er, wrong.. but in the present case it’s besides the point… the main (and only real reason) is political

No not wrong, the capabilities offered by both aircraft are close enough that there is nothing significant better in the Rafale that couldn’t be provided to or adjusted tactically by the Eurofighter in operation to cover the gap.

1. What bad thing may happen to Eurofighter if the US gets the entire source code of Typhoon ??

Who knows but are the respective manufacturers/operators willing to accept that condition? I doubt it. I also suggest that the cost to upgrade a potential T4 Eurofighter to be nuclear capable would be costly, potentially past the point of economic viability against acquiring an off the shelf aircraft.

2. If German airforce can let its own Tornado to be integrated with the specific command systems required for nuclear delivery in 1980s, then why Typhoon can’t be let to do the same thing now ??

Pretty sure it was built in from the start but that was also a different aircraft in a different time. A real and present threat that was much easier to justify compared to today.

1. German Air Force wants to procuring about 40 new fighters for replacing the 85 Tornado fighter-bomber it has now.

I haven’t seen a number in any article, can you link to where it states 40 please?

If German chooses F-35, or anything other than Eurofighter for replacing Tornado fighter-bomber, then they will have to pay a lot of money for procuring, supporting, and maintaining a completely different fighter with the number of just 40.

When Australia replaced the F-111 in RAAF service they did so because acquiring and operating the SH for a ten year period was going to be cost neutral to upgrading/operating the F-111. The Tornado in German service will be essentially the same. It will become uneconomical to operate when Germany becomes the sole operator, which will likely be by 2022.

Moreover, after 2035 or 2040, GAF will have to afford three completely different manned fighters (Eurofighter, F-35, and FCAS) for many years.

The new European fighter plan for both air forces is to replace the respective Eurocanards with the FCAS system concept, whatever that becomes, so even if Germany acquires F-35 then it will be two aircraft and three for only a 5 year transition period.

Therefore, I think German Defense Ministry’s favoring plan (replacing Tornado with Eurofighter) is reasonable.

It makes sense only if Germany gives up NATO sharing. I think a Tranche 4 Eurofighter is a great idea for Germany but it appears that the German Air Force is not keen to surrender nuclear sharing and as such the F-35 becomes a valid option.

Source:
Der Spiegel.com

In true Der Spiegel form they have published an article that gets some facts right and some facts wrong with the sole intent of meeting the political agenda.

No. Power generation got airbone long ago. Refining of present and “innovative” solutions are firmly expected in the next future. We are talking about several MW.

Probably not even MW, the initial concepts are looking at 100kW with 250kW seen as the desired start number for desired energy on target for A2G applications.

Yes and NO. Peer against peer will involves a lot of non lethal battles. To this, an opponent not targeting human aboard will gain point and momentum on the geopolitical scene where the end of conflicts will be played or half solved. Hence, non lethal targeting algorithms will be a must… and advertised. (And obviously, since the ONU is now a battle theater, coherent policy among future allies has begun to be an utmost urgency!)

I disagree. While blinding laser weapons are prohibited by convention incidental damage caused by attempting to lase a surface target is just that, incidental. Additionally, I don’t believe the convention covers viewing via enhancement.
The emergence of laser weapons may see a move towards enclosed cockpits where sensors feed all round displays. The issue is these same sensors may be capable of being blinded or damaged by the laser systems so redundancy or spectrum blocks will be required. I expect there are technical solutions to absorbing energy and minimising transmission and absorption across some wavelengths.

It has been discussed earlier, but IMOHO, missiles will close on targets without any explosive fuel left on-board: Either in a pure kinetic attempt to strike or with an air- plasma discreet guidance mode, either with a pressure driven phase change for example (solid to liquid fuel) that will prevent a laser (a thermal and phase medium) to ignite easily a missile. In any way, missiles will have to adapt but will maintain their BVR domain. Laser will simply prevent the surge of effective missile design by phasing out a lot of them coming from emerging market.

