While a 600km cruise missile is nice now (I prefer they actually concentrate on supersonic missiles with ranges of 150km as a priority for the immediate future), I cannot but help feel it is in the long run essential for the future of the RAF – come 2024/5 the RAF needs to get their hands on 6 – 8 stealthy UCAV’s carrying a payload of long range, supersonic cruise missiles in order to be able provide global strike capabilities. It would be even better if the UCAV comes in maritime flavour as well, then the UK could carryout precise, prompt, deep strike from anywhere in the world.
That is work for the Taranis if the experimentation with it is funded by the SDSR, and it should be since drones are said to be one relatively safe area.
Also, such a long range strike missile, possibly with a couple of interchangeable warheads (i’m thinking to a unitary high-explosive warhead with tri-mode explosion method and anti-bunker capability to hit, say, armored commander centres and a multiple warhead with intelligent submunitions capable to destroy, say, an artillery or SAM battery) is undoubtedly a good target for the future. Possibly, it should be supersonic, if not hypersonic, to be able to survive against modern air defence.
But, realistically, at the moment the RAF will have massive troubles trying to justify the expense of designing such a missile in the current situation (Afghanistan + budget disaster) so we hare to realistically expect any work on such project to go “on hold” for a good few years, like the never-officially abandoned but matter-of-fact dead Challenger II upgunning with the Smoothbore Rheinmetal 120/55 gun.
Of course, the Taranis should be extensively tested and studied and bring to a final production version that can take off from carriers too.
Because it is from carriers that such an attack would be launched, no doubts on that.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/raf-under-fire-as-battle-for-shrinking-defence-budget-turns-vicious-2078431.html
And here there are again suggestions of RAF losing in the SDSR to the army and navy.
Sincerely, i can’t disagree from many points. From the war of Korea onwards, most of the air-to-air kills have been scored by fighters at sea. It is time for the Fleet Air Arm to get the F35 for itself and deploy them at sea in the right way.
Not like now with the Harriers, that make a visit on Lusty every now and then but mostly always are being toyed with by the RAF.
The Army should have the grip over the, say, Mantis drones for recon/close air support.
The RAF can retain the Typhoons and such. Disband the RAF is a no go… But for sure, the F35 should be Navy’s matter.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3d6adeb4-bf6a-11df-965a-00144feab49a,s01=1.html?ftcamp=rss The Type 26 draws attention even from Brasil, after Australia and New Zealand! This is potentially a very good news for the development of the new frigates and for their characteristics. As we have already noted more than once, the Type 26 is a VITAL project for the RN and for british shipbuilding as a whole.
Hope the SDSR doesn’t mess everything up…
Also, it is good to notice that HMS Ocean must have been impressing the Brazilians: it is down there for joint training of Marines and to represent british industry in Brazil.
She just arrived, and already comes some good news! 😀
SAVE HMS OCEAN, the finest of all!
On the subject of the FRES Scout, the Army is no longer looking to field a “Light” recce tank but rather develope a platform the replace its large fleet of 1960s and 70s AFVs with a common fleet based on the ASCOD 2. These would form the core of the so called “Medium” Brigades which will be the core of the new army.
Quite true i guess, but we are still expecting a 120 mm smoothbore gun armed ASCOD as new “tank” that becomes the center of the future medium brigades. The ASCOD SV includes Scout, Protected Mobility and Recovery/Repair vehicle. And it is not bad.
My doubt is that the Scout is simply too big. There are advantages in terms of commonality, armor and such, but the ASCOD Scout will simply be unable to go in most of the places the Scimitar could reach.
An ASCOD, for example, would simply sink into the kind of wet terrain the Scimitar conquered in the Falklands.
Being tied to a certain kind of routes, the ASCOD Scout will be more subject to encounter IEDs, mines and ambushes, since the enemy has less places to worry about. Remember the Vickings in Afghanistan? They became popular because they could go in off-route places where the enemy did not expect them.
Also, this is not just spectacular: 
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/08/cvrt-what-are-we-losing/
Being able to insert a bit of armor with Chinooks is a true benediction for units like Royal Marines and 16 Air Assault Brigade. Besides, being able to drop a Scout by the air in an advanced location also means great advantages.
Again, such a light vehicle is far easier to move to the front.
I don’t oppose the medium weight ASCOD Scout, but i really think that, more than a Scout, the UK is about to build a new IFV vehicle when it could just upgrade the Warriors it has got, and cover the FRES requirement with a far smaller vehicle, centered around both tactical and strategic mobility.
