They didn’t forget about an HMD/HMSS. They had to abandon integration because of technical difficulties.

Encountering technical difficulties was not the end of the story–read carefully what they said regarding cost and the number of airframes. The implication is that if there were more F-22s on order, then the cost of overcoming these technical difficulties would not be a factor. This is the way that cost is viewed by the government, at least when a new capability is to be developed: the cost of development divided by the number of units. Perhaps they will even use this as an argument for more F-22s (stranger things have been done with math before 🙂 ).

The fact that the F-22’s HMSS integration involved more cost than most in addition to other potential issues (e.g. developing additional AIM-9X launch modes) certainly does not help, nor does the F-22’s phenomenal success in exercises when it is used as intended. If the need were great enough, however, then just about any obstacle could be overcome. As for the number of airframes ordered, we’ll have to see whether that can be increased before production begins winding down.

I think I know the difference between disinformation and an honest admission of a failure.

Well, the USAF has failed so far in getting an HMSS integrated on the F-22 (i.e. getting funding for it), but I still don’t believe for a moment that it could not be done, period, as you’ve been trying to say, or that it would not be done if it were critical for the F-22 to be effective. A number of people had initially believed that the F-22 could not cope without an IRST (stealth + passive sensor is an obvious synergy, right?), but they’ve been proven wrong so far.

I certainly wouldn’t accuse Dozer of talking out of his posterior, I’d just place more trust in what the programme manager says, on the record.

Well, if that’s what the program manager said, then that’s what the truth is…for the time being, anyway…. 🙂 Note, however, that he (or whoever was actually speaking in the quote) had said: “We do not expect to ever have a HMCS in the F-22 under the current buy of only 183 aircraft.” He said “expect” and even gave a condition, which hardly seems like an absolute decree for all time due to impossibility.

And while “decisions on things like this go back and forth all the time” without funding they aren’t happening.

That’s absolutely true, but the funding can also be reconsidered. 🙂

We’ve all seen the kill ratios achieved by F-22s in ONE, Red Flag, etc. and it’s clearly impressive.

Well, there was also the major joint training exercise Northern Edge in Alaska, as well as exercises of varying scope that take place all the time. We may merely be at the beginning of learning how to use–and how the enemy might counter–the F-22 right now, but as time goes on, we’ll have an increasingly clear picture of what additional capabilities are required. If we discover later on that an HMSS is essential for the F-22, no matter what the reasons turn out to be, then I’m sure that the USAF will request funding for it once again with greater weight for their arguments. At least for the time being, the need is not sufficiently compelling.

But open sources like Av Week have described some of the tactics that caused the aircraft problems, and it’s clear that while the aircraft is impregnable when RoE allow it to dictate the terms of engagement, if RoE dictate closing to visual range for an identification, for example (this would usually be against an incoming enemy, head on) many of its advantages would disappear.

Speaking in the most general terms, if the F-22 cannot be used as it was intended to be used, rendering both its stealth and mobility moot, then even if it had HMSS, it would be a waste to send an F-22 to do a job that the currently more numerous F-15C could do nearly as well. It would encourage the enemy to do everything possible to deplete our fleet of F-22s while such a restrictive RoE is in effect. Frankly, it would be better to hold our F-22s in reserve in such a scenario until conditions are more favorable or we have no other choice.

Or the RoE might be that the F-22 can’t fire unless threatened. And the HOBS-equipped aircraft might avoid threatening the Raptor until the moment the missile leaves the rail.

In this case, having an HMSS might help the F-22 fire back more quickly, but the result would still probably end up being a mutual kill. Either way, the F-22 is dead, so unless it’s highly missile resistant (unlikely at such close range), you might as well use an F-15C until the ROE changes.

These are RoE that would negate the F-22’s stealth advantage (because the aircraft becomes visible) and not it’s stealth capability, so you still wouldn’t hang ASRAAMs under the F-22’s wings.