I expect we will see a move away from camouflage and see aircraft and missiles that are coated in high absorption or reflective material, perhaps even shining polished metal. Missiles could also apply rolling profiles to reduce laser impact on the same surface. We may see greater use of sub-munitions to increase the number of targets and launch of multiple missiles that impact from multiple vectors. Perhaps decoy missiles or support missiles designed to blind targeting sensors? At some point self-defensive lasers will require a recharge and that may be the avenue or opening for missiles to make it through, by simple attrition.
A change to BVR may also be a return to command guided systems, missiles guided by datalink with antennas obscured from view. Will be interesting to see how hypersonic BVR missile speeds change engagements as the missiles will already require coatings capable of handling large heat loads.
It also changes the role of support assets. A large AWACS with multiple self-defensive weapons will have a greater chance of survival closer to the forward battlespace and therefore provide command and guidance for aircraft and missiles. Of course it could all go autonomous swarm warfare as humans will simply become the weak link in warfare.

Crazy times ahead though!

when somebody doesn’t want to understand…

Mate, it is a simple concept. I don’t care where the Rafale starts at clean because it doesn’t matter. What matters is the RCS of the jet when it is loaded with the stuff it needs to do its job.

@ Ozair

thing is, it all depends on what you use as weapons… in A2A role, both will have quite discrete RCS increase from their loadout, for example an aircraft having 5m² RCS won’t care too much about the radar signature of its A1A missiles, pretty much insignificant when compared to the rest… an aircraft having 0.5m² RCS will see the missiles become more significant compared to itself clean, but then again, what will be the RCS of an A2A loadout?

Everybody when wanting to denigrate them put forward heavily loaded fighters for A2G, in which case it still can play a role, just as well as the electronic warfare suites and so on… but, in any case they don’t fly around just like that, carelessly. The mission planning is done as to succeed, and if they can fly high, they do it, if they need to get below radar coverage, they do it.. there are pretty much always different tactical options to consider. The only ones who do not want to admit it are those who have an agenda, like trying to justify their own choices as the only ones available

The answer to your supposition is any loadout makes the RCS greater than a clean jet, so what it is clean remains useless given neither jet can conduct ops other than using the internal gun.

Happy to have a discussion on RCS of various loadouts but with so little public info it would be rather short…

Apparently a BDF report has been leaked that makes it pretty clear there is little economic rationale for the replacement of the F-5 with the Gripen/TA-50 and strongly hints at corruption being a central driver in the potential acquisition.
Given the non-existent threat Botswana faces keeping the existing F-5s is the right thing to do.

The report is also pretty damming on the BDF and flight currency for its aircrew.

