Liger30Farewell to a great old lady
Farewell to a great and heroic old lady. HMS Invincible has shaped the history of the UK and of the military seagoing, as her success as Harrier carrier has meant the appearance of clones all over the world, from Spain to Italy to Thailand.
It shouldn’t have been ended this way, though. I feel like it is HMS Warspite all over again.
It was a sacrilege to destroy the most decorated warship ever, and it is an equal sacrilege to give this end to the winner of the Falklands.
Long live HMS Invincible!
Liger30It’ll be some time still before the assembly work starts in Rosyth. Until the Lower Block LB03 isn’t completed and shipped up north, there’s no starting. The block is progressing… but it is, like… 6000 tons worth. It is not so easy.
In august A&P Tyne will send the five parts of the middle-area of the flight deck to Rosyth on barge, however… And this week, any day now, there will be the official steel cutting for the start of the work on the Prince of Wales.
Who knows… if the rumors were true, i guess that the ceremony might turn out with a big surprise and involve the re-naming to Ark Royal, but this is pure speculation.
Liger30Anyway, the plan for 4 F35 Squadrons has not been officially abandoned. Even in the latest audition (18 May) of the Defence Chiefs before the defence committee, the first sea lord and RAF chief both agreed that in 2020 there’ll be one squadron… but they will grow to 3. They say 3 squadrons which could go on a carrier. This means that another squadron should serve as OCU at home, because the last time things were so extreme that even an OCU was fielded in the fight was in the Falklands with 899 NAS embarking for the war regardless of its role as OCU.
The official plan is a 60 : 40 share RAF : FAA. If four squadrons are stood up as planned, there’s good chances of two being 800 and 801 NAS, and the other two might be 1 and IV RAF (if they build on Harrier heritage) but i would suggest/expect that one of the two gets the 617° Dambusters badge. Would suck to loose that along with the Tornado. It would be like Joint Force Harrier, with Navy and RAF personnel mixed up in the squadrons, so that the 60 : 40 figure would easily be respected despite the 50 : 50 share of badges.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=6477523&c=EUR&s=SEA
I looked at the video of the whole hearing, which is here: http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Main/Player.aspx?meetingId=8373
You can hear it by yourselves. There’s also the transcription document of a previous hearing, of Lord Stirrup and Sir Rupert Smith, former chiefs, providing their own views.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/uc761-iv/uc76101.htm
It contains a lot of interesting stuff, such as:
Q296 Chair: Can I just ask you a couple of questions about the aircraft carriers? What was the point of having an aircraft carrier that was interoperable with the French?
Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Well, the point of interoperability is that if one is operating alongside one’s friends and allies, it provides you with greater flexibility. I think we have to be clear what we are talking about in terms of interoperability. We are not talking about French aircraft flying and fighting from our carriers or vice versa, because it is not simply a matter of aircraft landing on and taking off from carriers. They have to be refuelled, rearmed and repaired. You need the spares, the weapons, the engineers, and you can’t provide all those for different kinds of aircraft. It would be easier to interoperate in a fighting sense with other nations that were using the same kind of aircraft and weapons.
Q297 Chair: So if it is not flying and fighting from an aircraft carrier, what is the point?
Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: It can land on, be turned around, be refuelled and sent off again back to its own carrier, and that increases your overall level of flexibility.
and even:
Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: I think probably the whole area of intelligence surveillance, targeting and reconnaissance. It was an area that we wanted to protect in the SDSR. It was set out as a clear policy decision not only to protect it but, if possible, to improve it. That was not possible, given the financial constraints. So we have reduced in those areas, and I suspect that my first area of concern would be to reverse some of those reductions.
Q294 Chair: Would that include the maritime patrol aircraft, or would it not?
Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: It might include some of the capability. I am not clear at the moment what stage they have reached in the examination of the ability of unmanned vehicles to help in this area. As you know, we have expanded the number of unmanned aero vehicles over recent years in this area in particular. They are so valuable predominantly because of their endurance, and the fact that they can stay up for so long. They have been critical to current operations, and they will be critical to other operations as well. It would not necessarily be a reversal of the Nimrod decision, not that I think that that is feasible since they have been cut up, but it might be putting some of that capability into the unmanned arena.
Q295 Mr Havard: One of the things about the capability that we have lost was its ability not only to see, but to hear. Unmanned vehicles can see a lot, and surely being able to hear is a crucial part of any recovery of a capability.
Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: It is, and they cannot do it at the moment to the extent that manned aircraft can, which is why there is a programme to replace that particular capability of the Nimrod, as you may be aware. But that does not mean to say that, in five years’ time, they will not be able to do it. For all the reasons that I have stated, we do need to keep pushing as hard as possible into this unmanned area because of the advantages that it brings. It will not supersede everything in the manned arena, but it will take on more and more of the business as time goes by.
And more:
When the Prime Minister announced the defence review in the House last October, he said that it was his personal view that that would be required for Future Force 2020 to be affordable. But he is, of course, unable to commit a future Government, so it is still very much an area of uncertainty. It would be enormously welcome if there were a degree of cross-party support for that particular proposition. I do not think that there necessarily is such support at the moment, not least because the Ministry of Defence has to plan now for certain aspects of the force structure beyond 2015. It can only plan on what it knows, so at the moment it is planning on the basis of a flat real budget from 2015 onwards. At the moment, the Ministry of Defence is planning not to achieve Future Force 2020.
And again:
Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Carrier strike is one. Anti-submarine warfare is another. Along with others, I made it clear in the defence review that if we went ahead with the decision to get rid of maritime patrol aircraft, in the circumstances of a resurgent submarine threat we would not be able to send a naval taskforce to sea unless someone else provided that capability. It was not a case of taking a bit more risk; we simply would not be able to do it, should that particular threat level rematerialise. Nobody is saying that it will or that it won’t, but we would have to look for somebody else to provide that capability. That is another fairly stark example.
On Tuesday, May 24, another hearing will take place, with ex First Sea Lord Jonathon Band. I expect it to be just as interesting, if not more.
Liger30The Typhoon force WILL comprise 5 squadrons, indeed.
I contest the 16 figure, though, as the old Tornado GR4 after the cuts is going down to 5 squadrons, 96 planes and 18 deployable planes at high readiness.
Even if the Typhoon fleet in 2019 goes down to 107 planes with the retirement of the Tranche 1 as planned, there will still be 5 squadrons capable to deploy abroad around 20 planes.
To which we might add 4 hypothetical FAA squadrons, that operating to RN guidelines can be deployed for 660 days in every 36 months without breaching the guidelines.
RAF guideline is 140 days in 12 months. 4 months deployed on operations followed by 16 months of break.
RN deployment guidelines are that “up to 60% of any 36 months period can be spent deployed”.
Deployability would GROW, not shrink. Indeed, the limit would not be so much in the crews but in the machine’s mainteinance, if the F35 goes navy.
For the RAF it might be bad, but for the UK it would be good.
And then again, yes. The RAF has been downsized with axe chops in the last decades… But this applies to all three services. What should the RN say if we reason that way??? It had over 600 ship in the late 50s!
Liger30The sensible move at this point would be to allocate ALL F-35Cs to the FAA for carrier ops (that is what they are for anyway, and the RAF can then make the transition to a single FJ fleet of Typhoons, replacing the Tornados with Tranche 1 Tyffies which are currently bought, paid for, modified for ground attack and scheduled to be thrown away in the next few years. The T2 and T3 Tyffies can cover the AD role with secondary strike capability and the logisitics and training pipeline for the RAF can be streamlined producing massive savings. The FAA can concentrate on the carrier strike/fleet air defence role and there is then a situation of neither service straying onto the other’s turf. Plan for this now and the big savings can be made, persist with the nonsense of ‘jointery’ for the carrier air groups (an idea NOT being copied anywhere else in the world, because it won’t work and hasn’t worked in the past) and we all lose out.
One problem: from where would the money for retaining the Tranche 1 would come? We always go back to the main problem: if the defence budget is not increased, there simply won’t be money for much.
And one consideration. I agree with your plan, i’d only suggest doing the opposite: use Tranche 1 for air defence (their ground attack capability is limited to Litening III target pods and Paveways II/III/E and IV from next year if everything goes well) and use Tranche 2 and 3 as swing role with ground attack as main mission, since they’ll come integrated with Brimstone, Storm Shadow and everything.
Liger30Yeah, but the point is that the F35 JCA is not the Harrier/Sea Harrier replacement anymore.
When in 2005 FOAS was cancelled, the RAF suddenly became supportive of the switch to the more powerful F35C variant, and effectively turned JCA into Tornado’s replacement.
So long at the carrier isn’t left with the hangar empty, i can accept it.
But yes. I totally, utterly agree that the F35 should be a FAA thing, end of the story.
Sadly, that can’t be. As long as it is joint, the government can say to have replaced both Sea Harrier and Tornado.