If you mean that the F-22’s stealth would still help protect it against SAM threats (a fact often neglected in discussions such as this), then you’d have a valid point. However, if we assume that this is not a major issue (e.g. flying defensive CAP over friendly/neutral territory or enemy IADS has been wiped out already) and that F-22s have to get within HOBS firing range in sight of the enemy, as you’ve been supposing, then there would be no reason not to carry external armament, as long as it’s needed.

I don’t assume that the F-22 is going to simply confront the enemy on equal terms head-on – whenever possible it will do that and destroy the enemy at the maximum range possible using the longest range weapon it has available (just as Typhoon will attempt to do, and just as the F3 tries to today). But I do acknowledge that this won’t always be possible.

As do I, only I tend to view it as an extremely exceptional case in general, and one that should be handled by another fighter if the ROE is the cause–this would be true even if the F-22 had HMSS and HOBS, because it makes no sense to trade F-22s with other fighters on more or less equal terms (perhaps it would be different if the original 750 airframes were ordered). In such a scenario, I would task the F-22s with DEAD and discreet sensor coverage for other fighters. If and when the ROE changes, then they could go in and sweep the skies in the manner for which they were designed.

Nor has there been any real explanation of how much close in fighting has been attempted during these exercises – most of the reports would seem to indicate that what little WVR stuff there has been has been against ‘leakers’ or regenerated threats after a classic BVR start.

Well, you’d want to focus on training that reflects how a system is intended to be used in combat. In the case of major exercises that try to simulate combat as realistically as possible, whether WVR combat happens or not depends mostly on the capabilities of both sides and the tactics they use, much like in real combat (ROE allowing). Perhaps once the F-22 has proven itself more fully over time, they’ll set up ROEs that would put it at a disadvantage without HOBS in a ploy to obtain the necessary funding, but it’s too early for that.

The range at which Raptor becomes visible on radar is highly classified, but there have been indications that it varies a great deal according to aspect.

Sure, for example, there must be at least two narrow but prominent RCS “spikes” exactly 42 degrees off either side of the nose due to its planform alignment; there should also be a couple of spikes in the rear hemisphere for the same reason, forming a rough “X” shape from the top. Although the returns from these spikes and other less prominent spikes are mitigated substantially by RAS, the F-22 is not nearly as LO from certain directions as it is from others.

That said, this type of LO design is considered superior to that of the F-117, for example, which has many more smaller spikes that significantly increase the probability of being detected, albeit probably at a shorter distance when this does happen. In practice, it hasn’t been easy to exploit the F-22’s known weaknesses–typically, the most the enemy will get, if they’re very lucky, is a single, relatively weak return on one scan. This is a deliberate design feature, and has yet to become an issue, as far as I’m aware.

Co-altitude, head on, the Raptor will be detected later than if the enemy has a major height differential.

The F-22 is not necessarily designed to be as stealthy from the top, but it has been very effective when it’s much higher than its adversaries (including ground radar), which should be the typical case. It could also get around the enemy when circumstances allow–its stealth may not be perfect, but it is for practical purposes all-aspect. It is actually more effective than its pilots, who have undoubtedly been instructed on its theoretical limitations, had initially expected. I’ve been told that it took a while for them to build up enough confidence to take full advantage of this capability.

And then you have IRST, and radars on other platforms, ground based radars (remember the bizarre claim that Raptor’s plume was more visible than the aircraft at high supersonic speed).

The only thing I know about the F-22’s IR stealth is that given the natural physical limitations of IR systems, it is “balanced” between radar and IR. In most cases, as reported by F-22 and aggressor pilots, you’ll probably see it visually before detecting it on other sensors, and it’s even harder to track and target. Obviously, it remains to be seen how this would affect missile guidance systems in real combat, but to be on the safe side, I usually assume no advantage whatsoever.

