Liger30You referring to me? I did not propose a land operations in Somalia, i don’t know what did give you this idea. When i said “sending them ashore” i was referring to the pirates that, currently, after being captured and disarmed are sent back to coast with food and water generously supplied by UK (or Italy or whoever else who gets them for that matters) taxpayers. In the best case, they are sent in Kenya to a local judge that inexorably leaves them free as well.
End result: they go back to their “base”, get new AK47 and RPGs, and they are back at work.
EPIC FAIL.
I say that the RN should be able to do more about it, though, and for sure a more radical approach could be used too.
The seized ships are all moored in known positions, and the SBS could, if allowed, assault them and get rid of the terrorists. French special forces have done already a few succesful interventions, and doing it on a larger scale and more aggressively would: free ships and a lot of people. Save money. Give a strong signal to the pirates, and make them feel scared and at risk even in their own bases.
British ships should be allowed to fire with less restrictions, and commanders in the area should have more freedom to react as they see fit in the circumstance at hand, not being held back watching as a british couple on a yatch is seized by pirates and the SBS is called back when it is about to intervene by a politician sitting thousands of miles away in London. With the navy being later ridiculed by the press as well.
That was a sad failure, just like getting sailors kidnapped by Iran in international waters without moving a finger.
All situations sons of the “politically correct” pushed to the most ridiculous extremes.
And cuts to ships of the RN and to Royal Marines will inexorably make the fight against piracy even more of a failure, and they are even more injustifiable in this climate.
However, as to the land operation, for sure it wouldn’t be easy to mount a land operation in Somalia, but as bad as it is to think about it, it may be impossible to deny the need for it one day soon.
You won’t be able to stop piracy, unless every single ship is escorted in and out.
And you won’t be able to solve ANY of Somalia-posed troubles without an intervention of some kind in it.
And sometimes it’ll become impossible to look the other side any longer.
Somalia is one of the very most likely scenario for future military ops, for Europe, for US, for NATO, for the UK itself.
Like it or not, it is a continuous source of danger and trouble. And it may reach a point where sending in the Marines is the only option left.
For now we pull through with the clow-show of the multinational naval ops, the UN food programme sending convoys of food into the country only to see the militia take the food all the times and then use it as a chip to control the starving population. We pull through ignoring how much terrorists and other threats are making roots in there, and all the rest.
But what when something inexorably will go REALLY wrong…? It is not a matter of “if”, but a matter of “when”.
On the difficulties of a land campaign, we agree. But this does not change reality.
Liger30A major sign of how the government is failing at providing even the most basic service in that “defence of the realm” that should be its first duty:
http://www.lloydslistdcn.com.au/archive/2010/september/14/private-anti-piracy-patrols-condemned
A Wales-based company plans to offer private sector armed military vessels to protect ships from Somali pirates.
However, naval top brass is opposed to the proposal and lawyers warn that customers risk voiding their insurance.
SeaMarshals, set up by a Swedish scrap dealer and run from Cardiff, is in the process of converting a fleet of four naval patrol boats, which it plans to crew with Ukrainian former special forces personnel and then hire out for around US$10,000 a day.
Another British concern is already understood to be running similar services.
News of the new outfit met with a frosty reaction from the European Union counter piracy mission, EUNAVFOR.
A spokesman told Lloyd’s List that the private outfit could complicate matters, especially in a hijacking situation, as military operations – especially while a hijack is underway – need to be deconflicted.
Maritime lawyer Paolo Ghiradani of Stephenson Harwood warned that the venture was illegal and that the operators “could end up being prosecuted, effectively for vigilante-type crime”.
He added that underwriters would probably void the cover of any vessel being escorted.
Meanwhile, pirates attacked a Belgian dredger and kidnapped two crewmembers in Cameroon on Sunday, owner Jan De Nul said in an emailed statement yesterday. Two men were seized.
Insurers have drawn up plans for the world’s first private navy to try to turn the tide against Somali pirates who continue to plague the global shipping industry by hijacking vessels for ransoms of more than £100m a year, The Independent has learnt.
When the Royal Navy is forced to give food and water to pirates and send them back to shore after capturing them, while the Navy struggles to find a warship to assign to Operation ATALANTA against pirates, WHILE THE CIVILIANS ARE FORCED TO EMBARK ON A “PRIVATE NAVY” SOLUTION, the government has nothing better to do than plan shrinking the navy even further.
And then bitch about private navy as well.
Does the government support pirates, it makes you wonder?
Its actions certainly make their job easier, that’s for sure.
I find it quite appalling – and dangerous – that “private navies” start to pop up, after so many Private Military contractors have already appeared (and often caused havoc and trouble, so much that many firms had to be kicked out of Iraq because they had become a problem and not an help).
Are we getting a step closer to the nasty, dark future of mega-firms and multinationals with their own private armed forces that so often appears in fictions…?
For sure, it is a frightening sign of a major failure of the States to do their main job.
And also signals the failure of the “send them back ashore” policy. WRITE A FRIGGING RULE, SIGN IT, AND GET RID OF PIRATES THE OLD WAY: HANGING THEM UP.
Because sending them ashore, or in Kenya like it is being done right now, is CLEARLY not working.
I bet there are pirates that have been captured and released several times in a row already. It must be frustrating for the Navy to see politicians spelling doom over their hard work to tackle piracy.