I’d rather see Warrior being upgunned and updated, and ASCOD units purchased to replace Spartan and other AFVs to create an all-medium weight kind of unit.
I’d also like to see something replace the Striker, an ASCOD armed with ground-launched Brimstone missiles, for examble, would cover the role perfectly and give ample cover against tanks, bunkers and any other kind of hard target.
But for the role of proper Scout (and ultra-light armor support when needed) i’d want something small, fast and incredibly mobile. Perhaps a modern re-edition of the CVR(T) hull, with modern armor technology, some kind of mine-protected belly and with obviously new electronic and engine. To arm it, there’s the Toutatis unmanned 40 mm CTA gun turret, that weights only 1.5 ton and offers commonality of gun and ammunitions with the Warrior.
As to employing CR2 in Afghanistan, i agree they could have been useful. I guess they did not get deployed (apart from money reasons) because the UK garrison is a close friend to the danish, which have their own Leopard tanks in the area and have used them in support of british lead operations many times.
The future is about an ASCOD armed with a 120 mm gun. A medium tank with the firepower of an heavy one, that will be easier to deploy and sustain in the area. That is the idea, at least.
Argus is the only Hospital ship the navy’s got, apart from being the place where chopper crews practice their landing skills at sea.
Are we sure that the RN can do without a Joint Casualty Treatment vessel…?
Besides, again, the truth is that Argus costs very little to run, and cutting her won’t save much.
😀
Thanks Liger – I think that SDB II is a fine weapon, but I still like to see (in parallel) a development of the Sea Skua II/FASGW(H) to be expanded to be used as a precision strike weapon in the 100 kg range.
Personally I prefer a BPE over a Mistral, but then I have cousins working in the yards at Ferrol who I am sure could do with the work 😀
Well, personally i was amazed by the SPEAR requirement about a 600 km+ cruise missile, and i’d love to see what weapons come out of the SPEAR requirement, but we have to be realistic and face the budget disaster: at the moment, the most likely outcome is that the SPEAR requirement gets entirely cancelled, i might say, so it would actually be a triumph if the SDB II could be acquired. Again, it would also come already fully F35-compatible thanks to the US funded requirement, and that’s good too.
And the Camberra is quite great a ship indeed, but again, if the RN will ever have a comparable ship, we’ll know in 202-something, when Albion and Bulwark bow out. The RN was planning 2/3 LHD on the 30.000 tons range to replace Ocean, Albion and Bulwark. Of course, what dies in october does not resurrect, so if the UK loses the amphibious fleet, it is higly unlikely there will ever be a programme in this direction.
I keep believing, however, that the National Security Council CAN’T be so fool to sacrifice the finest product of the post-1998 military strategy, that’s the 3 Commando Brigade and the ships it depends from.
It is too demented to be an acceptable plan, quite frankly, and i truly hope they won’t prove so stupid.
Also because, seriously. How much do they plan to save by scrapping the amphibious ships? I’m trying to find a document with indications of the average running cost for year of the Albion class, but i expect it to be pretty low.
8 Sandown would most likely provide for a greater saving, with less loss of capability.
An amazingly detailed analysis, including some areas where I do not know enough to discuss but I highlighted a few:
I think that the nature of NATO will change in a few years time, once US is out of Afghanistan, and our politicians need to be sensitive to it or they will find that America decides it days of covering European backsides are over and they will end up having to massively ramp up defence spending.
While I cannot entirely understand the move to heavier reconnaissance vehicle, I understood the entire process has been driven by an analysis of Afghanistan and Iraq and a perceived weakness of a reconnaissance vehicle in the Scimitar weight class to IED’s and anti-tank mines. I predict however that following the induction of FRES Scout the Army will get in the medium to long term a light Scout for areas where mobility is more important than blast resistance.
Are you suggesting SDB II instead of the 100 kg and 50 kg programmes for guided munitions with ranges in excess of 75 km?
I would have agreed with you a few weeks ago but I read the recent interview with the Air Commodore Simon Fella, former Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff for JHC – he makes the point that the Puma fills an important medium lift role currently, and when it retires they will have buy a small number of medium lift helicopters for urban operations (to quote page 59 of this months Combat Aircraft Monthly) “Following the retirement of Puma after 2022, current plans will also see us operating a small niche fleet of medium-lift helicopters for insertion for extraction in confined landing spaces.” – I guess this an important capability for the SAS and if you retire Puma now they will need to procure the helicopters ASAP or suffer a capability gap.