Leaked documents reveal for the first time that the Botswana Defence Force (BDF), concerned over lack of training and insufficient logistical support advised its chain of command to upgrade the 28 Squadron’s existing F-5 planes as opposed to buying new aircraft.
A confidential military report, indicating that the “28 Squadron has been tasked to research on the viability of operating the BF-5 and make recommendations based on their findings” was presented to the highest chain of command in the BDF. The Report, which was prepared to advise on whether it would be cost effective to engage in an outright purchase of new aircraft and further develop BDF’s airwing, recommends that government does not purchase new aircraft, “As thus (sic) we advise that the BF-5 platform should be kept, but instead change to the BF-5E variant. The same approach is being used by other operators of the F-5 worldwide, hence this platform has been found to be sustainable and relatively less expensive to maintain” advises the report.
Ignoring the Report’s recommendations President Khama, in his capacity as Commander in Chief has engaged in talks with both Sweden and South Korea to purchase military aircraft. In 2015 Khama was invited to South Korea to inspect South Korean military aircraft, during his visit he was awarded an Honorary Doctorate Degree in Political Science. In June 2017, Sweden invited Khama to view their military facilities and inspect the Gripen C/D state of the art fourth generation fighter jet. The move by Khama, a civilian though the former commander of the BDF, is seen by some in the BDF chain of Command as undermining the subservient role that the military ought to play in a democracy and elevating it above its oversight organs in parliament such as the Public Accounts Committee, the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Security and the Parliamentary Committee on Finance and Estimates.
In justifying its position as to the need to upgrade its existing aircraft and not purchase a new fleet, the Report by the BDF highlights the increased expense of purchasing new supersonic aircraft, which cannot be seen as the cost of new aircraft alone.
The Report advises that within the existing framework of the airwing additional training craft will be required, which the BDF currently does not possess, highlighted by the finding that, “under training pilots should be exposed to an intermediate trainer before they commence their flying on the BF-5. This will definitely result in a smooth transition from a slow speed conventional trainer to a twin engine supersonic fighter. Modalities regarding sending BDF pilots abroad to a suitable country or to conduct in-country lead-in training could be worked out keeping the overall cost-effectiveness in mind. In such a scenario, BDF will not only get 4-5 better skilled and operationally orientated pilots every year but will also be required to have shorter conversion periods and syllabi on their return.”
The inability of current pilots, trained on BDF’s trainer aircraft, the PC-7 to successfully move over to the current turbo jet F-5’s, is cause for concern in the Report, noting that “training pilots find it difficult to handle the BF-5 in the desired fashion during the initial part of their syllabus which shows that there is a quantum jump for these trainees from a turbo prop trainer of PC-7 class to a high speed, swept back platform of the BF-5”. The current BDF F-5 have a top flight speed of Mach 1.64 as compared to the Gripen C and D designations which reach speeds of Mach 2.
In order to retain their fighter pilot credentials air force pilots are required to continuously undertake a specified number of flight hours. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) established the international standard for fighter pilots to log a minimum of 20 flight hours per month (240 flight hours per year per fighter pilot) to remain qualified. The leaked Report reveals that the BDF’s pilots log considerably less than the international standard, indicating that “from 1996 to 24/01/2013, the actual total hours flown by 14 aircraft is 8901.2 hours. The average hours flown by each aircraft is 421.5 hours,” or 3 hours per month per pilot.
As a result of the lack of flight time, the Report notes that the BDF airwing will not in the foreseeable future be combat ready with only 5 of the 11 pilots being qualified to fly the F-5’s, “at present, there are only 5 qualified operational pilots in the squadron and with the rate of flying (3 hours/ pilot/ month), it will take us a very longtime (sic) to have 21 qualified operational pilots which is our target, hence the squadron will continue to be a training squadron.”
Pilot training costs and retention of pilots raise additional costs for the airwing, emphasises the Report. Under the current BDF airwing the need to increase personnel remains a priority, “The squadron currently has 11 pilots and 85 maintenance crew comprising of engineers and technicians. To efficiently operate and maintain a fleet of 14 aircrafts, the squadron needs to increase its current strength to 135 personnel: 21 pilots and 114 maintenance crew.” The veil of secrecy surrounding the intended purchase of the new airfleet means that such additional costs, of training and logistics has not been publically disclosed.
While the Report does not estimate the costs of an entirely new unit, it does acknowledge that the cost of training new pilots for the F-5 “is divided into two main categories: local and external pilot training. From 1996 to 2000, a total of $2 169 984.00 (~ P9 764 928.00) has been spent on 12 students sent abroad for pilot training. The average student training cost was about P813 744.00.” Local training using international instructors over the same period was P86 088 749.00.
The air requirements of the BDF, can be met without needing to purchase an entirely new fleet as the existing F-5’s will be able to continue to serve the country to the next 15 years without placing undue financial constraints on the fiscal, “the BF-5 platform is capable of carrying some of the latest armament in the world and therefore with minor modifications/additions such as Forward Air Control Systems, Mapping and Mission Planning Systems, the aircraft can be used as effectively as some of the latest fighter platforms in the market.”
Concluding their Report, military experts from within the BDF and internationally highlight that “It should be taken into consideration the fact that for a fighter aircraft to be kept in the air a suitable set of ground support equipment has to be put in place and it goes without saying that a lot of funds have to be made available to acquire those”.
Government has not disclosed the total cost of the intended purchase of the new airwing for the BDF, with estimates in the media indicating that the purchase of the aircraft will set the taxpayer back in the region of P17 billion. The cost estimate have however been based on the unit price for each aircraft and not ancillary costs.
The Report, is clear in its recommendations that that BDF does not see the need for an entirely new airwing, desiring instead to focus on improving its logistical and training capabilities at considerably lower expenses than that currently engaged in by government, raising the question as to why the Khama led Cabinet is currently engaging in refleeting 28 Squadron.
Seleka Springs a company owned by the President’s brothers, acted as the agent for the 1996 purchase of the F-5 “Freedom Fighters” for 28 Squadron. Seleka Springs’ commission for the purchase has not been disclosed to the public.

http://www.sundaystandard.info/bdf-command-recommended-f5-upgrade-%E2%80%93-khama-ignores-advice