The mixed fighter cost analysis is flawed on a number of levels:

First they made assumptions that operating and maintenance costs for two different fighter types are the same. The idea is that not only does one cost less to buy, but one may cost a whole hell of a lot less to operate. .

No they don’t.

Despite having a sub-fleet of lower cost aircraft, the loss of economies of scale combined with the cost of duplication may result in a mixed fleet that is more expensive than its single fleet counterpart as was shown in a recent estimate of sustainment costs of future Australian fighter fleets

They made assumptions that availability for the fighter types were the same

They chose reasonably acceptable assumptions for aircraft availability.

Aircraft availability: 80%
Aircraft serviceability: 70%

Given aircraft availability is almost directly related to sustainment funding and not the specific airframe there is no reason to suggest that a lower acquisition airframe is likely to be more available than a higher acquisition cost airframe.

They made assumptions that the mix was high and low capability rather than specialized capability which screws up their assumptions about allocation of those aircraft to particular missions.

??

When considering mixed fleets, a straightforward way to calculate the overall fleet size begins by first determining how many Fleet A aircraft are required to satisfy the NORAD commitment and adding sufficient aircraft from Fleet B to fulfill NATO commitments. Since aircraft in Fleet B are capable of fulfilling both missions, the combined fleet now has more capability than required to meet its commitments. The optimized fleet is determined by reducing the number of Fleet A aircraft to the minimum value that allows both commitments to be satisfied. This approach may seem counterintuitive initially, particularly since it appears to prioritize NATO missions ahead of the NORAD commitment. However, the opposite is true in this case. Instead, the optimization hinges on the NATO role because it requires the more capable aircraft – so Fleet B cannot be reduced in size if both commitments are to be satisfied. The size of Fleet B therefore needs to be determined first.

There is no hi/low capability. The NORAD mission type is different to the NATO mission type, which should be pretty evident, and to fulfil NATO the airframe has to be able to do NORAD already. It is not high low but merely single role versus multi-role.

That analysis was quite poor. Read the report.

It appears that you skimmed it without actually looking into it in more detail. Take another look at what is probably the best analysis of mixed fleet operations available in the public domain, especially given the context of this thread…

The runways issue: The F-15 requires longer runways than we have in our forward operating locations and possibly require them to be in pristine condistion. The carrier capable aircraft (Rafale, F18, F35C) and the Gripen have shown a much better ability to utilize more austere locations because of the reinforcement of the planes and landing gears for those kinds of conditions.

The link between Rafale, F-18, F-35C and Gripen with handling more austere runways than other platforms is tenuous. Specific carrier capable versions of these aircraft are acquired for heavier landing conditions but must be maintained to carrier standards for this to occur. For example the Canadians could not land a Hornet on a carrier today because the fleet has never been maintained to a standard that would allow that to occur.

All possible airframes could operate from shorter runways with lighter loads What you are forgetting is that short runway operations result in payload restrictions, often resulting in airframes that cannot fulfil their quoted max ranges or have no munitions bring back capability.

Gripen, Rafale and Typhoon should be small enough to fit into existing hangar infastructure.

The F-35A has both a smaller wingspan and is shorter than the classic Hornet, thus requiring no modification to the hangers as you suggested while the Super Hornet, which was your most likely option, is both longer and has a larger wingspan, thus possibly requiring larger hangers.

What you will actually find is that no matter what platform Canada chooses almost all base infrastructure will be upgraded to last the life of type and therefore this cost will be essentially the same across all airframes. For example Australia upgraded infrastructure at RAAF Base Amberley when they acquired Super Hornets even though the Super Hornet is both shorter and has a smaller wingspan than the F-111 it replaced.

Dave Mujumdar has the following to say. Given he is more wrong than right take it for what it is.

Given that the LRS-B is slated to enter into service in the mid-2020s, the aircraft will necessarily have to use an existing engine design. Moreover, that engine must have a profile conducive to a stealth aircraft.

That would almost certainly rule out a commercial airliner engine derivative with a large bypass—such an engine would have an extremely large diameter even if it is highly efficient.

A more likely choice is a derivative of an existing military engine that is already in production. Possible choices could include unaugmented derivatives of the F-15 and F-16’s Pratt & Whitney F100 or General Electric F110. The F110, though an aged design, would give the LRS-B commonality with the Rockwell International B-1 Lancer and Northrop B-2 Spirit, both of which use engines from the same lineage. The B-1’s F101 was derived into the F110, which in turn was derived into the B-2’s F118 motors.

An F110 derivative does have its advantages, but the most likely candidate to power the LRS-B is an unaugmented version of the Pratt & Whitney F135, which in its current state offers roughly 28,000lbs of dry thrust. With some tweaks, such as an increased bypass ratio, a version of the F135 could probably produce more than 30,000lbs of thrust while potentially increasing fuel efficiency. With two such engines, an LRS-B would have less than the roughly 70,000lbs of thrust available to the B-2, but there are indications that the B-21 is smaller than the Spirit.

While the LRS-B might be provisioned to accommodate whatever engine ultimately comes to fruition from the Air Force’s adaptive-cycle engine program—variously called ADVENT, AETD and AETP—if the service is serious about an initial operational capability date around 2025, the new bomber will necessarily use an existing propulsion plant. It takes a long time and large sums of money to develop a new turbine engine. It’s also not an endeavor without risk—look no further than China’s frustrated efforts to develop an indigenous jet engine.

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/americas-lethal-new-b-21-vs-the-b-2-stealth-bomber-15352

Sure, an increased AoA is a must have item when you have HMS and HOBS missiles to shoot behind your shoulders. Maybe the average Joe will swallow such a fantasy without protest, who knows ?