Do you think that the price of cooperation with France will be for the RN to buy one of the Mistral’s that France built for economic stimulus reasons but did not really need?
Rapidly,
The Small Diameter Bomb II is being acquired now, and the choosen weapon is
Raytheon’s GBU-53/B SDB-II is 7” in diameter around the seeker, with a clamshell protective door that comes off when the bomb is dropped. The bomb tapers to about 6” diameter beyond the pop-out wings, and is about 69.5” long. The wings remain swept back when deployed, and are about 66” across with a 5 degree anhedral slope. The bomb weighs about 200 pounds, and all of these dimensions are important when trying to ensure that the US Marines’ F-35B, with its cut-down internal weapon bays, can still carry 8 of them per bay. It also fits on BRU-61 external bomb racks.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Raytheon-Wins-USAs-GBU-53-Small-Diameter-Bomb-Competition-06510/
So, yeah, i think it can cover both roles envisaged for that part of the SPEAR requirement, while ensuring lower unit cost thanks to the fact that US alone plan to buy 17.000 (!) and thanks to the fact that it will already be “in the belly” of the F35, the B version too. Tri-mode seeker ensures maximum precision and the warhead is good to pick up your target without too much collateral damage. I think it fits with the SPEAR requirement quite heavenly.
I don’t know. The Puma never are on the news, so i don’t really know what they are being used for. I’m sure they are useful, but on the other end, with the viciousness of the cuts to come, i don’t think you can cut anything else and create less damage. It is a “less worse” decision, not a decision for good.
I think they may being used in pre-deployment training for troops: i think i remember photos of an exercise of 11 light in Kenya before they got their tour in Afghanistan, and they were being moved around by Pumas.
As i said, they certainly are useful. But i try to pick up the “less worse” decisions. Best scenario (damn unlikely, unfortunately) is using part of the savings to buy an handful more of Merlin HC3 (the HC3+ version, the one already Navalized with folding tail and such!) together with leasing other Merlins for the SAR role, so that all Sea Kings can bow out and one only kind of chopter remains to support and maintain.
As to the RN having to buy a Mistral… i think it is sci-fi, to say it brutally. But you know my ideas enough to have probably realized already that, if in 2018 HMS Ocean was to bow out and be replaced by a Mistral ship, i’d be happier than on Christmas.
The Mistral is a fantastic ship, better than Ocean under many, many aspects, and it also has a dock for landing crafts. It would make a fantastic addition to the fleet, and it would be the most welcome of news. It would be a leap in terms of capability for the Marines, and coupled with the PACSCAT fast landing craft that will hopefully replace the LCU Mk10, it would be formidable to finally assure a true “Over the Horizon” amphibious assault capability.
I suspect the RAF was given the choice of either GR4 or F-35B and they chose the F-35B, they like both but they know that they are the whipping boys for this set of cuts as the Army is still fighting in Afghanistan and the Navy has been cut to the bone already, bar the carriers, and cancelling the carriers would IMO be a bit of political suicide.
However saying all that I am secretly hoping that Obama phones up Dave and tells him how disappointed he is the UK is chopping their military and if persists in doing it, the special relationship will be in trouble. Then Dave can tell his chum George to play nicely with Liam instead of keeping picking on him 🙂
It already happened:
But unfortunately, it does not mean much. The US have been long bragging about Europe cutting its defence budgets again and again and again. In the NATO meetings, the high officers from USA have been pointing this fact out very loudly and very frequently. The message they gave, ultimately, is that the US is not willing to take on an ever wider burden and responsibility to defend allies that chop capability after capability.
Answer they got was Denmark saying “no” to the request to send in Afghanistan 4 F16 planes.
What is “funny” is to think of what will happen the one time Europe asks and America says “No”.
Here in italy we have a rather rude but very effective way to express what that would be like, but i think i’d just say it will be a MAJOR PAIN IN THE ASS.
Hope they hear it aloud before being mad enough to scrap the Marines. There’s no real expeditionary capability without amphibious ships.
Nor there is anyone who will do the Nimrod’s job if they are scrapped.
_Cutting Tornado in 5 years can be survived. It is a gap of 3/5 years at the most, from 2015 to 2018 when the F35 should be getting operative
_Cutting 8 Sandown class minesweepers can be survived easily: NATO is full to burst with minesweepers, and all are pretty advanced and effective.