As for radars on other platforms, as mentioned earlier, the F-22 has all-aspect stealth except for some fairly narrow spikes. It’s not as though a fighter or other aircraft from any direction other than the front quadrant is much more likely to detect it and pass along the information. This applies to most ground radars, as well. As for long-wavelength radar detecting F-22s with limited precision, this is simulated in training by ground control providing the general location of approaching F-22s via their telemetry data and/or transponders. Thus far, this has not made a difference in the kill ratio, and adversary fighters can still get whacked from behind, too, which is an example of the synergy between superior situational awareness and superior mobility.

Put simply, there’s less room for complacency than you affirm.

Like I said, I’m all for integrating HMSS and HOBS, myself, but one of my points is that the USAF currently has reasons for being able to put it off indefinitely (which is not the same as forever, whatever the program manager expects). Obviously, I don’t think it’s nearly as critical for the F-22 as you do.

You assume that Raptors will always operate in their optimum formation,

By no means will this always be true, which is why I tend to rely more on what I hear about large-scale, complex exercises regarding the overall combat-effectiveness of the F-22. However, as you pointed out, the information we have is still limited, and if we learn something different in the future, then maybe some people will change their minds about the need for an HMSS.

This whole debate started with your assertions that it was not technically possible to integrate HMSS onto the F-22 and that fighters without an HMSS are severely disadvantaged, which we could deduce using simple logic to imply that the F-22 is inherently crippled in comparison to other fighters and that there is nothing that anyone can do about it. I think that based on what we know so far, your original assertions are too extreme in every respect, and that’s all I need to convince anybody else of (not that I will–people will generally believe what they want 🙂 ).

and will always see the enemy first

That’s the idea, and that’s what has generally happened, even when crossing the threshold into WVR territory. It’s not that easy to spot an aircraft visually if your radar can’t track and indicate its location for you first. Given far superior situational awareness, the F-22 pilot can choose how or whether to engage, and the F-22’s mobility gives him many options for escaping when necessary to avoid a furball, which he would do even if he had an HMSS.

and will always have RoE that allow them the first shot.

If the whole battle were set up by the US to defeat all of the F-22’s advantages, then why would the USAF use the F-22 for air combat at all? Whether the F-22 was worth developing in the first place would and should come into question–even with HMSS–but that’s another topic. Under these circumstances, if we suppose that the F-22 has to fight in a significant number of tight furballs no matter what, negating all of its advantages, then of course it would be at a disadvantage. Is that what you wanted to force me to say, despite the fact that I never denied the notion? How does this support your assertions that HMSS integration is insoluble? We’ve had more liberal ROEs during the last several major air campaigns, and the F-22’s identification capabilities are far superior to what we had back then. And if anyone is thinking about Vietnam’s ROE right about now, it could also be used to argue that HOBS missiles are ineffective (because all missiles are) and that we need to close to within guns range. 🙂

More than any other aircraft, Raptor doesn’t need close-in armament at all. But if it needs a gun and IR-homing short range AAMs at all, then it needs a helmet too, and it would need a helmet for air-to-ground, even if it didn’t for air-to-air.

Having a gun and WVR missiles as backups is far more necessary than having an HMSS, due to situational awareness. As I’ve said before, an HMSS would be great for emergencies, but in my opinion, it’s another level down in priority in terms of probable need. If you disagree, that’s fine–people can make up their own minds based on what we’ve argued.

As for air-to-ground, why is it necessary now when it hasn’t ever been before? It might improve any fighter’s effectiveness in this regard to some degree, but the F-22 is not going to be hunting a wide variety of ground targets, particularly mobile ones–not unless it is given a full multirole capability, which would almost undoubtedly include integration with the appropriate helmet.

This is starting to look suspiciously like invention becoming the mother of necessity, rather than the other way around, which often seems to happen when technology is involved. No doubt, some technologies can become great enablers every so often, but not every shiny new gadget is absolutely necessary all of the time or at any cost.