Liger30Hope so. But you are going down the way of the “can’t do”. UK narrowly missed to find itself in that situation in 1982.
Next time it won’t be a miss, but a full-speed crash into a reinforced concrete wall.
Liger30In the meanwhile, RFA Oakleaf left Portsmouth today for her last travel. She’ll soon be dismantled.
No replacements at all in sight.
Liger30HMS Indefensible handed over to Royal Navy.
It’s 2038. HMS Indefensible has been handed over to the Royal Navy…
Today in a grand ceremony at Portsmouth dockyard HMS Indefensible was commissioned into the Royal Navy. Described as the most stealthy warship in the world, she is now the only vessel in the Royal Navy and replaces 2 mothballed aircraft carriers, 6 destroyers and 4 submarines. Responding to criticism about the shrinking fleet, the MoD replied “It’s not about numbers, it’s about quality not quantity. HMS Indefensible represents a revolution in naval procurement, stealthy, light and agile she will provide a highly flexible platform. She is invisible to radar and almost immune to torpedo or missile attack. Her shallow draft makes her ideal for work in the littoral (coastal) areas. She is also highly efficient with virtually zero carbon emissions and zero fuel consumption.”
Admiral Sir James Bland added “She is ready to respond instantly to events and can be deployed to trouble spots anywhere in the world. The RAF have promised to fly her to wherever she’s needed provided (1)They are not busy (2)The weather is OK (3)There is a large airfield provided by a friendly foreign nation close by”.
Constructed by Britain’s only ship builder BVATe Systems in Birmingham, taking 8 years to build, and costing just £1.5 Billion she is a triumph of British engineering. Her forward section was built in China in 2 weeks and then shipped to the UK. The forward section was then joined to the stern built in Birmingham and the complex technical systems installed. However the programme was not all plain sailing and has not been without its problems “The original design included an outboard motor but early in the building process the Treasury insisted cost savings had to be made so out went the motor. After some time spent on computer-modelling and research we selected oars” said a BVATe spokesperson.
Although £1.2 Billion over-budget and 3 years late, Secretary of State for Defence, William Bragg says we can all be proud “The Type 48 programme has sustained 10,000 British manufacturing jobs in addition to 30,000 civil servants in the MoD project team. She will represent the leading edge of British manufacturing wherever she goes and is worth every penny” Bragg is also says he is hoping to see export orders soon although as yet there has been little interest.
Some observers have commented that her lack of any armament could be a problem but the MoD answered robustly “The Foreign Office advised us that carrying weapons can be seen as provocative and that actually firing a weapon at someone would definitely infringe their human rights. We considered this advice at an early stage in the design process and together with the fabulous cost-savings, the case for having no armament was overwhelming”.
Her commanding officer, Commander Rupert Tubworthy-Pollock said “To be selected from the 1,200 officers still serving in the RN for the only seagoing command available is a great privilege. Bringing her out of build and into commission has been a huge challenge but I’m confident she will prove to be a great asset”.
With a crew of just 2, she is a fine example of lean-manning, reducing running costs and lessening the RN’s recruitment headaches. Her crew, AB “soapy” Watson said “On my last ship I had to share the mess with 40 other men but on the new Type 48 sharing is far a less of a problem. As I’m now the only rating in the Royal Navy I have a lot of responsibility”.
HMS Indefensible is expected to complete sea trials shortly, go to Plymouth for Operational Sea Training, have a short refit in Rosyth and then and be deployed as part of the new Euro-Navy task force.
Thank you SDSR, for making all the more realistic this piece! Also, for how things are going, it’ll happen far earlier than 2038…
This SDSR is a major fraud. And, like Fox honestly said, the “Mother of all horrors”.
The 1981 review that caused the Falklands war was better done and better thought out than this unreal mess…
But be all glad! While Britain becomes powerless and british jobs are lost, many forever, your taxes are paying a ringfenced 8 billion International Aid budget set to grow further in coming years, perfectly affordable, while the 200 millions for new Nimrods and the handful of millions for running the amphibious ships that have been used in ALL the wars the UK had a part in from 1943 onwards are absolutely unsustainable an expense.
Because defence has nothing special, but aid has everything about it!
Have Bono Vox as next Treasury chancellor, i suggest, so that he can give a further 1% of GDP to aid and the other 1% to welfare, so that defence spending is finally gone.
The following year, panic will spread all over the coutry BECAUSE THERE WON’T BE ANYMORE A DEFENCE BUDGET TO CUT, AND PEOPLE WILL HAVE TO FINALLY REALIZE THAT THE ABSURD AMOUNTS SPENT IN WELFARE CAN’T RISE FOREVER, NOR SUFFICE FOR CURRENT NEEDS.
What will be cut that day…?
Liger30About time Mr. Fox did say things clearly!
Quite amazing how his points resemble the ones many of us made on this same forum. In particular, i’m admittedly pleased by seeing he listed pretty much the same “good reasons” i put forwards when talking about Nimrod. It almost looks like he read my intervention on this forum. 😀
But it is not really surprising. It does not take that much to see the value of certain assets that have been and always are in high demand.
The truth is that if the whole world invests in such assets, a clear reason exists, and the UK can’t look the other side and fake that it does not exist.
Also, the point about amphibious shipping is absolutely clear and absolutely accurate.
