reach an F-35 crusing at 40K ft let alone have enough energy to turn, , especially when considering that air at sea level is very thick, motor burn time is around 5-6 secs, thus missiles launched from sea level cant accelerate to speed as fast as the one launched at high – medium altitude , thus their ability to climb will be worse ( it easier for a missiles launched from 40K ft to zoom climb to 60K ft than the one launched from sea level to climb to 20Kft)

Also, flying low does shorten the radar detection range because of the amount of clutter.

agree, but clutter doesn’t shorten radar range as much as a delicate VLO design

Either you gain the advantage of a surprise atack (in which case energy state doesnt matter since the climb is over in less than a minute) or you go in at high altitude with good energy state and excellent range potential.

how exactly to you have surprised attack though? , do you think normal aircraft will suddenly gain radar detection range advantage again stealth fighter just because they flying low?
and iam pretty sure fighter can launch most of their missiles in a few seconds, so 1 minutes climbing is still too much time

Lets see how often that has happened….

The last incident was a Mirage in 1995. Thats like what, 20 years ago? I think the risk is acceptable. Sure, there have been some propeller aircrafts and helicopters as well but no fast jets.

last jet shot down by dogfight is even older than that

In theory the F35 is perfect, assuming that BVR missiles can’t be jammed.

This will motivate operational costs (including capital costs) of 2-3 times that of the competition.

If the missiles had a Pk of over 50% against jamming targets then it’s all good.

But in reality, just looking at whats out there now, the base Pk is less than 50% in a jammed environment. With systems like BriteCloud the missile also has multiple possible targets to choose from + much clutter. Since a normal fighter jet has a capacity of 36 stations with BriteCloud + 36 stations with chaffs + towed decoys one can assume that the missile will face at least 4 targets (3 decoys + actual target).

In the absolute best case scenario the missile will have a Pk of 0.5 x 4 = 0.125 or 12.5%. In reality this is probably optimistic if the enemy has modern jammers. 12,5% is the Pk for the correct target in this case.

To add an extra layer we could also assume IRIS-T being used as a hard-kill countermeasure (it has the capability, but the actual performance is not known). This would be a last resort but it is still in the mix…

Most AAM also have ECCM capabilities themselves so the effectiveness of BriteCloud again Meteor, AIM-120D is also questionable, another thing is AAM can be supported by the launching aircraft through data link and it is alot harder to jam the aircraft radar compared to a missiles especially if that aircraft have AESA radar
AAM will also have AESA radar seeker in future making it much harder to jam them ( from what i know, Russian already making prototype of AESA seeker for R-77, Japan cooperate with MBDA to make a new version of Meteor with AESA seeker for their F-35)
And there is nothing say that future long range AAM cant have IIR seeker, we already have a few of them like MICA IR, NCADE, R-27 IR… etc, Israel also have a programme to convert their Sturner SAM to AAM, stuner have both EO and RF sensor.
P/s : i think most on battlefield most soldiers would prefer to have a gun than a bullet proof vest and a knife