Meanwhile of course, with the success of the EMALS catapults in tests, there’s people advocating for switch to F18: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/09/27/emals_looking_good_as_sdsr_looms/
It wouldn’t be impossible wasn’t for the political side of the F35 equation, which probably secures that, even if in reduced numbers, is the F35 that comes along for the british forces (luckily, it is not time to invest in a design that’s still good but also inexorably aging in comparison to the latest generations of fighters and air defence SAM batteries).
For me, the very best option (militarily speaking, possibly not so in terms of dirty money) would be to still go EMALS and buy F35C and lease a bunch of Hawkeyes. That would give an unmatched, cutting edge capability.
But if this was the way forwards, pretty surely only one carrier would get the catapults and arresting gear, and the other no, which would cause havoc with availability.
If they are both built to the same STOVL config, no matter the reports of “reduced capability” for PoW, when one is out planes can still fly from the other.
(seriously, this “reduced capability” is something i struggle to understand. What could they strip out of the ship? Radars? CIWSs (admitted that at least QE gets them, which is far from sure…)? What?
I continue to think that the “reduced capability” of the press is just the fact that PoW will be presented mainly as a Commando ship and used in place of the bowing-out Ocean with just helicopters on board.
But i think it is higly unlikely that any serious difference in outfit/building of the two ships can happen. (luckily, so the navy could just move the planes from one to the other when necessary).
As to the Type 45, only chance to lose them is that Fox gets a contract from Saudis for a couple of hulls, so that Duncan and Defender are handed to Saudi Arabia.
I hope this won’t happen, but i also don’t see what other credible options do exist in terms of cuts to the Type 45 fleet otherwise, because it is too late to save anything on them.
Almost surely, the navy will be unable to have the destroyers fitted with CEC in 2014 as it had hoped, and this will already be quite a setback for their air defence capability, while giving a negligible saving, once more.
Strategic Defence Review… better not to say what i think it is, i don’t want to be too vulgar.
Indeed.
Most of the cost-cutting proposals made so far save little to nothing in terms of money, while costing a lot in terms of capability.
The only really massive saving obtainable is to phase out at least half of the Tornado bombers. It would still be the largest saving available.
Sound advice! http://www.euractiv.com/en/foreign-affairs/france-wants-europe-boost-defence-cooperation-news-498152
Mod Edit: Please do not post substantial cut-and-pastes from external sources.
We have had complaints from other publishers about this practice.
A summary and a link is quite sufficient.
It was about time someone more influent than me started saying things without puns, clearly and directly.
Problem is, if he gets listened to as Liam Fox in the UK, his words will stay the prophet’s advice in the desert, lost on people who’s deaf and blind. 🙁
Well, not buying F-35 but instead keep maintain and operate Harriers will have the massive financial impact that is needed to solve the equation.
Actually, no. It wouldn’t work since it is a good few years before the UK starts paying and receiving airframes.
Save for 3 planned to arrive in 2012, there’s no firm order yet, and the money the UK spends on the F35 programme now for its design and low-rate initial production most likely comes from the RAF in the large part.
And there’s no way that can be cancelled without pissing off the americans to no ends, and risk the future workshare of british industry in the programme as well. If not for purely military reasons, the UK is POLITICALLY incapable to quit the F35 programme. Already halving the order will have a politic cost. But quitting is quite impossible to envisage with Washington pressure coming to ensure the main partner in the programme does not quit with the disasterous consequences in terms of funding, jobs, and bad publicity for the UK, for its forces, and for LM’s plane too.
You’ll have noticed how Fox made it clear that the F35 will continue, and how even the general’s Top Brass have conceded that, if the carriers are sunk, the UK should “buy F35A”.
Which, arguably, would re-become F35B all the same in the end because Washington would like to ensure the B version is bought in as high numbers as possible, so that the US marines can get their share at the lowest possible cost. They would be stuck in the RAF bases and be nearly irrilevant, but still cost a damn lot.