I’m surprised there’s no hints to the carriers, which possibly means that they are relatively safe, despite the latest reports that came out.
Which means to a couple of considerations on my part:
1) UK’s SDSR with the cuts proposed so far is a SDSR that leaves the UK incapable to act indipendently even on small scale ops of medium complexity.
Forget the Falklands, even Sierra Leone will be hard/impossible to replay. (go read how many ships were sent there, and you’ll immediately understand why. Surprise! Amphibs were down there, included Ocean, the most hard-worked RN ship in the last 12 years!)
The SDSR, and this is NOT DRAMA but REAL THING, is sacrificing everything for Afghanistan: AKA, everything for boots on the ground, AKA everything for US wars. The same kind of adventure abroad that the UK public loathes and that “for at least 10 years” the UK will struggle to avoid.
The UK risks becoming mostly only a “reserve of soldiers” to use in America’s operations, with the UK interests being put at serious risk by an immensely reduced capability of not just intervention, but of carrying out “gunship policy” by showing the white ensign of RN warships sailing around the world.
2) Mr. Cameron is possibly starting to get it.
The whole, massive impact in terms of political interest.
It was said before the last elections that “with the need for austerity ahead, the party that gets elected is unlikely to govern a second time for many years, until the public starts to forget the pain”.
Never been more true!
Apart from cuts to public spending, Mr. Cameron is possibly realizing that:
A) Shredding the Carriers will lose at least 10.000 jobs and mostly destroy british shipbuilding forever. Scotland isn’t a very Tory area already as it is, but scrap shipbuilding and it’ll be a century before Tory party gets votes from Scotland. (and rightly so!)
b) Scrapping the amphibs and closing Devonport will have similar impact on Plymouth. Forget getting votes from there too, once you make of the city a “ghost town” with abandoned docks and destroyed economy.
C) Destroying so much capability for the Armed Forces after being so vocal in the easy propaganda before the elections is giving Labour a well-sharp knife to use against you, and as Fox notices, the “defence of the realm is the first duty of any government” will become your nightmare.
D) Trident is a Tory creature and a sacred Tory cow. Messing with it will make a good part of the party angry.
E) If he starts being attacked by admirals, officers, wounded heroes of war that get kicked out of the army, SAS leaders and even by mr. Fox, he’s gonna get in serious trouble.
Call this “the best option”, but i think that David is starting to get these points, and they possibly are the very reason why Cameron failed to make any real decision in yesterday’s meeting of the NSC, asking more time and more “study”.
Eventually, if he takes in his hand a pocket calculator and tries doing the calculation i did make, he’ll see that even scrapping the whole escort fleet of the Royal Navy will save a few hundred millions in running costs, but still be well away from the billions required.
Scrapping amphibs would save even less.
Dropping out of the carriers programme would be a disaster and save very little.
The only real cut that “survives” the math is Tornado fleet. But it won’t make a 4 billions saving either!
If the WHOLE fleet of Tornado goes within five years, it will save a few (2? 3?) billions, considering bases closure as well, but not four billions i fear. And it’ll be on five years or more however. Not IMMEDIATE. There’s no big IMMEDIATE savings that can be done.
Some can be saved by dropping Puma (200+ millions planned upgrade plus running costs and RAF Benson closure. Total = ? 300 millions? More? But the upgrade saving is “virtual” since it is not being paid, it is just planned).
Some more by getting rid of Sea King HC4 and Gazelle, with Merlins going to Culdrose and RAF Benson shutting down.
Chinooks all to Odhiam, but even reducing the order from 22 to 12, or even scrapping it entirely (higly unlikely) won’t really save a thing since it is money the MOD IS STILL NOT PAYING.
An hundred millions from getting rid of 4 Type 22 B3 and 5 Type 42 left.
Up to 200 millions from eventually scrapping Nimrod MR4, but with the consequences that Fox outlines and with the task of facing the press and say: “yes, we spent over 3 billions on them to develop and build them, and now that they are ready to serve, we scrap them, close Kinloss and Lossiemouth (at least temporarily, until the first F35 come in place of Tornado) and make Scotland a bit more miserable and a lot more angry at us”
Hardly a smart thing, or even a justifiable one.
Mr. Fox is right. The task they have been given is impossible, unless Britain is prepared to become a Belgium with nukes as someone else said.
Then it can scrap the carriers, pay the penalty and hope to still save some, sell a couple of Type 45 to Saudi Arabia, drop the RFA, retain 10 Type 23 and 6 Astutes (or build only four and ignore the long lead orders on boats 5 and 6) (in future replaced with diesel electrics obviously, no point in going nuclear for a new Belgium), retire Tornado and Typhoon T1, get rid of Harrier and decommission Illustrious and Ark Royal and possibly the amphibs as well.
With these cuts, MAYBE, a four billions total saving can be obtained.
Is it a bargain? NO.
Will it save the economy? While creating tens of thousands of jobless…? Not bloody likely.
Will it ensure Tory are never again voted for many years? Very likely.
About time mr. Cameron opens his eyes and starts thinking about this.
