The draw down of the GR9 training pipeline notwithstanding Wittering, and therefore 20sqdn, still make most sense as the F35 home and OCU. That is unless the RAF is planning to shift its expeditionary logistics set up somewhere else?. Otherwise the sense in colocating the services most deployable squadrons alongside their logistics elements is manifest!.

The GR9 training piepline hasn’t drawn down, you misunderstand me. 20(R) sqn has gone, the Harrier training sqn is now 4(R) sqn formerly IV(AC)sqn. The way things are going, the next sqn to train pilots for carrier ops will be 899NAS once more…;)

Because if we wanted a little STOVL carrier or an LPA then we would have ordered one. We didn’t need an LPA because we have excessive maratime lift with the Ocean, Albion, & Bay class. What we lacked was the ability to project airpower, we went for a design capable of supporting 40 aircraft rather than 20, with a large flight decks with deck edge lifts so flight ops are not interupted and aircraft can be refuelled and rearmed around the deck edge rather than having tio be returned to the hanger as they are on smaller STOVL carriers.

Whilst broadly in agreement, it should be noted that carrier aircraft are bever refuelled or rearmed in the hangar deck whatever the size of the ship. It is always done on deck for safety reasons. Aircraft only travel on the lifts when defuelled and disarmed, and only go down to the hanagr deck for maintenance reasons (so when calculating if a particular aircraft can be carried by a particular ship’s lift, as well as length and width empty weight of the aircraft should be taken into account, not MTOW). Usually between sorties the aircraft remain on deck, so deck parking space is at a premium hence the very large flight decks of the CVF. Smaller carrier designs such as JCI and Cavour would benefit immensely from deck extending sponsons in this respect…

I rather suspect the difference in capacity between Hermes & Invincible during the Falklands War probably had some influence on thier requirements, where the larger hanger and flightdeck of hermes was used to the maximum effect to sustain air power over the battlespace.
G

The difference in capacity was very telling, Hermes was allocated the ‘Strike’ carrier role in 82 whilst Invincible was primarily ‘Air Defence’. Invincible operated about 10 Shars (801NAS) over the course of the operation and Hermes about 12 Shars (800NAS) alongside a Sea King sqn each (802 and 826 respectively), but Hermes had the space to also accomodate a sqn of Jungly Sea King HC4s (846 IIRC, until they went ashore after the San Carlos landings) a sgn of about 10 RAF harrier GR3s (1 sqn), a flight of about five Wessex HU5s (again up until the landings, some remained for ship to ship work) and a cople of Lynxes for decoy and utility work. Plus a large number of Booties prior to the landings! And the most of the press core! An Invincible just could not cope.

When those involved talk about losing a carrier being catastrophe, they really mean losing Hermes. Had Invincible been taken out, provided her aircraft could be launched across to Hermes she could have coped for a while at leastand would have to hang on until Illustrious arrived (not an appealling prospect, but the RN has a long history of making do and exceeding expectations). If Hermes had been lost finding space for her aircraft (those not destroyed on deck) would have been much more difficult.

Interesting – but I suppose if the F/A-18 E/F was in RN service it would have a different name like FRS18 Sea Hornet?!?

Under UK military aircraft designations it would be referred to as the Hornet FA mk1, but would commonly be known as the F/A-18E/F

Towards the end of Ark’s life her Phantom and Buccaneers when not on board went to RAF stations that opperated the same type. The Phantoms of 892 went to the RAF QRA North at Leuchars and the Buccs of 809 to RAF Honington. Many of the aircrew were RAF on tour with naval squadron by this stage as RN aircrew recruiting had been drastically run down post 1966.

By the end of her life, Ark’s FJ sqns were reckoned to be composed 50:50 FAA/RAF, as the aircraft were to be issued to RAF sqns afterwards it made sense to have an adequately sized pool of light blue pilots and WSOs to transfer with the aircraft. Similarly it made sense to retain a pool of RN pilots to transfer to the Sea Harrier sqns due to form in tthe next couple of years; for examples in the Falklands war the three frontline sqn COs had all served aboard Ark Royal.

800NAS was commanded by Lt Cmdr Andy Auld RN, a former F-4 driver from 892NAS, likewise 801NAS was commanded by Lt Cmdr Nigel ‘Sharkey’ Ward RN also ex-892. 809NAS, formed to reinforce the other two sqns was commanded by Lt Cmdr Tim Gedge RN, appropriately a former Buccaneer pilot with 809NAS in it’s previous incarnation.

RAF pilots and crews have served exchange tours with the FAA since before WW2, and indeed all the SHAR sqns have had a light blue presence throughout their history, though much smaller than the situation in the 70s.

Air Tanker can be canned, but the RAF would still need Tankers, so it might be a bit cheaper, but not by too much.