_Retiring earlier a couple of Trafalgar class to save the 6 Astutes being built is a must if there’s no other way to ensure at least 6 SSNs for the future.
_Cutting the C130s can be survived if the A400M are really pooled with France, because then we’d look at a combined force of 72/75 planes (22/25 Uk, 50 France)
_Pooling air tankers is ok, better than have none
_Cutting an armored brigade… painful, but they are the true Cold War relic in the forces, and the tanks can at least be mothballed for a future need.
_CASD: it increasingly looks like the new sacrificial goat. The Armed Forces are being asked to face cuts too draconian to care that much for Trident. There’s actually more and more support to build only 3 or perhaps even 2 new subs, and build them later by drawing the Vanguard’s lives longer by dropping requirement for a boat at sea at all times. France has been proposing again to sincronize patrols at sea: http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/global-filipino/world/09/13/10/french-defence-official-cooperation-britain-subs and this time there could be an agreement. That would make the LibDem happy, the old-Tory furious, the new Tory nearly unfazed since it is no total drop of deterrence and the armed forces may pull a little bit of breath by saving some on Trident. This may be a cut to come, and i will confess that i take it an any time over dropping amphibious capabilities or aircraft carriers.
_Marines to move to the Army for training, but amphibious capability and ships retained
_Typhoon Tranche 3B cancelled
_Pooling mainteinance on Sentry E3 with France and perhaps with the NATO AWACS force
_Retain Nimrods,
_project Scavenger for drones safe
_Rivet Joint planes to be acquired as planned (too important a capability to lose it)
_FRES Scout: is it really more urgent than upgrading Warriors? I don’t think so. True, the Scimitar is old and torn, but the ASCOD is no replacement for the amazing scout capabilities of the small and extremely mobile Scimitar. And a buy of a new kind of light tank (that’s what ASCOD truly looks like) is a bit out of place while the armor fleet is axed so viciously as it seems to be about to happen. I’d rather have focus on Light Patrol Protected vehicle, Warrior upgrade and FIST at the moment, since they’d be more relevant in the immediate in Afghanistan too. http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/03/fres-scout-%E2%80%93-spot-the-difference/
A vehicle like the SIKA
armed with the Toutatis unmanned 40 mm CTA turret (weight 1.5 tons, desired weight for whole vehicle around 10 tons) would make for a far better Scout, far more deployable as well. (remember the Falklands and the Skorpion tanks going EVERYWHERE? That’s a Scout and a Battle-Winning asset!). Delay FRES Scout decision
_SPEAR requirement for RAF: drop large part of it. SPEAR capability block 3 is better served by buying Raytheon’s Small Diameter Bomb II, which will also ensure they are integrated from the very start with the F35. A job less to fund and do.
Capability Block 2 can be filled with a Longer Range, folding-wings Paveway IV and the Dual-Mode Brimstone once the modular insensitive warhead is fully designed.
The block about a longer-range cruise missile (600 km) should just be cancelled for now. Storm Shadow is enough for the work at hand. Better to fund integration of the Storm on Typhoon and F35 than design another cruise missile at the moment.
_16 Air Assault Brigade: lose parachute training, save for a platoon. 120 men or so. Parachuting is more of a special forces work than a mean to insert such a large force. Too much limitations. Proceed with the buy of the 22 new Chinooks, and there’ll be the needed helicopter mobility, much more effective.
_Puma and Gazelle out immediately.
_St Athan college project scrapped
_Future Lynx safe
_Merlin HC3 to be navalized and go to the navy, Sea King HC4 out of service.
To ringfence at all costs:
_Both CVF and enough F35B or C to fully arm one at any one time, with PoW carrier available to replace Ocean and to take on Carrier Strike role when the QE is out for refit.
_Amphibious capability
That’s a stub of Defence Review which makes sense, for me. Plenty of money could be saved (7 billions in 5 years just from Tornado, it has been said) while still retaining a very effective armed force structure capable to operate in autonomy when needed, and make sterling contributions to NATO ops.
Areas of excellence:
_ISTAR, SIGINT: Sentinel R1 and AWACS and RIvet Joint make for a capability matched only by US. Add 10 Mantis drones and 8 Zephyr drones (scavenger requirement), and you have a formidable force multiplier.
