Liger30For me it is everything but not aimless.
Seeing as the threat to shipping lanes in the Atlantic basin has gone in political and physical terms it could well be someone’s saying enough is enough!
It is gone in peacetime, but that’s all. Unless you believe the fables of the russians SSNs being unable to wreck havoc to merchant shipping in a war, and i’m hoping you are not so hopelessly optimist…
Shore based Merlins can provide delousing support for the bombers.
When the UK will deploy helos in Scotland to hunt subs, we’ll value that. Until they are in Culdrose, they are as relevant as they didn’t even existed, when it comes to THIS particular problem. And it does seem that the Merlin Flights are all preparing for deployment with the Type 23s, but none is going north.
So unless you refer to the couple of SAR Sea King at Lossiemouth…
Your point about Russian SSBN’s evaded me completely. They haven’t deployed their missile boats into the atlantic for more than a decade so what relevance they have to Nimrod I dont know?.
Nothing strange. They have missiles with enough range to be used from their own home waters, where they are easier to defend. It is an obvious procedure and not at all a sign of weakness.
More than point out a need for Nimrod, which would have an hard time trying to hunt them in Russia’s garden, it was to point out that the russian fleet is far from dead, and the need for a nuclear deterrent is more than real, regardless of “Cold War is over” junk.
Twice in a few months stories have run in the media of submarine tracks. IF they are genuine stories we are giving away intel on our capabilities very cheaply.
Most likely, the russians knew already all too well that they had been picked up by UK SSNs and shadowed. It is rare that one of the two parts do not notice it at some point. Trafalgar subs come home with photos of the Akula’s hulls, but you can assume that Akulas go home with their own shots most of the time. Unlikely that any real information on intel capabillities of the UK were given away.
The news came out on the news to help the RN score a rare point in its favor in a battle for funding that the Senior Service is losing by at least 20 years in a row. (not that RAF and such laugh that much, but the RN has been axed horrendously)
The only obvious one being to let the other team know not to bother anymore!.
The kind of plea the other can just ignore…?
What are you going to do when they come again, torpedo them…? Of course no.
Fact is: the “dead” russian navy comes spying on british SSBNs. British SSNs do not go wandering outside Murmansk. Who’s more “dead”…?
Liger30Firstly an open question, when the Vanguard’s exit Faslane, at what point are they safe in their transit. The reason I ask is I am wondering if 6 or so land based Merlin’s or Wildcats could cover them as it seems the RN is going to end up with many more Wildcats than escorts to operate them
Don’t say it too loud, because it is not exactly true, but at the same time there were already rumours that the Navy Wildcat could be cut to an even smaller number…:mad: Don’t give them ideas!
As to where Trident is safe… well… i guess the best answer is everywhere, and nowhere.
The Vanguards are very silent and hard to be picked up, but lately the reports are that one and recently even two russian Akula submarines where trying to get close to the SSBNs to register their noise signature. (Which is something the RN tries to dissuade them from doing, since if you have the noise track of a sub, you know what to search and your work at the sonar is one hundred times easier than it would otherwise be).
We don’t know WHERE the russian subs were exactly found, but we can safely assume that in peacetime no russian commander would dare going too close to the coast, since the entrance to Faslane is said to be a bit of a nightmare even for UK boomers, and a russian one, far less practical and expert of the area, wouldn’t want to risk running aground somewhere on the Uk coast, for obvious reason.
Then again, the russian subs most likely try to come as close as possible to Faslane’s entrance, probably at the very limit of the deep water, to pick up the Vanguards as soon as they leave to then try and shadow them on their route.
With Nimrod, these submarines could be found and signaled a lot before they could make it so close to Faslane, and thus intercepted by a british SSN a lot earlier, and dissuaded from wandering too close to the SSBNs.
We could argue that 9 Nimrods were too few anyway, but i still say that they were a massive help: now there is absolutely NOTHING between russian submarines and SSBNs, unless a Trafalgar accompanies the SSBN in and out of Faslane and escorts it in its cruise, to pick up “enemy” SSNs and lure them away from the silent Vanguard, which can so escape silently and hopefully unseen.
In this sense, a definite “thumbs-up” to having the Astutes in Faslane with the SSBNs.
Sounds like the Cold War…? Yeah, it is Cold War. But there was never a real, definite end to these games.
Sure, they aren’t as frequent as back then, but it still happens.
Thank you for the SAR document, though. It is quite awesome, and it is most likely tied to the treaty i’d heard talking of.
Without Nimrod, though, that massive area is effectively uncovered, now.
And HMS Ocean had to make a dash to answer to a call for help on her way back home in the Atlantic.
Luck she was close! She had to recover a patient from a ship, a work Nimrod cannot do, nor can a helicopter because of range, so for this time it was a luck and a situation Nimrod wouldn’t have solved…
But it is not drama. The possibilities of people dying in the future because of the loss of Nimrod are high and real.
Liger30A squadron of Wildcats or Merlins covering the Vanguards as they transit is more than enough.
Yeah, well. Overlooking the fact that this doesn not exist and never will exist. At the most, the RN can offer ONE merlin based on ONE frigate, trading a current standing commitment with the North Sea.
AKA: we retire from… say, drug patrols in the caribean, and provide a frigate to the security of the vital garden of the country and to Trident protection instead.
But since at least one standing commitment is already going to be past the Navy’s reach from next year thanks to the drop in escort numbers, i guess the RN will have to retreat out of not just the Caribean, but from another area as well.
Not the Falklands for obvious reasons.
Not the Gulf.
But withdrawing from piracy-contrast would be a major setback too.
