Deliberate attacks on civilian personnel, sometimes in large scales…it shouldn’t matter who’s side you’re on. Besides, isn’t it a fact that many Serbs, especially the younger ones, tend to see things in a perspective that differs strongly from that of stubborn nationalists?

Serbia is brewing at the moment and is politicaly divided….did you see the number of people that turned out at Milosevic’s funeral?….despite the best efforts of the current government and the western media.

Apart from the hardcore supporters of his party, most people present, would’ve been his opponents back in 1999-2000. Due to the political circumstances, he’s been turned into a symbol of resistance.

The trully pro-western political parties in Serbia have only marginal support from Belgrade elitist circles, while the nationalist Radical Party has at least 40% support (probably more since the funeral)

No point going on about this.

I guess we’ll have to agree to dissagree on this topic

The UN requested NATO to provide air support to UNPROFOR ground operations. NATO responded by deploying air assets which could provide CAS to UNPROFOR units on the ground and monitor and enforce the UN-mandated no-fly zone over BiH (Operation DENY FLIGHT).

NATO was more or less successful in preventing any of the parties from using fighters and attack aircraft over BiH, especially in the Bihac area. However, due to UN regulations, NATO aircraft were not allowed to engage helicopters (probably in order to minimise the risk of blue-on-blue incidents with UNPROFOR helicopters). NATO pilots would frequently attempt to force down any non-UN helicopters detected in the air above BiH, often without results. Naturally, this added to the frustration felt by many aircrews.

Your reasoning is very simplistic…or at least that’s the impression you’re leaving.

I mean no offence, but I’m not sure whether to laugh or shake my head in dissbelief.

Nato wasn’t present there as some sort of impartial party, enforcing UN resolutions, but as an instrument of US policy. The only side that Nato was “preventing” was the serb side.

It was quiet happy to allow covert flights into Tuzla with weapons and supplies, supposedly banned by the UN embargo and which, theoretically Nato was meant to stop……

No one is denying that war crimes were commited. The war was fought not by “regular” armies but mainly by armed civilians — militias, where revenge and counter revenge was the order of the day.

The problem I have is when you exagerate the crimes of 1 side and ignore or even deny the crimes of the other parties involved.

The media was used (and is used) to justify foreign policy and there are plenty of examples that can be brought up.

Example: the number of dead in Bosnia was reported as “several hundreds of thousands“, then reduced to 250 000 and even today is reported as “over 200 000“, even though there is a recent official bosnian government report that estimates the total dead on ALL sides at less than 100 000 — 1/3 of which are serbs.

Srebrenica, “the biggest war crime in Europe since WWII” is another example. The figure of “up to 8000” dead is parroted around even though it’s a blatant exageration.

The story goes that it was a de-militarised UN “safe area”, but no one has yet explained how an entire division of the muslim army happened to be there, launching continuos raids out of it, devastating large swathes of serbian territory, massacring over 2000 serbs in the process.

Here’s what the former UN commander, Lewis McKenzie had to say about it on the 10 year anniversary:

———–
The Globe and Mail (Canada), July 14, 2005
The real story behind Srebrenica

By LEWIS MacKENZIE

This week marked the 10th anniversary of the United Nations’ second greatest failure since its creation in 1945 — the genocide in Rwanda being the undisputed No. 1. With much fanfare, the ceremonies focused on the massacre of “up to” 8,000 Bosnian men and boys by General Ratko Mladic’s Bosnian Serb army in Srebrenica in July of 1995.

In the vast majority of recent media reports, the background and responsibilities for the disaster in Srebrenica were absent. Preferred was the simple explanation: a black and white event in which the Serbs were solely to blame.

As someone who played a modest role in some of the events preceding the massacre, perhaps a little background will provide some context.

In early 1993, after my release from the Canadian Forces, I was asked to appear before a number of U.S. congressional committees dealing with Bosnia. A few months earlier, my successor in the UN Protection Force, General Philippe Morillon, had –against the advice of his UN masters — bullied his way into Srebrenica accompanied by a tiny contingent of Canadian soldiers and told its citizens they were now under the protection of the UN. The folks at the UN in New York were furious with Gen. Morillon but, with the media on his side, they were forced to introduce the “safe haven” concept for six areas of Bosnia, including Srebrenica.

Wondering what this concept would mean, one U.S. senator asked me how many troops it would take to defend the safe havens. “Somewhere in the neighbourhood of 135,000 troops,” I replied. It had to be that large because of the Serb artillery’s range. The new UN commander on the ground in Bosnia, Belgian General Francis Briquemont, said he agreed with my assessment but was prepared to try to defend the areas with 65,000 additional troops. The secretary-general of the day, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, went to the Security Council and recommended 27,500 additional troops. The Security Council approved a force of 12,000 and, six months later, fewer than 2,000 additional soldiers had been added to UNPROFOR for the safe-haven tasks.

Then the Security Council changed the wording of the safe-haven resolution from “the UN will defend the safe havens” to “by their presence will the UN deter attacks on the safe havens.” In other words, a tiny, token, lightly armed UN contingent would be placed as sacrificial lambs in Srebrenica to “deter” the Bosnian Serb army.

It didn’t take long for the Bosnian Muslims to realize that the UN was in no position to live up to its promise to “protect” Srebrenica. With some help from outsiders, they began to infiltrate thousands of fighters and weapons into the safe haven. As the Bosnian Muslim fighters became better equipped and trained, they started to venture outside Srebrenica, burning Serb villages and killing their occupants before quickly withdrawing to the security provided by the UN’s safe haven. These attacks reached a crescendo in 1994 and carried on into early 1995 after the Canadian infantry company that had been there for a year was replaced by a larger Dutch contingent.