You’re right, while the sensors suite on the F-35 will provide it with a unique ability to launch missiles over the shoulder, I don’t think this can yet replace high AoA maneuvers with HMS and HOBS missiles, especially when facing other 5th gen aircraft.

If you trying to infer that Rafale, F-18 etc can launch missiles over their shoulder they can, but have only done so using off board targeting transmitted via Link 16. I think we can both agree that this has nothing to do with flying BFM, unless your trying to argue that the dogfight is finally dead…

A rational and common sense article by someone with enough experience to be taken seriously…

Thank you for bringing this article to my attention, and hot off the presses, no less! What I’ve been saying all along about the F-35 is that it’s FAR too soon to be making definitive statements like “WORST FIGHTER EVER!” As the article points out, the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for this aircraft are still in the development phase. Really smart guys are still working to figure out ways to best employ this aircraft tactically. That doesn’t happen overnight.

So, I applaud you for turning to actual fighter pilots instead of Wookie-necked hipsters to get your information. Even though he speaks in this weird “Metric system” vernacular, I will take the word of a Norwegian guy who has actually flown the jet over someone that has never put on a G-suit in his life.

Ok, with that rant out of the way, let’s address your actual question: what does this article tell us?

Well, as GM pointed out, a dogfight boils down to RATE vs RADIUS. You can think of the two as ENERGY vs NOSE POSITION. The rate fighter uses his energy advantage to turn more quickly (measured in degrees per second) while the radius fighter uses his nose position advantage to make a smaller circle (measured in feet).

There are a lot of “cheats” that designers will use to make a fighter good at both. These include Leading Edge Flaps that extend based on airspeed, Leading Edge Extensions that help with low speed control, and thrust vectoring. This is why fighters like the Viper, Hornet, and Raptor do so well in both types of fights.

The Super Hornet is a very agile, nasty dogfighter in capable hands, given its slow-speed, high-Alpha capability and tight turning radius. (Photo by Jason Hyatt)
Angle of Attack (AoA, or Alpha) is mostly referred to in the slow speed, radius-fight environment. A fighter that can fly with high angles of attack (that angle between the relative wind and the chord line of the wing) can “point their nose” more easily. It’s what makes a Hornet so scary to fight. They’re still flying and in control while other aircraft stall and fall out of the sky.

What the Viper and F-35 have that the Hornet doesn’t is power. Yes, the Viper is AoA limited, but that also means it’s never “not flying,” and has the ability to power its way out of just about any situation. This is what’s meant by transitioning from maneuver to maneuver.

The Hornet might be able to cash in, pointing the nose at 50 knots and 60 Alpha, but that’s it. You’re along for the ride at that point. When it gets slow, it’s very hard to get that energy back.

A Viper, on the other hand, can regain that energy through thrust. Coming off the limiter slightly, especially at low altitude where the big inlet and GE motor do their best work, can mean getting back to a fighting airspeed and energy state. This is especially useful if there are multiple bandits – you don’t want to finish a fight and be a sitting duck.

If the reports are accurate, that means that the F-35 is a good compromise between the two. It has the ability to point its nose where the Viper couldn’t, while not getting itself into an unrecoverable energy state like the Hornet. That’s good news.

At the end of the day, though, I still say don’t chase the reports–and continue to ask informed questions. As the F-35 gains more ground in its testing, there will be more reports coming out – some good and some bad. We won’t really know what it’s truly capable of until we see it in the hands of Johnny Wingman who just finished his initial Mission Qualification Training. That’s where the realistic operational capabilities will be found as he employs the aircraft exactly as he’s been trained, having never been in any other jet.

https://fightersweep.com/4395/ask-a-fighter-pilot-dogfighting-in-the-f-35/

probably just reduce its air force and use the Typhoons for ground pounding as well (as they are progressively cleared for more and more A2G operations), chances are that german government simply decides to use these capabilities instead of buying another type.

Agree. Given how few Tornados/Typhoons are operational reducing to one type makes sense and allows the meagre German maintenance budget to be allocated to a single type. Hopefully this allows Germany to have more total airframes available for operational versus the current low numbers across two platforms.

er, I was speaking about the part in bold saying, in substance: “LM having been paid for the same work twice”

unless the information is incorrect, there is a problem, don’t you think?

Do you honestly think the US is paying LM twice?

Lucky we have Defence-aerospace to point out from publicly released contract awards that the US Government has slipped up and someone wrote two cheques for the same invoice. Seriously this is beyond a joke!

Unfortunately for Defence-Aerospace and yourself none of the agencies in the US charged with managing and monitoring the financial affairs of the F-35 has ever claimed LM has been paid twice for any work throughout the entire program.

One example of what the GAO look at…

To assess the program’s funding and long-term affordability, we reviewed
financial management reports, annual Selected Acquisition Reports, and
monthly status reports available as of December 2013. In addition, we
reviewed total program funding requirements from the Defense
Acquisition Executive Summary. We used this data to project annual
funding requirements through the expected end of the F-35 acquisition in
2037. We also analyzed the fiscal year 2014 President’s Budget data to
identify the current status of unit costs for each variant, and the
differences in this cost since 2012. We reviewed the Office of the
Secretary of Defense’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Concurrency Quick Look
Review, and discussed and analyzed reported concurrency costs with the
prime contractor and program office.

http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/661842.pdf

What Defence-Aerospace is pedalling is propaganda journalism that Goebbels would be proud of!

^ The LRS-B/B-21 project has no reason for being except for use against China. The discussion is inevitable.

Poor point. Every single US bomber for the last 50 years was designed to deploy nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union yet they never did. Instead they all operated around the globe in all types of combat scenarios. B-1 was the CAS star performer of Afghanistan, bombers participated in both Gulf Wars, in Libya in 2011, over Serbia etc etc etc.

Less political rubbish and more specific bomber talk would be appreciated…