The F-111B concept was envisioned before major air combat took place in Vietnam. It was supposed to engage Soviet bombers and fighters from extended ranges while F-4s and future light fighters would engage at shorter ranges. Once the realities of air combat in Vietnam set in it became obvious that missile and radar technology were not up to par yet and political retraints would kill the F-111B’s performance against the small and nimble MiG-17 and MiG-21s. The Navy’s response to this was the Naval Fighter Attack Experiemnt (VFAX) program, that would produce a better dog fighter than the F-4 and a better attacker than the A-7. The Navy recommned the F-111B be cancelled even after successful carrier trials in October 1967, and was in early 1968. In July 1968 the VFAX requirements were changed into the Navy Fighter Experiment (VFX), which could perform both fleet air defense of the F-111B at a lower cost and air superiority/air interdiction of the F-4. The VFX’s requirements were tailored around the advanced Grumman G-303 which was originally intended for the VFAX requirement.
In January 1969 the Grumman G-303 design was chosen and named the F-14, manufacture and testing proceded rapidly. Costs were never able to stay at the levels Grumman promised, the TF-30 experienced serious teething problems, and the plane was difficult to land on carrier. With the wind down of the Vietnam War military budgets shrank, and soon the F-14 program had became the most expensive US fighter. By the August 1973 Congress mandated the Navy to pursue a lower cost alternative to the F-14, and a new VFAX was born. In September the F401 performed poorly and the plans for engine replacement was shelved due to budget concerns. The Navy’s outline of an interim A model, fleet defender B model with a 1:1 T2W ratio, and C model with new avionics and air to ground capability was thrown away. Marine Corp interest began to severly wane. Grumman tried offering stripped down versions of the Tomcat for the VFAX requirement, the F-14X, but the Deputy Secretary of Defense didn’t bite. A navalized F-15 was offered but proved to be just as expensive.
In May 1974 the House Armed Services Committee said it would no longer accept stripped down F-14 bids. In August 1974 congress decided it could not fund another major fighter and cancelled the VFAX but some of the money was funneled in to the Naval Air Combat Fighter (NACF) which was to use technology learned from the USAF LWF program. After meeting much resistance from the pro-Tomcat faction few long-sighted Naval brass wised up and set the requirements for the NACF. In May 1975 the USN picked the McDD’s navalized YF-17 over LTV’s navalized F-16, heavily modified it and the end result was the F/A-18A.
The Tomcat still had its defenders like Vice Admiral William Douglas Houser who fought to keep the plane from complete cancellation, but it had lost political and technological momentum to what would later be called the Hornet. When Iran, or should I say the Shah, announced the purchase of 40 F-14AGRs in 1974 and provided much of the money up front this gave the F-14 a bit more breathing room and F-14A production continued throughout the end of the decade. Further exports pitches to Japan, Israel, Canada and Germany were unsuccessful.
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