Liger30The Royal Fleet Auxiliary urgently needs to replace most of its existing tankers in order to meet an amendment to MARPOL regulations (the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 and the Protocol of 1978) that requires tankers to be double hulled. With the exception of the new Wave-class tankers, the RFA has a single hulled tanker fleet which will be become non-compliant with MARPOL from 2010, although a waiver can be claimed for government owned ships
Six remaining Leaf and Rover class tankers provide logistic support to Royal Navy vessels at sea, under current (early 2007) plans their decommissioning dates are as follows: Gold Rover (2009), Black Rover (2010), Brambleleaf (2009), Orangeleaf (2009), Oakleaf ( 2010) and Bayleaf (2010) – although these dates may be advanced.
They effectively have been advanced for Gold and Black Rover and for Bayleaf and Orangeleaf, the only tankers left. (for how long still…???)
As for costs:
On 10 December 2007 the MOD issued an “Invitation to Participate in Dialogue” to industry for up to six Feet Tankers at an expected cost of £800 million, this stating that MARS project “aims to obtain quality ships at competitive prices and reduced whole life cost by exploiting commercial best practice and with designs that can demonstrate cost benefits throughout 25 years of service life”.
Little considering that the requirements were pretty high:
The MOD requires that the FTs are constructed with quality equipment and material of proven reliability and be:
* interoperable to NATO standards and with NATO assets
* designed to maximise reliability, facilitate ease of maintenance, repair or replacement and minimise through life costs
* designed with open architectures that facilitate support and readily enable future capability upgrades and incorporation of emerging technologies
* capable of operations worldwide, seasonally unrestricted from Tropical to Arctic (1st Year Ice).Indicative characteristics of the FTs are:
* Petroleum Class II and III clean product compliant, reconfigurable for two grades concurrently with capacity up to 18000 m3
* Carriage of 8 fully laden 20ft ISO containers
* Potable water cargo capacity of 1300m3
* Sustained speed of 15knots in Sea State 5
* Range of 7000nm
* Replenishment at Sea rigs to include three abeam tensioned jackstay rigs, one astern fuelling reel, single buoy mooring point
* Helicopter deck and facilities for maintenance and refuelling;
* Accommodation for up to 100 persons of mixed gender to UK Flag merchant standards
* Ship life of 25 years
* OCIMF compliant
* Classification to Lloyds Register Naval Ship Rules with Naval Ship Auxiliary notation
* Medium speed diesel propulsion operating on MGO fuel
* Capable of passage through Panama and Suez canals, i.e. maximum draught of 11m, maximum air draught of 39m, maximum length of 220m.The ship shall be fitted with equipment and systems to load and offload Cargo (Liquid), Cargo (Solid), Stores (Solid) and Stores (Liquid) to and from:
1. the shore when in a port
2. other ships and boats when at anchor
3. other ships while underway
4. other ships while rafting
5. VERTREP by helicopters hovering in flight (solid stores and cargo only)
6. helicopters on the flight deck. (flight deck and hangar for AW101 Merlin + air weapons magazine too)It also was required “fitted for but not with” a couple of Phalanx, have a couple of light guns position for self defence and provvisions for fitting a Decoy System.
Paul Lester, the chief executive of VT, said in May 2005: “There could be an opportunity to get some of the hulls of those ships built in China or Eastern Europe and then brought over to the UK. The Mars programme brings that potential because they are support ships; they are not typical.” Assembling the hulls abroad would save a lot of money, he said. “There is no doubt that the cost of producing steel and doing some of the fabrication work offshore would be 25 to 30 per cent less than doing it in the UK. But a lot of work needs to be done to establish quality and reliability.” Other companies also pointed out the advantages in cost and time of building hulls abroad, at least for the first fleet tanker phase.
After considering the options, the MOD decided that while the ships were “warlike”, they were “presently not needed for the protection of UK essential security interests”. The selected procurement path for the fleet tankers is therefore via an OJEU Competition, i.e. any EU company can bid. The Defence Industrial Strategy announced in December 2005 specifically allows this approach.
The ownership and operation of the ships was another issue, but an MOD study in 2007 essentially backed continuing current arrangements – i.e. the tankers will be operated by the RFA.
You find excellent coverage here, thanks to Richard Beedall http://navy-matters.beedall.com/ft.htm
Liger30It’s the other way around Liger, you have to show (a) why they ARE needed, and then show (b) why they’re needed MORE than other things are needed, so they get higher up the priority list; because that’s what it’s all about these days: Britain can only afford to do some things, not everything, so whatever ends up in the lower end of the priority list – taking military, industrial, economic, political etc. factors into account – will have to be cut.
I already provided plenty of good reasons.
Being rapid, i’ll say that losing Nimrod:
A) Makes the UK “blind” in keeping control of the North Sea, be it military or civilian ships traffic
B) Makes the UK incapable to launch anti-ship missiles from the air since the Nimrod is the only platform left with this capability
C) Loses a valid long-range support for SAR ops, that more than once saved lives
D) Loses the RAF most of its ISTAR capability at a time when R1 is going out and Rivet Joint may very well never come
E) Loses the RAF/RN the capability to track submarines transiting through the GIUK gap, breaking one of the main tasks of UK in NATO
F) Loses the RAF the capability to protect SSBNs from dangerous russian harassing (reported last month as well, Akula submarines are coming back on operation and they have been resuming the old game of shadowing UK subs to register their sonar signature)
G) Loses the RAF and RN the capability to track and attack subs in long range
H) Ultimately loads the RN assets with yet more tasks, with need for more SSNs to be used merely to protect SSBNs and deter russian subs, with subsequent impossibility of deploying submarines (and thus Tomahawk missiles) elsewhere where they could and should be. Forces the Royal Navy to waste more ships in North Sea policing.
