[USER=”70376″]stealthflanker[/USER] – It’s not otherworldly, but if it does lower the noise floor while simultaneously opening up the useful frequency range then it would be a marked improvement. But this is still at the lab prototype stage. Any field prototype is likely several years away. And improvement in electronics may allow many of the same benefits during that time.

ROFAR is just a typical radar with all the frequency upconversion and downconverison done optically vice electronically. See my awesome MS Paint skills.

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Details for an exact field setup is yet to be determined because the technology is still experimental. It’s not a quantum radar. It doesn’t use entanglement. It’s a microwave based device just like regular radar sets. The hope is that using an optical “photonic” arrangement for the upconversion and downconversion will result in a lower noise floor and a large band of useable frequencies.

[USER=”40269″]FBW[/USER] – You are simply out of your mind if you think any part of Russia’s defense industrial base was in good shape in the early 2000s. NPO Saturn surely wasn’t. They were in such poor shape that they partnered with SAFRAN for the SaM-146 – with SAFRAN handling the far more materially demanding hot section and Saturn producing the cold section. The Russian aviation industry as a whole had deteriorated so that service life of their engines were typically around 1000 hours and sometimes less. So there is simply no way that they could design for any substantial temperature jump. Additionally, the Soviet Union had a supply chain distributed across the Soviet Union. With its collapse, that supply chain disintegrated, and a new one had to be developed to take its place (only financially possible once the oil price started shooting up in 03-04). This is a large reason why so few of the late era Soviet designs made any substantial progression.

What you are suggesting they should have done simply wasn’t possible. The supply chain had to be rebuilt, new scientific instrumentation and low yield industrial processes for experimentation produced, and newer technologies – such as computerized design tools – imported from Japan or the West (as they were never produced in the USSR). And it was only after that was completed (late 2000s) did tangible improvements in Russia’s aviation engine technology manifest. They could not have undertaken an attempt to reduce the fan & compressor stages from 14 to 8 without that base work taking place first. And without that, they couldn’t achieve a stealth design from the front, because they need to shrink the power plant to make room for the blocker. Nor could they have achieved stealth from the rear because of the conflicting demands of extreme thermal cycling and signature reduction. So there would have been nothing realistic that they could right into a request for proposal!

But again, the main point is that even nations which have not been through a recent socio-economic collapse did not chose to go about the path that you are suggesting. (It is that difficult) The JSF program could draw upon both a pre-existing stealth aircraft design and a stealth rated engine. That is why the JSF program was undertaken in the manner that it was. Nobody else is in that same position, and so they all took (or are taking) different roads.

Yes, this does inconvenience them with avionics and such. But this isn’t as much of a problem as you suggest because they have a shorter development cycle and lifecycle anyways. You will have to replace them or update them frequently. But, with an engine design, you want to take the time to do it right so that it can carry you for 30 years with few and minor updates. It’s a very different thing.

It’s a project to keep design teams employed and up-to-date with current technological advances, and who knows, maybe 5 years from now, Russia can actually afford to start building it. Probably not, but it’s something which can be worried then.

A nation’s military tends to mirror its economic priorities. Take the United Kingdom. It has a very capable Navy which can undertake just about any mission assigned to it, and anywhere in the world. On the other hand, the UK only has around 300 main battle tanks. This is because it has an economy very much geared towards maritime traffic and offshore oil exploration, but doesn’t have much economic need for large ground forces. Their only requirement (a political one) is to augment joint expeditions, and 300 tanks is enough for that.

Russia has historically had predominantly land based economic and trade connections. So they kept a lot of tanks and such from the USSR but didn’t bother to maintain it’s Navy. However, with the rapid development going on in the far north, maritime trade and traffic will become increasingly important. And if that continues the Russian Navy will recover.

I would say there are two valid complaints that are hard to dispute in regard to the Pak-Fa program:

1. Far too rosy pronouncements from gov officials with unrealistic timeline.

2. No reason

Izd

.

30 shouldn’t

have entered development and testing concurrent with the award of the Pak-Fa development to Sukhoi.

I definitely agree with you, FBW, on #1. However, your opinion on #2 shows a lack of appreciation for the engineering difficulties in going down such a path. And don’t just take my word for it, take note that nobody new to the stealth game has chosen to do it. China didn’t do it with either of their designs (they may or may not have tried but it is evident that their engines lag their airframes). The Japanese took a three step approach – fist a small stealth demonstrator airframe, then an engine which is now in bench testing, and last a definitive fighter design which is still to be finalized. Likewise, the other stealth projects that nations are planning to initially use off the shelf engine designs which will only later be replaced with indigenous (and supposedly dedicated for stealth) designs.

The reason for this is because an engine design is an enormous materials science job. Heat, and particularly the thermal cycling, places extreme limitations on what you can do from a signature reduction standpoint. It limits the shape of components and structures because you can only tolerate so much induced stresses due to thermal variations. It places severe limitations on the materials you can use. And the thermal cycling is horribly rough on bonded coats – which you will need to use for both infrared and RCS reduction.

The Russians made the right choice to work on the airframe first. They could do a lot of work with that in the early 00s such as aerodynamic studies, fusion architecture conceptualization, tests on the RAM samples obtained from the downed F-117, etc. With the airframe they could push a lot of the hard materials science work midway into their schedule. But with an engine most of that has to be done up front. And there was no way for them to design and build something as capable as Izd 30 until they had renovated their Soviet era industry.

[USER=”41403″]Yama[/USER] – Scooter’s brain stops working when it comes to the FC-31. Facts fall on deaf ears.

That is exactly why i say the program was poorly led. too ground breaking instead of a clear path for implementing the program step by step.

And how does this indicate that it was poorly led? How is learning about a possible attack vector AND devising mitigation factors before there is such a corrosive attack a failure? Again, how long do you think it will be before there is another stealth platform cleared for carrier based ops?

And any material you use is going to have attack vectors for corrosion. Titanium alloys have them (dassault uses them), carbon fiber composites have them (dassault uses them), and, yes, aluminum alloys have them. The goal is to manage corrosion…unless if you are advocating building a stealth fighter from noble gases!

An entry date of 2023 is very reasonable, Scooter. Five years is plenty of time to flight test an engine. Keep in mind it has already passed the bench testing phase. (And, by that point, there is very little cost remaining in the program) So I’m not sure why you think it should take so long.

…the price range that has been hinted for the Su-57 should pose a significant strain for the budget, much less in the amount of units per year that Russia normally buys for their main types. Other hardware is way more expensive even despite the lower numbers, for instance Tu-160, transport planes, AWACS etc.

1) I think the low price that is often floated out is the target once they get their planned production volume going. So, I don’t think this statement is valid in the early period.

2) It’s not just the cost of the plane when you are talking about a stealth aircraft. It’s also the upgrades to the facilities and training and equipping personnel that needs to take place so that you can provide proper upkeep on the aircraft. Russia is in much better shape than it was a few years ago during the crisis periods. They likely didn’t do a whole lot with training and infrastructure then, which would mean they are starting now.