The MiG-29OVT and Su-30 (and bear in mind that there are already TV ‘Flankers’ and will soon be ‘Flankers’ with OVT type 3-d nozzles) should be no real problem for the F-22 if it fights on its terms, and not theirs. The F-22 enjoys dominance over either over much of the envelope. But I’d say that the F-22 pilot who got into a situation where he had to try to match that kind of post stall manouevring would be most unwise, and probably walking home.

I would say the same regardless of which fighter he was going up against, and there is almost always an option to avoid such close combat. Having an HMSS and HOBS would undoubtedly give the pilot one last option, but by that time, he has already made a number of tactical blunders that have degraded his advantages to parity and most likely a mutual kill. It’s like a Wildcat pilot in WWII choosing to turn against a Zero (extremely foolish!) when he knows better, instead of diving to get away (the heavier Wildcat was a much better diver). On that note, maybe denying F-22 pilots an HMSS would actually help them do what they’re trained to do. 😉

If my arguments are “absolute, it-must-be-this-way-and-no-other type” then it’s because they are based on what the real experts say – not on my own layman’s opinion (which is worthless).

I get your point, and it does have some merit, except that different experts can have different opinions, so they aren’t always right, either. At least in my experience (engineering job, life, etc.), those who argue in absolutes tend to be wrong more often than not. Just to make it clear, though, I didn’t mean that all of your arguments were at the extreme end, just the main ones that formed the basis for this debate.

A helmet isn’t the only way of designating all off-boresight weapons – but it is the easiest, quickest and best way.

It only makes a difference if you find yourself in the middle of a close dogfight all of a sudden, to your surprise.

There’s a huge difference between something that’s a recognized need but which is abandoned, unfunded and on which no work is being done, and something (like AESA on Typhoon) that is a recognized (potential) need, and on which work was undertaken by industry at its own risk, building on long-running and fully funded technology demonstrator programmes.

Oh, they can change their minds later in a hurry if something entirely new is learned during training or while developing tactics–there’s no need for such melodrama. :rolleyes: And if they ever do, then they could make use of the F-35’s HMDS or other solutions that will exist by then.

If the pilot has to “maneuver into firing position” then the systems are not doing the job that an HMSS can do.

I didn’t mean pointing the nose of the airplane right at the targets, I meant getting within range of them–you still have to do that. Closing in on their six without them knowing would not normally require HOBS, but if one of them has his head “on a swivel” and spots the F-22, and they attempt to evade, then it would be very handy for the avionics to cue the seekers automatically. This can be done much faster and more accurately than by manually using an HMSS, and it could also be done for more than one target if necessary.

“Armed with HOBS capability alone–without an HMSS–there would be no need to point the nose of the aircraft, anyway.” I don’t believe that RoE and fratricide concerns would allow anyone to fire a close-in weapon at an unseen target. There’s simply too much chance of it being your wingman.

F-22s generally operate quite far apart from one another (even wingmen), and the avionics are always aware of the locations of other F-22s through IFDL, so they won’t be targeted.

“It might be a core piece of equipment for them, but not for the F-22.”

“Even professionals can be sucked in by dogma if they haven’t had the chance to thoroughly think things through from a different perspective.”

Right. Because a spotter is more likely to ‘get it’ than a professional fighter pilot.

Pilots often disagree with each other. If I happen to agree with one pilot about something and disagree with another pilot about the same thing, and the first pilot turns out to be proven correct, then I guess that I do “get it” better than the second pilot. In this case, I agree with what Dozer says because he’s sensible and he’s also an F-22 pilot, and is therefore better qualified to comment than these other pilots you’ve quoted. The comment of his that is most germane to this discussion that I could find is the following:

http://www.fencecheck.com/forums/index.php/topic,6835.msg151121.html#msg151121

Unfortunately, for reasons of security, Dozer is not allowed to elaborate on how HOBS would be implemented on the F-22 without an HMSS, but even my simplistic suggestions would make for a useful capability (in fact, better than HMSS in the more common scenarios expected for the F-22).

