I generally agree with you, but.

(i) Quite often JTACs (or NATO FACs for instance) prefer two seaters for the very reasons you gave. Backseater is of great help in awareness.

If we look at the tactical fleets of most air forces there are a far smaller number of two seaters available though.

(ii) New generation pods (at least some have a dedicated datalink allowing real time image transmissions.

Agree although most of the UAVS used in IRQ/AFG also have the capability to stream data to troops directly as well as home base. For example even a small unit like Scan Eagle was capable of this in 2004.

Enabled by Harris Corporation’s National Security Agency-approved Type 1 classified SecNet-11®Plus technology in ScanEagle’s avionics bay, streaming video and voice-over IP communication was sent from a ground control station over a secure high-bandwidth network to ScanEagle 18 miles away. The data was then instantaneously relayed to ground personnel six miles from the UAV.

http://boeing.mediaroom.com/2004-12-21-Boeing-ScanEagle-UAV-Demonstrates-Communications-Relay-Utilizing-Harris-Secure-Wireless-Technology

A.t.c in trying to support him, you made instead his own positioneven worse as you affirmed that also the first flight was delayed of an year: if you are true, total delay would amount to six years , one to get to first flight and 5 between it and IOC…

The delay is not cumulative, if first flight is scheduled for 2005 and it is delayed to 2006 but IOC remains the same in 2010 how can you say that the delay is six years? There is no logic to adding these years if the point at which you are grading it against doesn’t move.

If your metric is first flight to IOC then the time was 9 years.
If your metric is actual IOC compared to planned IOC then the delay is 5 years.
If your metric is planned first flight to IOC then the delay is 10 years.

Whatever it is doesn’t really matter as long as you can remain consistent in which milestone (first flight or IOC) is the one you are measuring delay against.

My facts are right.. Nothing in your links states that the 4th FS IOC’ed with Blk 1. And it doesn’t even make much sense, by that time they have already operated Blk 10 for months. Didn’t receive “enough”, how many is that? VMFA-121 IOC’ed the F-35B with mere ten examples and corresponding number of pilots.

No your facts are not right. See my further post. All the facts, not unsupported claims, points to Blk 1 being the IOC jet.

Anyway, we should never forget the original topic and that is the F-35’s IOC. I could somehow accept IOC of a sqn having early block F-35s with some major flaws, if at the same time they already had later block F-35s with fixes installed.. But obviously they did not..

This is directly pertinent to F-35 IOC and it clearly demonstrates that the USAF went IOC with early model jets that were subsequently upgraded. That was the whole basis and claim of your source article, that by so doing it wasn’t a real IOC but we now have great example of where that was not the case.

Haven’t seen this posted here yet.

So Senator John McCain has released some info on what he sees as acquisition priorities going forward for the US. His document is titled Restoring American Power and covers recommendations for the 2018-2022 Defence budget years.

http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/25bff0ec-481e-466a-843f-68ba5619e6d8/restoring-american-power-7.pdf

Amongst his recommendations are the following,

“The Navy should also pursue a new “high/low mix” in its aircraft carrier fleet. Traditional nuclear-powered supercarriers remain necessary to deter and defeat near-peer competitors, but other day-to-day missions, such as power projection, sea lane control, close air support, or counterterrorism, can be achieved with a smaller, lower cost, conventionally powered aircraft carrier. Over the next five years, the Navy should begin transitioning from large deck amphibious ships into smaller aircraft carriers with the goal of delivering the first such ship in the mid-2030s.

Similarly, the number of aircraft carriers is irrelevant if there is a shortfall of Navy strike aircraft, as there is now. The Navy currently has approximately 830 frontline strike fighters. Its projected shortfall will grow from 29 aircraft in 2020 to roughly 111 aircraft in 2030. The continued delays to the F-35C have exacerbated these shortfalls, while delaying the modernization needed to keep pace with emerging threats. Over the next five years, the Navy should therefore procure 58 additional F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets and 16 additional EA-18G Growlers, while continuing to procure the F-35C as rapidly as possible, to fill out ready and effective carrier air wings that can meet joint requirements.”

“The Marine Corps also requires critical investments in readiness, especially in its aviation enterprise, which is in a state of crisis. The Marine Corps is in the process of modernizing nearly its entire fleet of aircraft, but those new aircraft have not shown up yet. In the meantime, many Marine Corps aircraft have been pushed well beyond their service life. As a result, the majority of Marine aircraft now sit in depots awaiting maintenance. So many aircraft are unusable that pilots are unable to meet training requirements. While Marine Corps leadership has instituted a number of changes to help rectify the situation, fully funding spare parts, depot maintenance, and other enabler accounts could accelerate the recovery of Marine Corps aviation readiness.

Increasing aircraft maintenance only buys the Marines time. Eventually, these aircraft will have to be replaced. The best fix to this readiness crisis is accelerating the procurement of replacement aircraft, especially the F-35B strike aircraft, CH-53K helicopter, and KC-130J tanker and support aircraft. This will speed the transition out of the older aircraft while bringing new and needed capabilities to the Marine Corps. In particular, procurement of the F-35B—the replacement for the Marines’ F/A-18 Hornet, EA-6B Prowler, and AV-8B Harrier—should be increased by 20 aircraft over the next five years.”

“Due to funding constraints, the Air Force is planning to procure 228 F-35As between Fiscal Years 2018 and 2022, reaching a maximum rate of 48 aircraft per year. At this low rate, the Air Force will not complete its total projected buy of 1,763 F-35As until 2040. This goal is unrealistic and requires reevaluation, and likely a reduction, of the ultimate size of the F-35 fleet. However, we do not have to make that decision during the next five years. It will take the industrial base until Fiscal Year 2022 to ramp up to the maximum annual production rate, resulting in an additional 73 F-35As beyond current plans by that time. Therefore, given the Air Force’s ongoing capacity shortfalls, the goal for the next five years should be to procure as many F-35As as possible, with an ultimate goal of moving beyond the program as quickly as possible.”

