Imagine that instead of building the F-35, the USAF had ordered a “super F-16”. In such a situation no a/c with “stealth capabilities” would have been available. Do you think this would have meant that the Canadian Air Force would not be able to find a new jet to replace the Hornets? Of course not. They simply would have had to accept one of the others.

While that is 100% correct it neglects one vital thing. The F-35 does exist and now the Canadians have the ability to acquire a stealth aircraft for the same price, or less, than the alternatives. Surely they would be mad to not pursue the best capability they could acquire for the price they are prepared to pay…

The “trends” are irrelevant if you know anything about Canadian ROE. The ability to engage WVR is essential in this country…no matter if it has not taken place recently. If you are a F35 fan fine, but you clearly don’t understand this country nor it’s unique circumstances that make first day strike fighters far less relevant than interceptors. The A2A mission is more relevant and more frequent than bombing over denied air space which could have taken place exactly twice in the last 50 years.

Actually it is three just for the Hornet alone, GW1, Bosnia and Libya but that is besides the point.

You should tell the RCAF that their current aircraft, the F/A-18 which they have operated for over 30 years, is not sufficient for the A2A mission. They seem to think it is sufficient.

You also need to understand why the F/A-18 was chosen in the first place. It certainly wasn’t due to it being an interceptor, the Hornet frankly does that poorly compared to other alternatives due to its short range, poor thrust and average sized radar. The main reason the Hornet was chosen over the F-16 was the ability to launch a BVR missile while also having a full multi-role ability for A2G missions using a laser targeting pod. Your statements also don’t make a lot of sense when you consider that interceptors are typically poor WVR aircraft.

As for ROE, the F-35 possesses superior sensors and data fusion that provide an ability to make ROE decisions at significantly longer range than previous aircraft. The F-35 will not need to progress to WVR to make an ROE decision, it will have all the info it needs, and a decision made, long before it gets that close.

Affordability of the f35 is not the only issue. The SOR was written to exclude other vendors on false prioritization of stealth capabilities.

That is not accurate. If the following is to be believed it explains the different requirements,

“I have been advised that departmental analysis concluded that of the mandatory requirements, there were six mandatory requirements that could not be met by any aircraft options other than the F-35 Joint Strike fighter.

The possession of stealth capabilities that make detection by enemy sensor systems exceedingly difficult.
Capable secure data link communications permitting operations in a hostile environment.
Capable of permitting the pilot to visually operate the aircraft in no-light conditions.
Capable of automatically sharing data and sensor information between friendly aircraft to maximize own aircraft and formation effectiveness.
Capable of permitting the pilot to effectively detect and engage small targets at tactically significant ranges.
Capable of maximizing the probability of identifying and keeping track of friendly and enemy forces through the use of automatic sensor prioritization.

http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/if-f-35-is-the-right-aircraft-for-canada-it-would-win-an-open-competition-says-former-procurement-chief

Let us be clear, of those requirements only the first can probably only be accomplished by the F-35 and even that is subjective to the determined threat. Of the above, all are pretty specific for requirements that improve the ability of the RCAF to operate and survive in hostile environments.
Every other platform has the opportunity to employ a secure data-link, allow ops in no light conditions, share data between friendly aircraft, identify and track small targets at significant distances and conduct sensor fusion.
Should we fault the F-35 because it will likely do all of those better than its competitors? Should the RCAF settle for lesser requirements because only a limited number of aircraft can fulfill the previous ones?

I am not going to get into a flame war over this subject

I’m not interested in a flame war, I am interested in valid and accurate information being presented that has a factual basis.

but in my opinion a mixed fighter fleet of differing capabilities is a valid consideration for Canada and I ‘d love to see a more complete report on the subject becuse that one is incomplete in it’s analysis. Every one of the five options Canada currently is evaluating have deficiencies that could be overcome by operating a mixed fleet.

