Wasn’t self protection also a requirment? Could we see the Apg-81 being used here? What about being AMRAAM capable?

I’ve never seen self-protection as a requirement but I think it is pretty likely that the B-21 will have the ability to launch an AIM-120 or follow-on BVR missile. Do they also go for dedicated smaller missile bays, for example two bays sized to fit a couple of AMRAAMs or perhaps a AGM-88E, as well as one or two larger internal weapons bays or mount the AMRAAMS on the bay doors? No doubt it will have MADL and probably Link 16 as well so will be able to feed the link as well as receive, also expecting the F-35 DAS or an upgraded version of.

A derivative of the APG-81 is pretty likely if we follow along the same reusing existing technology theme. The only issue becomes how the antenna is designed and fit, as a whole antenna as per the radar on the B-2 or do they distribute arrays along the wing and around the airframe for 360 deg awareness. Unlike F-35, there is every chance the B-21 could operate independently so a 360 deg radar might be beneficial.

Nope. The “LR” in LRS-B means “long range”. No low bypass, fighter-cycle engines in the B-21. Northrop made that mistake with B-2 and I’d be very surprised if they made the same mistake with B-21. Airlines use high bypass turbofans because they go long distances on little jet fuel. Expect B-21 to use fuel-efficient, high bypass ratio engines.

In a stealth airframe? Everything I have read to date indicates that the LRS-B was going to use a modified F135 or similar including the below, (yes a few years old but I haven’t seen any changes to that).

In a last-ditch bid to keep the F136 combat engine alive following cancellation by the U.S. Defense Department, General Electric and Rolls-Royce are developing a plan to convert the development effort into a self-funded demonstrator for the U.S. Air Force’s long range bomber as well as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

http://aviationweek.com/awin/next-gen-bomber-linked-self-funded-f136-survival-plan-0

Also, Carter leveled another warning against a possible second jet engine competition for the new bomber program. Carter said that would spoil the whole plan to share equipment with other aircraft. “A major tenet of the new bomber program is to maximize re-use of existing systems. Very realistic opportunities exist which do not require development of a new engine. Mandating such development will result in increased cost and risk,” he wrote.

http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/washington-whispers/2011/05/24/pentagon-obama-bombs-house-bid-to-revive-jet-engine

This more recent report just after contract award also hints at an F135 in some variety.

The US Air Force has refused to disclose the names of the second and third-tier LRS-B suppliers for security reasons. But emerging details may help observers piece together the subcontractors involved.

If Northrop builds LRS-B, GE Aviation will manufacture the primary and secondary power distribution systems, not the plane’s engine, according to a source with knowledge of the program. GE was partnered with the Boeing-Lockheed Martin team on the power plant, the source said. This reflects a departure from history, as GE builds the F118 engine that powers Northrop’s B-2 stealth bomber.

The news that GE is not the winning engine maker fuels speculation that Northrop’s bomber will be powered by Pratt & Whitney engines. Although nothing is certain, some have hypothesized that LRS-B will use Pratt’s F135 engines, according to a recent analysis by Jim McAleese.

Pratt spokesman Matthew Bates declined to comment.

Just minutes after the award was announced, Pratt sent out a statement congratulating Northrop on the win.

“Pratt & Whitney congratulates Northrop Grumman for their selection on this very important program,” according to the Oct. 27 statement. “P&W declines to comment on any other questions regarding the Long Range Strike-Bomber program.”

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/strike/2015/11/16/new-details-emerge-lrs-b-subcontractors/75882906/

See the history of B-61s on NATO airframes.

http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/euro.pdf

Thanks all. So it appears that the Tornado is the only non US manufactured airframe that was capable of B61 delivery.

So the Swiss got it for free because they were last off the line? Source please?

I didn’t say they got it for free. It was an option that wasn’t available to previous operators when they ordered the airframe.

So you see, the original Hornet engine did not meet Swiss requirements…

Nor anyone else. If you spoke with every Hornet pilot they will all tell you they want more thrust.

Well, umm, no. Just from your own post, new or significantly expanded capabilities relative to previous plans include:

— doubling the number of P-8s
— armed medium-altitude UAV for Australian Army
— medium range air defence system
— land-based anti-ship cruise missiles (this will be the first thing on the chopping block)
— doubling the number of SUBMARINES

Do you even know what Australia currently operates? Reviewing your comment
— We have 19 P-3C Orion aircraft. Combining the P-8 with the MQ-4C makes a grand total of 22 platforms, an increase of only 15% and provides significantly more capability and persistence.
— Australia already operate 4 Heron MALE. What you are looking at is essentially a direct replacement.
— Australia doesn’t currently operate a land based anti-ship cruise missile but these are hardly expensive items. Poland purchased a second squadron of land based NSM anti-ship missiles in 2014 for a measly AUD$200 million. At most Australia would look to purchase two squadrons probably for a total acquisition cost of AUD$500 million. This is precisely what the yearly underspend from Australian DoD could provide.
— The number of submarines will not double.