On the industry front, Rolls Royce would arguably be the only one safe in that scenario, just because pretty much no one else is really ready to deal with the VTOL aspect of the engine.
But, for example, you could expect the alternative, half-british F136 engine to die immediately and very possibly the share of fuselage work being done in the UK going elsewhere. And billions would have been lost for no result if UK quits.
So, no. There’s no saving at all in the short term in cutting F35 orders. The savings on F35 will happen a few years from now, with the order being halved, integration of british weaponry delayed and airframes accepted in service at a very low rate.
IOC is expected in 2018 at the earlier, with consequent retirement of Harriers in that date.
AKA, no savings for now.
As for the Amphibs, I hope the worst that happens is a ‘Fearless/Intrepid scenario’ where half the ships are put into maintained reserve and rotated back to the fleet every four to five years. Cuts costs significantly but retains capability.
I hope so too, if the need for cuts is really so bad that it can’t be helped! Cutting on amphibs in a DEFINITIVE way would be insane and injustifiable.
Mothball a Bay and put one of the Albions in reserve will be painful like hell, but at least the ships will still be available.
Of course, though, they should be “put in reserve” in a realistic way, not like Invincible who was “put in reserve” but effectively pretty much made incapable to take to the sea again without major refit and work to put her back in shape.
Also, HMS Invincible’s destiny was expected to be announced in september 2010. Any news about that…? I couldn’t bear to see Invy scrapped without regard for her career and for what she’s been for the navy and for the whole country.
She’d make such an awesome museum/monument… And with HMS Hermes sold abroad, at least one of the two great veterans of the Falklands should really be saved!
Let’s not make the error of scrapping HMS Vanguard again to later regret the fact there’s no british battleship to show to the world!
HMS Warspite would have been an even better example to protect, with all what she did in IIWW…
Hope they find a way to save HMS Invincible at least!
As to frigates/escorts, there’s been insisting noise about 3 type 23 possibly going on top of Type 22 and Type 42 (which incidentally gives you that terrible 12 hulls figure that’s been coming out on the press lately as the number of escorts the RN is going to loose)
We can only hope it is not true.
As to two submarines going, it is not actually the first time this rumor comes out either. It appeared in some very early press reports. I remember speculating personally on this forum that the navy may have been thinking about speeding up the retirement of two of the oldest Trafalgar to “ensure” the future of 7 Astutes.
Again, we can hope this is one proposal out of many, and does not get anywhere.
My suggestion is still the same: the RN has too few escorts and arguably “too many” minesweepers. With a requirement for 4/5 hulls, a class of 8 boats should suffice. NATO nations burst with minesweepers, all of excellent quality, so i think that a reduction in this sector would be the “least evil”. Either the Hunt or the Sandown should be sacrificed, in order to avoid aving to cut Type 23 hulls on top of the Type 22 and 42, or to save the Amphibs.
Arguably, the loss of minesweepers would be far less painful than losing anything else.
As to an analysis purely economic of the possible savings envisaged in such scenario, i’m basing myself on some useful data recovered on Wikipedia to make a few calculations. (i know, it is not the most reliable of sources at times, but i had got nothing better!) I’m sharing my conclusions with you all (please, not call this scaremongering, it’s a math exercise based on the most reliable figures i could find, and you can all control my calculations and see for yourselves):
£13.5 million Average running cost of a Type 42 every year in 2002/3 reported by Wiki, with this as reported source http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/2003/sep/09/destroyers: we can expect this to have grown further because of inflation, age and such, but i’ll make a conservative calculation and use this data.
Annual saving from scrapping 5 Type 42: 67.5 millions
£10.3 million Type 23 average annual operating costs, based on historic costs over each full financial year. The figures include manpower, maintenance, fuel, stores and other costs (such as harbour dues), but exclude depreciation and cost of capital.
