Developers and operators of purpose-built stealth airplanes are not crying in their beers. RAM and RAS provides attenuation of RF scattering no matter where the emitter and receiver are located.

Would a radar using radio vorticity by constructive interference between two or more channels change anything?

Encoding many channels on the same frequency through radio vorticity

I must enfasise that I’m no radar expert, I’m just curious 🙂

@ Berkut

PAK FA’s landing gear was designed to operate from short, unprepared runways 😉

While the F-18s are considered to be “low observable” because they have RAM paint, their RCS is still several orders of magnitude greater than the purpose-built F-35C. Countering F-35C’s small RCS would require a substantial, expensive rebuild of a near peer’s air defenses.

I’m no expert but wouldn’t be enough to just add Nebo SVU to the mix? Using Nebo SVU for volume search and passing along info to other radars for cued search?

There was text next to that picture, it said:

Greetings A cockpit of those seen in MAKS … … image comes from Aviapanorama

Maybe it will help a bit 😉 .

.

It’s from this site http://www.ejercitos.org/viewtopic.php?f=14&t=19&start=880

6. Non-flat underside – Well, even the F-22 and J-20 have protrusions from the plane of the wings, the difference is merely that it is one HUGE bump (the fuselage), rather than a few medium-sized ones. And then there is the F-35, which is *festooned* with bumps large and small! Non-issue.

Am I the only one who sees a huge flat underside with two big bumps/nacelles 😉 ?

The error involved is fairly small – that is why INS was useable for intercontinental flight long before GPS became available. A drift on 0.5nm per hour gives an error of only 5 nm after a ten-hour flight. Since the error is due to hardware limitations, there is no way that an electronic attacker can increase or alter it.

That is just one part of the whole picture i which GPS and INS work together to determine aircraft’s position (that’s why I quoted that csmonitor article). The way I see this is, that when GPS was updating INS to cancel its drift, it did so with a false signal which was fed by Iranians. For this to work they had to feed it with a false GPS signal which was only slightly different than original GPS signal and then gradually, step by step, they altered the course. They had to use small steps to get through Kalman filters (or whatever more advanced filter is in use today), but once they did then GPS was updating INS with “wrong data” and Sentinel was flying where they wanted it to fly. Of course, I’m not claiming that really happend… 🙂

I hope Sentinel ends up where it belongs, in a museum, like U-2 in Russia and F/A-117 in Serbia.