No, what is most likely to happen is that the Trident will move around on its own, with no overlook.
Unless of course France really uses old Atlantic planes to “cover” Uk-relevant waters…
To say it is embarrassing is still being very, very generous.
As to the long range SAR, there’s an international treaty that in theory binds nations to provide a coverage. I don’t know exactly the terms, but it seems like the UK is going to respect the treaty just like it’ll likely respect the 2015 date for retiring single-hulled oil tankers…
As to russian subs being not a threat, it was truer in the 1990 than it is now. Now actually the submarines, just like the russian bombers and all the rest, are getting back on line at the most of their capability.
Russia launch-tested succesfully 3 intercontinental ballistic missiles, (one land based ICBM and 2 models of Sub-Launched missiles) no later than yesterday too, firing them at their missile range in Kamchatka. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4992584&c=EUR&s=AIR with further test launches of the new Bulava to follow.
Oh, just came out: a Bulava was test-fired this morning exactly. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4995765&c=EUR&s=AIR
So i don’t really agree with the “no threat at all” thing either. I’ve a quite different idea over that all.
But then again, UK is also about to retire the Coastguard’s tugs, regardless of the oil rigs and of the works for the offshore wind farms which could both pose a lot of troubles and need for tugs.
And two days after you announce the tugs are to go, HMS Astute runs aground and one of said tugs is called on the scene…! No comment…
It looks like the first “1981-flashback”. Back then “Carriers to be sold” was followed by “Falklands invaded”.
Now “Tugs to be scrapped” is followed by “submarine runs aground”.
Yeah, it promises to be another lucky and smart strategic review, all things considered…
Liger30Is it 3 or 4? If its 3 I’m right. If its 4 you can correct me!
As i said already, they are currently 3, with a long standing, never fullfilled requirement for a 4th.
The $17.5 billion E-2D Advanced Hawkeye program aims to build 75 new aircraft with significant radar, engine, and electronics upgrades in order to deal with a world of stealthier cruise missiles, saturation attacks, and a growing need for ground surveillance as well as aerial scans.
For what i know, so far the USN is favoring the “new-built” approach, also because, when the navy asked if it was feasible to upgrade existing planes, Northrop Grumman was reported to have said: “we can do it, but it might come close in cost to building a whole new plane”.
However, this should mean that there will be a lot of E-2C that could be leased or bought for an advantageous amount of money.
It wouldn’t be the latest model, but it would be common to the existing 3 french Hawkeye, cost less and still beat any Merlin AEW conversion, thus still filling the RN and french requirements brilliantly.
Upgrades could follow in time, funded cooperatively by UK and France, when funds are a bit less of a dream and a bit more of a reality.
I’d still take a deployable 3 Hawkeye, even E2C, over 8 Merlin AEWs any time. Much as i love the Merlin, there’s a whole ocean of difference in performances that can’t be overlooked. Merlin was the best choice if the carrier had no catapults and trap wires. But since this is not the case anymore, other considerations take importance.
Liger30Correction: France has 3 and dreams a 4th to ease the pressure on the other 3.
And buying 3/4 for the UK does not mean that pooling them makes no sense. Pooling would make it easier to maintain crews trained for both countries and would ease the mainteinance costs and complexity.
I’ve produced more than 16 billions of savings in my list: for example, i’ve not quantified (because i can’t produce accurate enough estimates by myself for obvious reasons) the savings of my revised MARS programme, nor can i say how much would be saved from my additional cutbacks on the deterrence force (i expect this to be in the order of the billions, however, especially if i build 3 Trident subs instead of four and halve the cruises at sea for year by taking on a bi-national CASD procedure, 6 months coverage from a UK sub, 6 months of French one and so along)
Nor have i considered the cuts already made and their long term effect. (i’m guessing the overspend figure included the running costs of Nimrod, Harrier and all what is already gone…)
Also, if you read correctly the reports, of the mythical 38 billions overspend figure, only about 20 are related to the equipment programme, so i have possibly more than covered that figure.
Costs in personnel have already dropped by unknown percent with the 17.000-worth cut in frontline numbers and by the even greater cut in MOD personnel, and i expect defence estate and the rest to be the cause (and thus the solution too) of the rest of the overspend. The bases that are about to close, the end of the German stationing, and also the termination of the 14 billions St Athan college programme cut away a great chunck of that to say the least.
Without any increase on the average current budget of the MOD after the SDSR cuts, i believe that the programmes i outline are affordable.
This is, of course, merely a quite empiric exercise to show that it is not impossible to balance things, even without throwing away the whole of the military.
Was the 38 billions figure all-equipment related and the only solution put forwards was “CUTS!”, the UK would face no less than 10 years of ZERO equipment procurement, save (hopefully) for ammunitions, which sincerely is simply impossible to even conceive.
Now, if that’s what politicians envisage, we can shut down the UK as a whole, put a “For Sale” sign on it and stop talking altogether, because it makes no sense to worry at that point. But thanks god i think we are far from such a situation if some good sense is used.
Also, Cameron has said he expects an increase in military spending from 2015. I’m the first who says it is a “smiling-face” promise of no real value… but some increase i really do expect nonetheless.
The MOD can’t always pay disproportionately for a budget deficit it is not the cause of or for whatever government wish of the moment.
Liger30If you think the French would give us to mistrals or pool hawkeyes and let us thrash the living daylights out of their aircraft then say how you think it would work.
Pool Hawkeyes is feasible because it would benefit both countries. A single, larger fleet from where to pick up planes to ensure the french and the UK carrier have 3 Hawkeye on board when they deploy is no so big deal.
