Seems we are progressing. This is not totally the same though, because what I was talking about is correcting the raw return signal by broadcasting corrections to the effect of either compressing or pulling that signal by combination of the 2. In a sense reconstructing the desired signal from the raw return to mimic return from the ground

What you said make no sense xman
you can send return all you want but you cant erase the original reflected signal , if you send return mimic the ground reflection then that return will be filter out , but the return echo from your aircraft will still be there
Think about it :
enemy radar send out frequency F
due to doppler shift effect :
the frequency of echo from the ground is F1
the frequency of echo from enemy aircraft is F2 ( an be anything that # F1 )
enemy radar , since they know the speed of their aircraft , will know what F1 is , and filter them out , if your jammer sending out F1 then that signal will be filter out too

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.But anyway I do not think the counter measures listed here can truly apply. Random PRF would work against legacy system ,but I doubt it would affect significantly a system with multi-channel receivers. Cross checking in the sea of signals with a range varying barely a 100 meter and which can be manipulated as well ,by modeling feed back to mimic the ground returns , all in all it does not seem obvious.

when i say range channel , i didnt mean the altitude of Rafale , i mean the distance it cover ,
for example : a rafale moving at mach 1 will cover 338 meter in one second , while the ground is stationary , and again , if your jammer send back signal that have doppler shift like the ground then that signal will be filter out , not the reflection from aircraft

also the point of random PRF is that radar will know what waveform it send out , and change it very fast , allow it to ignore signal that doesnt match it’s waveform :angel:

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Besides, while I do not doubt counter measure exist, and that jamming can be ultimately detected, the issue is that one as to know it is jammed or where to look for, which in this case is looking for a needle in a very big haystack. It would require the radar or a subsystem to divert critical resources to focus on a particular sector and analyze the raw signals which the filters normally expunged .

when you turn on your jammer , enemy will know your direction by using their RWR ( they dont know the range but they will know the direction , because a jammer is basically a transmitter , just like a radar

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AESA was a game changer, it effectively brought the bar too high for legacy jammers and RWR to cope with it. But the balance has swung , and while it remains challenging ,the technology have adapted. The see all un-detectable that can’t be jammed , which AESA was and still is for legacy system ,but which unlike some would like to still believe, is no longer against more recent system.

Can you show me where they say random PRF , random scan pattern , frequency agility are no longer effective ECCM method ?

Expert also agree that changing PFR , scan pattern , frequency randomly is very effective ECCM method again deceptive jammer

In general, high PRF radars are more resistant to ECM because their average power is greater. Changing the PRF in a random fashion is an effective counter to deception because deception ECM depends on predictability of the radar. However, because PRF is related to the basic timing of the radar, this technique results in additional complexity and expense. Random PRF has been employed as a very effective ECCM feature in some radars for many years and has the additional benefit of elimination of MTI radar blind speeds.

Scan pattern. The radar scan pattern can influence ECCM capability because it influences the amount of energy directed toward the radar target. An active tracking phased-array radar is quite ECM resistant because of its ability to rapidly scan its radar beam in a random fashion than in the regular circular or sector scan pattern of conventional radars. This irregular beam positioning would give the opposing ECM system little or no warning and make it impossible to predict where and when to transmit false signals. In systems where scanning is performed in the receiver rather than in the transmitted beam, such as those mentioned in the section on angle deception, ECM has no direct access to the radar scan pattern and thus has difficulty using that information to interfere with the radar system operation.

Frequency. Frequency agility is a significant ECCM design feature. Using components such as frequency synthesizers (something like those employed in radio scanners) instead of conventional crystal-controlled oscillators, some radars are able to change frequency within one pulse repetition time (PRT). This makes deception and jamming very difficult. The radar can be designed to change frequency automatically within a certain range, or this can be done manually.

http://fas.org/man/dod-101/navy/docs/fun/part11.htm

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I tend to give credit to the French when it comes to ECM, since they earned a quiet good reputation in that domain and invested tremendously and consistently (relative to the country) on “active stealth / jamming” even before spectra. Hence I would at minimal give them the credit of a doubt when it comes to effectively DRFM jam from the clutter an AESA radar.

