Therefore the weapon was OUT of the holster otherwise he wouldn’t have been trying to place it BACK in the holster.
Incorrect. Perhaps my explanation wasn’t clear enough but at no time was the weapon drawn from the holster. Here’s the video I referenced earlier.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SV-wZt_IcLE
You are familiar with weapons. Would YOU remove the safety catch unless there was an imminent necessity that you discharge the weapon?
Not all weapons have what you may describe as a “safety catch” as there are different ways manufacturers incorporate a safety feature. Springfield Armory for example incorporates trigger and grip safeties. The handgun can’t be fired unless the shooters palm depresses the button/lever at the back of the grip as well as depress the center lever located in the middle of the trigger. If one isn’t completely depressed the weapon won’t discharge.
FFDO’s use the H&K USP Compact handgun which has the LEM trigger (Law Enforcement Modification) which doesn’t incorporate a safety which is to insure the gun fires on the first trigger pull. H&K actually has a deal selling this gun to any US airline pilot for cheap for their own personal use. The safety would be you don’t pull it out unless you’re going to use it. I would assume the gun is carried loaded with a round chambered for the same reason, it fires the first time the trigger is pulled. Remember this is to defend the cockpit and reaction times are short when the battle would take place in a space no bigger than a small car.
Some cargo pilots are FFDO officers too and carry firearms. Just to protect them from those scarey packages.
The problem is that cargo isn’t screened nearly well enough to ensure that it’s only those scary packages and doesn’t include an unannounced passenger. FedEx DC-10 doesn’t have passengers that can fight back.
Under what circumstances would you put a loaded, chambered, safety off gun into stowage? Or did this occurence happen while he was checking it prior to stowage?
Weren’t law enforcement informed? What was their view upon investigation?
I doubt the British police would have been so lenient.
He was a Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO – armed pilot) who was stowing his gun when the lock on the holster discharged the weapon. The locking holster requires the padlock to be slipped behind the trigger to prevent it from firing. In this case the padlock was slipped in front of the trigger and when the weapon was fully seated in the holster the trigger was depressed. There’s a video out there that demonstrates the locking holster and how a padlock can be accidentally misaligned when attaching it.
They’ve been referred to as Jungle Jets for as long as I can remember. More formally they are referred to as the ERJ as compared the CRJ with the E-170/190 series called the E-Jets. Officially the 145 series is called the Amazon but I’ve never heard that used. That is probably what lead to it being unofficially called the Jungle Jet. Now the -120 has been called the BraKillya or Brazildo out on the line. BraKillya goes back to when Continental Express lost one back in 1991, at least around these parts.
The outer pane of a passenger window has a small hole in it to allow the space between panes to equalize pressure in climbs and decents. Sometimes water makes it through the hole or in humid conditions condensation appears between the panes which freezes at altitude.
Interesting, thanks Cking.
That’s what I thought at first but that would require some sort of blister on the outside of the aircraft?
IWas that because of full load flight and/or non optimal trimming of aircraft by the loadcontroller?
…or headwind.
Is it me, or is the “leading” edge of the hole left behind bent inward?
Just to the right of the hand writing
My guess would be that the downward bend was done after the skin failed as a result of the 300 knot wind hitting the exposed metal.
I know there is considerable focus on the subjects of Crew Resource Management (CRM) and Human Performance and Limitations (HPL) during flight training, at least in some European countries. Afterall, HPL is part of the current JAR-FCL (now EASA?) curriculum for ATPL-A.
I’ve heard that some airlines in Europe conduct some sort of CRM training for their crews. I don’t know if that comes from company initiatives or requirements or recommendations made by the aviation authorities, though.
CRM is a pretty big topic in the States as well. We’ve also added TEM (Threat and Error Management) to the mix. CRM tackles issues of people working together while TEM tackles people working together to deal with problems. It’s a lot of good stuff but it’s a bit moot when crews are numb from lack of sleep or excessive duty days.
I’m under the impression that many airlines/operators first have a look at their own organisations after incidents happen. “Where did we go wrong to potentially cause this?” might be a question an operator should ask itself at an early point after something like this has happened.
The first thing an airline will do after an incident/accident is comb through their procedures and find everything that the crew didn’t follow, no matter how small or intentional or not. From that they build a case against the crew in an attempt to minimize the inevitable lawsuits. (don’t blame us, blame them). Only after that dust settles and the official findings are delivered will the operator be obligated to change their procedures to prevent such things from happening again.
Here in the States there is a rush of interest to prevent an accident like the Colgan Q400 crash which has roots in the fatigue issue. The Colgan company has issued their “blame the pilots” statements but it has fallen a bit on deaf ear as it’s clear they pushed the limits on what is legal vs. what is safe when it comes to the fatigue issue. Not that anyone has try to justify the actions/inactions of the crew, just that some operators don’t help the situation by pushing duty and flight time limits.
One would hope that, as you stated, the first reaction would be to right a wrong. Unfortunately with money hungry lawyers out there they circle the wagons and try to deflect the blame to the crew.
Lesson to learn? Don’t abort after V1.
It wouldn’t suprise me if that is the next generation of CVR and Data Recorders we see.
I agree 100% kevin. The messages do nothing to explain if the failure was a cause or result.
Here’s an LA Times explanation of what some of the released ACARS data means. Interesting read:
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2009/06/13/world/13plane.grafic.ready.html
A question from a GA pilot whose aircraft didn’t have pitot heat…
Why wouldn’t the heat always be selected “on” when at altitude?
After all, it’s never warm at airline cruising altitudes…[/I]
I’m not familiar with Airbus systems but on other airliners the pitot heat comes on automatically when the engines are started and turn off when they are shutdown. I would guess the Airbus is similar. The ACARS message indicates a loss of pitot/static port data which doesn’t mean the pitot heat wasn’t on or failed.
And regarding the speculation the Captain wasn’t at the controls…
How would anyone know that?
Perhaps it’s customary for the captain to take the first nap as part of the crew rest cycle but unless the CVR is found stating the captain wasn’t in the cockpit is pure speculation.