And this is the “short” and “rapid” list of good reasons.
Now you’ll say “russian subs aren’t a worry”, “that press reports was from RN officers that want Nimrod to stay”, blah, blah, blah.
Truth is, russian subs aren’t a threat now, but a worry they surely are.
Tomorrow subs may be once more a threat.
Today, marittime patrol capability is badly needed.
Oh, sure! Another reason too came to my mind right now:
I) Tornado cuts are being resisted also because they are the only Storm Shadow capable platform at the moment. (personally, it worries me even more to lose the RAPTOR reconaissance pod that is FORMIDABLE and in extremely high demand [it was used even in support of police to track down that homicide weeks ago!], but even the army agrees that Storm Shadow and Tomahawk are great [very possibly because both missiles are used ultimately to ease the army’s work, so even generals can’t ask them to be scrapped like they seem to be asking of nearly everything else non-army])
Reports seems to suggest the Nimrod MR4 can/could carry and launch Storm Shadows, with the handy plus of its incredibly long range and endurance.
Otherwise, the only platform that remains is the Typhoon T2, but they’ll need a weapons integration process to be funded and carried out quickly to be able to use Storm Shadow, since so far they can’t and aren’t planned to become capable until 2012 at the very earliest.
Good reasons i’d say.
And as Swerve said, even nations with tiny defence budgets have marittime patrol capability. Italy has got the Atlantic, new-bought ATR MP, is planning/dreaming P8 Poseidon and IT ALSO HAS A FLEET OF PATROL PLANES RUN BY Guardia di Finanza (call it… Finance Guard), a sort of economic police that has the task to keep track of illegal immigration, movements of shipping, and a lot of other tasks.
In the UK, all of this is Nimrod dependent.
Liger30IIRC governments can choose to exempt military vessels, but the last British govt. announced that it would not exercise that option.
Exempt temporarily, i think i did read. Not for an indefinite time. I guess they can ask a few more years of time, i dunno how much.
However, from 2015 onwards your “legal” single-hulled oil tankers could start being prohibited to dock in certain ports as governments take strict security measures and don’t risk allowing unsafe, old single-hull tankers into their ports.
So, there are still many good reasons for thinking about the need for new tankers anyway.
Liger30Since the MRA4 has significant ISTAR abilities (more than the MR2 it’s supposed to replace), maybe we should consider making do with it & our existing ISTAR aircraft, & not spending a billion quid on converting three 1960s-built USAF tankers (a new airframe & engine type to add logistics for) to ISTAR aircraft. After all, we’re planning to do without that capability for a few years from next March, when we retire the Nimrod R.1s. If it turns out we need that capability in the future, we could, perhaps, buy some secondhand A330s & install the kit, or convert the development MRA4s. I intensely dislike the idea of procuring almost 50 year old airframes of a type new to the RAF.
Switching from one budget to another doesn’t cut my taxes. The money is still spent. Also, budget practice is that if a task is switched from one department to another, the money goes with it, so switching it to another budget means that the MoD loses both the role & the cash, & is no better off.
Very correct analysis. [wasn’t the RAF supposed to man 3 borrowed Rivet Joints, however, to continue getting ISTAR intelligence over Afghanistan even when R1 was hurriedly (and without real reason) scrapped? Was that another government lie…?]
BAE did already propose fitting the development MR4 airframes with the SHAMAN ISTAR suite, but the MOD rebuffed the proposal because Nimrod was impopular at the time (no one cares that the MR4 is practically a whole new world, nor cares for the so many years of sterling service the Nimrods have given from the 1969 to yesterday, pretty much, but just remembers the cost overruns and the tragic incident over Afghanistan and shrieks “burn it!”).
The idea could be resurrected in time. Or perhaps part of the ISTAR suite could find space in the MR4 itself with time and a single fleet could cover both roles magnificently.
Or the RAF could just man three US-borrowed Rivet Joints without buying and converting 45-years old KC135 airframes. It’s pretty sure that the americans would be all too glad to hand over to the UK 3 airframes, knowing that the RAF would end up using them in Afghanistan anyway, and thus were the US most need them at the moment. On the long term, they could be leased relatively cheaply, without arriving to the KC135 coversion plan.
I think in the current climate it is too much for the job and we can do without the capability as we are no longer the guardians of the Greenland Iceland UK gap and haven’t been for quite a while.
I have to totally disagree. NATO still has evident interests in guarding the GIUK gap, the americans still have the SOSUS in there, but especially, with the retirement of the US air force units from Iceland, the UK is more than ever the guardian of the GIUK.
Unless you think that Norwey can do the job… and they definitely can’t.
And anyway, it is UK’s very own interest to ensure that the North Sea, arguably its most vital area for energy supplies, fish stocks and other economic interests, is well guarded and defended.