Crews would train in the US with a trinational agreement. Mainteinance costs would be shared like it’ll be done with A400.
The French are going to buy hours off the new RAF tankers for a good few years. They might also be cleared to benefit by UK carrier by deploying Rafales on it when CdG is out, allowing them to suffer less the lack of PA2 (i don’t believe they can build that). The UK in such a collaborative climate could certainly get a bargain price to buy a Mistral-class LHD in the future, when Ocean needs replacing.
We are talking about 2020, possibly, with the latest planned OSD date of Ocean being 2022, you know… it is a long term possibility.
If you add up the cost of buying 2xCVF, F35, AEW, Type 26, C2, C3, LPH, trident and the rest in the 20 year time frame required, how do you pay for it. If you cant what do you drop?
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CVFs will be paid for by 2020 when they will be commissioned. By then, they’ll have costed 6 billions or so on… countless years. 600 millions a year from now to 2020? It is probably a lot less, but let’s assume this.
The last of the Astutes will hopefully be commissioned in 2022, in time to replace the last retiring Trafalgar. At around 1 billion each since price for the single boats drop slightly along the production time, they are paid spread on a long period: long lead orders for HMS Agamemnon, the A05, have been placed this year, but it will be 2013 before work for building it starts, so the expense is spread on years too.
Anyway, let’s assume 580 millions a year for the Astute programme up to 2022.
Type 26 could easily cost 400 millions each (i believe it could be done cheaper since most of the weapon system won’t be new but migrate from Type 23, but let’s stick to this MOD estimate) and be, in a happy world, launched one for year from 2021 onwards.
The 124 millions design programme will be over in 2014.
By then the Type 45 procurement expenditure will be over. However, around 2015 the RFA need for new fleet tankers will have become desperate with the MARPOL regulation going into being and the UK embarassed at asking to keep going with single-hulled tankers for some more.
800 millions was the cost of 6 full-military specs tankers. Now, with the shrinking fleet, we can safely assume that a 540 millions, 4 ships deal would be more than adequate, especially if they are built to good specs and take over the Auxiliary Oiler role of the two Oiler Forts too.
The Fleet Solid Replenisher Forts instead would go along for quite a lot still, for much longer than foreseen.
This requirement could be covered in 2/3 years, replace the 3 tankers that survived the SDSR and the Fort Oiler remaining (since one is going, it seems).
The RFA would for now renounce to the Joint Sea Based Logistic ships and the new Solid Replenishers too, doing with four tankers, 2 Fort of the Stores kind and the Waves.
Diligence and Argus would carry on for long, indefinite time.
The RN would then fund the MASC. Possibly starting from 2016, so that by 2020 a flight of 3 Hawkeyes with crews could be provided to the Strike Carrier. (The french do with 3 Hawkeyes. 3 they have, 3 they deploy on carrier. The UK should be able to do the same, and there could always be a joint management of the small fleet, possibly with an additional plane jointly funded too.
At 80 millions dollar apiece, 4 Hawkwyes would cost 320 million dollars. Want to be more realistic/pessimistic? 500 millions dollars with training, spares and all. Today, that would still be a 316 millions order once in pounds.
From 2016 onwards, possibly up to 200 millions a year would go in Trident replacement design and preparation work if Main Gate decision stays in 2016. But still, with the first in-service date being 2028 in the review, the thick of expenditure would not start before 2020 at the earliest.
This would give some hope to the navy to fund Ocean’s replacement. A couple of Mistrals come at 600-some millions dollars.
The RN could get rid of RFA Argus if two were procured, and cover both LPH and ASS and JCTS requirements with the twin LHDs.
This could be covered in 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, with a rough expenditure of 150 millions a year.
C3 is well far away in time, and likely to be pushed even further ahead with current minesweepers enjoying a long, long life.
F35C are going to be financed from RAF budget, for the most part if not entirely. Even in the worst case of paying each 150 million dollars, (95 million pounds at today pound’s value) the order will come at the very earlier in 2015, and only an handful of planes would be ordered, year for year, with the aim of having 12 ready for operation by 2020.
8 billions were planned for acquiring F35C a few years ago, then it was “virtually” raised to 10. I hope that at least half of that amount will still managed by the RAF and Navy by then! It is going to be the only major RAF programme in the next decade, after all.
You have to consider that, in this time, Typhoon expenditure will go shrinking and then will vanish. A400M will also have been paid for by then.
400 millions will be the PFI tanker year cost, but once Typhoon and A400M are handed over, the RAF will only have F35C as major programme to care about and fund, apart from (hopefully) work on drones.
The Army will also spend a lot less than envisaged up to recently.
FIST kits are now unlikely to be more than 30.000, down from a starting point of 35.000 “with more to follow”. Cost for FIST is not known, so i can’t quantify the savings. There was a very vague “15.000 pounds per soldier” around the net, but since there’s not even a final configuration for the kit, the value of the assumption is low. It would be a 75 millions saving, but still it would give the 30.000 kits needed for a planned “deployable strenght for major ops” of 30.000 men set in the SDSR, so it would be optimal in its way.
449 Warriors were to be upgunned and upgraded for a billion or so, but now, with one armored infantry battalion in each of the Five Multi-Role brigades, that shrinks to 290 or so, possibly nearly halving the costs.
Similarly, FRES Scout will equip five recce formations, with possibly as few as 180 Scouts (plus of course the other Protected Mobility, Recovery and other versions, but total numbers will be much lower than earlier planned)
Even FRES UV might revolve around 290 or so wheeled IFV (Nexter VBCI thanks to closer links with France? Possibility not to undervalue… but not bad either) plus the usual special-variants vehicles.
