That article looks like a political piece, one slamming the Greek MOD, the relevant bit being the “hordes of Turkish F35’s”…

Agree, I’ve seen a number of Greek articles over the last few months that have spoken of the capability mismatch that will occur when the F-35 arrives in Turkey.

TooCool_12f
TooCool just reminds the fact that the Canadians themselves have said more than once, and the fact that a twin engine is safer than a single one if anything, because it can afford to loose one engine

And, once more, this whole discussion about twin vs single engine aircraft started because someone asked how Canada could prevent the F-35 to compete.. and I gave an answer that is obvious: all they have to do is ask for a twin engine aircraft. You can argue about how marvelously safe the F-135 is (it was already grounded a couple of times, but hey, let’s imagine it is safe), the fact remains, if they want to eliminate the F-35, they can easily, and perfectly legally do so .. end of story

I’ve already indicated the prospect of that is highly unlikely.

Ozair
It would be politically very difficult to claim an open and fair competition and then exclude an aircraft from participating. Even more so given the article I linked earlier shows that even in 1979 the RCAF was happy to operate the single engine F-16 and down selected this airframe over other twin engine aircraft.

To add to that, when writing the requirement it would be essentially impossible to state the airframe must have two engines because the requirements have to not only be justified but also verifiable and traceable. The requirements would have to be written around the number of safe flight hours between engine incidents. Given what we know of twin engine flight safety and the USAF experience over the last ten years that type of requirement may exclude twin engine airframes.

The best source doc that I have found on Canadian Hornet crash history so far is provided here, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol15/no4/page30-eng.asp

Some excepts,

In the early-1980s Canadian Forces pilots and technicians were introduced to their new fighter aircraft, the CF-18 Hornet. A slightly modified variant of the US Navy and Marine Corps’ F/A-18A, it promised a near revolutionary improvement over the three aircraft it was replacing, the CF-5 Freedom Fighter, the CF-101 Voodoo, and the CF-104 Starfighter. One area where there were major hopes was a significant improvement in the air force safety and availability record. The Starfighter was a notorious aircraft in this regard, difficult to fly in its demanding roles, and it suffered from numerous technical issues. Consequently, 111 of the 238 aircraft originally purchased were lost due to accidents or failures during its operational life with the Canadian Armed Forces. Yet, hopes for a dramatic improvement were quickly dashed. By 1991, its selected replacement, the CF-18, had been involved in a string of tragic crashes, leading to the deaths of 11 pilots. It was only in the 1990s that a significant improvement with respect to the CF-18 flight safety occurred. It should be noted that early operational attrition is an unfortunately common occurrence with new operational fighter-type aircraft. Every air force faces teething issues with the introduction of a new aircraft, even if it has been in service with other countries.

Prior to the CF-18’s introduction, the then-Canadian Air Force (CAF) had predicted its catastrophic mishap rate (known as Category ‘A’ mishaps) would be 5.6 crashes per 100,000 flight hours.2 This would be a major improvement over the CF-104, which experienced a Category ‘A’ rate of 18.5 incidents per 100,000 flight hours.3 The CF-18 predicted rate, it was believed, would be more in line with the other fighter aircraft operated by Canada at that time, the CF-101 and CF-5, which experienced rates of 5.68 and 6.74, respectively.

Unfortunately, the expected safety dividend did not emerge. While the CF-18 was inherently safer to fly than the CF-104, its early attrition rate was significantly higher than expected. In the first eight years of operation, the Canadian Air Force’s loss rate was 7.14 aircraft per 100,000 flying hours.4 By comparison, the American mishap rate during this time frame was only 3.75 aircraft per 100,000 flying hours.5 In essence, Canadian Hornet pilots were therefore twice as likely to become involved in a major crash as their American counterparts.

While greater transit time was a factor, it may not be salient. Although Canadian Hornets flew a substantial number of low-level training flights, such missions accounted for only two of the Category ‘A’ mishaps (see Table 1: Crash 1 and Crash 8). The majority of crashes occurred as a result of ‘human factors,’ where pilot error was determined to be a primary cause. These often occurred during take-off, or at medium-to-high altitude, where the pilots’ situational awareness was impaired in a way that caused them to crash into the ground. The USN and USMC appeared to experience proportionally fewer such incidents; over 50 percent of their Category ‘A’ mishaps occurred, due either to technical faults or mid-air collisions, based upon the data available to this author.

Further corroboration of the difference between Canadian and US fighters can be found in the USAF’s statistics with respect to the F-16 Fighting Falcon. This aircraft generally flew similar flight patterns, although again, less in low altitude operations. The USAF’s figures indicate a mishap rate of 6.51 per 100,000 hours for the first decade of service.7 While this may seem comparable to the CF-18, it should be noted that the F-16’s Pratt and Whitney F100-200 engine was notoriously unreliable at the time, and it factored into a disproportionate number of crashes. Once the engine failures are factored out, the F-16’s crash rate is around 4.7, or even lower.