USA also have experience in jamming , DRFM , look down/shotdown radar , and AESA radar for a really long time , arguable much longer than France

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Did i say the oppposite? But the idea is break kill chain. And a radar must recognize his own signal returns from clutter. To do so he uses headers. These headers can be recorded and used. Exacly like your GPS is recognizing GPS signals (around 20 watts…

radar is not the only one have to recognize signal from clutter , the ESM system have to as well ( think about it , when the AESA radar scan the ground there will be reflected signal every where , thus Spectra will have to distinguish these signal from the real radar , otherwise it will overload itself try to jam everything around it )

Unlike the radar, which knows which direction it is sending its signal, the receiver simply gets a pulse of energy and has to interpret it. Since the radio spectrum is filled with noise, the receiver’s signal is integrated over a short period of time, making periodic sources like a radar add up and stand out over the random background. The rough direction can be calculated using a rotating antenna, or similar passive array using phase or amplitude comparison. Typically RWRs store the detected pulses for a short period of time, and compare their broadcast frequency and pulse repetition frequency against a database of known radars. The direction to the source is normally combined with symbology indicating the likely purpose of the radar – airborne early warning, surface to air missile, etc.
This technique is much less useful against AESA radars.

http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/aesa_radar

also , while the header you say can be recorded , and overtime be used to detect AESA radar , the radar can away use new waveform while the ESM system will have to play catch up

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Nothing is perfect of course, but like saying stealth is useless, saying AESA are jamming prone is a bit excessive.

i didnt say AESA are immune to jamming , i say deceptive jamming are going to be highly ineffective again them , thus noise jamming should be used

Ok then . Very good . Let say i agree with all what you say. It’s wonderful. You are very knowledgeable peoples.
Now PLEASE , would you start your own low level strike vs hi level strike thread ? And leave the Rafale News thread alone ?

they made Rafale New discussion XVI thread already , why you bother? :confused:
Not like i go to that thread

Well let’s try to analyse a bit your list. We were talking about the F35 that for me is not only a stealth fighter. It is a fighter that sacrifice a lots of capabilities to be stealth. So from your list, which one are developing an aircraft that has as many constraint that th F 35? I don’t see a lot. The T50 is not sacrificing the basics for stealth.

1) there are 3 them are developing stealth fighter, the rest are just bought stealth fighter from countries developed them, so up until now the list of next generation stealth fighter that will be produced are : F-22, PAK-FA, J-20, J-31
F-22 kinematic performance are known, and we know that it better than F-35, but how can you be sure J-20, J-31, PAK-FA will all have better kinematic and signature performance than F-35 rather than the opposite ?

2) every aircraft is the matter of compromise , trade off have to be made to make aircraft suitable for the mission it doing . if you think something is good at every aspect then you are just delusional. For example : F-16 vs F-15 , F-16 design give it low RCS and visual signature along with good acceleration and sustain turn rate especially at low altitude, By contrast the big F-15 have significant advantage in combat range, weapon load, top speed, radar range, acceleration and Agility at high altitude .. etc. For different mission, different criteria are needed

3) Now back to the T-50, let assumed it will have much better kinematic performance compared to F-35, how do you know it’s LO characteristics still equal to F-35? . ( there isn’t even any info regarding J-20 and J-31 to assume they have better kinematic compared to F-35)

4) If stealth wasn’t important they could have easily design F-22 and T-50 with even better kinematic characteristics

Then for the one that purchase the plane. How much from your list have the choice ? Not a lot. They purchased the F 35 not because it is good, not because it is late and so obsolet, not because it is expensive, but only because it is American that is the case for Canada, Turkey, Netherlands, Australia, Israel, South Korea, Japan, UK
.

Well ok, let say they buy the F-35 only because it is from America not because it is stealthy . Why didn’t they buy the F-15K instead?. In term of kinematic characteristics F-15K can fly faster, accelerate faster, carrying more weapon, fly alot further, fly higher, more agile carrying heavy load. In term of sensor, F-15 can carry bigger radar , bigger ECM. , If stealth wasn’t important they could have easily choose it instead! why didn’t they?

