Interesting reading in the latest Parliamentary Defence Committee hearing:
Q578 Chair: On the regeneration of capabilities, the SDSR states that “we will maintain the ability to regenerate capabilities that we plan not to hold for the immediate future.” How is progress on the regeneration of capabilities going? How are those capabilities being prioritised?
General Houghton: Primarily, I think the carriers and carrier strike is the thing that we are thinking about in the regeneration, particularly the second carrier. At the moment, we proceed with the build of both carriers. We proceed to abide by the SDSR outcome that one will be in operational use and a second at extended readiness. But we sensibly delayed till 2015 a decision on whether or not to keep it in extended readiness in perpetuity or actually to use the existence of the second carrier in the context of what might be a different financial situation, whether or not we want to make operational use of it. Therefore, we give ourselves the ability to have a carrier available 100% of the time rather than just what would be five years out of seven.
Q579 Chair: Do you agree with the proposition that if you have only one aircraft carrier, every time it goes into refit you are proving to the Treasury that you do not need it?
General Houghton: Um.
Chair: You are allowed to say yes.
General Houghton: That is palpably a serious risk. That is one of the areas where, as it were, in international collaboration, it would make sense-would it not?-between, for example, ourselves and the French, that we made certain, in terms of the availability of our single carriers, that we so rostered them that there was a seamless availability between the two nations.
Q580 Chair: Are you suggesting that we would use the Charles de Gaulle to fight from?
General Houghton: No, but what I am saying is that, patently, we have a defence co-operation treaty with France. Patently, between the UK and France, we are the two leading defence nations of the European pillar of NATO. There will be many occasions on which our security interests absolutely coincide. Therefore, would it not absolutely make sense that if we both as nations happen to be in possession of solely one carrier, we so rostered their availability to make certain that one of them was available at all times and that we did not make the period of two-year refit the same two years? To me, that would make absolute common sense.
Q581 Chair: On a technical issue, do you accept that the joint strike fighter could not land fully laden on the Charles de Gaulle?
General Houghton: My understanding is that the stresses on the deck of the Charles de Gaulle would mean that the joint strike fighter could not, under the current physics and dynamics of what we know, land. The reverse is not true.
Q582 Chair: The reverse would clearly be not true. Rafale could land on our aircraft carriers, but not ours on theirs.
General Houghton: Yes. But again, within an overall coalition force mix, it is not ridiculous to suggest that the French might generate the carrier strike capability, and that some of our ships would be used as escorts. We might use an Ocean and fly attack helicopters on them. There are some wholly sensible joint capability agreements that we could reach with a coalition partner, which keep carrier strike capability an option for coalition operations.
Q583 Chair: In view of all our recent memories of the Falklands and Iraq, one cannot really see the French alongside us for such an operation. So do you think it is okay to take such a risk?
General Houghton: This, to me, is in the political space.
Q584 Chair: You would need to give some military advice on that, wouldn’t you?
General Houghton: I am not certain that it takes military advice; it is a pretty pragmatic statement. If there is a political agreement that there will be defence co-operation and political decision making about the commitment of a coalition force, everything flows from that. We cannot just say, “I’m not certain that we get on with the French.” There will be issues of interoperability, but if the political will is there to make the defence co-operation treaty a reality of political will in real-time scenarios, we would salute, turn to the right and match our capabilities accordingly.
Q585 Thomas Docherty: I will come back to Harriers in more detail shortly. Two things, first to the General: I think you might have misspoken-HMS Ocean is coming out of service in 2016 according to the Secretary of State’s most recent statement, so we will not have an Ocean-it is QE or nothing for the Royal Navy.
General Houghton: Yes, but we still have another LPH.
Thomas Docherty: But we would not have Ocean.
General Houghton: Not Ocean, but another LPH. I was just picking Ocean as a current-day example.