Avoiding dogfights is the whole point of any fighter – close in is fun in peacetime, but it’s intrinsically unpredictable and dangerous. Of course it’s “better to just sneak up on them from where they can’t see you and shoot them in the back.” That’s been the name of the game since the days of von Richthofen.

Other current fighters cannot play this “game” like the F-22 can–thus far, it has been on an entirely different level. However, if the aggressor squadrons at Nellis AFB–who never like to lose, much less get whipped like a bunch of chumps–can find a way to make this “game” far more difficult, then maybe the F-22 will get an HMSS and HOBS after all. In a manner of speaking, one could say that the F-22 is currently a victim of its own success.

“Once you’re in a dogfight, you’re more or less at parity, and the other guy will likely have HMSS, too.” Right on! And the HMSS suddenly tips the balance from parity to enemy superiority in this environment. You were at parity before – but he’s got a better HOBS capability than you have.

My point was that describing HMSS as an absolute necessity for the F-22 would imply that the F-22 is expected to find itself at parity in a dogfight often enough to justify a relatively high cost of integration. I won’t deny that this capability would be very desirable when such an emergency arises, but the F-22 has excelled so greatly in setting up engagements to its overwhelming advantage and avoiding dogfights that there just has not been a demonstrable need for an HMSS to date. And the fact that a useful HOBS capability could be implemented without an HMSS does not make for a strong enough case for integrating an HMSS at present. And finally, based on all of this, there is no harm in waiting for a better HMSS to be developed (for the F-35) first.

“Pilots of other fighters keep forgetting that they can’t locate the F-22 before it moves into position to kill them.”

It’s LO, chum, not invisible. RoE may well dictate that the aircraft has to get near enough to be seen,

So then, I guess the F-22 will have to sneak up on targets from where it can’t be seen (like from behind), at least in time for the targets to take effective action. F-22s have come into visual range many times during exercises, but they still get their Sidewinder and gun kills.

and WVR, the advantage of Stealth is lost.

It certainly is greatly diminished, but the terms of the engagement will be set before getting WVR, giving the F-22 the first shot, which is usually a total surprise for the target. Having an HMSS in this scenario would not help substantially, nor would it protect the F-22 from a lucky enemy fighter taking a HOBS shot. And by the way, if the first missile launched by the F-22 misses, then a follow-up shot would be quicker and more accurate when cued directly by its avionics.

And he’s not more agile than Su-30,

The F-22 has a lot more power, speed, and high-speed maneuvering capability, which along with superior situational awareness and stealth allows it to practically dictate the parameters of engagement from the start. As for raw agility in a typical dogfight, the F-22’s advantages diminish in practical terms (it’s better, but not dominant like at high speed and BVR), but it can point its nose at least as well as the Su-30 can.

That said, it’ll be interesting to see whether anyone can find a way to force the F-22 into a dogfight in which HOBS would be essential (besides setting up a training exercise specifically for this). I’m not saying that it can’t or won’t happen, but the USAF needs to have a very good reason to spend their limited resources on something that they have not been shown a need for to date. This money would be better spent on a full Link 16 transmit capability on the F-22, for example, which would make the entire force more effective. This includes the F-22 because the pilots won’t be distracted by having to identify bogeys for the AWACS over the radio like they do in major exercises now (the APG-77/ALR-94 combination is actually much quicker and more accurate at this task than the AWACS).

The programme manager and the ACC Chief of 5th Gen Fighter office did not say the HMSS hadn’t been integrated because the integration wasn’t cost effective, nor because solving a minor integration problem wasn’t worth the candle.

They said that “Integration was abandoned because of technical difficulty.”

I did some searching, and found that they actually said: “Integration was abandoned because of technical difficulty. To add it in today would be very costly with the integrated avionics architecture. We do not expect to ever have a HMCS in the F-22 under the current buy of only 183 aircraft.”

Gee, it looks like my guess was right on the mark after all, and that this is in fact a matter of cost-effectiveness.

