Returning to the topic, does anyone know whether or not Ark Royal could have been kept in service a little longer ie 1980 or beyond? She wasn’t in the best condition, increasingly had to rely on RAF fixed-wing pilots and they kept Eagle around in Plymouth waters as a floating spares store. However the first book I bought on the FAA was called funnily enough ‘The Fleet Air Arm A Pictorial History’ by Reginald Longstaff. I’ve no idea whether there were subsequent editions but the book was written and published pre-Falklands with a picture of a Sea Harrier F/1 and HMS Invincible on the cover. Anyway in the section titled ‘Carriers and Commando Ships’ the Author claims that as a result of her 1973/74 refit the ship was capable of remaining in service until the end of the 1980s.

Ark Royal’s machinery was not completley overhauled during her 67-70 refit to the same degree as Eagle’s during her 59-64 refit ( three years versus five years, something had to give. In Ark’s case it meant no time to install the four Sea Cat launchers, rebuild the island as completely as Eagle’s and the boilers and engines were given a more modest overhaul). The following refits were just ordinary maintenance after that. between 66 and 69 the RN intended her to remain in service alongside Eagle until around 1980 with her sister lasting into the mid 80s at least. They were hoping a change of government in 1970 would reinstate the new construction program, but as usual the Tories broke their promise and continued with Labour’s policies. Ted Anson, Ark’s last commanding officer, has said in interviews that Ark could have been retained in service if an emergency arose around 78-79, and told his officers to retain a small supply of catapult bridles just in case. The rest of the stock were to be used up in normal ops in the last few months of service (by not connecting them to the bridle catcher system so they would be lost into the sea after launch) so that the crew would not have to unload large numbers of them when the ship decommissioned. The retained supply would be enough to cover ops until a new supply could be manufactured. For any service beyond 79 she would have needed another major refit (at least a year in dock). Ark’s engines had never been reliable, and she had been run hard early in her career in hot and humid conditions out in the far east, so was ‘higher mileage’ than her age would suggest.

After the Healy axe of 66 the FAAs aircrew training program was wound down and a redundancy program brought in. Some pilot and observer training did continue but at a very reduced numerical level. By the 70s this meant that RAF officers were seconded to 892, 809 and 849B NAS to fill the billets. by 1978 about half the air group were RAF, and as the aircraft were to transfer to that service it eased the transition. The remaining FAA aircrew mostly transferred to the Sea Harrier sqns about to form in 1980 if they weren’t due for promotion to desk jobs or sea going billets. For example, ‘Sharkey’ Ward, CO of 801 NAS aboard Invincible in the Falklands had been senior pilot on 892 NAS for several years, whilst Lt Cmdr Tim Gedge who commanded the reformed 809 NAS during the Falklands campaign had previously been a Buccaneer pilot (ironically with 809 NAS in it’s previous incarnation).

I could say the same of you, but thus far I have shown more respect. In war you fight to win, and if you put your forces at a disadvantage compared to your opponents, then you have as good as lost before the fighting starts. In Naval Warfare, a Navy with carriers has always historically prevailled over one that has none. To go into battle without organic air cover is suicidal. Yet you seem to imly air cover is an optional extravagence, and anything short of a Nimitz not worth bothering with? And yet… history says otherwise. The best is always the enemy of good enough, and good enough is infinitely preferrable to nothing at all.

You criticize the idea of a single Essex taking the place of Melbourne and Sydney because the number of platforms is halved, but the Australian Government had already decided to reduce the number of platforms to just one in the 70s, so exchanging Melbourne for the notional Essex allows the capability Sydney brought to be retained within the fleet. Fixed wing carriers often re roled to transport status when required without specialist facilities. An Essex in RAN service with a small air group would have plenty of space aboard to devote to the troop facilities Sydney had, and such a ship would be demonstrably much more valuable from a political POV. This could have strengthened the case for aquiring a replacement vessel, akin to the Canberra class vessels on the table now.