The last is most significant in a budgetary sense and is also the most revealing insofar as the notion of doubling the number of submarines:

(1) would leave Australia in the remarkable position of being perhaps the only nation in the world to have more submarines than surface combatants. How such a remarkably skewed force structure fits with Australia’s strategic requirements is anyone’s guess.
(2) originated from a literal thought bubble from former Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, in the total absence of any supporting analysis or requirement.
(3) given that a fleet of twelve submarines will almost certainly not emerge, the fact that the notion persists in the White Paper reveals its purpose as an eminently political document designed to satisfy various constituencies — namely the right-wing of the Liberal party, and electoral constituencies in South Australia. Realism has political costs whereas, given that the white paper makes no funding commitments, an ongoing lack of realism is politically expedient. The music won’t stop until everyone involved has moved on, is out of office, or has retired.

If you actually took the time to read the White Paper and were informed on Australian Defence policy you would have a better understanding of how the submarines will be built and why Australia will never operate 12 submarines at the same time. The plan has always been to build the subs in three tranches of four boats, incorporating lessons learned, and improved technology, in the second and third tranches. At no time will Australia have more than 6 boats in service nor could they, the key issue with submarine operation in Australia has never been the boats themselves and has always been the manning of. Not only that but the first boat will not enter service until after 2030, long after most of the White Paper acquisitions have been delivered. That seems to handle your crazy political theories and rant…

Yeah, and this is precisely what will not happen. With external pressures on the treasury growing as a result of both long-term demand (ageing population) and supply (end of the mining boom) issues, the notion of a sustainable increase in defence outlays rests upon a significant reconfiguration of the political consensus in Australia. And there is very little prospect of that happening.

As anyone who has observed the various attempts by the Liberal party over the last few years to enact (and campaign for office based upon) significant shifts in policy and funding priorities has observed: favoured Liberal policies are almost invariably electorally disastrous, forcing a constant process of backtracking, compromise, Judas-like denial of previous policy positions (WorkChoices is dead! Dead I say! Please trust us!), adopting of watered-down versions of Labor policies, and even clumsy attempts at claiming Labor’s territory as with Abbott’s ludicrous Paid Parental Leave policy. In the Howard years the Liberal Party was able to push its agenda of structural reform off the back of the remarkable prosperity then being experienced that allowed him to simultaneously buy the support of the electorate with middle-class welfare — but those years are over.

In the short-term, what this means is that the path of least resistance for the current government is to abandon its pledge to fiscal conservatism, making everyone happy at the cost of the national debt (and kicking the can of state funding issues down the road). In the long-term, such policies are unsustainable and something will have to give. And what will give is the commitment to Australia having a STRONG MILITARY, as undoubtedly the weakest pillar — probably the weakest pillar even within the Liberal party itself — with the narrowest support base.

TL;DR: the notion of meeting and sustaining 2% GDP on defence spending implies significant modifications to the Australian political consensus. These reconfigurations will not succeed, as anyone who has witnessed the fumbling attempts of the Liberal party to enact much milder reforms — with the last major retreat (from a GST increase) being as recent as last week — would have to concede.

Aside from the political rant, you again don’t understand the numbers. Australia already spends 1.8% of GDP on military expenditure http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS and has done since the middle 90s. A 0.2% increase is not a budget breaker, especially given much of that money is absorbed into the Australian economy in submarine/future frigate/offshore patrol vessels builds, on-going maintenance, F-35 industrial work, local LAND 400 and LAND 121 vehicle builds etc.

Politically, the White Paper has bipartisan support, end of story.

And if you believe that even half of the above will come to pass, I have a bridge in Brooklyn to sell you.

Unfortunately for you, the force structure their projecting is quite possible and very sustainable.

These ‘commitments’ (read: mastubatory fantasies with no money behind them) are about as realistic as DoD’s plans in the early-mid 1990s: DD-21s, SEAWOLVES, RAPTORS, NATFS AND FLYING IFVs AS FAR AS THE EYE CAN SEE FAP FAP FAP.

Hardly. These are not massive force structure increases but replacing in service equipment with modest and affordable upgrades.

The eventual bloodletting will at least be entertaining, even if it means the nation will, like the United States, end up with a rather less capable defence force than the one it could’ve had if force planners had incorporated more realistic budget projections in the first place.

Nothing they have projected is out of reach financially. If you consider the schedule all the commitments line up nicely to roll one into the next. Not only that but of the commitments only Future Frigate has come forward. The other fact is the Australian Defence Department is already underspending each year and has done so for at least the last four. Underspend combined with gradual increases in the Defence budget to the target of 2% of GDP will provide the necessary funding.

Finally, what they have proposed are sound acquisitions. The RAAF has had a great last 10 years and their run will essentially finish in the early 2020s, at which point the Navy and Army will swing into acquisition mode and begin their force structure upgrades.

lol True
I think that probably is the best answer and perhaps the low level performance of this plane was superior to other mach 2 jets ?
it would be interesting to see how many rounds of 30 mm ammo the cannons of J-6 had and if AP and HE rounds both were available

Wiki has the following from a reasonable source.

3x 30 mm NR-30 cannons (70 rounds per gun for wing guns, 55 rounds for fuselage gun)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shenyang_J-6

Not a great amount of ammo but combined with a couple of rocket pods there is the potential for a good effect.