That’s pretty clear and unmistakeable.

Sure, if you only quote the parts that you agree with.

On being asked: “14. Are there specific difficulties mapping the F-22 cockpit for a head tracking system?”

the one word answer was:

“Yes.”

Well, that’s true for every fighter. That’s why engineers all get paid millions of dollars a year to design solutions (OK, that’s just wishful thinking on my part 😀 ).

They made additional comments about software integration that made it clear that they understood the difference between cockpit mapping for head tracking and integration.

“software integration issues” may have “been the usual cause of difficulty in integrating anything onto the F-22 since the beginning” but not in this case.

It’s not my problem if they make self-contradictory statements. I just go with whatever makes the most sense and can be corroborated with what others in the know have to say.

Nothing is insoluble, given enough prayer and money,

That’s the spirit!

The lack of an HMSS makes less difference to the F-22 than to any other fighter (it’s a really severe omission on Omni Role Rafale) but RoE and circumstances may force the Raptor pilot to fight the WVR fight, and without an HMSS he WILL BE DISADVANTAGED, just as the Typhoon pilot is, today.

I admit that in such a scenario, the F-22 would be disadvantaged compared to what it could be, but not in comparison to the enemy overall as long as the right tactics are used. In actual training exercises, F-22s have scored a number of Sidewinder kills after they’ve run out of AMRAAMs, as well as gun kills after running out of Sidewinders. If I remember correctly, Dozer once bagged nine aggressors during a single mission, and he’s not the only F-22 pilot to have done this (sounds almost like a video game).

Note that despite all of this, I do agree that the F-22 should have an HMSS of some kind in order to at least have parity in absolute worst-case scenarios. That said, although you’ve acknowledged that it matters less for the F-22, I’m just emphasizing that realistically it matters very, very little, that’s all. 🙂

And if you look at the HOBS launch range of ASRAAM or Mica IR, you’d be cautious about inferring that we’re talking about only improbably close range encounters.

Without the help of your radar, if you can spot an F-22 visually, aim at it with your HMSS, and get a good IR lock, then that, to me, is improbably close range.

Moreover, with its JDAM and SDB capabilities, an HMSS would be useful for Raptor, even without air to air application.

Couldn’t the pilot just pick a target on the HDD and push a button? While it might be nice for him to be able to view SAR imagery on an HMDS when the situation calls for it, for example, the F-22 will usually be looking out for ground radar and SAM sites to bomb from high altitude.

The “we don’t need it” arguments are redolent of those who argued that the F-4 didn’t need a gun,

I certainly see your point here, and it is a valid one, but what we’re talking about is not quite as extreme as visual ID ROE + sucky missiles + no gun. On that note, shouldn’t all multirole fighters have a second seat for a WSO?

or that IRSTs were of no use when the enemy had them and the teen series didn’t.

When have the teen series fighters ever needed an IRST in combat? (the F-14D did have one, by the way)

It’s not a ‘sensational story’ it’s fact, confirmed by senior programme people.

Do you always accept what they say uncritically, even if it doesn’t make literal sense? Maybe the cockpit of the F-117, for example, would be difficult to map, but the cockpit of the F-22 should be simple enough. Perhaps they don’t fully understand the technical aspects and/or are describing the problem in a way that most people could find comprehensible. The reason I had suggested a software integration issue, rather than mapping per se, is that this has been the usual cause of difficulty in integrating anything onto the F-22 since the beginning. In general, the USAF doesn’t add anything unless they feel that they can’t live without it. There are both relatively high cost and technical risk (in the form of potential bugs that could affect other systems) to consider.

The processor architecture used in the F-22 is both a strength and a weakness. It provides an extraordinarily powerful and highly-integrated environment of fused sensor data to the pilot, is very robust in terms of incremental hardware malfunction, and is very flexible with regard to making software updates in the field. However, it also makes adding any completely new functionality–even relatively simple things–a huge pain in the ass.