The overall CF-18 Category ‘A’ incident rate is a worrying trend, but in itself, it is far too blunt a measure to understand the issues relating to the aircraft’s early history. An in-depth analysis of the thirteen crashes provides a much better sense of the problems faced (Table 1). Only one of the early CF-18 mishaps was primarily attributed to a mechanical failure. Of the twelve remaining, two aircraft were lost in a mid-air collision during basic fighter maneuvering. In this case, although the 1000-foot safety distance rule was violated, the accident cannot necessarily be attributed directly to a lack of proper training.

The leading cause of catastrophic mishaps in the remaining ten incidents was the lack of situational awareness either just after take-off or in-flight, which resulted in a “controlled flight into terrain,” or CFIT. In most of those cases there was an additional factor that degraded the pilot’s situational awareness [sit awareness], or ability to control the aircraft. The most common primary cause for CFITs were either G-force induced loss of consciousness (GLOC), where a violent maneuver incapacitated a pilot who was unable to regain control before flying to the ground, or Somatogyral effects in low light situations. The latter occurs in absence of visual cues due to poor weather or low light, and the pilot can misinterpret his or her actual situation, occasionally leading to crashes. Of the remaining accidents, two involved an improper aircraft configuration as a major factor, with the pilot failing to apply a proper corrective procedure. In those incidents, better aircraft knowledge may have helped the pilot safely recover the aircraft.

So one aircraft lost from the first thirteen crashes was due to mechanical failure and this was attributed to a maintenance error, not an engine failure. As already stated, the misplaced hysteria over single engine operations is just that, hysteria, with no logical or supportable evidence to back it up. Aircrew and ground crew remain the single biggest threat to military aviation safety and will remain so for the foreseeable future.

Without knowing details about those 7 class A mishaps, statistics don’t tell a lot.

Agree, and there could be a host of issues there behind those stats, including different maintenance standards or timings for the engine when in single or twin configuration. Either way I’d rather have this discussion with at least some actual facts instead of vague assertions and big hands claims that have no evidence to support them.

All those seven a/c could have landed safely, while the F-16-52 only needs one mishap for a total loss. I.e. a class A engine related mishap in flight is usually a loss in a single engine jet, not in a twin.

There are plenty of examples of single engine aircraft that land safely after losing an engine, while plenty of examples of twin engine aircraft losing one engine failing to land safely. What we know for certain is todays engines are far more reliable than previous generations, so much so than militaries across the globe are quite happy to operate single engine aircraft.

but here, we’re discussing about canadian procurement process, and the argument is much more about engine reliability than being shot at.. as up north, there isn’t much of a threat of being targeted by any sort of weapon. And again, even the most modern engines (see the A380) do have failures… be it due to weather conditions, birds, maintenance (a tool forgotten in air duct for example) or god only know what other reason, having only one means that in case of a fail, you will fly your MB if you’re lucky enough to have the time to eject, and if not… too bad. In a multi engine you still have a chance to remain airborne and get back down safely with your aircraft

We need to inject some facts to this discussion instead of speculation and assertions.

First – Other nations operate in conditions similar to Canada also operate single engine aircraft, including Sweden, Norway, Japan and the USA. All these nations continue to pursue single engine aircraft. The USN, who has operated single engine aircraft off carriers, clearly a more hazardous environment for single engine ops than land based, has no concerns operating the F-35C from a single engine perspective. Australia will operate the F-35A in an environment as remote and dangerous as Canada

Second – Now some engine facts. USAF is a great source for engine related incidents, http://www.safety.af.mil/Divisions/Aviation-Safety-Division/Aviation-Statistics/

Let us first compare single engine and twin engine.

Single engine aircraft
[ATTACH=CONFIG]256181[/ATTACH]

Twin engine aircraft
[ATTACH=CONFIG]256181[/ATTACH]

Overall twin engine fighters have less class A mishaps over the timeframe.

When we look at the most modern engines in the respective fleets though.

F-16 F100-PW-229
[ATTACH=CONFIG]256181[/ATTACH]

F-15 F100-PW-229
[ATTACH=CONFIG]256181[/ATTACH]

Same engine across both aircraft. Less flight hours in the F-16 but zero incidents for F-16 compared to F-15.

F-22
[ATTACH=CONFIG]256181[/ATTACH]

F-35
[ATTACH=CONFIG]256181[/ATTACH]

F-22 has two class A from 500k flight hours, F-35 has one land based class A from 50k, still no inflight issues.