_Air tankers
_Royal Marines and Carrier Strike: only USA and, partially, FRance, can do comparably
_Strategical mobility: Point class Ro-Ro ships, amphibious fleet, C17 and A400 make for a formidable asset
_Special Forces: UK special forces are ALWAYS in high demand. Plans to bite on the SAS efficiency and size when terrorism is recognized as main, here-and-now threat is a demented proposal
_ASW chase: Nimrods and, tomorrow, 10 Type 26 and 30 Merlin HM2 make a formidable screen
Main Weak points: only one armored brigade, with one to be re-established in a hurry if the need was to arise. Such a scenario, however, means a major war happening, and thus NATO fighting. There would be continental powers like Germany and France supplying tanks.
Smaller army: this is a common problem within NATO with cuts to all armies. But it makes sense in a declared future policy of “no intervention if we can avoid to”, and it also grants the greater savings, since the first voice of expense in the budget of the MOD is for personnel, training, pay, pensions and accomodations.
This is a draft of SDSR with a sense, to protect Britain’s indipendence and relevance and at the same time to ensure the UK remains indispensable and precious within NATO and Europe too. I think in five years there could be 8, perhaps 10 billions of savings. 7 billions for Tornado, over 300 millions from Puma (228 millions are expected to be spended for the upgrade alone), an unknown amount from the Sandown class and from the Trafalgars, and so along. The St Athan project is expected to cost 13 or 14 billions in ten years, and the savings of concentrating the training there have been wrapped in doubts by later analysis. Also, with shrinking forces to support, there’s less need for such a move.
Obviously, mine is a gross estimate, but i tried to be as realistic and precise as possible. I hope the Security Council comes up with the same conclusions. I’ve seen nothing that justifies losing the amphibs or the Nimrods or the carriers, in all the “strategic” babbling made so far. No matter how bad the budget situation is, there’s other savings that can be made with less disasterous impacts.
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOperations/HmsOceanOnAmphibiousExerciseWithBrazilianMarines.htm
HMS Ocean, meanwhile, is always busy like Hell! She was one of the best investments ever for the UK, and one of the finest for the Navy.
How is a private company cutting jobs a casualty of an SDSR which hasn’t happened been written yet.
Easy. The company knows there’ll be no market in the UK and its cutting jobs in consequence.
Causes: more-than-likely cancellation of Tranche 3B Typhoon work (we are sure of it, regardless of the SDSR being not officially out yet)
Delays in agreeing follow-up work on the Mantis drone (the MOD did not sign in for second phase of development yet)
Near-completition of work on Nimrod MR4 means that many jobs are reaching the end. If the MR4 gets cancelled, it will be immensely worse
And so along. Need other reasons?
This is not the first bunch of jobs that go lost. Qinetiq was the first, BAe itself cut many jobs already in the past months, and with the effects of SDSR, the jobs lost will be counted in thousands.
No surprise in this.
You can’t expect a private company to lose money to keep employing your people if it has no market in the country. Each and every cut incoming to the armed forces budget will also mean a lot of jobs being lost. I hope you aren’t surprised by this, right…?
The whole point of the SDSR is to close the black hole in defence spending over the next 25 years, so longer term savings for short term cost should be under consideration
In what world?
The MOD is asked to save between 10 and 20% on the next 4/5 years, and the SDSR will be shaped by this fact.
That would mean restructuring the entire PFI,which is why the RAF should just buy the bloody planes.
If it had had the budget to do so, it would have. No money, no planes. It is already a blessing if the FSTA deal survives, for how bad the situation is. 14 tankers, in use or owned, are 14 tankers. That’s what the RAF desperately needs in the first place.
You are right, i did not think to the C17 of the 99° sqn, which surprisingly enough are indeed currently incapable to be refueled in flight. Probably it has to do with the fact that initially the C17 were leased as stop-gap measure to cope with the delays of the A400, and secondarily with the fact that the RAF has no money to embark on fitting probes on its C17s, and moreover they are so hard worked that there is no will to send any of them back to factory for the refit. It may be the easier future option, though, to fit probes on them.
And well, of course. The AWACS still have their receptacles too, and tomorrow there’ll be (hopefully) Rivet Joints to support too. Also, i totally agree that the boom would make the RAF tankers more flexible and more appreciated by the US themselves, as the RAF would be able to better cooperate and support allied planes.
However, we always fall back on money troubles, and with the FSTA being targeted as a very costy programme as it is, it is hard to see an addition of booms to the planes, even if the french were willing to collaborate on the expense, and they probably are not.