Dozer is a line pilot (albeit as a squadron commander a senior one), and as such is not as qualified as the programme and DoD desk people when it comes to detailed development stuff.

And representatives who communicate directly to the public are? In my experience, that’s rather doubtful, and even when they happen to be technically savvy, they rarely describe the real issue because people would get confused. On the other hand, Dozer is in a position where he can find out–and has the responsibility to find out–why the F-22 pilots under his command will lack certain equipment that pilots of other fighters will be getting, and he’s also speaking directly to military aviation enthusiasts, not just the general public. He won’t give many details, either, but if he says that it’s just a matter of cost (high) versus need (low), then I would listen to him (as long as what he says makes sense, and he’s rather sensible).

He’s the F-22 demonstration pilot, and as such has a PR role, and I’d be astonished if he isn’t either looking for rapid promotion or a TP job with Lockheed.

No, he isn’t–“Max” is the official F-22 demo pilot. Dozer filled in at the beginning just to get things off the ground, but only officially flew a basic demo, not the “real” one as recognized by PR. His fancy flying away from center stage before his slot came up was, shall we say, unofficial. 🙂

Either way, I wouldn’t expect him to do anything other than present a positive gloss on any F-22 story.

I wouldn’t either, but at the same time, he’s not a liar.

Larry Lawson, Lockheed’s F-22 programme manager has gone on the record to say that the failure to integrate a helmet in F-22 was due to technical problems, and other senior programme people (for example Col Sutter, Chief of ACC/A8F, 5th Generation Fighter Division) indicated that difficulties in mapping the cockpit were the most insoluble of these.

What is “most insoluble” supposed to mean? Is that like “more impossible?” :rolleyes: He said that there were difficulties, and based on past history, I’m pretty sure that my guess above regarding the root technical cause of the difficulties is not far from the mark. Describing a problem as “insoluble” is very different from saying that it’s difficult. Some people claiming to be in the know said that the F-22’s software in general was impossible to develop in the first place, but I guess we know now that it was merely difficult, huh? Integrating an HMSS would not be one of the bigger challenges, but it would still be more expensive than it’s worth to the F-22 specifically, hence no HMSS. However, if they find that F-35 pilots benefit from the HMDS as much as they’re hoping, then I bet that they will reevaluate its integration on the F-22.

The problems are as detailed above.

Yeah, that sure explains everything…. :rolleyes:

Cost and integration are further problems, but technical difficulty was the ‘show-stopper’ on F-22. That’s not speculation, it’s fact.

Wait, is it difficult or insoluble? If it’s insoluble because of the F-22’s wild, hippy cockpit design ;), then why even mention cost?

I made it clear that I’m speculating that mapping problems are speculation when it comes to Rafale, as we simply don’t know why helmet integration was abandoned.

Maybe the Rafale has software integration issues, too; I really don’t know enough about the Rafale to comment. Welcome to the modern world of software engineering, also known as “Plug ‘N Pray.” 😉 Virtually nothing is undoable, though–it’s all about requirements and money.

WVR, F-22 needs a helmet. And AIM-9X with LBL from within the bay.

It would be nice, no doubt about it, but combat starts at BVR, and the F-22 knows where everybody is all the time while denying situational awareness to the enemy. Even if it’s forced to fight WVR because of circumstances, the F-22 will still be able to fire the first shot and escape before HMSS would make any real difference for either side. An F-22 pilot in a real combat situation would have to make an extremely grievous tactical blunder to get trapped in a real dogfight and within HOBS shooting parameters (the missiles have very short range when used in this way), in which case having an HMSS would be really nice, but both fighters are likely to end up getting shot down anyway in such a dire scenario. That’s just one more reason to avoid dogfights if at all possible, and the F-22 is exceptionally well equipped for choosing whether, where, when, and how the battle will be fought.

We’ll eventually find out whether an HMSS will become necessary enough for the USAF to pay for a challenging integration, but the whole point of the F-22 is to not need such a system, and thus far it has indeed not proven to be a necessity.