Perhaps this analysis has been done in the classified space with more specific numbers and you would hope that when tenders are finally submitted for this contest that the Canadians actually undertake this analysis. Until then, what we have right now is quite valid and informative. Many of the references provided by the Canadian assessment also provide excellent reading and information on sustainment costs.

If a single fighter type was the only choice I think I’d dismiss the F35 and Gripen pretty quickly and probably even the Rafale on the grounds of having to go it alone in ongoing certification of weapons.

Those are the only three I think are worth keeping.

It seems that a mixed fleet is indeed very expensive — but that makes it even more puzzling that small countries like Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand all can operate mixed fleets.

How can they do that?

The decision to operate a mixed fleet is not necessarily about sustainment costs. Other reasons to have a mixed fleet include;

– The cost of replacing old airframes is a bigger factor in having a mixed fleet against a single type, many nations cannot afford the number of new aircraft required for fleet rationalisation. For third world countries, often the only airframes that come their way are gifted or refurbished second hand, in those cases you take what you can get.

– The political case as with Malayisa, where they acquired both MiG-29 and F/A-18D in the mid 90s, and suffered issues with both fleets ever since.

– Capability issues. Many of these nations that operate mixed fleet do so with aircraft that really only have a primary role, so a defined interceptor aircraft that has little capability for ground attack or vice versa.

– Final point to note is that what the country intends to do with the aircraft very much effects what they operate and to what standard. For expeditionary air forces having standardisation and commonality is very important. If the air force never goes anywhere and has no real readiness applied to them, then they are more likely to operate whatever they can get and will keep older airframes for longer.

Looking at those countries you mentioned, Malaysia as I said has an element of buying political. They could easily harmonise around a single type but haven’t. They could standardise around the SU-30MKM to replace both the F-18 and MiG-29 but instead are looking at another fighter from the west including Rafale, Typhoon, Gripen or SH.

Thailand received half of their F-16s second hand and had even agreed to purchase F/A-18s in the late 90s before they ran out of money. They have every chance to standardise around the Gripen but not sure yet if they will.

Singapore is a rich country and has the ability to operate quite a diverse fleet, albeit with a lot of it based in the US and training conducted in the US, Australia and possibly still in France. They chose F-15SGs to fulfil a specific need and are slowly phasing out the F-5s so they will become a F-15/16 fleet only.

What you quoted does not answer my question at all. They did not consider differences in operating costs between fighters. End of story. I am quite confident that there are substantial differences between them. That is illogical for a cost comparison of operating a mixed fleet vs a single platform. A mixed fleet can give you some advantages in operational capability (range and payload vs speed and A2A), and can give you a variable cost advantage that may overcome the duplication of fixed cost components (simulators for example).

You do not understand how much the fixed cost components represent. Typically, the fixed cost portions are two to three times the per flight hour cost. Several of the references in the assessment provide examples of this. The RAAF flies the F/A-18 at a per hour cost somewhere in the region of 15-20k but the total ownership cost, including per flight hour, is closer to 70k.

In maintaining a mixed fleet you have significant additional burdens including training infrastructure such as aircrew, aircraft, operations staff, maintenance staff as well as depot level staff, equipment and spares. For front line squadrons you have similar duplication.

The report makes it very clear, even just looking at aircrew, that to maintain a similar capability with a mixed fleet would require 22 additional aircrew each and every year you operate that mixed fleet of aircraft. Training a fighter pilot now costs somewhere in the region of US$6 million

It currently costs the taxpayer about $6 million a year to train one fighter pilot in today’s Air Force.

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/07/26/air-force-facing-fighter-pilot-shortage-offers-retention-bonuses-up-to-225000.html

Factoring for postings, promotions, washouts from training etc if you only trained a third of that required 22 every year for the 30 years you expect to operate the mixed fleet you arrive at a total cost of US$1.26 billion. Even the wages of an additional 22 aircrew, at a very modest 150k per year for 30 years, equates to an extra US$100 million.