Down from over 3000 “planned” and a FRES budget reported in 16 billions! A realistic cost for a 8×8 advanced IFV is 6/7 million euro. The whole FRES UV might become no more than 3 billions worth of programme, perhaps 6 with FRES SV included.
I already offered a rough saving of 15/16 billions or more over the “38 billions overspend” figure, already reduced by cancellation of Nimrod, base closures and other measures already taken by SDSR, while still facturing long term programmes envisaging Hawkeye, 50 F35C and two Mistrals plus 4 desperately needed tankers to cover a greatly scaled-back MARS requirement, while keeping faith to the levels of force set with the SDSR2010.
I would have still totally trashed Rivet Joint over Nimrod MRA4 myself, too.
It is not impossible.
Of course, if the MOD budget is to be always robbed, no matter what, and be reduced even further, and again by massive levels, this can’t be done… but this SHOULD be done. It is totally feasible for a country like the UK.
And if i have to cut back further, my first target is Trident. Submarines down to 3, coordinated CASD with french to ensure that one submarine is at sea at every one time, be it french or british. Cruises for year halved, along with costs, launch tubes down to 6 or even 4 on each submarine, only 12 missiles, with all the savings coming from this.
Liger30sad to say at the moment E2s don’t seem likely.
Jesus Mary… not now, in 2020, when the Carrier Strike will have to operate. “Now” or anyway in five years time, i’m pretty much expecting to see Sea King ASaC killed. At the moment there’s no need, no money, nor any sense in procuring E2Ds. But by 2020 MASC requirement will be back in full force.
Politicians may have forgotten the consequences of lack of proper AEW in the Falklands War, but the Navy will do its best to remind them.
Why everyone goes about “now”…? Now for sure it is not likely. It is not. Simply not, without even the likely. But by 2020 a MASC platform will be needed anyway, and i see Hawkeye in a very strong position for that day supported by: superior performances, availability of cats and traps, support from French and willingness to joint procurement, and the chance to get a good price for what could be a lease, not even a buy, from the US.
About MR4, what’s the big nasty in the future which has led to its cancellation whilst almost paid for and buying older platforms for SIGINT?
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Older Rivet Joint arriving in 2015 are handy for the current government to say: look! We are giving the right kit to the forces! Just in time for the elections. Also, the RIvet Joint makes US industry happy, and US troops happy too since they’ll benefit from UK using them in theater.
Nimrod instead is “labour shameful management”. See the difference between the two?
Other than this, i really don’t see any other acceptable explanation.
Liger30Is anyone able to confirm that HMS Illustrious is currently undergoing a 40 million pounds refit in No.2 Dock at Rosyth, alongside No.1 Dock where Babcock will be undertaking the assembly and integration of the massive new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers?
I read that she entered Rosyth in february and is expected to be out for sea trials in spring 2011: http://www.maritimejournal.com/news101/an-illustrious-refit-for-royal-navy-flagship
If it is true, HMS Ocean is dead.
No way the RN is allowed to keep her, refit her as planned next year, while scrapping a shiny, just-refitted HMS Illustrious…
But HMS Illustrious IS NOT and never will be a LPH adequate for amphibious ops, differently from Ocean.
Another totally non strategic decision coming along…
In 2008, OSD dates were as follows:
HMS Ark Royal 2012
HMS Illustrious 2015
This however is more recent, being dated 11 october 2010: Peter Luff – Two Invincible Class aircraft carriers currently remain in service with the Royal Navy, HM Ships Ark Royal and Illustrious. HMS Ark Royal is currently planned to be taken out of service in the third quarter of 2014, while HMS Illustrious will reach her out of service date in the second quarter of 2016.
HMS Invincible 2010 [gone]
HMS Ocean 2022
HMS Albion 2033 —-> Most likely the one that gets put in reserve since Bulwark has just come out of refit and is a “new” ship, which besides is now cleared to operate 2 Chinooks on deck instead of one.
HMS Bulwark 2034
Also, i read an amazing 2036 OSD date for HMS St Albans XD
Oh, hell, i’d like people to give answers when the SDR documents come out, not fancy words that hide the ultimate truths.
Refit considerations suggest HMS Illustrious might come out on top.
Military and OSD considerations give HMS Ocean as winner.
Oh, how i crave answers…
Another interesting fact i found, anyway:
Nick Harvey – Since 2003, UK pilots have not attended pilot training programmes in France. UK pilots have attended training courses in the US, where suitable training facilities exist, for the following aircraft types:
MQ-1 Predator
MQ-9 Reaper
T45C Goshawk
F18 Hornet
AV8B Harrier
C17 Globemaster
King Air 350ER
Erase the Harrier, and we have the plan for the coming years too. More pilots will train on F18 and Goshawk for obvious reasons.
One day, we’ll see F35C in there as well. Let’s hope we are saved from the RAF desire to own its own OCU for the F35C, or really there will be no active warplanes but just a training formation…
Liger30I must say that I find some of the comments on this forum intresting…..
All RN carriers to be scrapped not even mothballed, all aircraft scrapped immediatly, merlins to be retained by RAF for current use so nothing to fly off the sole surviving LPH, so guess how long that will last after the next SDR
CVF only to be built according to Osborn and camclegg because they can’t get out of doing so and the idiots want to sell one as soon as possible, remember neither of these three wanted any carrier built
With this background a suprising number of forum members only want to dream about purchases of Hawkeye (you can’t be serious) a couple of shiny new LPH, a helicopter purchase to go on them, 10xtype 26, loads of C2 and C3 ect ect.