Agree, but.
Thats where the notion of repetitive patterns is coming in (remember when i said not 1000 different wavelengths?)
Patterns can be recorded and compared using massive parallel correlators…

the pattern are random thus record them wouldn’t help ( i dont think it hard to program a AESA to choose randomly a frequency from 8.001 Ghz to 11.999 Ghz every time it transmitting)
Patterns are also random, and let be real, even if it isn’t perfectly random, and it have a certain pattern, radar still have the advantage of knowing exactly what coding, frequency, waveforms that it use , while the RWR will have to solve problem to figure out. Which is why i said deceptive jamming gonna be highly ineffective again AESA radar, and noise jammer should be used in such case. It also the reason why delicated jammer like NGJ, ALQ-99 required very high transmitting power, they are noise jammer

mig 31 bm,

That’s wrong,

Nowadays converting a anagogic signal into a digital one is very fast. You don’t necessarly need a database which will be used for simpler more predictable threats.
This require less processing than the radar which has to deal with multiple wavelenghth plus the target which needs to be tracked.

a data based are used, because otherwise the jammer will overload itself trying to retransmitted everything it received from background noise
it doesn’t matter how fast you can converting a analogue signal to digital one, you still have to analyse it, there is no way around it, think about it, what is the difference between a deceptive jammer and a noise jammer? , a deceptive jammer try to fool enemy’s radar into bealiving the jamming signal is the reflected signal while still created false information in the jamming signal
both side will have to deal with multiple wavelength, coding and random scan pattern , PRF but the radar side know exactly what it send out, thus it doesn’t have to waste time trying to separate signal from noise, the tracking of target required range, velocity the first are calculated by taking : speed multiple with time, the second are calculated by looking at the doppler shift which are relatively simple

you are trying to argue that a ECM system which doesn’t know the frequency, scan pattern, PRF rate, waveforms, coding.. etc from the start, can somehow magically analysis, modify, and retransmitted enemy radat signal faster than the reflected signal can come back to the radar source, that is simply nonsense, it like saying it easier for someone to guess the password than for the owner to know his own password

I simply don’t care about EADS talking down or not, this is not the issue. You can take 50 Km instead of 59 Km if you want…Fact is if a E-scan radar on a fighter jet is able to track an F35 at such distance (60 or 50Km I don’t care) the a ground based radar with 10 times or more the amount of modules and a much higher power supply and processing power will be able to track an F35 HUNDREDS of kilometers away. Period.

You havenot shown anything to support your assessment that grounds radar will be able to track F-35 hundreds of kilometer away
Smart-L a very big sea based radar , can only detect target with RCS = 0.001 m2 from 65 km , and to double range you have to increase power by 16 times 😉
not to mention Stealth aircraft like F-35 can jam enemy’s radar by their APG-81 or NGJ as well , and as we already know , stealth make jamming significantly more effective

Stealth was a silver bullet in the 90’s but this period is gone. Evolution in radar technology and other anti stealth techniques suddenly makes that metal golf or baseball ball visible at long ranges. Detection or tracking, a LO aircraft will be detected and engaged at long ranges nowadays and in the coming years.

Stealthy UCAVs can claim to achieve much higher all around stealth (Neuron, Taranis, X47 etc…) and gain some time before radar technology continues to evolve. This is the reason for the French air Force to combine rafales with stealth UCAV in the future around 2025-2030.

In the 2020’s F35 survivability against modern AESA GaN ground based radar will have nothing exceptional and won’t survive to this kind of threat. Back to basics and back to low level !

So USA, Russia, UK, China, India, Japan, south Korea , Israel , Canada, Australia, Netherlands,Turkey, Italy are all idiotic since they spend so much money develop or buying stealth aircraft ? :highly_amused:
only the France get it right 😉

You really don’t get it, do you..

I have (and many people as well) explained well enough how terrain following ops in Rafale and to a lesser extent 2000, was not comparable to terrain following ops on Tornado and even F-15. Comparing it to the F-105 shows well your bad faith and dishonesty.

