B fuselage is not the same. It has an enormous hump behind the cockpit, shorter nozzle and a shaft in the intake, increasing drag. On the plus side, it’s missing the tail hook fairing.
Assuming area ruling is optimised on the A model, that makes the B fuselage less otimised. The C is much worse of course due to its huge wing ie not only does it have more drag due to increased wing area, its area ruling is poor. Which is nicely reflected in the revised acceleration specs.
The differences between the front aspect cross sections of the three jets is below,
[ATTACH=CONFIG]246288[/ATTACH]
The difference between A and C are just weight and wing so it is pretty clear that the wing plays the major role in a longer acceleration time from M0.8 to M1.2. While the hump on the Bee is pronounced it doesn’t have anywhere near the impact of the larger wing on the C, especially given the airframe has less weight than the C and the smaller wing of the A.
If the evaluation was unbiased and the issues are simply due to a very complex evaluation, then you would assume that the number of assumptions negatively affecting each a/c would be uniformly distributed — can you please give some examples of odd assumptions in the Danish eval that has a negative impact on the F-35 and not the competition (SH and/or Typhoon)?
Certainly not negative to F-35 but I have already identified two such assumptions that favour the SH and Eurofighter. Those being the threats the aircraft were graded against, very vanilla in nature and frankly more likely to be encountered in 2015 than 2035, and the sustainment costings out to 2055 where the Danes are likely to be the only operator of at least one of the aircraft and possibly both.
None of which supports your claim that the F35 program was less than fully funded.
Let us refresh ourselves on what my claim was.
A fully funded program that went through the worst financial crisis the world had seen since the great depression… Reality is the fiscal environment the F-35 SDD phase encountered was no better than that faced by the Rafale and Eurofighter.
So, my point stands. The fiscal environment that the F-35 has encountered was no better than that faced by the Rafale or Eurofighter. There is a distinct difference between our positions though, I have provided a number of sources to support my claims, you have provided nothing.
The problem with F-35 is the fineness ratio. Stubby jet is stubby to fit on the LHD’s elevator. The F/A-18E/F’s fuselage is 19% longer (about 9 feet) than that of the F-35, giving the F/A-18E/F a superior fineness ratio.
Agree, which is why continued attempts to eyeball drag based on fuselage width remains dubious at best.
Without the fat fuselage the C would have been less draggy, so would have had more acceleration and supersonic speed. The wing certainly plays a role too.
There is no logic to that claim. For starters, the A/B/C model all share essentially the same fuselage cross-section but the acceleration times are all different. In that context, the only appreciable difference between them is weight for the B and weight/wing for the C. The weight difference is approximately 10% from A to B and 19% from A to C. The wing area difference is 36% between A/B and C.
I cannot see how a weight change of 19% would increase the acceleration times so markedly; especially given the times are calculated with internal loadings only. The only direct correlation is the size of the wing, which is mandated by USN for carrier landing performance (which it should be noted has been very successful).
Taking that further, the SH versus F-35C frontal aspect is the following,
F-35C carriers almost 5,000 lbs more fuel as well as 4,600 lbs of weapons all internal.
Typhoon and SHornet were calculated to need 6 extra airframes to make up 2000 hours shorter service life. Because Hornet is two-seater, they estimated they’d need more flying hours for training the extra crewmember. This extra attrition was then modelled for requiring 4 extra airframes compared to Eurofighter.
Footnote to that discussion, the Danes held a hearing recently where this, amongst other issues, were raised. The following link has some of the answers provided by the Danish panel. http://www.sldinfo.com/the-danish-parliament-and-the-new-fighter-moving-forward/
On the SH hours at 6,000 and the reason this figure was used,
The Defense Ministry also revealed that they had received a detailed response from the US Navy with regard to flight life of the Super Hornet.
The engineer has asked Ministry why new fighter office has evaluated the Super Hornet based on 6,000 rather than 9,500 flying hours.
The reason is, according to the Ministry, that the U.S. Navy, which would be the official seller of the aircraft to Denmark, during the issuance of the final bid in 2014 stated 6,000 hours without referring to 9,500 flight hours.