The outlook for the RN is extremly serious and it is more than likely they won’t survive the next SDR in any form currently recognisable to us. If they get the carriers and enough aircraft to be meaningfull than that will cost the navy the bulk of the surface fleet to pay for them.
It would be nice to discuss serious options and time lines to achieve them.
I want to be rude, but i’ll try not to.
Months ago, and many of the ones that regularly write on this forum, i was forecasting many of the nasty decisions we saw in the SDSR 2010. What i got from many people back then was “drama” easy accusations.
Now i get accused of being overly optimistic, but i think i am not.
The dream to see Mistrals acquired to replace Ocean is a dream, but if the LPH is to survive, a replacement has to be sought.
Hawkeye. We are talking of 2020. The decision is either to do without an AEW platform at all, modify a number of Merlin helos, buy new Merlins or lease a number of Hawkeyes in cooperation with the French who would love to get a forth one themselves. There is space for cooperation, and a joint leasing with pooling of the fleet may be cheaper even than modifying Merlin helos.
It is true, the Navy is in the worst state EVER and the future is not an happy one.
But, for now at least, i try to be at least positive enough to recognize that two carriers ARE being built and will be there.
The fight is not over, but honestly, even with most of the british public being addicted to NHS alone, i think that any government would be destroyed by certain absurd decisions like selling a NEW carrier for bargain price. No matter to who.
Also, i refuse to accept that the RN surface fleet can be allowed by any government to fall on even smaller numbers.
The RN is going to be forced to drop a Standing Commitment from next year already. We have arguably hit the point of non return for real this time.
If the Type 23 is not adequately replaced, on a 1-for-1 base, the fleet will simply cease to exist, and with it the capability of the UK to appear in the world.
Militarily, it will be an invisible nation, and it will be the end of the “special relationships” with US, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and whoever else.
Similarly, the amphibious fleet can’t be shrunken any smaller without a complete pulling out from the business. Cameron had a carcrash against the Harrier Pilot question.
Figure what would happen to who kills the Royal Navy and closes Devonport. You ever asked yourself why the crazy idea of closing Devonport was abandoned…?
The government, whoever will be in power, will have a VERY hard time killing the little that’s left.
And if they don’t get a hard time and finally destroy it all, well… blame the Britons.
This is called Self-Destruction. It certainly won’t be my fault.
You can’t run the budget of a nation on the cuts to the defence budget. If the growth of expenditure on welfare and NHS is too great to be managed, it must be reduced and slowed down.
Otherwise, at one point, Britain will truly be broke. Now it is not, despite what some crazy guys declare.
But if the economy of the nation is to always be “saved” by breaking down defence, you have 30 billions left to recover over the next years to throw them at Aid, Welfare and NHS.
Then there will be nothing else to cut, and it’ll be the end of the expenditure growth, or simply bankrupt.
This is not just sea-blindness. It is blindness pure and simple.
Also, i am hoping that the economy in 2015 won’t be in the same crappy state as now. While i’m expecting another year of weakness (if not plain recession) after the job losses from the budget cuts really smash into effect, the budget deficit will be massively reduced by 2015, and the need for so massive downscaling of the military will be arguably gone, which will make further downsizing even harder to justify.
As the budget deficit is reduced, interests payments will also grow smaller and free money. Currently, least we forget, nearly 50 billions (well more than the whole defence budget) are wasted paying interests.
Liger30We are promised that a LPH will still be part of the force, yes.
In practice, the promise is valid at the most until the next SDSR in 2015, which could well change the assumption depending on how much the budget will be robbed by that day.
Other deadline is the end of the service of whichever LPH remains in the Navy (PLEASE God, let it be Ocean! HMS Illustrious in that role is, sorry my beloved Lusty, an abort…). By then, or a replacement is funded, or we are screwed.
My dream is that the RN admirals start, right from now, contacts with the French counterparts to find an agreement to support in the next equipment planning rounds in the UK.
The French would love to be allowed to put their planes on the UK carriers when CdG is out, since the PA2 is seen as unlikely, much as now “a decision is expected in 2012/2013”, and they would also love to have some more Hawkeyes.
For the RN it might be a total bargain to fight hard for a “joint” fleet of Hawkeyes to cover MASC, to fit with catapults PoW as well, and use it in collaboration with the french. (they’d pay for it, of course, but they would still save a lot of money themselves compared to building a new carrier, obviously)
And the RN should find a way to obtain from the French a bargain price promise on one (ideally two) Mistral LHDs to replace the LPH when she bows out of service.
THIS scenario would reassure me a lot.
As to helicopters. Not-Navalized Merlins are a major drawback. Even assuming that, even if manned by RAF, the helicopters are tasked with Commando roles (and i’m sadly ready to bet the RAF will be a bitch about actually covering that by deploying at sea), they are a major drawback if not navalized.
The sea is cruel. Without adequate protection, the Merlins HC3’s life will shorten dramatically if they are used “regularly” at sea. The environment takes a serious toll on the airframes.
Again, if not even the rotors are made foldable, HMS Ocean will go down from 12 helos + 6 attack helos to a ridiculous number of absurdly space-consuming helos. Without the folding rotors, i don’t even know if the Merlins can use the lift to be brought down into the hangar. It is RIDICULOUS.
The Helos “strategy” of the UK is the worst mess EVER in military procurement.
The main cost of the Merlin move, is not so much about “marinizing” the airframes as it is about disposing of a lot of current Merlin pilots (some could transfer on the 12 new Chinooks, but others would lose their job) and retrain the actual Sea King crews for the Merlin.
