Well, of course Sukhoi used experience from Su-47, just like LockMart used experience from F-22. And projects do get cancelled and replaced all the time while requirement stays. One can easily draw the line from JAST further back in time, to CALF in 1992, to VFMX and ATA in early ’80s…

My guess is Russia will produce a very modest number of Su-57’s in the long-term. In order to at least save some “face” for it’s failure. While, using some of the early models to test technologies for a future 6th Generation Fighter.

Of course the problem short-term is what will equip the vast Russian Air Force over the next couple of decades in the meantime??? This is why I’ve speculated that Russia may approach China is hopes of acquiring the J-31. As it is the only viable option and could at least be “Russianise”. (i.e. Engines, Avionics, Weapons, etc.)

Ummm…all the arguments cited against Su-57 (operational engine not ready, slow progress, small number built) apply to FC-31 to much greater extent.

It’s like Indians should give up Tejas and buy Textron Scorpion instead…

Sure thing. IAC-2 has been envisioned as 65000 ton vessel, right on target for QE design. BAE was one of the companies Indians have asked design assistance for new carrier.
In December, IN said that IAC-2 has “moved ahead” which I take means they have either finalized the design or at least settled on requirements, allowing them to proceed with foreign design teams. One option has been to build a second copy of the IAC-1 instead of a larger CATOBAR ship. But I think they will go ahead with a larger ship, and BAE is probably strongest forerunner here. Russians haven’t build a new carrier for decades, French and Italian designs are much smaller, US ones much larger and all-nuke.

Yes some sort of flying demonstrator is usually required before producing prototypes (YF-22, EAP before Typhoon, Rafale demonstrator) but perhaps it’s not an absolute necessity , in which case why do they bother? To what extent can we really regard the project 144 or the Su-47 as tech demonstrators for PAKFA could be debated – 144 flew twice only for a total time of 40 minutes.

Demonstrators purpose is to show that underlying concepts behind the a/c design and specific technologies work as intended. When you have a plane which employs many new technologies, starting with a demonstrator means there are less surprises and less risk once the program hits actual prototype phase. Down side is that demonstrator itself costs time and money. So it’s a judgement call if you want to start with a demonstrator or go for actual prototype.

Or if you want to take a risk, you can even skip the prototype phase. This was done with F-15, there was no YF-15 or XF-15. They just started building preproduction series, hoping that it will work.

They’re planning to operate AEW helicopter off from frigate? Interesting.

No, the F-16C. The CAPE looked at total CPFH comparison over the lifetime to include all mission critical elements and costs that are depicted in the graphic shared by Spudman earlier. Once you factor all that manpower cost and the cost of the supporting elements that are traditionally not factored into the F-16 CPFH calculation, but are in the F-35, then that CPFH on the F-16 climbs to well above $25K.

Again, these are not your simple operating costs that look at fuel and spares etc. The CAPE definitions are some of the most comprehensive set of metrics that get rolled into CPFH and they have published plenty of documents that define exactly what each element of that is.

For example, from Spud’s post above, the CAPE considered the following cost elements while considering the F-35/F-16 CPFH –

– Unit-Level Manpower
– Unit Operations
– Maintenance
– Sustaining Support
– Continuing System Improvements
– Indirect Support and
– Other

This is a comprehensive list and includes a lot more than just the cost incurred if one were to deploy the aircraft. It includes long term sustainment, support and even system improvements. A lot of these are fleet wide spends that are then allocated with FH as the allocation base. As with basic accounting, which cost elements you consider and how you allocate that cost needs to be well understood for one to make sense of any CPFH $$ amount that is being discussed.

A detail description for each of those elements is provided by CAPE below. I am yet to come across an equally exhaustive official document that describes each and every element included in a CPFH estimate from other OEM’s or supporting government services. I’ve asked in the past from some of the forum members but they haven’t provided anything yet. What we get is usually a number. $5000, $10000 or $15000 but unless you have the underlying analysis that shows what elements are included one has no basis to do an apples to apples comparison. A good example of that is the earlier chart cited by Spud. One could easily claim, based on that, that the F-16C costs under $10K per hour to operate. In reality however, once the CAPE looked at all of the data and attempted to estimate the overall operational cost as measured per flying hour with a more comprehensive set of cost elements the cost jumped to above $25K.

Calculation of all those factors at this point for F-35 is, however, largely pointless, because we have no way to know what kind of requirements the plane will have 10 or 20 years from now and what sort of support systems in might necessite. It’s like attempting to foresee in 1975 that F-16 will require infrared/laser attack pods 30 years later and trying to predict what they would cost to acquire and upkeep.

Considering one of the failed performance parameters for the F-16 was sustained turn requirements due to refusal to allow it to be tested without the conformal tanks, one has to ask why they held the exhaustive trials in the first place.

Well, that is realistic though, has anyone ever seen E/F without conformal tanks?

I don’t think it is this simple. Having two suppliers, when one is not even producing a product at the level wanted is not the same thing as really having “two suppliers”. Boeing has the T-X till well into the 2030’s, has the MQ-25 into the late 2020’s, and has the F/A-18E/F till the mid 2020s with the F-15 Adv. Eagle likely also something that can sustain production till the early-mid 2020’s. So having St. Louis as a viable IB for military systems was not an issue. So Lockheed will not be the sole combat fighter producer in the US till perhaps the second half of the 2020’s. Even then, Boeing has probably delivered more fighters in the last 10-15 years than Lockheed Martin (overall domestic+export). Additionally, you have the $10 Billion in identified NGAD/PCA funding over the next 4 years to assure a diverse future fighter design base.

Well, as I said, T-X is much more important in maintaining Boeing’s fast jet production capability in any case as that program will probably keep going for very long. Still, it is not a combat aircraft and other programs you mention have limited legs. Mid-2020’s is only 6 years away. I guess they could force Super Hornet to the Marines…naah, I guess they can’t.

But I sure also have doubts that this is a good idea. 144 fighters which in many respects represents technological level USAF is trying to do away with…and even if the acquisition cost is relatively affordable as promised, what about support? F-15 is still honking big aircraft which is not particularly cheap to maintain when compared to say F-16. F-15X also has little common technologically with existing USAF Strike Eagles, and almost nothing with F-15C. It is basically a whole new type.