If you wish to send personal abuse please do so by PM, if you wish to rebutt arguments then please do so by presenting a coherent counter argument.

I think you are all getting your dates a bit mixed up. The RN Essex deal was on the table in 1966, and during this period was also being considered by the RAN. In the 1960s the manpower issue for the RAN was somewhat different fro the early 80s, because at that time the RAN was operating two carriers, HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Sydney. Although the latter was operating as a troop transport-cum-commando carrier, she still required almost as many men to crew her as Melbourne. So there are the extra crewmen required to operate an Essex, or at least the gap has been mostly bridged. Also the figures for manning an Essex cover the needs of a full sized air group, and the RAN would have been operating far fewer aircraft in peacetime (her crew would have appreciated the extra elbow room!) and much of the accomodation could have been given over to temporary troop quarters so that she could act as Sydney’s replacement as well as Melbournes. By the 1980s none of the Essex class retained in reserve in the US were viable for reactivation according to the USN, because none had actually been maintained and they were in fact used as spares resovoirs for the rest of the fleet, especially USS Lexington AVT 16. The USN didn’t consider the Essexs as suitable candidates for reactivation because they were unable to operate the current (1980s) aircraft in service, and at best were only useful as helicopter carriers.

If Australia had chosen to replace Melbourne in the late 60s, then the best choice would have been Hermes before she was disarmed (1971-73 conversion to a LPH) and after that Aus should have joined the only light carrier building program on the table, and ordered a fourth unit of the Invincible class. This unit could have taken Ark Royal’s place in the building order thus being delivered in 1985, and Ark following about two years later. Hermes could easily have been extended to cover the gap.

Folks,

Was there any attempt by the US government to allow the British government to purchase one of its carriers it was retiring in 1978 for One Dollar? Just wondering. Because it would see it would have been in the interest of the US government to give every encouragement to the UK keeping those F-4K and Buccaneers on a conventional carrier.

Jack E. Hammond

.

In 1966 immediately after the cancellation of CVA-01, the US government offered three Essex class carriers to the UK for a nominal sum. Although many have speculated that these three ships would have been SCB-27C/125 conversions with steam catapults and angled decks (eg USS Shangri La), the sale actually referred to unconverted Essexs (ie still in their WW2 configuration), on the grounds that they could be easily converted to RN standards as everything above hangar deck level was superstructureand could be easilt stripped away and replaced. This explains how the US CVs were converted so quickly in the 1950s compared to the RN carrier Victorious. The offer was made because the US thought the CVA-01 cancellation was simply because the design was flawed, and after the offer was made the British government told them they were just anti carrier regardless of the facts. Although the Essexs offered were in good condition and low mileage, the RN was ordered to produce a report stating they would be unsuitable because even after conversion they would only have fifteen years of service life before they needed replacing themselves.

Any conversion would have involved a completely new flight deck (all steel, able to withstand the heat from the Phantoms afterburners, which is why F-4s did not deploy aboard the US Essexs), and would probably have deleted the portside lift in favour of an extended angled deck and a waist mounted BS6 catapult. the other catapult would have been mounted on the fore deck as in Eagle and Ark. DAX 2 arrestor gear would have been installed and two starboard side deck edge lifts, one forward and one aft of the islandwould have completed the aircraft equipment. British radars would have been installed on the island, which would have looked very different from the original layout as well.

McDonnell Douglas did also propose a variant of the F-4 for the Essex class in US service, a Spey engined version known as the F-4L. This was basically an F-4K with the British equipment replaced by the same US equipment fitted to the basic F-4J on which the ‘K was based. So it would have been an Americanised-Anglicised-American Aircraft, and was rejected by the USN because the wooden decks of the Essexs would not take kindly to the Spey’s afterburners and anyway there were enough stocks of F-8 Crusaders to keep the Essexs decks full until retirement.

This is all very touching but also missing the point.