A “balanced” decision would be to still “marinize” the Merlin, but retain the current RAF crews, moving them to the Navy would be “symbolic” since the pilots would be the same. This would still mean losing the Junglies and kicking shamefully out of the Armed Forces the Sea King pilots after all what they did. (and it horrifies me to no end, but then again, hasn’t it been done with the Harrier pilots and so many others too?) But, at least, there would be a REAL force of sea-adequate helos, and it would… make the best choice for the Armed Forces as a whole. The most balanced and cost-effective solution.
Then again, i also consider the RAF owning Chinooks and Pumas DEMENTED.
Chinooks and Puma should fall under the control of the Army Air Corps and be solidly framed into Regiments of air mobility, normally assigned to the 16 Air Assault Brigade and then of course used wherever they are needed for operations.
Most nations do this way already. For example, Italy’s Chinooks are part of a regiment of the AVES, the italian AAC counterpart.
Also, i’d like the 12 new Chinooks to be built with foldable rotors. It would cost a little bit more, but Boeing is capable to do it, and it would be handy to make the new helos more naval-adequate too.
After all, CVF’s lifts can take the Chinooks to the CVF hangar… but i think that not Ocean and not Illustrious could ever held a Chinook anywhere else other than on deck, which is not optimal at all.
In time, i’d personally like to see the Chinook and Puma being handed (crews and all, so it would be a mere question of ownership and administration) to the AAC.
Equally, the Merlins HC3 should go to the Navy after navalization. Retaining the crews since they are already trained and experienced, but the airframe needs to be made adequate, and the RN must control the helos, or after the empty carrier we’ll now have the empty LPH too. (most of the time at least)
The SAR helos, perhaps coming as PFI if it is advantageous, might be flown by the Coastguard or another ministry. It should be valued if there’s really any advantage in charging the MOD of the SAR work too. And with the change of helo platform, the current Navy/RAF crews would have to re-train in any case, so there’s no real difference.
Ideally, the RAF (or the FAA at this point, so all Merlins are pooled with advatages in terms of running costs) should have a dedicated Combat-SAR squadron instead, equipped with Merlins well kitted for the role. They could be used for Special Forces, support to civilian SAR in emergency, and for the C-SAR work in conflict time.
That’s my ideal world, of course.
Liger30I’d lie if i said i wasn’t expecting it, honestly.
The RAF giving something to the Navy…? No way, of course!
The Commandos will be left without helicopters first as the Sea King HC4 goes.
So, not replacing HMS Ocean will look “less” absurd to the general public.
Next part: get rid of the Amphibs as time goes on, so that well before Albion and Bulwark end their life, they bow out.
Largs Bay gone.
Albion mothballed.
Gee. At this rythm, in 2015 the Marines will be ready to move to the army and the navy will lose all the amphibs.
Perhaps save a Bay to help Haiti at the next earthquake.
PLEASE ARGENTINA BE STUPID AGAIN AND INVADE THE FALKLANDS NOW!.
WE URGENTLY NEED A REMINDER OF WHAT IS ALL THAT BLUE WET STUFF SURROUNDING THE UK BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE!!!!
Liger30AKA, they did not make it. The attempt was a failure and they did not want to engage in a development programme that promised to be very complex, since they have no indigenous naval gun production experience from many, many years.
This does not mean they “lost interest” in the 155 mm NATO-compatible Army/Navy ammunition. They did not judge to have high enough hopes to design a cost-effective system and stick to Oto Melara 127 mm gun. (Which is about as justified as the 155 if we reason in terms of “they’ve got no marines”. They could have fitted a Oto 76 Strales which could have worked as CIWS as well, but they want a shore-bombardment option to influence events on land, and thus they want a heavy gun.)
Good choice, of course, from their point of view. They arguably chose the best gun available on the market, after all.
But this all has no value whatsoever in downplaying the sale-chances and the sense of continuing with the 155 TMF development all the way to fielding the system on Type 26.
Liger30My pleasure to share what i can.
In response to a MOD request for information made in 2001, Northrop Grumman proposed the then latest E-2C Hawkeye 2000 variant which entered USN service in 2003, however the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye – now under development and due to enter USN service in 2010 – became a more likely candidate. The Hawkeye is a fully pressurised aircraft and is thus able to operate at greater altitudes than either the Merlin or Osprey.
The STOVL mode of carrier operation by the aircraft (the F-35B) selected in September 2002 for the JCA requirement significantly affected the MASC platform options. CVF would not have the catapults and arrestor gear that the Hawkeye normally uses. However the chosen carrier design is “adaptable” and it could, at least theoretically, be fitted with one catapult and arrestor gear in a hybrid configuration. Also the new carriers could be easily modified to a STOBAR configuration, with a box ski-jump and no catapults, but with arrestor wires. The E-2C Hawkeye demonstrated its ability to launch from a ski-jump during the 1980s and thus the “new” Northrop Grumman E-2D Advanced Hawkeye remained officially a viable choice for MASC, indeed it still had many supporters if the funding can be found. Ironically, the RN first considered purchasing the Hawkeye, in its original E-2A form, way back in the 1960’s when it needed a replacement for the Gannet AEW.3 to be carried by the then planned new fleet carrier, CVA-01.