30.9 millions a year
£13.1 million Type 22 Batch 3 frigate, average annual operating costs, based on historic costs over each full financial year. The figures include manpower, maintenance, fuel, stores and other costs (such as harbour dues), but exclude depreciation and cost of capital.
52.4 millions
Since scrapping ships is not for free and all sort of other considerations, the missing money from inflation and such we can assume would go anyway from scrapping costs and other end-life operations, including hopefully moving the Phalanx CIWSs to the Type 45, together with Harpoon coming from the scrapped frigates and possibly Stingray torpedo systems as well. (I know, it may not be “urgent”, but my heart bleeds at how little the Type 45s are equipped, it would be A WHOLE DIFFERENT ship with a “full” capability equipment)
What worries me is that we are looking at a saving of merely: 150.8 millions.
I doubt the amphibs would add much saving, even in the end-game folly of scrapping them entirely, which i think we all hope does not happen.
We are SOOOOO far away from a 1.5 BILLION in savings that the navy is apparently required to make.
I think that scrapping the whole fleet of escorts and the whole fleet of amphibs still would be well far away of that desired saving figure, since if we are to believe to Wikipedia the whole Type 23 fleet averages an annual cost of 133.9 millions. (roughly as much as a single Type 23 costed when she was built)
I don’t know if and how much Devonport costs to run as navy base, but 1.5 billion is a figure the navy apparently can’t obtain neither shutting itself down ENTIRELY.
There’s obviously no figure on the annual cost of running SSNs, but i have serious doubt that two Trafalgar can cost a billion a year to run, sincerely.
Albion and Bulwark also are most likely not very expensive to run: with a crew of 256 (excluding the Marines, we reason on the ship alone) they boost a mere 3 more than a Type 42, and they don’t have a Sea Dart missile to keep operational, no main gun and other expensive features.
On Albion class there’s no figure on annual running cost, but i don’t expect it to be that much higher that a Type 42 and probably lower, since they are newer and should have lower need for mainteinance.
HMS Bulwark’s running cost for this year would be deceptive since she’s just coming out of a 30 millions refit.
My point is, gentlemen, that i’m scared by the obvious size differences. The cuts of hulls are going to hamper the navy’s capability MASSIVELY, and give back almost unrelevant savings in exchange.
Which brings us to the next painful question: HOW THE HELL IS THE NAVY EXPECTED TO SAVE 1.5 BILLIONS…???
Probably the only real chance to obtain such saving would be to stop CASD and maybe retire an SSBN or two, because no other cut in hulls, from the data i can collect, can offer a cut anywhere high enough.
Are the carriers safe…? I’d like to say they are, but there’s this huge question mark floating above me. From where such massive saving can come out…?
A curiosity: HMS Queen Elisabeth, once in service, is expect to run on an annual budget of 44 millions. If this is achieved, both carriers will cost 88/90 millions a year to run. I exclude the planes, since F35B or more planes for the RAF would still cost, since apparently the option is “arm the carriers” or “scrap the carriers but buy F35A” (demented idea) so the argument “but the planes are the true expense!!!” is totally unvalid.
Hardly unaffordable, i’d say.
I dare to speculate that 2 Albions + 4 Bays probably cost roughly 40/50 millions a year, and possibly less since the Bay has little crew and should really not be mainteinance heavy since they lack mostly any kind of combat system, weapons and other expensive gear.
If anyone has got ideas and/or more accurate figures, it would be good to discuss about it and pull out some pocket calculators, because it sounds like the navy is being screwed!
I agree on the manning point, and i also expect more helicopters to be operated without troubles by a ship that size.
I wonder what caused the 4000 speculation, though. It is not appeared just once, and not just on Wikipedia either. I found it several times around on blogs, defence websites and such.
Was it 2000, it would be still pretty damn high too, and impressive for sure.
He did not specify, but all evidence is that the UK will continue down the F35B path, but with order halved to around 70 airframes.