Air tanker can be covered as it always has been, not by buying ‘gold plated’ new airliners custom built for the role but by buying second hand airliners and converting them. Instead of the current FSTA £14Billion PFI (and you are forbidden from using anything else inthe tanker role such as A400Ms…) find some low mileage second hand Airbus’s sitting in the Mojave desert and issue them to the existing sqns and make use of the existing infrastructure. Could be done for less than £2billion IMHO. The ‘Black Hole’ is actually £3.7Billion a year over ten years, which is a better figure to work with rather then £37Billion which is constantly thrown about. Unless to match it we should start quoting the defence budget as say £360Billion over ten years (ballpark figure).

So bin FRES and make do with existing assets upgraded where possible (saving £15Billion), bin FSTA ans substitue second hand aircraft operated by the RAF (saving £12Billion), bin GR4 early (saving £7Billion), lose the C-130Ks early (saving pennies in reality but the politicians don’t know that) and perhaps chop the T42s early too (mothballed, not scrapped just in case…) and the ‘Black Hole’ is well on the way to being plugged! SEEMPLES!;):D

Liger: Interesting post, couple of points though;

Merlin HC3 /3A, Likely to become HC4 once marinised rather than HM3 as the ‘M’ in HM stands for Maritime Patrol, basically ASW and the ‘Junglies’ don’t do that. The ‘C’ in HC is for Cargo, including Booties, as it would be hard to call them passengers! The modifications needed to navalise the Mk3 Merlins are sufficient to warrant a new mark number.

The ASaC sqns: Currently the two frontline sqns 854NAS and 857NAS operate with three helos each, 849NAS the OCU has about four in use for training and the remainder of the 13 strong fleet are in maintenance/trials/storage. A minimum of 10 airframes are required to sustain the sqns and I would hope these were new build, though there are rumours that up to ten of the HC3s will be used instead reducing the numbers available for Commando duties, and yet under current planning there will be eight spare HM1 airframes left over from the HM2 upgrade which would be ideal for ASaC conversion.

Also the HM1 Merlin sqns are normally equipped with around six Merlins instead of the 9 Sea Kings previously deployed (on the carriers), in part a reflection of the superior capabilities of the Merlin over the Sea King but also due to budget cuts. So 814NAS and 820NAS (the two sqns normally allocated to the carrier air groups) will generally have six rather than nine, freeing up six airframes from your calculations. There will be a few other wrinkles to iron out as well I expect, and with overall numbers so small it could lead to some different conclusions…;)

It is a scary standard practice on a carrier.

You have to remember that the difference between SRVL and CTOL recovery is to do with the speed; a CTOL aircraft approaching the wires will hit the deck about 130 KIA whereas a STOVL aircraft making a SRVL will be coming in at more like 50 KIA. Stopping using brake alone with possibly a small degree of forward thrust from the engine/lift fan becomes a much safer option. Modern weapons are too expensive to simply ditch before returning to the deck and extending engine life given the high costs of these as well should make a significant difference to running costs, another important factor in these times.

Some of the numbers are a little off, and should read:

HMS Ark Royal:
1962-1963: 16 Scimitar F1 (2×8 aircraft sqns); 12 Sea Vixen FAW1; 4 Gannet AEW3; 8 Wessex HAS1; 1 Whirlwind HAR5
This is still mainly a “Strike” air wing, as the Wessex doesn’t have the range or “on-station” endurance of the Gannet.

1970-1973: 14 Buccaneer S2 (10xS2D ‘Strikers’, 2xS2C ‘recce birds’ and 2xS2C ‘buddy tankers’ (coded 020-036 with gaps to make the sqn look bigger!); 12 Phantom FG1 (coded 001-014 again with the odd gap); 4 Gannet AEW3 (coded 041-044), 1 Gannet COD4 (coded 040); 6 Sea King HAS1 (coded 050-055); 2 Wessex HAS1 (SAR, coded 046-047)

After 1973 the COD4 was replaced by a single extra Sea King HAS1 (also coded 040).
There were two Wessex SAR helos embarked, nicknamed ‘Make’ and ‘Mend’

HMS Hermes
1981: 5 Sea Harrier FRS1; 9 Sea King HAS1, The same air group as intended for the Invincible class (for which she was a ‘place holder’), though this was far below her capacity and she could have simltaneously embarked a sqn of ‘Junglies’ and a Cmdo force. Indeed this was done in excercises in 1983. In april 82 she sailed for the South Atlantic with her SHAR sqn reinforced to it’s ‘Wartime strength’ of 12 aircraft (proving the RN never seriously contemplated going to war with just 5 SHARS).

In British military context, Strike means Nuclear capable, hence the Bucc’s ‘S’ designation, and the Sea Harrier’s ‘FRS’ (Fighter/Recconaisance/Strike). The Phantom was also Nuclear capable, but recieved the FG (Fighter/Ground Attack) designation to conceal this (not very well though!).