So, since SSNs have already more tasks that they can cover, Merlin choppers are equally busy (and set to drop from 42 to 30 as well), frigates have things to do everywhere and already are unable to constantly fullfil every commitment, the Nimrod fleet is arguably as badly needed right now as it is never been from the very height of the Cold War, when the Nimrod was a sort of NATO hero. (i recently bought a NATO book on Russian Forces written in the Cold War period, with analysis of all russian armed forces and weapons, and evaluations of still new and relatively unknown russian gear: one of the most interesting things is that this US-written book is full with stolen photos of russian ships and subs, and the very most of them are all taken by RAF Nimrods. It is a shame that such sterling contribution has been sorta left uncelebrated and abandoned drowning in dust: it is a fascinating story of success)
In terms of need for Nimrods, the answer is a very loud YES, they are needed.
If they are scrapped, the whole Marittime Recon is lost. Dream of buying a smaller plane is ingenuous since it would cost more than go Nimrod, since the Nimrods are effectively already paid for.
If they are scrapped, a huge gap in coverage pops in place: dreams of using frigates, SSNs or any other already hard-worked and overcommitted platform to patrol the North Sea are madness that lives only in the lies of ministers like Ainsworth who first gambled with this very area of capability.
If they get chopped anyway for budgetary dreams of saving (maybe) 200 millions “in the future” while losing the billions already spent and losing all capability at the same time, it is another matter entirely. I sadly can’t rule out the happening of such a scenario, absurd as it is if one thinks about it.
But it becomes a matter of penny-pincing and political dumbness.
But as for need for Nimrods, i challenge everyone to give solid evidence of why they aren’t needed, with the certainty that there’s no way they can do it.
Liger30This is the most recent item of news that came out about the MARS, and we were back in May: http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4608941
This articles ends with this:
Inside the MoD, they reckon elements of MARS will be protected from a defense review, but that’s not the opinion of many outside the ministry.
“The timeline for this puts it right into the sights of the strategic defense review,” one executive said. “People are looking at this program with raised eyebrows. Anything without a contractual obligation to proceed is going to be among the first targets when the new government comes to cutting equipment programs to balance the books. The first thing the Navy will sacrifice will be at least part of this program.”
Alderwick reckons that MARS in some shape or form will continue. “Will it survive untouched? Probably not,” he added.
Much could hinge on the demands of the upcoming Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers and their F-35 strike force, he said. Reduced numbers of aircraft – and hence, lower-than-envisaged sortie rates – could see MARS ambitions reduced as well, he said.
To cloud the picture further, the government is reviewing the future of the RFA to see if the 16-strong fleet, which is manned by civilians but owned by the MoD, can be run more cost effectively. Privatization is said to be one option being looked at.
At this stage, there is no formal connection between the RFA study and a future theater maritime sustainment program that includes MARS. The outcome of the wide-ranging review will be used to inform future capability delivery plans, including the current tanker project, ministry insiders said.
The article says the MOD was going to receive answers for its request for tender for the oil tankers on May 13. Nothing ever followed, which means that for the third time the programme ran aground and died.
Meanwhile the RFA is losing tankers at alarming pace, with NO replacements in sight. All what’s left are the Bayleaf, the Orangeleaf, the Gold Rover and Black Rover plus the Wave class.
With an ever shrinking fleet, i guess six fleet tankers would be overkill, but i think we can all agree that the RFA needs to get 3/4 new 18.000 tons Fleet Tankers to replace the Leafs and Rovers, plus a larger ship optimized to support CVF operations, to come around if not in 2016, then for 2018, but anyway in time to actually serve with the carriers it should support and resupply.
I think in 2015 single hulled replenishers will be illegal because they do not comply with MARPOL regulation, and anyway the current Leafs and Rovers are old and worn and need replacement anyway.
The Fort class instead could undergo a major refit and get double-hulled somehow, if it is cost-effective. It certainly should be feasible, and the Forts are still excellent ships with life left in them, so this can be valued, i guess.
Quite possibly only Fort George and Fort Victoria would need double-hulling since they are oil replenishers.
Fort Austin and Fort Rosalie are solid replenishers and probably aren’t required to have double hull. Fort Austin anyway was mothballed in 2009, just because the Royal Navy was in too good shape and needed to lose some more pieces.
But indeed, the RFA must preserved: the RFA represents 37% of Europe’s capability in this vital field of operations, and it is 100% of what keeps the Royal Navy a true ocean-capable fleet that can deploy abroad.
Without the RFA, the RN will suffer a monstrous setback in capability, arguably worse than losing frigates themselves.
I hope the SDSR does not happily neclect to take heed of the urgent need for action in this field.
Potentially, some news about a bunch of new Replenishers and the lease/acquisition of the new norwegian icebreaker to replace HMS Endurance could be two little “nice news” for the long term to repay the navy a bit for all it loses.
Unless, of course, all procurement save for Light Patrol Protected Vehicle, FRES SV and 12 Chinooks get shredded altogether. You never know what’s “relevant to today’s threats and needs” in the mind of politicians…!
Because the Cold War is over, you know.
Because BAE’s CEOs and workers are evil guys with blood on their hands and vaults bursting with money.
Because everyone now is good and nice.
There are no enemies anymore.
War is just a bad word. It won’t happen anymore!
We need boots on the ground, we cut all the rest for them, and cut on soldiers as well after we’re done with the rest, in an example of masterful planning!
Ships can run without fuel and carrier-borne planes can make missions without bombs.
We’ll release irresistible Propaganda Pamplets in place of weapons! Or nothing at all perhaps, better yet.