The carrier doctrine was unaffordable for a Britain that was bankrupt. The force that was meant to support CVA-01 had already been stripped to below the bare minimum at cancellation and that is not even taking into account how useless the Type-19 would have been. British Frigates were already making serious sacrifices in design capability just to be affordable, the Personnel crisis was acute and the wider economic situation getting worse.

Trying to make the carriers work as if they are some sort of panacea to a defeat that never happened has become a strange fetish along similar lines to the TSR-2 myth.

As Ken pointed out, following the withdrawal from east of Suez the original rationale for CVA-01 vanished. That was the reason the ship was designed the way she was and with the end of that, her purpose was no longer there. CVA-01 being built results in the escort fleet being turned into a bunch of near useless corvettes. Some here seem to be suggesting that the RN should have sacrificed some of its escorts to fund carriers……….absurdity of the highest order. The role for which the RN was being constructed was much better suited to Frigates and Destroyers than to a carrier heavy fleet.

That we have someone here suggesting a three carrier force is alarming, we should all know our post war history better than that! And it has yet to be explained how an Anglicised Clemenceau solves the problem, how exactly would it have been cheaper than CVA-01? Lose the Sea Dart system and you are pretty much out of savings already, assuming there are any.

What people further forget is that the way the Royal Navy was developing in up to the Nott review it would have easily been the third most capable fleet in the world with a very capable set of AAW weapons and a fantastic fleet of ASW ships. The three Invincibles were a bonus.

And what I keep coming back to is that the Bankruptcy argument does not hold water for one indisputable reason…THE MONEY WAS SPENT ANYWAY! To much less useful effect. A Navy the size of the RN of the 70s is impotent without air cover. Doesn’t matter how many or how good the destroyers and frigates are, if there isn’t a carrier to provide AEW, fighter cover and long range anti ship strike then you may as well keep them in port… a bit like now in fact. Carriers are not a luxury, they are essential. That is why they should have priority. As for infrastructure, the RN was planning to continue supporting two air groups through the 70s right up until 1969 when Eagles Phantomisation was cancelled. Why else form 767 NAS as the Phantom training unit? All the required defence savings were made by closing the bases East of Suez. Maintaining mobilr rapid reaction forces (ie Carrier and Amphibious groups) was always a better way to invest resources. Ask the USN…

Have enjoyed reading the thread so I hope you don’t mind me adding my two pence worth.

I think that although the cost and manpower issues during the 70 were very real they would not have prevented the RN running fleet carriers during that time. I have a naval review dated from the end of the 70s that lists the RN as 67,770 regular service personnel with 29,100 regular reserve and 6,500 volunteer reserve. If the 7,770 were to say man 3 fleet carriers that still leaves 60,000 to do the rest of the work, which must surely be possible if sensible decisions are made.

In fact more realistic decision making really is at the heart of avoiding the carrier crisis. If in the early 60s consideration had been given to value for money and sustainability rather than trying and failing to keep up with the USN then a different chain of event could have emerged.

The Phantom is the biggest problem as it could not fly from any existing carrier, even the biggest and most recently refitted Eagle, without major modification of the aircraft and the carriers. Some of which such as the relatively new Hermes would never be able to operate it. At the same time the buy of the Sea Vixen continued till 1966! How can this be value for money? How can such waste be sustainable? If the sea Vixen by dint of necessity is the fighter for the 70s the updates that were offered for it, new engines and a new radar becomes sensible spending and will keep it basically viable.

The deadly necessity to urgently replace the current carriers is deferred and limited investment in the Sea Vixen and Buccaneer is all that is necessary during the financial crisis of the late sixties. It allows a breathing space to react to the fact that the age of empire is over and a new NATO centric defence situation is arising.

If the carrier force stays at the heart of the navy then they draw in money and manpower and get allocated roles within NATO, North Atlantic, Arctic and the reinforcement of Norway. Expensive manpower intensive frigates like Type 22 don’t get built as the need for lower manning lower cost ships more more akin to Type 23 is required. Replace the Counties hull for hull with an 8 ship programme with something in between the Type 82 and 42. Perhaps rather like the later Type 43 with all gas turbines.

