Playing devil’s advocate but I think that the combination of carrier strike and the Bays will deal with most of the problems the RN only need large amphibious assault to for a major conventional campaign which it will do with it’s allies for the rest I think the answers are:

1) We are not going to be taking back the Falklands as we will be making sure that it is too costly to take in the first place – hence the permanent army base and the flight of Typhoon’s. Once carrier strike is up and running there is little chance of the Argentina moving in it’s forces to take the island by surprise and between the Typhoon’s and a couple of squadrons of JSA (of whatever flavour that gets picked) the Argentine Navy and Air force will be in a bad situation. What I like to see now (assuming they can Nimrod MR4 – a frequent rumour) is the UK to buy some C-295 MPA’s and base 1 or 2 on the Falkland’s for continuous maritime surveillance.
2) Giving the flexible nature of the carriers, you would deploy your marine’s with heli lift to accomplish this, in conjunction with your Bays
3) As the mostly likely scenario for this is hitting a training camp you would obviously send in marines or SAS deployed from the carrier’s
4) Again can be done with helicopters from the carriers and Bays if you need to ship in supplies and equipment

Plus if you take some of recent stories seriously like the France and UK to share carriers then it also stands to reason that France and UK are going to cooperate on amphibious assault.

Still I rather the replace Ocean but if the choice is carrier strike or reduced amphibious assault I rather the reduce the amphibious capabilities than the carriers

So your answer to everything now is sending “someone” with “helicopters”.

My questions are: from where these choppes will take off? From a 2 billions aircraft carrier coming well close to the shore, practically asking to be attacked with anti-ship missiles that by now almost everyone possess? When an already available, 2001 launched, NEW and immensely cheaper Albion could do it better? SERIOUSLY? This i want to see. Say it is demented is still generous.

Assuming there is no anti-ship missiles… The choppers are going to face, say, Iranian air defences or even just man-portable SAMs and anti-aircraft guns, flying it at night loaded with soldiers…? Because not everytime it will be West Side Boys. Losing a Chinook and 55 soldiers in one go would be a MAJOR disaster. And a 14.5 russian machine gun mounted on the back of a Toyota truck could do the work, with a bit of luck.
With the militias in the world drowning in cheap SA7 Strela and Stinger and chinese-built SAMs, optimism should be accompanied by serious prudence.

Chinooks. Even assuming they truly become 70 (the order for 22 is not safe. Best case, they may buy 10-12 from Boeing, handed over in 2013, and the rest never come. Worst case, the SDSR chops them as well. A firm contract is not yet in place, never forget that), how many will be eventually available for operation…?
The Merlin HC3…? Will a Commando Helicopter Force survive at all?

CVF is no LPH, no LHD. To embark soldiers, the air group must be reduced. You’ll only be able to embark a few hundred men, most likely, 500 if you are lucky. You’ll miss the command and control facilities of the Albion class (the CVF has NO C4I fit, so at least a Daring ship would be needed, since every Type 45 has extensive C2 communications outfit and could act as a bit of a command post) and you’ll have a ship un-optimized for amphibious ops replacing Ocean. It would take double the time for the Marines to move to the deck and embark on a CVF than on Ocean, that has been designed for that role specifically.

Vehicles: the CVF could embark some in the Hangar, but it will have to be all helicopter-compatible load, or it will never be able to disembark unless a port is conquered, with extensive craneage and facilities.

Overall amphibious capability: in the best scenario, a CVF and 2 Bay would be available. Which means merely 2 LCU MK10 and… how many? 30 Chinooks? Probably a lot less, to disembark everything.

It is simply a mess. And good luck in hoping to have the french borrowing Mistral and Tonnere to you for an operation.
Come on! It is not a car for a trip outside saturday afternoon. But you truly believe anyone would “borrow” a warship to someone to fight a war with…?
Get real, it’s bull****.

And my reasoning still stands. Why to save such a large army at the expense of cutting on Marines, the most likely unit to be used in a crisis…? The 16AB and the 3CB should be the only formations spared from cuts entirely in terms of land forces. They are the Joint Rapid Reaction Force, the first choice in a whole range of emergency situations.