I won’t loose more time explaining something to someone who do not wish to hear. I suggest Eagle and other to do the same, we brought enough evidence and sources to support our point of view – whether he reads it or not is up to him.

The point is almost any fight can fly at low altitude , that not a hard thing for them to do ,the most you have to do is improve the radar software a little bit . . And your explanation are also quite confusing in some part : for example when you say F-111 is only limited to mach 1.3 at low altitude, do you really think Rafale can do better with 6 AASM ?
Btw do you have any source to show that Rafale can fly at lower altitude than F-15E and F-16 ?
Btw The F-16 Block 60 can do automated terrain following as low as 100 ft,

As with all F-16s since the Block 15, the Block 60 has a programmable data transfer cartridge (DTC). While the physical size of the DTC has not changed over the years, its memory capacity has increased dramatically. In addition to communications and route information, for example, it can also hold a digital terrain elevation database (DTED). The DTED for an operational area is a powerful tool that provides terrain elevation and resultant ground clearance when combined with aircraft altitude.

For low-altitude ingress, the aircraft has two terrain-following (TF) modes. One, database terrain following (DBTF), uses the DTED to assure terrain clearance. The other, radar terrain following (RTF), uses the APG-80 to establish terrain separation. The pilot can select which TF mode he wants to use, and altitudes from 100ft (30m) to 1,000ft can be selected and flown manually or hands off.

Of the two modes, DBTF has several advantages over RTF. First, it is not limited by the radar’s physical look-angle capability. Even mildly aggressive manoeuvres at low altitude can move the aircraft’s projected flight path outside the radar’s field of view. DBTF “sees” all the terrain around the aircraft, allowing for more aggressive manoeuvring during terrain-following ingress to the target.

A reduced radio-frequency signature is another benefit of DBTF operations. Since the radar is not required to assure terrain clearance, the Block 60 is less likely to give away its position by its own radar emissions. But it should not be construed that DBTF will be the pilot’s mode of choice. Database terrain following lives in a virtual world, where inaccurate or incomplete terrain data could cause real problems. One large advantage RTF has over DBTF is reality versus virtual reality. RTF uses the actual ground, as sensed by the radar, to compute terrain clearance. In some cases, pilots may be willing to be a bit less stealthy to be more assured of avoiding the ground.

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/flight-test-lockheed-martin-f-16ef-block-60-bridging-the-174510/

a big LOL for the figures. :highly_amused::highly_amused:

Now back to reality :
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/10/205_97236.html

EADS = European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company , so wouldnt be a surprise if he talk down the F-35 a bit ( in fact he got the number for Apg-81 count wrong as well , it is 1676 rather than 1400

and as i have explained , that number is detection range , in perfect condition , no jamming , clutter ..etc

By contrast modern ground based radar will be able to pick up FR35 or F22 HUNDREDS of kilometers away.

Smart-L a very big radar , can only detect target with RCS = 0.001 m2 from 65 km , and to double range you have to increase power by 16 times
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=4S3h8j_NEmkC&pg=PA263&lpg=PA263&dq=smart-L+stealth+missile+km&source=bl&ots=hJRyOS_ZfZ&sig=RqlhsrbEaJmGJ5A4JLFwoLFL8DA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Ejn2U7nkLujZ0QXXo4Bw&ved=0CDQQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=smart-L%20stealth%20missile%20km&f=false
and stealth also make jamming significantly more effective

Not to mention other counter stealth techniques already in service based on UHF.

low band radar are not accurate enough for weapon guide , and actually , low band radar allow over horizon detection aspect , so they also negate Rafale capability

That’s why the idea of flying at medium or high altitudes is equal to death even for LO aircrafts. Only UCAV “could” claim to be survivable enough and this remain to be seen.

how much stealthier a UCAV compared to F-35 that it can change situation from being wiped out to survivable ?

Flying low remain a perfectly valid tactic. Risky but at least you have a chance of success unlike the F35 flying at medium or high altitudes.

oh so a low flying Rafale that can be easily detected by AWACs , enemy fighter , vulnerable to threat from ground SAM , AA cannon is a valid tactic , but F35 flying at medium or high altitudes suddently have no change of success if being detected