Also when trying to work out what was possible it is perhaps sensible to remember what was actually maintained during this period. Air stations like Lossiemouth and Yeovilton stayed on the MOD books and maritime attack Buccaneer squadrons were also maintained, albeit light blue manned. The RAF also probably had funding for fighters with which they claimed to be defending the fleet! Funding that in an alternate history could have been RN.

At last some sanity… My point: The RN carrier fleet was NOT on it’s last legs in the late 60s, from a material point of view anyway. Deferring the replacement program until the mid 70s avoids clashing with the RAF’s big budget items like TSR2 and if the RN stays in the FJ game through the late 60s onwards then some of the projects of the era gain support from both services (eg Jaguar, Hawk). The Sea Vixens had plenty of fatigue life left when they were withdrawn (about half their expected life) and their primary weapon remained in frontline service on RAF Lightnings until the late 80s. Modifying the Vixens to fire BAe Skyflash AAMs, as well as replacing the radar sets with more up to date units would not have proved too difficult since the Vixen had plenty of room to accomodate a new set. The Vixen may not have been supersonic, but it was well suited to the CAP role as it had good endurance and was very manouverable.

ARA 25DM was decommissioned in 1997, scrapped in 1999. She was not able to sail since 1988. Last aircraft on board was S2 Tracker. Last jet operations in 1986. Steam cat Mitchell Brown BS4 sold to Brazil for spares to refit MB NAeL Minas Gerais, but MB didn’t have any aircraft till 1998 (A4KU Skyhawk) and they only operate on board twice (sea trials) before decommission of this ship. FAB S2 Trackers were decommissioned in 1996. MB will probably order 6 ex-USN S2 that would be refitted with turboprop (S2T). 3 of them would be AEW, 3 COD. 12 A4KU will be modernized.
ARA have about 6 SuE able to fly. 3 of them went on board NAe Sao Paulo during ARAEX VI in april may 2002, but none prior this date. One SUe (3-A-203)landed on NAeL Minas Gerais 29 november 1995, during ARAEX III, but it was an incident (hook up). The plane was disembarked with a crane. ARA S2T turbo trackers were on board Sao Paulo during ARAEX and TEMPEREX exercises in 2002. SUe and S2T don’t land on USN carriers, they only make “touch and go”. USN carriers are not able to catapult such aircrafts (no more bridle system)

ARA Veinticinco De Mayo was indeed decommissioned in 97, most sources quote her as being inactive since 1986 and laid up in reserve since 88. Parts of her catapult were sold to Brazil, though these would only have been smaller parts as the catapult itself remained aboard all the way to the scrapyard. Also Minas Gerais catapult was a different type to the 25DM’s, so whilst in principle very similar many parts would have been incompatible. MG had a McTaggert Scott steam Catapult whilst 25DM had a Mitchell Brown Long Stroke BS4 Steam Catapult, parts of which would be compatible with the BS5 Steam Catapults fitted to Sao Paolo (ex Foch) so those parts may have been a forward investment .

Has the Agrentine Carrier been scrapped???:eek:

Veinticinco De Mayo was scrapped in Alang India 1999. The modifications she recieved prior to the Falklands war included extending the deck park to starboard aft of the island, and extending the edge of the forward part of the angle to effectively square it off. The acuteness of the angle was not reduced. The catapult, which was of a much longer stroke than those fitted to her sisters, was able to cope with Super Etendards on trials prior to the war, but this was in ideal wind conditions. The catapult was in need of a major overhaul at the time of the war, but was still operational. The problem was that the parts required for the overhaul were to come from the original manufacturer, in Scotland, and they were embargoed during and after the war. By 1986 the ship’s machinery was also worn out and a major overhaul was required, but the state of the Argentine economy precluded any refit and she was paid off into reserve. Finally in 1999 all hope of returning her to service was abandoned and she was sold for scrap.