I’d rather do without an heavy armour brigade, thanks. Besides, if the UK is not to intervene anywhere in the future, the only case in which heavy armor would be used would be an invasion of the UK soil that the navy would prevent or delay enough that mothballed tanks could be pulled back out.
I’d totally reduce the size of the army if i had to choose something to unavoidably cut. And still no one has given me a lone good reason not to do it.
The Uk can do better with a lone Heavy Armour brigade and a smaller regular army than it would do without its marittime expeditionary capability.

As, anyway, as always been in History. Arguably, the british army in proportion never was so large and powerful as it has been from the end of the IIWW. The large, heavy-armour formation of army is the true Cold War relic that has no real precedents in the UK history.

Ignoring the sensationalist headlines, it appears the choice for the Royal Navy is going to be either Carrier Strike or Amphibious capability (and yes I know this is going to only be one of many options leaked)
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1305880/Britain-forced-borrow-U-S-jets-fly-OUR-aircraft-carriers-cutbacks-bite.html

Thinking about William Hagues stated foreign policy that post-Afghanistan the UK will not intervene in countries no matter how badly we view them, then the Royal Navy would be utterly right to go for carrier strike at the expense of some of our amphibious capability do you not think?

There is little point in having it (or certainly so much of it) if you do not intend to follow through with the ‘force for good’ doctrine of the 1998 SDR.

Personally, no. I think it makes no sense.

UK is not going to make a new Afghan-style operation. Ok. Then we need no marines anymore? Where is the sense in such an assumption?

Are you going to send carrier strike to bomb a nation down, but have no intervention capability ashore? This NEVER worked in history, unless with Japan, but the amphibious landing was avoided (not really, it just happened AFTER the war was over, but it still was needed) just because nukes were used.
What if:
1) You have to retake the Falklands
2) You have to enter with force in an area and bring british citizens out and evacuate them
3) You have to raid enemy installations
4) You have to bring aid and establish security and control over the crowd to an Haiti-style area, where the only way in is from the sea because there’s no airports in conditions to be used. It is no wonder USA sent in the Marines, and the UK sent a Bay class ship.
And so along.

You have to say me what is the point of 100.000 soldiers stuck on an island, then. What the hell is the army planning to do in the future if state-on-state wars are a no-no, Afghan-style counterinsurgency is as much no-no and the nation states that it does not plan to use force against anyone. Oh, and the main assumption is that UK is not going to be invaded by anyone.

Well, then what’s the use of the army? Internal security? Police? A massive programme for jobs to keep thousands of persons employed? How the hell are you going to move soldiers to the point where you need them? STUFT? Airplanes? (don’t make me laugh, it takes a friendly airbase and a number of cargo planes the UK simply does not posses) What the hell is the strategic justification for sparing the army from cuts while cutting back savagely on the only one force (the Navy) that is busy at peacetime almost as much as in full wartime and the only one that is flexible and relevant enough to be able to act at one time as shield and sword for a nation that before a nation is an ISLAND.
The strategic thinking behind this plan is worth a 4-years old baby’s mind. Or probably not. He’d be able to see the water all around himself, probably.

Note to self: a situation that requires force to be used, unfortunately, will require the UK to apply decisive pressure on a foreign nation with its own force, despite the best intentions of not going on “foreign adventures” in the future.
100.000 soldiers stuck at home playing simulated wars won’t impress anyone.
A force of Marines ready to intervene and supported by a decent navy and a serious carrier strike capability can easily deter more than anything else.

Take this with a pinch of salt due to the source , and indeed it may not say anything new but this thread and the one over in Modern Military Aviation on the F35b being replaced by the Super Hornet may be academic:
http://www.metro.co.uk/news/838576-budget-cuts-could-sink-new-aircraft-carriers

I keep saying this is non-sense. A STRATEGIC review in my vision would have been a document starting with two assumptions: aircraft carriers and marines SAFE. They are the only real mean the UK has to influence events around the world, even more than Trident in their way.
The rest should pretty much be built around them.