Q586 Thomas Docherty: On extended readiness, it occurs to most people that there will be a problem if you do not fit cats and traps to both carriers. For argument’s sake, let us say that Queen Elizabeth does not have cats and traps fitted by its entry date and you tie it against a wall at Portsmouth. If you wanted to get it out into service, you could not then fly the Rafale or the joint strike fighter-either our version or the American one. Am I right in saying that extended readiness means that you must put cats and traps on both of them, or they will be one, big, glorified pile of scrap?
General Houghton: It depends how extended your readiness is.
Q587 Thomas Docherty: In that case, General, do you accept that if you took a carrier into either Brest or Rosyth, stripped its deck off and tried to put cats and traps on, even working 24 hours a day, you would be looking at many months, if not a full year?
General Houghton: That is not to say that a carrier without cats and traps has no utility.
Q588 Thomas Docherty: As a fighter jet carrier?
General Houghton: Yes. What I am trying to stress more publicly is that carriers are associated purely with strike. But they are a sovereign air base that can, with relative security, go to strategic distances-you can fly attack helicopters off them and you can use them as a platform for amphibiosity. In future-these things will last 40 years-one would hope that they will have UAVs, UCAVs, Cruise missiles and all sorts of things. So it is not right to narrowly say, “If you can’t fly those jets off in that time frame these things have no utility.” All I am saying is that we can afford to wait for a 2015 SDSR to say, “Okay, what do we want to do with that second carrier? Is it extended readiness? Is it to fill it with cats and traps? Is it to use it as an LPH?” There is a range of options.
Q589 Thomas Docherty: But do you accept that although the SDSR and the Government refer to extended readiness, when the wider defence community refers to it, it means an ability to fly fast jets off carriers? You have already said that we will have an LPH in addition. And would the Minister like to comment?
Nick Harvey: I do not think that we would accept that definition. It would be one option to take the carrier away and work 24/7 to put cats and traps on it, as you say. But as the Vice Chief has laid out, there will be a variety of other uses to which it could be put that would help plug the gap that would need to be filled if the first carrier was not in operation at that time.
Q590 Chair: The Vice Chief suggested that it was a relatively well defended piece of real estate. But one of the main defences of an aircraft carrier is the fast jets that it has on it, which it would not have on it in such circumstances.
General Houghton: No, but it does not deploy in isolation; it deploys within a maritime task group.
Q591 Chair: Assuming we have them.
2014: (if not next month…) HMS Illustrious bows out.
2016: HMS Ocean bows out
2016: QE in service (?)
2020: PoW in service as Strike Carrier
It is evident that, from 2016 to 2020, QE will be alone, and will be an LPH.
In 2020 we will have the carrier strike, and QE might be mothballed.
Then what the hell is the LPH they babble about?????
Either QE is not mothballed and kept around as LPH, or there is only one flat top, the carrier.
What is this LPH they hint to? An HMS Ocean replacement…? I thought it was the first thing which got cancelled in the SDSR.
Reassuring to see expressed the idea carrier AND LPH, as some sources had suggested that the risk was to have a single, everything-doing CVF.
Recently, BAe System has also added an LHD page on its website, with the LHD being most evidently an upgraded Ocean design. (Better troop and vehicle space, dock for LCUs, even if with smaller hangar for just 6 Merlins)
http://www.baesystems.com/Businesses/SurfaceShips/PlatformsandProgrammes/AmphibiousVessels/index.htm
http://www.baesystems.com/BAEProd/groups/public/documents/bae_publication/bae_pdf_lhd_datasheet.pdf
Two hints make a proof?
Not in this case, but i try and have a hope at least.
However my solution would be to fit catapults to both CVFs and operate both to cover Strike Carrier and LPH role.
Non optimal a solution itself, but probably the best one. Both carriers would be able to take on Strike or Landing Helicopter Aviation role, and cover each other during scheduled refits, giving constant presence (as either Carrier, LPH or Mixed [LHA] depending on operation, of course: when only one ship is active, you cannot have Carrier AND LPH)
However, the bit about catapults in the Hearing comes later, and points very firmly to a single carrier fitted:
Bernard Gray: What I am trying to ask you is what is the cats and traps issue in your mind?