As an alternative to the Hawkeye for a CTOL carrier, Thales suggested that an AEW variant of the venerable Grumman S-2 Tracker carrier based ASW aircraft would be very cost-effective. The S-2 Tracker first flew way back in 1952 and the US Navy had already replaced it with the new S-3 Viking for ASW purposes by the mid-1970’s, although a few specialist conversions served until 1986. The US Navy still has about 18 airframes (S-2E and S-2G standard) in long term storage at AMARC, Arizona. An appropriate number of these could be bought very cheaply by the UK and then refurbished, re-engined (replacing the old R-1820 radial engines with modern turbo-props) and given new avionics and cockpit systems prior to conversion to an AEW role, for this they would be fitted with a Searchwater 2000 radar and other mission systems similar to those used in the Sea King ASaC.7.
In late 2002 Flight International magazine also reported that the UK MOD had sought information and pricing from the US DOD in regards to buying surplus US Navy S-3B Viking airframes, with a view of converting them in to AEW aircraft for MASC – an evolution of the S-2 Tracker approach, but using a more modern airframe.
It is unlikely that either the Tracker or Viking option was ever seriously considered for MASC.
Since mid-2004, one focus of work has been on the maritime strand of the Joint UAV Experimentation Programme (JUEP), which is increasingly seen as having the potential to deliver a system which will be able to meet parts of an increasingly extended MASC requirement at an attractive cost.
The budget for MASC was drastically reduced in MOD’s ten year equipment plan (EP03) and Hawkeye and Osprey were formally eliminated from the list of options at Initial Gate in mid-2005. Instead, signs began to emerge that the MOD was increasingly interested in UAV’s for MASC.
On 9 May 2006 Lockheed Martin UK announced that it had been awarded a contract by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to study the potential of using Merlin helicopters as a platform for both maritime airborne early warning and command and control. Under the 15-month programme, Lockheed Martin will led a three-way team which included Thales UK and AgustaWestland. The overall study, with a total value of £3.4 million, included two more contracts (believed to be worth about £500,000 each) which saw AgustaWestland and Thales UK each leading similar teams looking at other airframe and mission system options.
Interestingly, while there is a presumption that the Merlin is the most likely platform for direct replacement of the old Sea King’s – Thales is also looking at other possibilities for fitting with an enhanced Cerebus-Searchwater mission set. The Eurocopter NH.90 helicopters is one option, while the V.22 Osprey is another, in the later case the radar would have to be fuselage mounted.
Lockheed Martin are also investigating enhanced Rotary Wing solutions – identifying the best value Rotary Wing solution to meet the User Requirement Document as an Airborne Early Warning and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance asset, covering force protection, littoral manoeuvre and force projection.
On 22 July 2006, EADS Defence & Security Systems (DS) UK announced that it had been awarded a £250,000 study contract by the Ministry of Defence to study and define a MASC Enhanced Manned Rotary-Wing Solution for use on the two Future Aircraft Carriers (CVF). This study will examine the helicopter platform and the sensor suite including radar technology, EADS will be required to submit a report as a conclusive assessment of the current offering and a recommendation of new alternative technologies. The report will focus on “through life capability” forecasting requirements and technologies of the future.
These low value studies (which appear to have a deliberate degree of overlap) are expected to complete in mid-2007.
The MOD has never announced the number of MASC platforms that it is seeking to acquire, but hints from Northrop Grumman in 2001 indicated that it was between 6 and 12. The programme has always been very budget constrained and the higher number of platforms was presumably associated with less capable, but also less costly, aircraft such as the proposed AEW Merlin variant or large UAV’s.
The allocated procurement budget for the MASC programme has not been published but again hints from Northrop Grumman would indicate that it was originally expected to be the range of $1 – 1.5 billion (£700 million to £1 billion, FY2001-2). However, critically, no significant budget line for MASC was included in EP03. it becoming apparent that even the original baseline of 12 new Merlin AEW helicopters fitted with already extant mission systems (estimated cost of under £500 million) could no longer be afforded in a 2012-13 timescale.
The MOD has become amiable to splitting the MASC project in to several phases with the final Sea King replacement possibly not now entering service until the 2020’s, but it remains to be seen whether the MOD can even procure within the available budget the type of innovative and still cutting-edge UAV carrier-based solutions that it is now seeking to supplement the Sea King ASaC.7 by the middle of the next decade.
In June 2001, at the Paris Air Show, Northrop Grumman’s Gary O’Loughlin, Director of International Business Development, revealed that the United Kingdom was considering purchasing up to 6 E-2 Hawkeye’s – perhaps enough to equip one squadron containing a second-line HQ flight of 2 aircraft, a single front-line operational flight of 3 aircraft, plus 1 aircraft in reserve, deep maintenance or modernisation. (incidentally, this would be perfect to equip a single Strike Carrier in the new Cat & Trap mode, and it would be the “ideal” kind of MASC solution if the platform Hawkeye is selected)
In July/August 2001 the MOD released a formal Request for Information (RFI) to Northrop Grumman seeking life cycle cost data in relation to its Hawkeye 2000 platform.
In response to this RFI, a document was delivered to the MOD by Northrop Grumman on Jan. 17, 2002. According to O’Loughlin, “In the RFI letter, the Ministry of Defence asked for a more solution-oriented report. … The team, led by Northrop Grumman, provided a very detailed response that concentrated on the Hawkeye 2000, the current-generation E-2C with the most up-to-date capabilities. …. When you factor in absence of nonrecurring costs, the E-2C becomes an affordable AEW option for the United Kingdom.”