Otherwise, the RAF will whine and complain and make a terrible fuss. Understandably, to a point… But this does not make a stupid decision a smart one. It remains stupid.
Liger30The cost of building CVF, as recognized by NAO, climbed by 1,5 billion JUST because Labour delayed the programme one year in order not to pay 450 million pounds that were due.
So far, the CVF building has been SPECTACULARLY succesful: often targets have been met ahead of schedule, and there have not been cost overruns save from that political one.
The carriers are now said to cost 5.2 billions because of that demented decision. But as the NAO itself confirmed, other than that, the carriers are on budget and schedule. No fault of the industry there, much as they try to make it look that way.
Liger30On another note I am rather bemused by A&P’s progress with the flight deck modules. At this rate we will have the rather perverse situation of having to cut about brand new modules to incorporate the design changes.
Some cutting will be inevitable, but much less than you fear: under the flight deck there was always going to be space reservation for catapults and arresting wires.
But the pieces built by A&B Tyne and shown in the video are probably not affected by the conversion, judging from this ACA building video.
http://www.aircraftcarrieralliance.co.uk/media/video-library.aspx
Looking at the “Ship Integration” video, from the right menu, i believe we can identify, more or less, the Blocks that really will need modifications.
CB04D, built by Cammell Laird, is (empirically speaking) the deck block where the arrestor wires might end up being, for example, judging roughly by the position. So this might be affected. Or the one immediately behind it, or both.
SP02, by Babcock, is affected for sure as it will need redesign, with the angled deck and catapult changing the shape of the whole module and making indispensable a re-location for the platforms for the 30 mm gun and Phalanx. Some of the nearby modules will be affected by the second catapult.
CB02B, 2A and CB01 modules are, indicatively, those affected by the main catapult.
But the modules on the video should not be affected, or touched only marginally, since they should be CB03A, 03B, 03C and 03D and 03E, which will form the middle of the flight deck area. They should not be affected, nor by catapults, nor by wires.
Of course, this is a very rough analysis i make.
Liger30If you ask me, the RN/RAF are better off training their F35 pilots wholly in the US. France sends its naval pilots in the US for training, and we all know that France goes national on pretty much ANYTHING if there’s a chance at all of doing so. Italy also sends its naval pilots on Cherry Point in the US to train on the Harrier.
Investing in a full sized OCU which brings away planes and money from the frontline strength to save a “sovereignty” over training has no sense to me. If a situation in which the US would not train UK pilots can be envisaged at all, then the whole strategy behind the military planning of the UK is wrong and must be entirely revised. But since this is not the case, i say send the pilots training in the US, buy the mere number of F35 simulators needed to keep pilots trained and qualified to install in whatever base is chosen for JCA, and have a mere “flight”-sized OCU/OEU for the little tasks that remain.
Remember the interview to the RAF’s Group 1 chief which came out not so long ago about the first squadron on F35 in 2020 being a “large” squadron with 20/25 crews and 20 planes?
That’s my idea. 12 frontline, 8 OCU/OEU/spares, combined in the same large unit.
Of course, the squadron should be 800 NAS, for carrier ops to start in 2020 as planned.
The second squadron would be a RAF one, personally i’d suggest 617° since the Dambusters are not a squadron i’d want to see lost.
Then 801 NAS, and last another RAF squadron.
The 60 : 40 balance would still be effective since, as with Joint Force Harrier, RAF personnel would be part of the Navy squadrons as well… and anyway, it is likely that, just as with the Harrier, the “navy” squadrons will be under command of the 1° Group RAF anyway.
It is a very imaginative 60 : 40. I’d call it 90 : 10, personally.
But someone years ago decided that it makes sense to have the RAF doing FAA work… so there’s nothing we can do save shaking our heads and hope for the best.
Liger30If you ask me, the F35 should be a Navy affair. End of it.
Liger30Note that original plan was 50:50, to start with: 800 NAS, 801 NAS, 1 RAF, 4 RAF, as with the Joint Force Harrier.
The Joint Force Harrier plan was betrayed, and the F35 is already going down the same route.
When the RAF top brass speak, shivers go down my back.
Anyway, i covered that article and its implications vastly on my blog: http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2011/05/spot-differences.html#comments for whoever’s interested.
Liger30And anyway, the escorts are not built specifically for the carrier. The Type 23s and Type 45 as well and all the rest exist and will continue to exist anyway. And they will continue to deploy at sea each year, for the very same cost.