“That was in connection with the issuance of Request for Binding Information (RBI) in April 2014 where the vendors were asked detailed questions about airframe life. The answer from the US Navy (approx. 60 pages) includes detailed information about the plane’s design, testing of the plane, material selection, design principles, corrosion, service life limited components, etc.
According to the U.S. Navy, the F/A-18F Super Hornet is designed and tested for 6,000 hours, “ according to the written response by Press Secretary Linda Liboriussen.
Some additional info in the link on minimum airframe numbers if the Danish Foreign Policy or the mission set required were changed.
“Budget increase of US$4.6 billion.” Sure the budget was impacted. It went up.
I suspect rather strongly that the “concurrency risks” played a larger role in the LRIP numbers reduction than the budget,
The reduction in per airframe cost from increased production would probably have offset any increased concurrency costs. That is one of the main purposes of concurrency and has been proven time and again on just about every new US military aviation program for the last 30 years. The difference is that increased concurrency costs but lower production costs becomes politically untenable in a fiscally constrained environment.
handy that sequestration and the financial crisis can be blamed rather than issues with the program and design ;).
I said there were two main reasons the LRIP jets were reduced with the first being slow SDD progression. I don’t see why you have to restate what was already said. Sequestration still played a role and continues to do so. For example, the cuts mandated by sequestration in 2011 are still in effect and impacting capability today.
Counter to warnings from top military officials, the two chambers’ fiscal year 2016 budgets will likely restrict both military and domestic spending to levels agreed to in a 2011 deficit-reduction deal, according to GOP lawmakers and aides.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/gop-to-stick-to-sequester-spending-limits-in-2016-budget-1426018538
Russia does it in a lot more practical and effective way.
It is easy to say that given Russia has dropped comparatively so few PGMs during their time in Syria. Conversely, it would be hard to find a US platform that dropped an unguided munitions except for cannon rounds and perhaps some rotary launched rockets. Russia also isn’t flying anywhere near the sortie number and distance that the US are flying, hence does not need the coordination that the CAOC provides.
Those issues may make Russian air strikes in Syria easier to coordinate but it doesn’t make them necessarily more accurate.
So Saab over engineered the structure on the prototype?
Would be strange if they started with a structure on the weak side and hope that strength / vibrations “would be ok”.
Not really, It is pretty common in aerospace to engineer just enough strength into the airframe. Look for example at the civilian side of things with Boeing and Airbus either failing just short or just over their testing of wing load targets. The A380 failed within 3% of the wing load test. I don’t recall the A380 wing requiring a re-test, just some validation that strengthening had been applied to the right places.
Therefore, it is often easier to add a couple of pounds of reinforcement to the wing or structure to reach the limit than remove it when the structure has far exceeded the design specification. F-35C wing is another example with a half a pound of additional strengthening required to get the wing to the full 8,000 hr minimum design limit.
The reason is unimportant. The original claim was that F-35 could carry 40+ SDBs to combat which is certainly not the case.
Sure, which I never contested.
Sure, you do that in Syria, Iraq, Libya or A’stan where there is no credible IADS to care about and where a guy with 20yr old MANPADS is the maximum threat you can encounter. Send your F-35s to lurk around Nanjing and look for mobile targets and see what happens.
The airframe has been designed to do just that.
Don’t say.. And how many of those proficient air forces have led a war against an enemy with any sort of meaningful air defense system?
Do they need to engage in a war to demonstrate what they spend vast sums of time and money training for? Do you think Red Flags, which most western air forces now participate in, involve planes flying around over low threat environments?
Yes, they continued to operate aircraft for few days until the last 20% that still was not destroyed yet took off and left to Iran. A great example, indeed.
Again, you may not like the example provided, but it demonstrates that despite the best efforts of the GW1 powers airfields remained in operation. If not so, how else were the aircraft able to fly to Iran…
Amazing.. So you want to start a war against an enemy with solid IADS network (to justify the use of F-35s) and at the same time find significant intelligence support too much… Good luck with flying blindly over Chinese territory and target dynamically whatever truck you can find.. Lunacy..
I mentioned China and starting a war where? Again you demonstrate a lack of understanding on how modern air forces conduct operations. There is a big difference between providing intelligence support to a cruise missile compared to intelligence support for SCAR missions.