The Bosnian Serbs might have had the heaviest weapons, but the Bosnian Muslims matched them in infantry skills that were much in demand in the rugged terrain around Srebrenica. As the snow cleared in the spring of 1995, it became obvious to Nasar Oric, the man who led the Bosnian Muslim fighters, that the Bosnian Serb army was going to attack Srebrenica to stop him from attacking Serb villages. So he and a large number of his fighters slipped out of town. Srebrenica was left undefended with the strategic thought that, if the Serbs attacked an undefended town, surely that would cause NATO and the UN to agree that NATO air strikes against the Serbs were justified. And so the Bosnian Serb army strolled into Srebrenica without opposition.

What happened next is only debatable in scale. The Bosnian Muslim men and older boys were singled out and the elderly, women and children were moved out or pushed in the direction of Tuzla and safety. It’s a distasteful point, but it has to be said that, if you’re committing genocide, you don’t let the women go since they are key to perpetuating the very group you are trying to eliminate. Many of the men and boys were executed and buried in mass graves.

Evidence given at The Hague war crimes tribunal casts serious doubt on the figure of “up to” 8,000 Bosnian Muslims massacred. That figure includes “up to” 5,000 who have been classified as missing. More than 2,000 bodies have been recovered in and around Srebrenica, and they include victims of the three years of intense fighting in the area. The math just doesn’t support the scale of 8,000 killed.

Nasar Oric, the Bosnian Muslim military leader in Srebrenica, is currently on trial in The Hague for war crimes committed during his “defense” of the town. Evidence to date suggests that he was responsible for killing as many Serb civilians outside Srebrenica as the Bosnian Serb army was for massacring Bosnian Muslims inside the town.

Two wrongs never made a right, but those moments in history that shame us all because of our indifference should not be viewed in isolation without the context that created them.

Retired major-general Lewis MacKenzie was the first commander of UN peacekeeping forces in Sarajevo.

he was responsible for killing didn’t get time to have a 5 year trial for being the “wrong ethnic origin” but then I guess that’s ok :rolleyes:

Responsible according to who?

And exactly what ethinic origin are you reffering to???

All former Yugoslavs (apart from the minorities) are of south slavic ethnic origin

If it was as clear cut as you say, then WHY wasn’t he convicted in over 4 years of trial….WHY did the media practically stop reporting the trial (a hint: the prosecution botched it up)…..it’s a lot easier to demonise someone over the media than it is to prove it with facts

To all the sickoes celebrating….I hope they say the same about you when you “kick the bucket” one day

There’s no point in getting into discussions as to what he was guilty off or not, but even the most shallow minded moron should ask themselves why it took almost 5 years for his trial to get nowhere. And now he conviniently dies…….I’m sceptical to say the least

Back to the capability, they still have over 350,000 trained reservists. I want to know why the hell officers have started to get called up. You won’t find it on the news, but it’s happening. Pay close attention to their news broadcasts. You’ll see officers in 80’s or 90’s uniforms and cammo in the background while the rest of the army got new camis 2 years ago. You’ll see and hear communist era officers giving interviews and you’ll notice their older age. Check the Serbian MOD site, majors, colonels, and full birds born b4 ’56 were pensioned 1 and a half years ago. I just got back from some business in Belgrade, and there is alot of activity in “abandoned” barracks locations and bases. Not to mention close family friends getting recalled to duty. I’m not saying they’re preparing for war, simply that it’s interesting to see them so active. The completion of the LF base in Bujenovic makes it the largest in Serbia. Guess where it is, 5km from the provincial border with Kosovo.

I can’t see a full scale war happening right now (this year) apart from maybe some small scale stuff in the Presevo Valey (just outside Kosovo).

The worst case scenario that might eventuate is if the Serbs in the northern enclaves are attacked and the UN doesn’t do anything about it, we might see some sort of conflict erupt involving Serbia, but it will probably involve the sending of “unofficial” help

A lot depends also on who is in power in Serbia. If the Radical Party, which is the most popular party at present, joins with the DSS in a coalition we could see an escalation of the situation.

As far as capability goes…the Albanian “internet warriors” here like to imagine a lot of things…enough said

But the NATO achieved their strategic target with little loss and no loss of life. The serbs had to accept that NATO can bomb anytime anywhere without getting stopped. Although the Serbs kept their army largely intact it remained useless.

I think that you neglect the political background to the whole Kosovo war.

Milosevic agreed to withdraw from Kosovo after he was threatened by the Russians (Yeltsin administration personified by the PM, Chernomyrdin) that they would back a much harsher UN resolution if he does not accept the agreement on offer…basicaly, either sign up or the alternative will be much worse (eventually leading to a full scale Nato invasion and occupation)

On the other hand, Milosevic was hoping that the longer he holds out, the greater the disagreements within Nato would become (European vs US), leading in turn, to a nationalist backlash within Russia.

As for the Army being useless, you forget that the plan was for Albanian forces to break into central Kosovo under Nato aircover and support. The same strategy as the later Afghanistan campaign in 2001 (The KLA playing the role of the Northern Alliance)…

…that did not happen, despite some pretty heavy fighting on the border. About 2/3 of Serbian military casualties are the result of ground fighting, not air strikes.