At very close in ranges, the advantage of stealth vanishes, and the advantage of agility is eroded if the enemy has a HOBS weapon and a helmet and you don’t.

Right, but we’re talking about VERY close ranges, here. It’s hard for the USAF to justify spending additional millions on an already expensive system designed specifically to avoid the need for such close fighting–that would be a contradiction of sorts, and critics would interpret it as an admission that the F-22 is a failure, and use this as propaganda against the F-22 (and the F-35 by extension) or at least as an example of government waste. If they do end up integrating the HMDS, for example, they’d have to use justifications other than dogfighting.

One begins to wonder whether (like the F-22 team) the Rafale blokes found some insoluble problem in mapping the cockpit that makes integrating a proper helmet problematic.

What kind of problem? Neither of these cockpits are so unusual that they cannot be mapped.

But even if that’s the case, a simple HMSS would be a huge improvement – with absolutely NO downside.

It costs money–that’s the downside. I’m merely speculating here, but perhaps in the case of the F-22, the integration would cost a lot more than it usually does due to the way in which devices must interface with its integrated processor architecture. This is certainly not an unsolvable problem in engineering terms, but it might cost more than it is worth, in the opinion of the USAF. Thus far, the F-22 has not had a real need for it; however, if it is deemed necessary someday, then given the probable cost involved in integrating any such system, the F-22 might as well get what the F-35 is getting.

HMSS is a battle-winner. Any fighter that lacks it (Typhoon, Rafale, F-22) is the poorer.

While I don’t doubt that any fighter would gain from having such a system over not having it, the F-22 can usually bushwhack fighters WVR much like it does BVR. There is no sharp dividing line between these realms of air combat, and the F-22 does get pretty close to the “enemy” at times (e.g. as a result of crowded airspace, running out of AMRAAMs, etc.)–always behind them or at whatever the best fly-by shooting angle might be, I’d imagine. :diablo: The key is knowing where the enemy is and not letting them know where you are before you shoot them down. If you can do this consistently, then integrating an HMSS would not be a high priority.

What has come out in recent years through various arrests and trials suggests that, with the exception of the blackest of black programs, the military industrial complex leaks like the Titanic.

So in other words, since the F-22’s secrets are eventually going to be leaked by Americans anyway, selling the F-22 overseas wouldn’t make a difference in real terms. Well, be that as it may, I still think that there are varying degrees of leaks and that the rate at which information is leaked over time is relevant, at least until someone who can collect everything one would need to know in order to build F-22s from scratch does so and ships the package off to Russia or China. 🙂

Otherwise, why should we institute security measures at all? Let’s just tell everybody everything up front, work on something even better to counter it, and then tell everybody before we even build the first prototype next time. In the meantime, let’s have fatally compromised F-22s shoot each other down during combat missions to save the enemy the effort. Then we could put up a white flag, kneel, and beg them through our tears to “Make it quick.” 😉

Really, if the F-22 were that invulnerable as its fanboys make it out to be, why wouldn’t they export it? The fact that they are not tells you the greatest weapon of the F-22 is the fear of the unknown.

Oh, it’s far more than fear of the unknown–in a real fight the F-22 will most assuredly thrash any other fighter currently out there with near-impunity. Don’t kid yourself about that, whether it has secret vulnerabilities or not.

To sell it to even a close allies means exposing vulnerabilities that allied militaries will discover. Which opens the possibility of it becoming public.

Assuming for the sake of argument that such worrisome vulnerabilities even exist, it’s analogous to keeping a password secret. No system is completely beyond compromise in the real world. That said, I think the issue is more about not letting others know how to build such a fighter for themselves to use against us.

Keeping it within the US contains at max any possible leaks.

Right, it’s not that we don’t trust Japan and other close allies per se, but all it takes is one high-level traitor to give our enemies one of our greatest advantages, and in general the fewer who know any secret, the better it will be kept.