Just so you are aware, the example mission types I am talking about are,
There are two DAS missions, and one DAS coordination mission performed by the ACE. The DAS missions
are AI and AR. SCAR missions coordinate AI and AR. Battlespace shaping is the focus of each of these missions.
Air Interdiction. AI is executed when target locations are known and are attacked in accordance with the
MAGTF commander’s intent and targeting desires. AI missions are planned in accordance with the MAGTF’s
targeting plan and lead by a mission commander designated by the aviation combat element (ACE) commander.
Armed Reconnaissance. AR is utilized when the target location is unknown, and requires aircrew to locate
and engage potential targets to achieve the MAGTF commander’s intent. AR missions are tasked by the ACE as
well, however, they are normally lead by individual element (four aircraft or less) leaders.
Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance. SCAR is a mission flown for the purpose of acquiring and
reporting DAS targets. SCAR missions coordinate and may mark a target for AR missions and precisely locate
targets for AI missions. SCAR is especially useful in target rich environments to prevent redundant attacks by AR
aircraft. The SCAR aircraft can be used to verify preplanned target locations and discriminate between actual and
deceptive targets.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA524808
Again…cruise missiles are great for some and even a lot of targets, but in the presence of GPS jamming, deceptive targets, mobile targets, pop up threats etc you need deep strike aircraft. Cruise missiles have a place, but their overall cost and effectiveness are limited, especially when a conflict goes beyond a couple of weeks. RAND demonstrated such in one of their studies a couple of years ago which I can provide if you want.
The program was fully funded as you yourself acknowledge; the prevailing fiscal situation, whatever it may have been, had zero impact on the funding for the program. Some might argue that perhaps it should have done!
Reality is that when the program was rebaselined in 2012 not only was development slowed because less aircraft were purchased for the SDD phase, but production funding, and subsequently aircraft, was removed from LRIPs.
The following from the Australian National Audit Office
The most comprehensive systems engineering review of the JSF Program to date was the 2010 Technical Baseline Review(TBR), which in January 2011 led to a budget increase of US$4.6 billion. That increase was needed to fund the program’s March 2012 cost and schedule rebaseline, which included the SDD phase being extended by three years to 2019. At the same time, budget considerations and concurrency risks drove a decision to further reduce the numbers of aircraft being produced in LRIP lots. Data from Lockheed Martin’s Earned Value Management System indicates that, since the TBR, the program has been achieving its cost and schedule goals in a more sustained manner than previously, indicating the potential for the program to continue progress within its cost and schedule parameters.
https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/g/files/net616/f/201213%20Audit%20Report%20No%206.pdf
The ANAO disagrees with you that the fiscal situation at the time had zero impact on the F-35 program. Those extra three years and less LRIP aircraft were a direct result of two things, slow SDD progression and funding issues associated with the global financial crisis and imminent sequestration.
Political and budget restraints hindering programs timelines versus the timeline of a fully funded and supported program can in no way be deemed comparable.
A fully funded program that went through the worst financial crisis the world had seen since the great depression… Reality is the fiscal environment the F-35 SDD phase encountered was no better than that faced by the Rafale and Eurofighter.
If you are in a somewhat/relative high intensity theater like DS/ Libya. Then you allocate the needed Intel resources, like spy-sattelite, drones, on the ground assets.. what ever you have.
If you have… Intel support like this doesn’t just happen, it takes years of planning, capability, training, and exercises to get to the point where you can execute mass cruise missile strikes.
In every conflict they has mass launched cruise missile as first day strike. Why debate this.. its common knowledge.
On the contrary, that supports my position. Cruise missile strikes worked for many of the targets, but in GW1 the US still flew F-117s over Baghdad on night one dropping LBGs on high value targets. Why didn’t they use cruise missiles for these targets?
We know absolutly nothing on how F-35 would fare when going in 1st day in S-300/400 AoD, so go easy with your advs here pls.
We know that the S-300/400 uses an X-band radar for terminal guidance of the missile. We also know that most of the S-300/400 missiles use X-band radar for their own terminal guidance. From the study I posted previously, available here http://www.scienpress.com/Upload/JCM/Vol%204_1_9.pdf we know that the F-35 performs exceptionally well against X-band radar systems, so much so the average detection range for an F-16 radar was approximately 5nm. The S-300/400 radar, while higher power, will be at a longer range than an F-16 for an engagement and the respective missiles from the S-300/400 are going to have less power, range and capability than an F-16 radar.