There’s actually quite a few flaws in your suggestion. You can’t “size down a carrier” if you go CATOBAR. Arguably, the CVF size is the smallest size you can have your ships at if you are to fly CATOBAR operations. It was in fact possible to size down carriers by going VTOL with the Harrier, surely not the opposite.

Also, the VTOL operations are actually A LOT less expensive than CATOBAR ops, stress the airframes less, require less training for the crews, less mainteinance on the planes and simpler ships with no catapults and no arrestor gear.
The F35B is a very expensive plane to buy, but it will be overall far cheaper to operate in the long term.

And Gripen navalized for CATOBAR ops is pretty much hopeless. I don’t see who should embark on funding the design of the “Sea Gripen” (because so far it is merely a suggestion, not something concrete) when there are already alternatives like the Super Hornet, the Rafale, the F35B and C.

And “gold-plated” equipment is actually just UP-TO-DATE equipment. The Type 45 is in the same league of the Horizon and other european rivals, and arguably ahead of the Aegis ships of the US for the Air Defence role.
Again, as “gold-plated” as it is, the Type 45 is actually lagging behind the Horizon since it lacks SSMs, torpedoes and CIWSs still.

Same goes for Typhoon. It is not “gold”, it is up-to-date, enought to beat any possible likely russian-built rival, keep the RAF modern and relevant and survive the introduction of new rivals like the new stealth russian PAK-FA.

Truth is, less-ambitious equipment exists, but going for it has a price: to drop out of the top league, and shy away from Britain’s position of relevance and lead to accept a lesser position. Something that, luckily, no politician wants to be remembered for.
Of course, the SDSR incoming will not be a good point in UK’s history, but no one will be too radical and shoving the UK off the top league. Luckily.

As people have said there are many capabilities planned for the F-35 but are not funded. Well going on past history the UK is likely to keep many of these on the shelf until a UOR comes along. I have seen quite a few internal load outs for the F-35 but if ASRAAM is carried internally then you lose the AMRAAM if you are caarying other ordonnance. I still think that although the RN would like to operate the F-35 as a fleet defence fighter it will be a bit like the Typhoon in reverce with A2G capabilities given priority over A2A.

With regards to competative pricing, I should have been clearer. Companies when bidding for contracts should offer true prices rather than unrealistic ones witch are usually greatly exceeded. The MoD need to return to fixed price contracts and if UK industry threatens to walk away as they did on Nimrod and Astute then the MoD should let them. In partnership with this the MoD must draw up reasonable specification for kit it wants and once a design is locked down it stays that way until delivery. Finally the MoD must gat away from programmes where manufacture is proceeding at the same time as developement. Industry must accept more of the risk for programmes. One thing I know from experience is that few if any MoD contracts actually have penalty clauses in them. I know problems will arise in any programme but both Industry and the MoD are supposed to identify these at an early stage. If both stick to the CADMID cycle as they are supposed to now thing would be smother. The Mod also has a part to play in this as it has burnt industry’s fingers more than once by stalling programmes before main gate for long periods, sometime cancelling programmes. There is also a tendancy for the MoD to make Industry use its own money to develope Programmes on a verbal promise that they will be purchased at a future date.

The DIS is supposed to soret this out but this will not be completed until after the SDSR. Both Industry and the MoD must work together closely . The Armed forces deserve the best kit that is affordable and not neccessarily the Rolls Royce standard every time. Where another countries platform best meets the UKs requirement then that is what should be purchased. The MoD can no longer afford bespoke solutions except is a very small number of cases. If it affordable to manufacture the kit under licence then fine but the UKs defence industry does not have a get out of jail card with definite MoD contracts. They need to look for products that have export potential looking at what other countries use and attaining commonality. Current programmes such as the ASCOD RV and the Type 26 are key examples. The former has potential with new variants being available to existing ASCOD customers and possibly new ones. Many countries have old AFVs needing replacement or have a requirement for a family of medium weight vehicles. The T26 will probably be the life or death programme for the UKs warship construction industry. We have an opportunity to make a capable AND affordable platform, but the programme must stand up to scrutiny and comparison for foreign designs and programmes.