Because this is the wonderland of the world without Cold War, and LibDems will remind it to us all! Cheer and smile!
Liger30This is how it is in the RN atleast, IIRC the well dock of the Albion able to store up to four LCU Mk 10s while the Bay class’s dock can only support one + a couple of LCVP Mk 5s, but the Bays able to carry far more vehicles than the Albions. I thought this was due to the Albions landing the first wave, so focusing on getting what they have onto the beaches as soon as possible while the Bays simply trickle reinforcments onto the captured beachhead at a much slower rate, but ultimately delivering more equipment.
That’s the idea behind the Albion (+Ocean) + Bay couple indeed. Original plans to complete this excellent amphibious capability called for the MARS-included 3 Joint Sea Based Logistic ships, which should have been able to support troops ashore with fuel, food, spare parts and offer extensive medical facilities as well, and provide support for quite a long time. They would have been awesome to support the 2 planned Fleet Solid Replenishers, and they would have made for excellent vessels to use to help populations struck by disaster.
Joint sea-based logistics (JSBL) support and sustainment to be provided to land forces from the sea to locations potentially well inland from the beachhead and then sustain their operations.
The most significant driver for the MARS programme at the moment is the need for early replacement of the remaining single hulled Rover and Leaf-class tankers – which bulk supply RN warships with fuel. In November 2007 the MARS IPT published details of a project class of 6 fleet tankers, and again in 2009 there was a tender directed to shipbuilding industry that included Italian Fincantieri and South Korean Daewoo, but that once more died for lack of funding.
in early 2007 MARS was envisaged as a fleet of:1. Five fleet tankers for delivery between 2011 and 2016.
2. Three joint sea-based logistics vessels for delivery in 2018, 2020 and 2021.
3. Two fleet solid-support ships for delivery in 2017 and 2019.
4. A single fleet tanker (CVF/carrier strike) for delivery in 2016
The need is still there and even more urgent as time passes by. If the navy is lucky, a new fleet of (possibly only 4…?) civilian oil tankers will be leased/bought and equipped for RAS and hopefully to take an helicopter and some stores on board. Maybe the SDSR will give us an hint about what will be of this requirement.
The next phase of MARS will be to replace the four “Fort” RFA’s with a new class of two supply and replenishment ships, optimised to support the future aircraft carriers. The requirements are still evolving, but good aviation and repair facilities are known to be included, and a capability to operate and support about 6 Merlin size helicopters and possibly unmanned air vehicles is expected; also offering ‘second line’ aviation maintenance/repair services as well as providing for rapid vertical embarkation and transfer of people and stores. Timescales are very uncertain, and will be affected by other factors such as funding availability and the viability of a service life extension for the existing Series II ships (Fort George and Fort Victoria). However, one schedule suggests an order for the lead ship being placed in 2012, with entry in to service in 2017. It is considered almost certain that these ships will be built in UK shipyards – but the MOD is keeping its options open.
Now we risk instead seeing the existing capability lost, now that it was perfectly complete and operative (last modifications to 3 Commando Brigade were carried out in 2008…). And the navy risks losing most of the RFA capabilities as well, with MARS disappearing almost entirely from the radars, very likely.
Folly…:(
Liger30A C3 armed with a 30 mm gun would be a glorified minesweeper. I would not want to be on a C3 vessel if a crisis was to start and i was fired upon with anything bigger and nastier than an RPG. I wouldn’t want to be cruising around Cyprus and have a Yakhmont fired by Syria/terrorists/Hezbollah coming at my little ship with the only hope of seeing it lured away by chaff distant enough that the slivers don’t sink the ship anyway.
A 76mm gun and a couple of 30 mm starboard and port would already give a bit more sense to a 3000 tons ship that would be pathetically underarmed otherwise.
Anyway, with everyone getting VLS point-defence missiles even on OPVs and so, i think that actually it shouldn’t be regarded as over-ambitious a Venator-like armament of 1×76 mm + 2 x 30 mm and 16 VLS cells for CAMM.
CAMM that, is worth remembering, won’t need a Sylver or Mk41 VLS cell, but it’ll need just the space for itself since it uses cold-launch from its own sealed launcher/canister. It should thus be relatively cheap for a missile system, and not needing a true VLS system will offer further savings.
I think it is very handy to have.
Also, C3 ideally should have space reservation to get Harpoons one day, or any way some kind of SSM should the need arise.
Back area should have the slip for RHIBS and for FAST minesweeping drones and such, and a wide garage like the Venator.
A telescopic hangar for a Lynx, at the very least, should be present: the navy shouldn’t risk re-learning the need for helicopters AFTER buying expensive ships. A telescopic hangar is a readily available off-the-shelf system that’s certainly not that expensive.
Deck area should suffice for a Merlin, too.
An hull-mounted sonar will be needed, while a towed one should be a possible fit to add as a pallet in the rear mission bay when needed to ensure the C3 can be useful as escort even in a more risky area where subs are a real threat.
Because the RN fears the small ships because in time of “peace” they are seductive: the government may easily decide the RN can do with less and less and less high-end frigates…
But what admirals know, is that the OPV can’t do much more than the OPV.
A frigate can do the work of the OPV, the opposite is not true.
The Royal Navy fears the small, low-end, disarmed ships because they can spell the end of the seagoing fleet.