It is an open door for the future, though. They could always be added later, since the FSTA will run for 27 years to say the least.
And yeah, that manual is pretty awesome indeed.
Agreed, on all points.
Interesting questions arise here:
1) Given sharing of both transport & tanker fleets, how difficult would it be for the RAF to take over one the French sets of AAR gear for the A400M & send it down to the Falklands? The stationing of a single A400M down there to cover both transport & tanking is logical, & AirTanker would have to agree to modify the exclusivity clause of their contract as part of the deal in which it is extended to cover France.
2) Could the tanker sharing include fitting booms on some of the joint tankers?
Your questions are interesting.
Having a french A400 (or a A400 kitted for AAR role with french kit, more likely) stationed in the Falklands all the time would be a formidable demonstration of the efficacy of the agreement, a boost to the defence of the island and a clear message to Argentina all at once. I’m hoping that the agreement will be thought in ample terms, and clear clausoles will be written down to encompass all of these considerations. We’ll have to see, though, and judge with time, i guess.
6 or so of the A330 tankers for the RAF have three pods for hose-and-drogue air refuelling, while the remnants for now are contracted to have only underwing stations for refuelling. Theorycally, these could be fitted with the centerline EADS boom without much trouble. But i don’t think there’s a requirement for it, so i don’t expect France and UK to be willing to found money for such an addition.
The current force of C135FR of France still has the boom, but when they are used, they are fitted with a conversion kit that transforms the boom in another hose and drogue station. After all, the french, just like the RAF, have, if i’m not mistaken, no aircraft that refuels the american boom way. I checked, and even their E3F Sentry AWACS are fitted with the same refuelling kit of the RAF AWACS, so i’m guessing the french have booms really only because they bought the KC135 from the US and never asked the booms to be removed. Rafale, A400 and Mirage and everything use the NATO system, after all.
Anyway, i’ll link you to this awesome document i found on aerial refuelling. Apparently, a RAF manual that explains how to refuel from a KC135R or C135FR. http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/9FF42D33_1143_EC82_2E64268B6443D3A3.pdf
I could answer you that the “pet projects” are all relevant, and wasn’t for the budget cuts, they all would have to come in, and fast, because they are objectively needed.
If the news leaks are strategically caused or not, it does not matter. We must consider them as facts, and while it is impossibly for us to comment on the matter of submarine-chasing (that anyway is realistic enough i don’t doubt it is true), we’ve had solid evidence of all the other events mentioned in the article, included the flights of strategic bombers to Scotland.
In fact, admirals, generals and air chief have no great effort to make to show how much the kit is needed.
Who is failing for the real is the people who should give a strategic consideration in support of, say, retiring Nimrod. STRATEGIC considerations, so the “we need to cut budget” is not acceptable answer. Why it can be done…? The threats they counter has vanished? What will do their jobs? And how will it do?
This has never been said, which is what makes this “strategic” review very little credible in terms of strategy. Even without showing the absurdity of some points made in time, like the total idiocy Ainsworth said about having over-used C130 busy 24/24h in Stan doing the work of Nimrods. With what sensors, besides? The mere eyes of someone looking out the window, i’m guessing.
Truth is plain and simple: the UK has a bleeding gap open in sea patrol capability without Nimrods. And, considering the situation merely with the eye of military planning and not with the eye of cuts, this gap is dangerous and injustified.
Also, this article about pooling A400 with France is pretty specific, to say the least:
Projects under consideration included sharing the A400M airlifter fleet – not just joint maintenance – pooling British air tankers, and collaboration on naval assets, Morin said.
But sharing aircraft carriers – one possibility reported Aug. 31 by The Times of London – is “utterly unrealistic,” Fox said. Morin specifically excluded carriers as well.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4767911&c=FEA&s=CVS
This is, finally, a pretty good news in a flow of bad ones, so it is welcome. We can hope in a future of collaboration on the Mantis drone, too, and if truly it was possible to have part of the MARS requirement tackled in a collaborative program with the french, it could be very good news too. A common design would offer significant economies of scale, and designing costs could also be shared.
It would be a much needed good news for the RN, too, since the MARS requirement is probably going to be, after the CVF, the next main target for the Navy: new tankers, and in particular a ship tailored to support a CVF at sea, after all, are very badly needed, more urgently than even the Type 26 frigate.