CADMID;
Capability – Establish a capability need within the Armed Forces.

Assessment – Assess numerous option to meet said capability. Downsize to a number of options that have the best chance of success at meeting the capability requirement.

Developement – Develope the means to meet this Capbility requirement finally settling on a platform that best meets the requirement including all factors such as price, Through life costs, commonality with existing kit if applicable and so on.

MAINGATE

Manufacture – Production.

In Service – The use and support of a platform for its service life including upgrades and other modification.

Disposal – Speaks for itself whether it the destruction, sale an so on.

Finally I must mention the Challenger II. It is probably the world best allround MBT although the US and Isreal make argue the point. If the Government had allowed a number to be deployed to afghanistan there usefulness would have been clear for all to see. A good example id at the moment we are using expensive Javeling ATGW for long range precision attacks. It certainly gets the job done but a HE round form a CR2 can do the job just as well at operational ranges, costing a lot less, and it brings psycological benefits as well being big, noisy and scary to face up to if you are the enemy. Also having 1 or 2 CR2s on overwatch is also very comforting to the troops.

On these terms i totally agree. Especially about Type 26 and Challenger II points. I share your view totally on these points.

Someone like Swerve will be able to confirm but I think that the number of MoD staff is an artefact of Front Line First which transferred lots of jobs normally carried out in other countries by uniformed personnel to the MoD and as result the UK looks top heavy in civil servants to uniformed personnel, but if you took out those jobs you would find that the MoD is surprisingly efficient compared to a lot of other countries (when you compare the ratio of civil servants to uniformed personnel).

It still costs a bloody lot. Every army of Europe, and possibly of the world, has its major spending at the voice “personell”, but considering that the british armed forces are pretty low on number of soldiers, the cost for personell is surprisingly high, and weights so much that ultimately the UK has less money for kit than France does. I don’t know if the problem is the civil servants, it was a theory of mine. It is for people with the right data at hand to determine. For sure, there are massive wastes that will need to be eliminated to ensure proper armed forces survive the cuts.

1. The Type 45 is fitted for (but not with) Harpoon.
2. The US have found that the Standard missile is very effective when used in a surface to surface mode. Sea Dart has a anti ship mode – as mentioned here. Quite a few have been used to sink ships in exercises. I have no idea if PAAMS/Aster/Sea Viper will have a surface to surface role.
3. See also here.

In other news, modern US ships are actually being built without Harpoon because SAM’s (the SM2’s in this case) are being seen as more effective than the big SSM’s – three things most important in ship to ship engagements are fire starting ability, kinetic energy and fragmentation, all of which a SAM is technically more effective than a big old hunk of explosive – plus, they are fired within line of sight. Which is great, really cause Daring et al doesn’t have Harpoon…

1. I know, but until the Harpoon is not fitted, the Type 45 is not armed for anti-shipping work. Simple like that. Unless the sinking of the Argie’s tanker in the Falklands by the 114 mm of HMS Alacrity is to be re-played.
2. I know as well. The ESSM can be used against surface targets as well. But to assume its warhead would be effective against a Sovremenny destroyer… Please, let’s get real. The only advantage of SAMs is that they are supersonic, but you can’t expect to deal enough damage to a frigate with 13/20 kg of explosive! If a ship could be disabled by so little, the builders of the ship would have to be nailed to a cross of wood like in ancient Rome. Even Canadians used ESSMs against target ships, but ALWAYS together with other weapons.

Also, ASTER has no surface-surface capability at all. Not now, at least, and it is unlikely to see any money being spent on giving the missile that capability.

Also, the only modern US warship lacking Harpoon is the LCS, which would probably get them in module form in case of need anyway. Also, the LCS is NOT a frigate for the americans, which can afford to use a dedicated ship to littoral war.

But there’s not a single Arleight Burke or a Ticonderoga lacking Harpoons, nor is there any program to abandon SSMs.
The US Navy, moreover, plans for the future a new SSMs, stealthy and supersonic, which will level the tremendous gap of the west with the most impressive anti-ship missiles of Russia, China and India. (from Sunburn to Bramhos, simply said)