Despite the DPA’s clear interest in other options, it is believed that the Concept Phase studies showed that the capabilities of the Hawkeye 2000, and even more its successor the Advanced Hawkeye, compared very favourably with other options when dealing with projected post-2015 threats and requirements. There was a lobby within the MOD still advocating a small Hawkeye purchase as the best and lowest risk option for MASC, even with the extra costs that would be incurred fitting the carrier platform with the associated equipment for CTOL operations. Indeed STOBAR (Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) was suggested as compromise. The E-2C Hawkeye had demonstrated an ability to launch from a low incline ski-jump built ashore at NAS Patuxent River during the 1980s and it was thought that adding arrestor wires to the CVF design (i.e. changing it to a STOBAR configuration) might still allow its adoption for MASC given some modifications (e.g. strengthened nose wheel) – and the necessary finance. Also, a STOBAR carrier would have a lower cost than a full CTOL configuration while perhaps being able to operate both the F-35A and F-35C. If the F-35C was selected for the manned element of the RAF’s Future Offensive Air System, then it would almost certainly be able to successfully operate from a STOBAR configured CVF. However the MOD showed no interest in the Hawkeye/STOBAR idea, perhaps sensibly as in 2004 and early 2005 Northrop Grumman did further research on a ski-jumping Hawkeye 2000 in the context of a proposal to the Indian Navy, and while insisting that this was perfectly feasible it had to admit that the required changes for STOBAR operations would reduce the aircraft’s capabilities somewhat compared to the standard model. The Indian Navy decided that it was unconvinced about the concept, citing concerns such as the disastrous effect of a single engine failure during the full power take-off run.
The Hawkeye option was formally ruled out for MASC in mid-2005, but is not completely out of mind due to developments and disputes in relation to the UK’s expected purchase of the STOVL F-35B.
A lease of 6 Hawkeyes would totally be the best MASC solution possible for the Strike Carrier now that catapults are the chosen way.
I think we can keep our hopes moderately high about the Hawkeye resurrecting as a very real option for the MASC requirement, and apart from Navy and MOD supporters, it is likely to have US and French backing too, which might help.
My hope is for the Hawkeye being chosen. If the carrier is going to be one, then kit it out properly at least.
As to UAVs solutions:
On 4 August 2005, Thales UK was awarded a £700 million contract for the development, manufacture and initial support phases of the Watchkeeper programme. At one point it was mooted that Watchkeeper UAV’s should be able to operate from the RN’s new aircraft carriers, but this requirement was ultimately not included in order to avoid “scope creep”, instead it and several other desirable capabilities were bundled in to the Joint UAV Experimentation Programme (JUEP) with the intention of better understanding the potential benefits, risks and costs before preceding to an operation system.
JUEP
In a development that directly relates to MASC, in 2004 the MOD decided to fund a series of ScanEagle trials as part of the “UAV Support to Maritime Ops” strand of the JUEP. The purpose was to explore the operational utility of current UAV systems, with an emphasis on ISTAR, and the potential contribution that ship-based UAVs can make to a future maritime Network Enabled Capability (NEC)
The trials culminated in March 2005 when a team led by Thales UK and including Boeing and QinetiQ conducted a two week long exercise with a SeaEagle UAV which also involved the Type 23 frigate HMS Sutherland and a Sea King ASaC.7 helicopter from 849 Squadron. During the exercise, the ScanEagle showed its ability to support maritime operations and land reconnaissance with flights of up to 8 hours, demonstrating capabilities which would for example, enhance the commander’s recognised surface picture and enable early warning and evasive action against fast attack craft. Unfortunately bad weather and technical problems limited the trials – the UAV had to be launched and recovered from a land-based catapult rather than the frigate; and the ASaC.7 was not able to directly control and task the SeaEagle, although it was able to vector the UAV in to investigate radar contacts. Richard Deakin, Managing Director of Thales UK’s aerospace business, said “The often hostile weather found off the North coast of Scotland in March added an element of realism that would not have been present had we taken the easier route of conducting the trials in warmer and calmer climates.” Lt Col Dick Park, the Officer Commanding the Joint UAV Experimentation Team (JUET), emphasised: “The trial was a success. We operated the ScanEagle UAV system within UK segregated airspace and demonstrated the Command & Control capabilities of a UAV from a RN Type 23 Frigate. First impressions from the ship’s operations room staff were that control of the UAV did not impinge on the ship’s ability to conduct other operations. The Commanding Officer of HMS Sutherland stated after the demonstration: “The concept has great merit and utility”. The final year of the three year JUEV programme has now begun. It had been hoped that it would be possible to further investigate the utility of an organic maritime UAV system operating with current RN equipment, including the launch and recovery from a RN warship and control from a Sea King ASaC.7 helicopter, perhaps during an exercise to co-ordinate naval gunfire support. However due to JUEP funding being cut by about a third from the originally planned £35 million, these activities are now unlikely to be undertaken.
The ScanEagle would be a useful capability to have on Type 23, and it could be used with great success against piracy, drug-smugling and disaster relief and mostly any other kind of very real commitment.
However, when even a “tiny” budget of a few millions is slashed constantly back as the MOD Budget is robbed, it is hard to continue down any serious path.
Thanks as always to beautiful Navy Matters for the incredible amount of useful data. http://navy-matters.beedall.com/masc.htm
Liger30Of course. But you gotta fund that all.
And if even HMS Daring has difficulties in getting money for completing the Merlin trials and all the rest, you can figure how many hopes exist about spending money to deploy “obsolescents” Sea Kings on new platforms to justify their existance.
Either way, if the need for cuts is not too bad, the ASaC could still survive, i guess. I only explained what i see as a pretty likely scenario.
Liger30They certainly COULD, but even the Type 45 has got the Hangar for a Merlin but is (for now) fully cleared only with Lynx for operations, even if a Merlin was shown on the deck for the first entrance in Portsmouth.
The same Type 23, they could all carry Merlins, but just a number of them are cleared for Merlin ops.
It is not so automatic.
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