Regarding the new 19,000 tonne destroyer for the Japanese Navy, is it going to fulfill the role of a full LPD or of an LPH? How large an amphibious operation would one, hypothetically at this early stage, be able to carry out?
These news came out last june:
The new 22DDH will be 248 meters long and 39 meters in beam, and displace more than 24,000 tons. This makes her almost 50 percent larger than the Hyuga class and places an unbearable semantic strain on the use of the term “destroyer” to describe these ships. To put the size of the ship into context, she is comparable with a World War II Essex-class fleet carrier.
Illustrations of the 22DDH show her to be a full-fledged helicopter carrier with no real destroyer characteristics. The superstructure is very similar to that of the Hyuga class with the difference that the 01 deck is extended forward, probably to accommodate a vertical launch silo for air defense missiles. The point defenses of the new ships are more than doubled, with three Phalanx Mk 15 mountings and two RAM launchers replacing the pair of Phalanx mounts on the older ship. Significantly, while one of the Phalanx mounts on the Hyuga is situated forward on the flight deck, and thus obstructs fixed-wing operations, the 22DDH has all of its mounts located on sponsons clear of the flight deck itself.
The flight deck layout on the 22DDH differs significantly from that of the Hyuga class. One of the lifts has been moved from the centerline to the deck-edge position. The added width of the flight deck has been used to shift the axis of air operations clear of the remaining centerline elevator. The number of munitions elevators feeding the flight deck has been increased from two to four.
A vertical launch silo built into the rear of the flight deck on the Hyuga has been removed, once again reducing obstructions to flight operations. Flight deck operations capacity has been increased from two to seven helicopters.
Japanese accounts suggest that one of the reasons for the drastic increase in size of the 22DDH design is a planned shift to the V-22 Osprey as the primary air group element for these ships. It is not clear whether these would be replacements for or supplemental to the SH-60Ks that equip the Hyuga class. These accounts also make it clear that the F-35B short takeoff and vertical landing variant of the Joint Strike Fighter is seen as a key system for these ships. Apparently, provision for the operation of UAVs is being included within the design.
Only indications i’ve found around the internet about her loadout are:
14 helicopters, 4,000 people and 50 trucks.
We’d now have to doubt about these numbers: i expect a ship so big to be able to use more than 14 helos, but moreover what bugs me is the 4000 figure for personnel capacity, which seems honestly too high.
If it is true, it’ll be able to carry A DAMN LOT of soldiers.
50 “trucks” is also an very vague indication: HMS Ocean can carry 6 L118 guns and around 43 Land Rovers and light vehicles. the 22DDH could have similar capabilities, but also have a larger area with stronger deck and different layout to carry 50 armoured vehicles. Hard to tell at the moment.
Realistically, we could look at the italian Cavour to have an idea of what could be transported.
However, just like the Cavour, the 22DDH most likely won’t have its own landing crafts. If Japanese are smarter than Italian designers, they’ll have a ramp on the ship that allows vehicles to transit from ship to landing craft (something like a larger scale rear ramp on Ocean) so that a 22DDH operating in team with an Osumi ship with its two US-built hovercrafts could send ashore heavy equipment from the very first hour, while Cavour is stuck to acting as an extremely expensive transport ship capable to unload only in port or on a beach secured and prepared to receive vehicles.
Cavour’s hangar can be used to hold up to 24 MBTs, or 50 medium armour vehicles or 100 light vehicles.
It is not absurd to foresee for the Japanese ship a similar range of capabilities, since the new DDH will be actually a bit larger than Cavour.
Cavour: 244 meters long, 39 wide, 22.290 tons standard
@Swerve
Japan plans a couple more Hyungas plus the new enlarged version.
And US sources value that with the addition of a 12° Sky Jump the Hyunga could operate a small group of F35B.
As to troop carrying, you’re right: there’s no evidence they’d be able to carry infantry and deploy it from the air.