Therefore we can make a pretty credible assessment based on the info above.
Yes, this is exactly what I was claiming.. Practical loadouts are nowhere near “40+ SBDs”, for whatever reasons..
To be clear you claimed it was not for whatever reason but for airframe life considerations which is certainly not the case.
Well, that is not my fault..
We can always think about hypothetical scenarios where exactly that particular feature of the F-35 becomes extremely useful and where the bird can indeed do the job of three F-15Es. If, however, these missions constitute 0.5% of the overall usage profile, then the whole debate becomes a moot point..
Sorry, mobile targets are not a hypothetical scenario. It is the reason that air forces fly tactical aircraft into hostile territory.
That is why I am a big fan of the F-35B and very reserved towards the F-35C while claiming the F-35A being the single most useless fighter in existence. The idea of relatively short-ranged fighters taking off nearby bases to sneak through the enemy’s integrated air defenses just to throw SDBs and JDAMs on targets which could simply be destroyed from stand-off ranges is pure lunacy. What makes one think that the opponent would wait up until the fighters are airborne and then desperately use high power radars to locate them while he can comfortably smash them on the ground is beyond me.. :confused:
You are certainly entitled to your opinion. The problem with it is it flies into the face of the practical application of air power by pretty much every single proficient Air Force on the globe, including those nations that have larger stockpiles of the very weapons you claim deny the use of airfields.
Fortunately we have a great example a of nation operating runways in the face of sustained air power and cruise missile strikes, such as Iraq during GW1, who continued to operate aircraft from runways and airbases that had apparently been put out of action.
Yes and that is exactly the lunacy I am talking about. Why risk a $150mil airframe and a pilot if you can simply risk a $3mil stand-off missile?
Because for some reason you fail to grasp the concept of a mobile target, one that a stand-off missile cannot prosecute. You may have no experience in working with fighter aircraft and conducting military operations, but thankfully there are perfect examples of why tactical aircraft fly into hostile territory. There is a reason the French flew into Libya on day one and bombed not with SCALPs but with smaller shorter ranged PGMs that can be dynamically targeted. Secondly, stand-off missiles require significant intelligence support, such support can only be provided by a few select Air Forces and defence structures should a conflict go beyond a few days. Again we can look to the French, who have reduced their stocks of SCALP cruise missiles. Why would they do this if they were so useful and valuable in preventing a non stealth airframe such as the Rafale from being put into danger?
Complete nonsense.. PR, the actual combat loadout schemes will be much more modest in order to preserve airframe life..
Airframe life has little to do with it, you do not fight a conflict while attempting to preserve overall airframe limits. What it actually comes down to is practical application. There is a finite limit to the number of targets a single fighter jet can prosecute effectively. Unless you plan on launching all 40 SBDs at two or three targets that load out is a waste.
An excellent example of realistic loadouts is available at F-15e.info here, http://www.f-15e.info/joomla/weapons/loadout-configurations What we see is that an F-15E, that has the ability to haul 20,000+ of ordnance, usually goes to war with 7,000lbs or less.
A nonsensical mission, in the first place.. No one sends in manned fighters directly into heavy anti-access area. In reality you send in cruise missiles and manned fighters with stand-off weapons.
Except the F-35 has been designed for that very mission.
Using cruise missiles and manned fighters with stand-off weapons only works when your target set allows it. For targets that are mobile, pop-up or are time sensitive a manned platform becomes the superior option. When you introduce GPS jamming and other denial aspects into the battlespace, then a manned platform becomes almost mandatory.
Which of these are already integrated? JASSM is no longer on the list of weapons for certification by the end of the F-35 development program. JASSM-ER, too, is not in the pipeline for now.. Ford SDB II, the fighter will not receive the software package required to operate the bomb until 2022..
Until that time there are plenty of other platforms that can launch JASSMs etc from outside the battlespace while the USAF etc uses F-35s for precision targeting of mobile threats within an A2/AD region with the current suite of integrated weapons.