If they deploy alone, with the amphibs, with an accompanying RFA, or with the Carrier Strike group nothing changes at all.
As to the cost of Libya: May’s edition of the Defence Equipment and Support journal provides a few interesting figures:
About 726 tonnes of freight and 848 personnel were moved by air in the deployment phase, and this is now being developed by DSCOM’s Movements Operations team into a sustainable, regular operation using military and commercial aircraft.
With a considerably easier destination than Afghanistan to reach, DSCOM has also been
exploiting both the Global Freight Transportation Service contract that they manage and the military assets of the RAF’s 2 Mechanical Transport Squadron to take
essential stores and munitions overland to Italy
The Defence Fuels Group has played a fundamental role, deploying personnel to provide (and pay for) aviation and maritime fuels for both UK and Allied forces
in Gioia del Colle, Trapani and Souda Bay. This has been backed up with the rescheduling of ocean tankers to ensure that operations, including the deploying Operation Cougar ships (ready to support evacuation from countries experiencing ‘unrest’) can continue apace.
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/69FFA8EE-F63A-49D0-8A97-BDB6C6778D39/0/desider_36_May2011.pdf
There is no indication of how many civilian flights were chartered, but it must be a good number. They were already being used to support Afghanistan alone since there’s not enough cargo planes, no way now that there’s two operations to resupply things can be better.
All this costs. Quite a lot.
As for CVF, there’s an article on page 16 about the sections being joined in Govan, and of course there’s news of the contract to Northrop Grumman for the Bridge Navigation system for the class.
workers in Portsmouth have brought more sections together for the first time.
The first two sections, known as rings, of Lower Block 02 were joined together on 1 April. Rings G and F were brought together in a six hour operation at BAE System’s
facility in Portsmouth.
Once finished, the block will weigh more than 6,000 tonnes, just under ten per
cent of the full displacement of first carrier QueenElizabeth.
F u r t h e r moves took place on 6 April – two days ahead of schedule – when the
smallest of the rings, Ring C, forming the forward hull section was moved using two trains of lifting trucks with 96 wheels 15 metres across the hall to mate with Ring D.
The next stage is to weld the two sets of rings together, a process that will take ten weeks.
Liger30Indeed! On trials the HMS Daring ran 4100 naval miles with an average consume of just 35 cubic meters of gas for day. http://www.science.mod.uk/codex/issue3/features/features10.aspx
That actually means A QUARTER of average Type 42 consume.
One of the baseline Type 45 requirements was specifically: “The T45 shall be able to transit at least 3000 nautical miles to its assigned mission, operate for 3 days and return to point of origin, unsupported throughout, within 20 days.”
More than met, as to trials results. Just as the speed (31.4 knots against 29 required).
The CVF will use a similar (even though bigger, of course) propulsion system.
Liger30Of course they’ll be different. The ship in itself will cost 44 millions a year to run in 2002 money.
CVF has a crew of 682 and no “tied” airgroup, but embarked Merlins (already there) or Apaches (already there) or F35C and, hopefully, MASC platforms, embarked when needed and not constantly assigned to the carrier.
US Carriers have 6000 (yes, 6000) men on board and 44 fighter jets plus some helicopters and 4 Hawkeye as baseline airgroup to factor in, for 1 billion dollars.
I want everyone to note that the whole surface fleet of the RN costs just around 1 billion a year to keep at sea, and definitely there’s no way CVF’s coming triplicates the budget.
Otherwise the UK would have bought two Nimitz and there it was the carrier.
Don’t we go saying heresy!
Liger30Building an air base is easy
Really…?
For what i know, Camp Bastion took a looong time to come up, in april 2006 was opened and could take just few flights for week.
For a long time the runway was made of gravel and kinda short. Had to be lengthened and paved a few times, with the first real runway coming online in 2007, first to adapt it for Tornado, then to make it C17-capable (for quite some time the C17 landed only in Khandahar) and so along. Last February the last lengthening work was completed and now pretty much everything can land in there. An evolution years long.
Hardly what you call easy. When was the last time the West built an airbase…? They are all around from many, many years by now, and just get upgraded and restructured now and then. Many have been closed, but i think there’s not been a single base (save for Camp Bastion’s airport) that has been built from nothing in the West in decades.
Build a FOB for Harriers was “easy”. Probably will already be quite a lot more complex doing so for F35Bs because of the super-heat and super-thrust that has to be managed… But build a base for jets is definitely not easy.
And you are right on the cost of moving personnel and stuff to the base.
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