But i won’t rule it out entirely. It may be possible to embark some in hasty conditions.
Sincerely, i’d be surprised if it couldn’t be done.
The Invincibles were not built with troop carrying facilities either, but at least one of them has been used as Commando carrier on a regular base. There’s no reason why we should be so sure that Japanese wouldn’t be able to do the same.
Anyway, that wasn’t exactly the point. The point was make evident the difference in approach: UK has more commitments to fullfil with its navy, on a global scale, yet it continues to size down its fleet.
Japan works mostly only in its house garden, but has got a formidable fleet that also includes 18 submarines.
Couple of things youve missed
Battalion on jungle warfare training
Battalion(s) doing arctic warfare training in Norway
Battalion doing desert training thats not including any in Canada
This all counts as tours.In case you werent aware that 36 battalions includes the regiment & SFSG
and both Ghurka battalions,
Battalions aren’t in Norway in a continuous fashion, and the battalions training in Norway are Royal Navy’s Marines, if we want to say it all. Yet the Commando Brigade manages to also supply battalions on a regular basis for Afghanistan. If the whole army was as efficient as the Commando Brigade, there would be a lot less problems in deploying larger forces abroad.
Similarly, i don’t know the schedule of the jungle training in Belize, but i don’t think it is done on a continuous base either.
I don’t think there are battalions stationed permanently in BATUS either. There’s a team as small as 8 men that rises to 50 in time of exercise and activity, and a normal exercise sees 30 days of operations for Two Tank Squadrons, two Infantry Battalions, an Armoured Engineer Squadron, and a Close Air Defence troop with supporting REME, artillery and services.
Also, BATUS is training and not operational deployment, so i think that overall these are hardly justifications for an availability rate that’s pretty damn low.
UK INFANTRY BATTALIONS (Data of early 2009, but it should still be valid for the moment)
THE GUARDS DIVISION
Regular Battalions
1st Bn Grenadier Guards 1 GREN GDS
1st Bn Coldstream Guards 1 COLDM GDS
1st Bn Scots Guards 1 SG
1st Bn Irish Guards 1 IG
1st Bn Welsh Guards 1 WG
Territorial Army Battalion
The London Regiment LONDONS
There are generally three battalions from the Guards Division on public duties in London at any one time. When a Regiment is stationed in London on public duties it is given an extra company to ensure the additional manpower required for ceremonial events is available.
THE SCOTTISH DIVISION
Regular Battalions
The Royal Scots Borderers, 1st Bn The Royal Regiment of Scotland 1 SCOTS
The Royal Highland Fusiliers, 2nd Bn The Royal Regiment of Scotland 2 SCOTS
The Black Watch, 3rd Bn The Royal Regiment of Scotland 3 SCOTS
The Highlanders, 4th Bn The Royal Regiment of Scotland 4 SCOTS
The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 5th Bn The Royal Regiment of Scotland 5 SCOTS
Territorial Army Battalions
52nd Lowland, 6th Bn The Royal Regiment of Scotland 6 SCOTS
51st Highland, 7th Bn The Royal Regiment of Scotland 7 SCOTS
THE QUEEN’S DIVISION
Regular Battalions
1st Bn The Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment (Queen’s and Royal Hampshires) 1 PWRR
2nd Bn The Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment (Queen’s and Royal Hampshires) 2 PWRR
Territorial Army Battalion
3rd Bn The Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment (Queen’s and Royal Hampshires) 3PWRR
THE ROYAL REGIMENT OF FUSILIERS
Regular Battalions
1st Bn The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers 1 RRF
2nd Bn The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers 2 RRF