And it is a valid fear since i see many here are ready to happily embrace a RN with less frigates than Italy, France and others, but with a lot of most-likely nearly unarmed glorified OPVs.
While of course, on the forums more and more and more capability seems to be suggested, making the C3 more of a Nanchucka missile corvette URSS-style than the multipurpose utility hull that she’s envisaged to be.
In fact, the Venator on the forums is often criticized for its garage and side doors and cranes and stuff, but actually that is its MAJOR STRENGHT.
The RN wants the C3 to carry a lot of RHIBS for boarding party, a whole Mine Countermeasures system when needed (possibly including 2 or more FAST 9-meters surface minesweeper drones to replace the Hunt’s capability: don’t forget the C3 won’t have fiberglass hull, so there’s no going into minefields with the ship like the Hunt does. It will all fall back on drones.), and other systems to be brought on board as pallets/containers in the rear mission bay.
My only critique to the Venator design is the overall insufficient provvision for helicopter ops, but for the rest i find it makes for a perfect C3 ship capable to cover all roles she’ll be asked to cover.
25 knots full speed, capable to go at 18 for Task Group ops, and great range for operations abroad. Enough weapons to be credible and self-defend to a good degree, and thus capable to realistically deploy on itself as well.
Back to the Nimrod issue:
If after 2015 it is deemed that a dedicated high end MPA/ASW is required than there is a case for a OTS pruchase of the P-8 Posidon but serious consideration needs to be given to the puchase a number of a simpler MP platforms, with the costs shared with other departments as they will be providing rescue and other civilain capabilities. In fact this could be tied in to the replacement Air Sea Rescue plrogramme to replace the exisiting Sea King and S-61 platforms.
So, after billions have been burned, we drop a leading-edge capability offered by Nimrod MR4 for a continuation of the embarassing gap in coverage in place right now, to buy really-not-cheap P8s and/or a little fleet of smaller patrol planes like the C27 SAR used by Canada for SAR support…?
I don’t see the logic. The second aren’t so needed for the UK, that’s got busy-like-hell waterways but not the expenses and climatic hell of arctic Canada. The first would mean paying twice for a capability that the UK already has available, and only needs to start employing, finally!
The Nimrod is already available and can cover the whole range of tasks.
It is the Nimrod or nothing, ultimately. And the UK needs the Nimrod. It is unthinkable to miss a marittime patrol capability with all the traffic of submarines in the north and the traffic of civilian ships all around the UK.
With the interests the UK’s got in the North Sea and its role as NATO’s “Gate Guardian” granting the GIUK security, the UK can’t do without marittime patrol and thus it can’t do without Nimrod.
Hopefully, it is the same conclusion of the NSC, since the voices about cuts to Nimrods have sorta faded lately.
Ultimately, Nimrod and Type 26 are brothers: both are being looked at with suspect, since “they are overkill”.
They may be overkill NOW, but overkill is a thing.
Underkill is another.
Little sense has to retain SSNs and aircraft carriers and any ambition of being of any serious international relevance if all the rest of the range of capabilities is scrapped/downrated/weakened to such level that everyone else in Europe will be able to look at the UK and laugh at the comparison.
Liger30If the MRA4 is to get the chop, then something else will have to be acquired to provide at least a basic Maritime Patrol Aircraft capability, presumably one of the twin turboprops on the market. So rather than a saving of X millions, a saving of, e.g. 75% of X, with the other 25% paying for the less capable alternative.
Yeah, provided they aren’t mad enough to scrap marittime patrol altogether and say an idiocy like Ainsworth did delaying operations for the MR4 and advancing retirement for MR2 saying that “we’ll cover the role using other platforms, like the C130”.
Which is actually an elegant way to say “we have got no real capability to go marittime patrol” without the general public understanding the gap.
Because anyone who’s got a minimum knowledge of what marittime patrol is, of what the C130 is and of what the Nimrod is, will realize that:
A) C130s are hellishly busy doing their job already
B) Because of what they are, they couldn’t do marittime patrol as well as a IIWW Catalina PBY could, which is quite embarassing.
However, since the UK has been left without marittime patrol coverage already, they may as well be irresponsible enough to scrap the Nimrod MR4 altogether, especially since no one has been ruthless enough to speak frankly and say that the C130-bull***t is bull***t, possibly to the press.
Liger30Just to bring-out one point:
Technically that is probably true, but the mine / fisheries fleet is really where junior RN officers cut their teeth. Their day-to-day job is pretty dull and routine ( except when they get to use the ROV on some seabed UXO ) but that’s what’s needed for officers to learn how to lead men and to take their first command.
Serving officers with whom I have spoken still refer back to lessons their learned on the mine fleet. It’s like a Perisher course for skimmers 🙂 For that reason I believe the RN will do all it can to protect it.
I know. The navy is desperately short of little ships where officers can gain experience and shape themselves up, and the minesweepers are indeed the only remaining main source for such practice, pretty much.
But this to me looks hardly like a justification for losing out some of the most precious pieces of the fleet to retain a load of minesweepers, that’s what i think.
Also because in the future there will probably be just around 8 C3 anyway doing the work of minesweepers and everything, and they’ll be bloody larger than the sweepers as well.
So, done the math, it is not a bargain to lose amphibs and frigates in exchange for minesweepers.
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