All signs bode well for increasing production as quickly as possible.

Things are a bit more complex. Yes, Time on station is a great advantage for CAS. However, time to station is a huge problem. When you have a TIC, as JTAC, you expect a quick reaction from air assets. Another problem is versatility. Hard, eg., to ask for a show of force from a UCAV. I do not know any UCAV capable of strifing a place. Finally, there are a lot of disambiguation (visual generally) work to do in intricated situations. So if UCAV can be an interesting asset, it still lacks many capabilities to make of them an “ideal” CAS platform.

TICs require support in different ways and frankly every TIC is different. The question was not whether the UAV is an ideal CAS platform but whether one was available that was designed for CAS. MY argument is there is no ideal CAS UAV, just like there is no ideal CAS aircraft. All have strengths and weaknesses. A good ATO will planner will ensure that various assets with different capabilities are available for support. We also get coloured by CAS experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. CAS support at the end of Vietnam showed clearly the type of aircraft that were required in an environment where the AAA threat was significant enough that CAS aircraft stopped going below 10kft.

A significant UAV limitation for CAS is weather, UAVs do not function in adverse weather well at all, they long thin wings are not designed for high wind for instance.

Correspondingly UAVs are great for situational awareness and identifying enemy and friendly troops. The UAV is controlled by a pilot but also has a payload operator and in most western nations has intelligence/imagery analysts present as well. A manned CAS aircraft does not have that expertise to call upon.

MQ-9 may be able to play a role for CAS but that’s not the same as a CAS UCAV and that is still only 1 UCAV.

I’m not claiming that the MQ-9 is the best or only UAV capable of CAS, what I am claiming is that it can conduct CAS, simple as that, as can pretty much any armed UAV with a decent sensor. There is no “designed for CAS” UAV because there is no requirement for it.

Sorry, my fault then:
Spudman said that original contract envisaged the reaching of IOC in 2010/2011: given that first flight of the F-35 was in december 2006 that would amount at 4/5 years.

Yes original IOC was 2010/11 but even before the F-35 had its first flight in Dec 2006 the IOC had been moved. First flight was originally scheduled for 2005 but was delayed to 2006 due to the weight saga.

If you have forgotten, the weight saga occurred because the JPO requested LM to make all three variants capable of carrying a 2,000 lb weapon internally. LM foolishly agreed, so both parties share the blame, but that resulted in first flight being delayed a year, and IOC and the production schedule being delayed by the JPO.

Now, he claimed that the total delay of the F-35 was of just 5 years overall, so I pointed out that is the double of time in comparison to what it was deemed necessary to pass between the two points.

If your point is that it was nine years from first flight to IOC then yes you are correct but Spudman is right, the total delay to IOC was 5 years.

I have taken the Su-35 because it made its first flight after the F-35 and is actually full operative and with first batch of full rate production completed.

Again, the Su-35 is not a good e xample as it is a derivative aircraft. In building the Su-35 Sukhoi did not start with a clean sheet. It had a design it modified and then brought into service.

If we look at the SU-35, we could compare it to the F-16C Blk 50 to Blk 60 transition. The upgrade program required the UAE pay US$3 billion, involved a new AESA radar, an integrated FLIR/laser targeting system, higher weights, an upgraded EW system, an upgraded engine and expanded weapons and fuel carriage.

As for timings, UAE ordered the jet in early 1999, it first flew in 2003 and deliveries started in 2005.

The only thing based on nothing is the PR advertisement nonsense you’re spreading here. First declare IOC and then order 61 retrofit kits for 10 aircraft in order to fix “deficiencies that Preclude Mission Readiness” which take another year to deliver.. but you’ve already ticked the box, fool… if there is no mission readiness, then there’s obviously no IOC, for every single aircraft on this planet.. except the F-35, of course…

I even include a link, but I you’re not even going to read it.. your blindness is completely incurable..

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/175797/why-declaring-f_35-initial-operating-capability-is-meaningless.html
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/feature/5/173812/marines-declared-f_35-ioc-despite-deficiencies-that-%E2%80%9Cpreclude-mission-readiness%E2%80%9D.html

I won’t bother going into the bias that is Defence-aerospace. Interesting position he is taking though and clealy not a student of US fighter jet history.

Let us consider the F-16.

The Jet first flew in 1975 and reached IOC with the USAF in late 1980. These were Blk 1 aircraft. What we know is Blk 1 aircraft were all modified from 1981-84 and brought up to Blk 10 standard. A lot of early issues were identified with the airframe and these were re-mediated in the Blk 10 standard. While I don’t have any figures on how much the Blk 10 standard upgrade cost it did involve replacement of the entire vertical stabilizer. Not be be outdone, not only were all Blk 1 aircraft upgraded to Blk 10 standard, so were all Blk 5 aircraft under the same upgrade program.

That is a total of approximately 300 aircraft, all upgraded to a new standard within a year or two of being manufactured and delivered to the customer and, here is the kicker, all delivered before the USAF declared IOC…

Su35 derivative airframe?. try put dfbw control 3D TVC with high supersonic flight speed in another airframe see how many decades take for another firm to make just the weight right. there is picture of location of 2000L fuel tanks on wing in below brochure. it will show you what it is capable of carrying.

Derivative: a term, idea, etc, that is based on or derived from another in the same class. 5. a word derived from another word. 6. (chem) a compound that is formed from, or can be regarded as formed from, a structurally related compound: chloroform is a derivative of methane.

http://www.dictionary.com/browse/derivative