Territorial Army Battalion
5th Bn The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers 5 RRF
THE ROYAL ANGLIAN REGIMENT
Regular Battalions
1st Bn The Royal Anglian Regiment 1 R ANGLIAN
2nd Bn The Royal Anglian Regiment 2 R ANGLIAN
Territorial Army Battalion
3rd Bn The Royal Anglian Regiment 3 R ANGLIAN
THE KING’S DIVISION
Regular Battalions
1st Bn The Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment (King’s, Lancashire and Border) 1 LANCS
2nd Bn The Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment (King’s, Lancashire and Border) 2 LANCS
Territorial Army Battalion
4th Bn The Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment (King’s, Lancashire and Border) 4 LANCS
THE YORKSHIRE REGIMENT
Regular Battalions
1st Bn The Yorkshire Regiment (Prince Of Wales’s Own) 1 YORKS
2nd Bn The Yorkshire Regiment (Green Howards) 2 YORKS
3rd Bn The Yorkshire Regiment (Duke of Wellington’s) 3 YORKS
Territorial Army Battalion
4th Bn The Yorkshire Regiment 4 YORKS
THE PRINCE OF WALES’S DIVISION
THE MERCIAN REGIMENT
Regular Battalions
1st Bn The Mercian Regiment (Cheshire) 1 MERCIAN
2nd Bn The Mercian Regiment (Worcesters and Foresters) 2 MERCIAN
3rd Bn The Mercian Regiment (Staffords) 3 MERCIAN
Territorial Army Battalion
4th Bn The Mercian Regiment 4 MERCIAN
THE ROYAL WELSH
Regular Battalions
1st Bn The Royal Welsh (The Royal Welch Fusiliers) 1 R WELSH
2nd Bn The Royal Welsh (The Royal Regiment of Wales) 2 R WELSH
Territorial Army Battalion
3rd Bn The Royal Welsh 3 R WELSH
THE RIFLES
Regular Battalions
1st Bn The Rifles 1 RIFLES (Part of 3 Commando Brigade)
2nd Bn The Rifles 2 RIFLES
3rd Bn The Rifles 3 RIFLES
4th Bn The Rifles 4 RIFLES
5th Bn The Rifles 5 RIFLES
Territorial Army Battalions
6th Bn The Rifles 6 RIFLES
7th Bn The Rifles 7 RIFLES
THE ROYAL IRISH REGIMENT
Regular Battalion
1st Bn The Royal Irish Regiment 1 R IRISH
Territorial Army Battalion
The Royal Irish Rangers RANGERS
THE PARACHUTE REGIMENT
Regular Battalions
1st Bn The Parachute Regiment 1 PARA
2nd Bn The Parachute Regiment 2 PARA
3rd Bn The Parachute Regiment 3 PARA
Territorial Army Battalion
4th Bn The Parachute Regiment 4 PARA
Note: 1 PARA have formed the core element of the new Special Forces Support Group and as such have been removed from the formal Infantry structure
The Brigade of Gurkhas
1st Bn The Royal Gurkha Rifles 1 RGR
2nd Bn The Royal Gurkha Rifles 2 RGR
This is without counting “the Regiment” SAS and its territorial army units and the RAF Regiment, which saw a new deployable Squadron created recently, together with a new deplyable HQ created with base in Waddington.
Well, in terms of escort, Portugal has 7 frigates, 10 corvettes and 10 patrol vessels.
If the Royal Navy is cut down to 6 Type 45, 10 Type 23 and no amphibs, it’ll still be better off than Portugal but will be ridiculously close in terms of number of hulls, which is astonishing considering the difference in wealth, global relevance, commerce bulk, oversea territories and other factors that pretty much DICTATE that the UK should have its navy on a far higher position in the list of priorities.
A better comparison is with countries such as France, Italy, Spain and Japan.
And it is not like the Royal Navy comes out of the comparison so shiny and happy, all things considered.
I keep wondering if there’s any real risk to see the amphibious fleet axed. Apart from being militarily nonsense, it would also be a political move pretty obscene that would give a very bad image to the world of a UK effectively losing most of its power projection capability.
Can the government afford to scrap the best of the navy’s modernization program of the post 1998 and lose a capability that even Italy, Spain and Holland retain…?