So the evidence suggests that for modern engines there is little difference between single engine and twin engine safety. In USAF service while the overall safety record of twin aircraft is better than single engine aircraft the last 10 years of flight data now don’t support that conclusion.

Third – Far more interesting is the following, that there are significantly more class A mishaps caused by aircrew than material issues. Quote below taken from the 2012 Air Force Safety Centre annual report,

Human factors continued as the leading cause in aviation mishaps. The Air Force had 20 Class A flight mishaps (a rate of 1.03 per 100,000 flight hours) with 10 destroyed aircraft and 9 fatalities. Human factors played a significant role in 18 of the 20 (90%) Class A flight mishaps. A review of Class A aviation mishaps over the past 10 years demonstrates that, on average, 83% were attributed to human factors

http://www.afsec.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-130523-033.pdf

Seems like the solution to safe flight ops is not engine related issues but removing aircrew, who are far more responsible for class A mishaps than engines.

As many of us expected, the Belgiums have apparently rejected the French offer for the Rafale as invalid.

“I do not see element that would not have allowed France to submit a detailed governmental proposal in accordance with what was requested in the RfGP,” the Minister stated to the Chamber of Representatives’ Defense Commission.

Referinf to internal and external legal advices requested by the Belgian Government, Vandeput added that “no price offer or reply was sent [by the french government] to the 164 questions the RfGP aske to the candidates and which should have constituted, in substance, the expected government proposal”.

“We can only note that the French [government] don’t want to bid as defined by the decision the Council of Ministers took on March 17,” he continued.

On Sept. 7, France offered Belgium a broad government-to-government deal to purchase Dassault Aviation’s Rafale fighter jets.

“The Defence minister, Florence Parly, has offered the Belgian Defence minister to setup an in-depth partnership between our two countries in order to respond to the need expressed by the Belgian air force,” the ministry said.

If the Dassault Rafale officially stays in the race, it has now little chance of being selected in February 2018, as the Belgian Government should most certainly follow Vandeput.

With the Rafale almost out, only two contenders remain in this US$4.3 billion competition.

https://www.airrecognition.com/index.php/archive-world-worldwide-news-air-force-aviation-aerospace-air-military-defence-industry/global-defense-security-news/global-news-2017/october/3786-accap-program-french-proposal-rejected-by-the-belgian-mod.html

Just to get back to the question of whether this debacle will affect the prospects of Canada ordering an American Boeing fighter, I think it will have a big effect on Boeing’s prospects of winning an F/A-18 order. Not so sure what effect it will have on F-35 prospects. Could result in a larger order for F-35 in the absence of an F/A-18 order. Could result in the Canadian government re-examining the F-18 replacement program.

Any Canadians reading know what the Canadian reaction is likely to be?

There is a whole thread devoted to the Canadian replacement. In a nutshell,

Already occurred
Liberal Govt campaigns on promise of no F-35 and wants open and honest competition
Wins election but realises it is illegal to exclude F-35
Liberal Govt claims existing Hornet cannot meet requirements and are old, makes baseless case for interim aircraft including silencing Canadian Military personnel from talking publically (bring in interim, delay open competition till later)
Liberal Govt continues to fund F-35 SDD program and protect Canadian manufacturing jobs
Liberal Govt tries to sole source SH (despite campaigning for competition)
Boeing and Bombardier have their spat
Canada looking at RAAF Hornets to plug non existant fighter gap

IMO Future
Canadian Govt locked in to open competition
Canada buys F-35 after long protracted process as it has the best mix of capability, interoperability, price and protection of Canadian Industry.

No? I draw to your attention to the fact that Delta ordered a Canadian product with (I imagine) absolutely no tariffs under the NAFTA arrangement because the management of Delta saw this as the best option for new lift. Boeing (a beneficiary of extraordinary tax breaks, as I understand, from the state(s) in which it has manufacturing plants) objected to the mode of financing of Bombardier. Result: if a massive tariff is applied to C-Series aircraft imported into the USA – unexpectedly – all the time, effort and cost incurred by Delta in negotiating a deal with Bombardier will have been wasted. Much more importantly Boeing’s actions will have prevented Delta from re-equipping with metal suited to their needs ie will cost Delta an awful lot of $$$

Delta currently operates approximately 480 Boeing aircraft. Bombardier will never be a tier one supplier to Delta. While Delta can support Bombardier they will always do what is best for their company which may very well be walking away from the CS100 order should the Boeing’s case be validated.

Forget the public statement. Refer to what I wrote above. OK, I’m British, so inclined to understatement, but I think Boeing will be off Delta’s Christmas card list for quite some time.

Do you think Delta has a Christmas card list and that Boeing cares whether they are on it… With 480 Boeing aircraft in the Delta fleet Delta is tied to Boeing support for many years.