That is just for aircrew, include the maintainers, which would be at least 5+ for every additional aircraft, include the additional spares load which you don’t get as much of a discount on because the fleet is smaller, include the additional tactics development staff, include the additional specific upgrades required for the airframe during its life and you can begin to see how much additional cost a mixed fleet introduces.

The report is flawed. It does not refute the option of managing a mixed fleet. Even a minimal difference of $4,000 per hour x 7,500 hours x 36 planes = just over a $1B dollars. That is material.

My above figures highlight the failed logic in your simple per flight hour cost comparison. That is before you factor in the discount a nation gets by ordering a larger single fleet compared to two smaller fleets of fighter jets, the reduction in total spares cost and holdings, not having two separate engine overhaul or maintenance facilities etc, single pilot training infrastructure etc. Again, per hour flight cost is not a significant metric in the total cost of ownership of a fighter jet.

If mixed fleets were cost prohibitive, we would not have welcomed bidders on FWSAR to consider submitting mixed fleet proposals. If it gives you optimized capability, you look at it.

Bad example, the mission types and operating environment for FWSAR are dissimilar enough that a mixed fleet can make sense. Ironically, all reporting indicates that none of the final three contenders are offering a mixed fleet anyway…

Canada’s decade-long quest to purchase a new fixed-wing search and rescue (FWSAR) aircraft has come down to three contenders, the Embraer KC-390, Alenia Aermacchi C-27J and Airbus Defence & Space C-295W.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/lockheed-c-130j-not-entered-in-canadian-fwsar-compet-420931/

With fighter jets a single multi-role aircraft can fulfil both a NORAD and a NATO role for the RCAF while providing value for money and through life savings.

Ozair…..you need to read that report again. They have no consideration in that report anywhere for differences in operating costs between fighter types. It’s an obviously flawed assumption. Show me anywhere in the report where they reflect operating costs or allow for variation in them. It’s held constant. Stupid assumption. I had to read it three times because it invalidates the report by skipping one of the most significant program cost components.

Again, I will quote

Despite having a sub-fleet of lower cost aircraft, the loss of economies of scale combined with the cost of duplication may result in a mixed fleet that is more expensive than its single fleet counterpart as was shown in a recent estimate of sustainment costs of future Australian fighter fleets (Ref. R).

No they do not specifically identify the per hour cost difference between operating the two aircraft in a mixed fleet, although the reference document does go into it, but they don’t need to. The per hour cost is not significantly different enough between two fighter aircraft compared to the fixed costs of operating two types.

This is evident by the assessment that doubling flight hours only results in a 50% increase in sustainment costs.

You cannot simply state that fighter availability is a function of investment in maintenance. The F-14 is an excellent example of that. They navy did not under invest. It was a difficult aircraft to maintain.

I stand by the statement. Plenty of difficult and troublesome aircraft meet their availability rates because the military in question provides sufficient resources to make that happen.

Perfect example is the B-1B which is known as a difficult aircraft to maintain yet in a conflict, with the money provided and motivated workforce, they can do amazing things.

“We were able to achieve these great stats through pure hard work,” said Lt. Col. Matthew Brooks, 9th Bomb Squadron commander. “Our squadron flew 130 more sorties than any B-1 squadron had flown in any other six month deployment. You don’t accomplish this by luck. It’s pure hard work and dedication from the aircraft maintainers, weapon builders and load crews, B-1 aviators, and the rest of the 7th Bomb Wing who deployed with us.”

The 9th EBS and 9th EAMU completed a complex B-1 sustainment block upgrade in the midst of combat operations, while avoiding any degradation in support to ongoing missions. The upgrade, completed to all nine aircraft in only six days, fulfilled an Air Forces Central Urgent Operational Needs request to fully integrate the sniper targeting pod onto the B-1, thereby providing machine-to-machine interface between the targeting pod and weapons, and reducing the targeting timeline by 33 percent.

http://www.dodbuzz.com/2012/08/02/the-air-forces-record-breaking-b-1-deployment/