My answer to the question is a loud “NO”, but my fear stays high.
Amazing how Japan, which has no global commitments and no oversea territories to protect and support and who declares its navy is for “self defence” only, needs 47 major escorts, anti-ballistic and anti-satellite capability and 9 amphibious assault ships plus two helicopter carriers (LPHs, honestly) with one more coming, even larger and capable to take in future F35B planes on board, while the Uk can neclet its Navy so stupidly.
And don’t say “Japan is close to China”, because China is not a threat to Japan more than Russia is to the UK.
China and North Korea missiles in test launches brushes Japan? Well, we had “UFO sightings” that turned out to be a Bulava missile exploding above Norwey.
Japan has china planes bothering its air space? Well, the UK’s got the Tu160 coming to Scotland.
Main difference being that Russia went to war against Georgia, allied of the UK, while China “only” invaded Tibet.
Amazing how the same things can be presented under different lights! China is a threat, but Russia no.
Pakistan with 300.000 soldiers is a threat to justify India’s weapon programme even if India has the power to pulverize Pakistan ten times over, Russia is no problem for the UK.
Reality is that a war between China and India is not any more likely than a war of Russia against NATO forces.
India and China and Russia consider defence the first need and duty of the state, the UK couldn’t care less for it.
That’s where the real difference is.
British army at the moment should cout:
16 Airborne, 3 Commando (Navy, but it is a brigade), 19° Light Brigade, 52° Infantry Brigade, 11° Light Brigade HQ (created for Afghanistan, it is not a real brigade with its own equipment), 1° Mechanized Brigade, 4° Mechanized, 12° Mechanized, 7° Armoured and 20° Armoured.
9 Effective Brigades plus the skeleton of a tenth.
In total the British Army has 36 Regular Battalions available for service and this total combined with the 14 TA battalions (excluding The Royal Gibraltar Regiment) could give a mobilisation strength of 50 infantry battalions.
One Gurkha battalion is in Brunei on a regular base, a couple are stationed in Cyprus as a reserve, one is in the Falklands and 3/4 are in Afghanistan on detachment.
This should be the situation overall.
I would not be surprised if it does up the cost in the long run, or that any such change to the PoW is the excuse to get rid of Ocean, Albion or Bulwark and some of the Bays on the grounds that the new PoW duplicates their capabilities!
That would be total, blatant and irresponsible lie, and trying to sell it would be a shame for whoever will dare saying an idiocy of these proportions.
If they want to be stupid, i hope they do it with that little decency that can still be managed even while doing an idiocy, at least.
But then again, they had the courage to call this obscenity Strategic Defence Review, so i guess they don’t know the meaning of the word “shame”
Changing the design of PoW in any way won’t save money, but require more expense. Adding LCVP Mk5 on davits would be relatively easy, but there are no chances at all to see extensive modifications in terms of a well deck or modifications of decks without having to face a ridiculously complex, risky and expensive redesign of the ship. It would be a ridiculous waste of money.
Same goes for lenghtening the duration of the work for building her up, which would save a few penny in the short term but add even more to the long terms debts.
Delays were large cause of the overspend Labour is so blamed for.
That proposal is pure nonsense, and it rivals with the idea to cut on the amphibs for the title of stupidest proposal ever.
That is on a long term sustained basis, it could surge 35,000 for a short term action. I’d be highly surprised if many other countries besides the US didn’t have logistics difficulties sustaining 10k of troops on the other side of the world for near on a decade.
I have my doubts about this kind of assumptions.
If the government asks the armed forces to go to war and then provides the funding (what has NOT happened in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have been funded on peacetime budget at the expense of defence needs for ammodernation), what exactly would stop the army from being able to deploy more soldiers on a long term basis?
It may be necessary to lenghten the duration of operational tours of duty, but other than that, a real constraint that can’t be overcome does not really exist.
Sure, if you have to do everything without funding, the matter changes…