Q622 Thomas Docherty: There are two parts to it, effectively, although correct me if I have got this wrong, Mr Gray. First, we are currently deciding which of the two versions of cats and traps we wish to purchase: steam or electromagnetic. Secondly, we are working out how to not get gouged by suppliers, given that if we go for the new electric version, my understanding is that the only current workable bearings are held by General Atomics. When the Secretary of State had lunch with the Press Gallery last month, he suggested that the cost of cats and traps was adding up to £2 billion. I would suggest that that was a bit of a problem.
Bernard Gray: What is the question?
Thomas Docherty: How are you getting on with driving down the £2 billion cats and traps problem?
Bernard Gray: I do not recognise that number.
Q623 Thomas Docherty: It is a number that the Secretary of State used.
Bernard Gray: You say that, but I wasn’t there, I didn’t hear it, it’s not an on-the-record conversation, so I don’t know. I am telling you that I do not recognise that number. We are doing work, which we would expect to come to a head over the course of the next three or four months, in determining what the most appropriate technology is and into which carrier it should be fitted.
Q624 Thomas Docherty: Or both? Has that decision been taken?
Bernard Gray: I believe we said in the defence review that we were intending to fit one of the carriers with cats and traps. That is reasonably clear.
Q625 Thomas Docherty: What the Prime Minister said in the House was that, as part of this process, they would review that-General Houghton is nodding. It was a minimum of one, but a decision would be taken on the cost of two.
Nick Harvey: The situation is unchanged from the SDSR.
Q626 Thomas Docherty: Is that one, or one and possibly two, or two?
Nick Harvey: A minimum of one.
Bernard Gray: If we were to go down the route that you are suggesting, which is one of the options under evaluation, to procure what is called the EMAL system, which is manufactured by General Atomics, the most probable procurement route for that would be through a foreign military sales agreement with the United States, where the United States system is responsible for handling aspects of that. I would not regard it as reasonable to describe us as “gouged” by a contractor with whom we have done some business in the past. It is as it is with references made earlier to the Yellow Book. When one gets down to the selection of a particular piece of equipment supplied by one person, you are in a negotiation with them. That would happen through FMSLs, as the acquisition of C-17s has been handled. I do not see any difference between the two. I do not see any evidence to suggest that there would be any difference.
The “a minimum of one” frankly does not enchant me. It is as sincere as the idea of pulling out of mothball a carrier and work “24/7 to fit catapults to it” is smart. It is total bonkers to say an obscenity like that. At best, i’d take six months…
And that “a minimum of one” is, i believe, a way to say “one” without clearly admitting it.
It seems set they have already decided that only one will be fitted, at least for now (and i’m willing to bet that in this case it is going to be HMS Prince of Wales to back-load the cost on the future – hopefully easier – budgetary rounds instead of the next few – white hot – ones) with the second eventually coming later.
This makes sense as a non-converted QE could be in service in 2016, taking the role of LPH from Ocean (previously expected to last to 2018 or even 2022, but here i read 2016…).
Then, in 2020/21, PoW comes as Carrier Strike/secondary role as LPH, and QE is NOT mothballed, but kept as LPH.
Eventually, if Santa is very, very generous, the Navy manages to fund fitting of cats to her too during the first refit (around 2022 if she enters service in 2016), so that she is back in service in time to cover the role when PoW hits her own first refit.
Would quite make sense, overall, i think.
In this scenario, no LHD to replace Ocean is built, but then again, i don’t think they are actually serious at considering a replacement for her (very sadly, but realistically). The LPH(R) programme is “on hold” since 2006, and i believe it was entirely scrapped as part of the SDSR.
Anyway, the whole hearing can be read here. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/uc761-vii/uc76101.htm
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